Jewish Policy Center (Webinar Recordings – Audio Only)

The rise of antisemitism on the right of the American political spectrum is alarming. But it is important to note that the discussion and the argument are taking place in public; there is no hiding.

Join us for a discussion with Ken Timmerman, author, political analyst, and Christian Zionist, about the split in the Christian community and why, in fact, Zionism and pro-Israel advocacy are pro-American positions.

The Jewish Policy Center joined with the Energy, Growth, and Security Program of the International Tax and Investment Center (ITIC) for a panel to examine US strategy in Central Asia. JPC Senior Director Shoshana Bryen moderated the group of regional specialists who emphasized a growing and often overlooked dimension in the region’s diplomacy: its deepening relationships with Israel and new openings created by the Abraham Accords.

The panel included:

During a wide-ranging discussion of security, economics, and emerging geopolitical alignments, panelists noted that Central Asia’s five republics—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—have maintained stable diplomatic ties with Israel for more than three decades.

Cohen described the five as “culturally moderate Sunni Muslim countries” whose longstanding channels with Israel have quietly expanded since their independence. He argued that this moment offers the first serious possibility of extending the Abraham Accords beyond the Middle East into the Eurasian space. Cohen pointed to Azerbaijan’s increasingly open interest in joining the Accords and suggested that Central Asian states could follow, describing such a development as a potential “force field for prosperity, investment, and American security.”

Bokhari tied policy shifts to a “new US geo-strategy,” one that connects the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia into a single emerging architecture, with Israel playing an increasingly important role in energy, security cooperation, and technological exchange across the broader Eurasian corridor. October 7, he said, had not derailed the Accords but only delayed and reshaped the path forward. And Kazakhstan’s recent move toward joining the Abraham Accords—something many analysts believed was years away—signaled accelerating diplomatic realignment.

Assenova tied the changes as well to the countries’ realization that they were “between the Russian bear and the Chinese dragon” after Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine and China’s decreased investments in its Belt and Road initiative. Determined that the way forward was to become politically and economically important, in 2015 the C-5 was established to coordinate and advance the capabilities and resources of the five countries together.

The discussion framed Israel not only as a political partner for Central Asia but also as a technological and environmental one. Cohen highlighted US–Israel leadership on water technology—an area of growing urgency as Central Asia faces shrinking glaciers, reduced inflows to the Caspian Sea, and long-term water stress. He noted that Israeli and American expertise in desalination, water recycling, and efficient irrigation fills a critical gap in regional capabilities.

Blank, emphasizing that increasing water shortages and our understanding of the dislocation and political upheaval that drought has brought to Africa, argued for “sustained bureaucratic support” from the US, including the creation of assistant secretaries for Central Asia in the Departments of Energy, State, and Treasury – as well as in the Pentagon – and close cooperation with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  Energy is another major driver in Central Asian planning, as European countries are increasingly turning to the region to supplant Russian energy.

This evolving alignment, panelists agreed, places cou

We were pleased to record a session with Jonathan Schanzer, Executive Director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and we are pleased to share the podcast with you.

Jonathan wrote recently, “Israel stood unwavering in the face of withering assaults, one more punishing than the next. And with help from the American president, it emerged from the fighting bruised but intact.”

The situation is not perfect, and may never be, but his assessment offers reason for optimism and suggests a path forward.

The Gaza “ceasefire” lasted only until Hamas refused to return the bodies of the deceased Israeli hostages. Since then, Hamas sent civilians to violate the IDF lines, has forsworn disarmament, and has been murdering Palestinians in the streets of Gaza. Some people – including in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain – are becoming nervous. As they should. And the US position appears to need modification.

Join us for a conversation with Or Yissachar, Executive Director of the David Institute for Policy and Strategy, an arm of the Israel Defense and Security Forum (IDSF-Habithonistim).

Many people have been holding their breath for the past two years, unsure that the Abraham Accords – the brilliant accomplishment of the first Trump administration – could withstand the pressures of the war in Gaza. We admit to being among them. But not only have the Accords survived, it now seems that they are ripe for expansion as parts of the Arab and Muslim world reject the vicious terrorist philosophy of Hamas, Hezbollah, and their sponsor, Iran.

Join us as David Schenker, Taube Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute and former US diplomat, takes us through the region to understand the resilience of the Accords and the political winds blowing through the Arab world and beyond.

While our attention has been taken up largely with events in the Middle East, China has been pursuing its own long-term regional goals – some of which are inimical to American interests and the interests of America’s allies. What has China been doing? How does Washington understand China’s increasing military confidence? Is the US assessment evolving – and have US capabilities kept pace?

Join us as former Pentagon official and security specialist Stephen Bryen brings us an analysis of China’s growing military capabilities and the geopolitical challenges Beijing presents in the Indo-Pacific region.

Reports coming from Lebanon are, in many ways, encouraging – the Lebanese government, it seems, is done with Hezbollah and the wreckage of a once-beautiful and prosperous country. The question is, can the government carry out the mandate to remove Hezbollah, its weapons and its influence and create peaceful relations with Israel?

Hussain Abdul-Hussain, research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, walks us through the disparate threads of Lebanese politics – from the comforting and hopeful to the skeptical, cynical, and despairing.

Hussein Abdel-Hussain cautiously celebrated what he called one of the most consequential developments in Lebanon’s modern history: the weakening of Hezbollah following the reported assassination of its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, and what he described as Israel’s “crushing” of Hezbollah’s operational capabilities. This surprising turn of events has opened what he characterizes as a “window of opportunity” for the Lebanese state to reclaim sovereignty and redefine itself as more neutral and nationally focused.

Although Hezbollah and its Shia political partner Amal initially agreed to a cessation of hostilities in late November 2024, they have since moved the goalposts. Specifically, Hezbollah now demands Israeli withdrawal from strategic hilltops before it will even consider discussions on disarmament, thus reverting back to old patterns of negotiation delay and defiance—strategies previously employed by figures like Yasser Arafat.

Despite Hezbollah’s resistance, the Lebanese government has achieved a historic milestone. For the first time since 1969, the Cabinet passed a resolution asserting that only state institutions are authorized to bear arms inside Lebanon. This directly challenges Hezbollah’s decades-long extralegal military presence. Even more remarkably, the decision was made with Hezbollah-affiliated ministers still in the temporary caretaker government, giving the resolution additional political weight.

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have been officially tasked with drafting a plan to disarm Hezbollah—a move that underscores a shift from rhetorical opposition to potential enforcement. A meeting to review the military’s disarmament plan is set, though the LAF has indicated that a full disarmament could take 15 months, well beyond the end-of-the-year deadline set by the Cabinet.

The Lebanese military, although increasingly seen as the backbone of national unity and sovereignty, faces severe logistical, operational, and financial challenges. Salaries have plunged to poverty levels due to the economic collapse, and the rank-and-file soldiers struggle with basic needs—including fuel and clean drinking water. Many soldiers hold second jobs to survive, and troop numbers are insufficient to handle complex disarmament tasks.

While the United States once provided $144 million annually to support the LAF, this aid has intermittently lapsed due to political friction and has recently been replaced by funding from Qatar, which raises concerns about foreign influence.

Abdel-Hussain expressed discomfort with growing Qatari—and increasingly Turkish—influence in Lebanon, particularly within the Sunni community in the north and in Beirut. These nations, he warned, are promoting Islamist factions aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood. This power vacuum, created by Saudi Arabia’s retreat from Lebanon since 2017, has allowed pro-Qatar and pro-Turkey candidates to gain municipal influence.

Worse yet, Turkey is replicating strategies previously demonstrated by Iran—investing in loyalist

Jewish Policy Center Senior Director Shoshana Bryen hosted Professor Mark Meirowitz, a foreign policy and Turkey expert from SUNY Maritime College, for a deep dive into Ankara’s growing regional role, its involvement in Syria’s evolution, and its increasingly fraught relationship with Israel. With characteristic clarity and urgency, Prof. Meirowitz broke down the labyrinth of regional alliances and rivalries, calling the situation “literally mind-boggling” and comparing Syria to a “petri dish for chaos.”

The ousting of Bashar Assad by the jihadist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led by Ahmed al-Shara (also known as al-Jolani), marks a significant shift in Syria’s power structure—and possibly the region’s. Once associated with al-Qaeda and ISIS, al-Jolani now wears suits and promotes a veneer of moderation. “Maybe the Turks provided him with some of these outfits,” Meirowitz quipped, questioning the authenticity of his transformation.

Al-Jolani was “boosted by” Turkish support, Meirowitz explained, calling him a Turkish client rather than an independent actor. HTS’s limited control—bolstered by foreign fighters like Uyghurs—has led to violent, sectarian repression, particularly against Alawites, Druze, Christians, and Kurds. “We’re with al-Shara, and a lot of people are depending on him,” Meirowitz said ominously.

Turkey’s involvement, Meirowitz stressed, is strategic. With over 3 million Syrian refugees inside its borders, Ankara is pressuring Damascus to stabilize and repatriate them. “The Turks want them back to Syria,” he said, noting the domestic strain and political sensitivity of the refugee crisis.

Turkey has walked a fine line—signing infrastructure and defense agreements with HTS-controlled Syria while avoiding giving it full military autonomy. “Turkey’s position is that Al-Shara is the go-to person… Let al-Shara unify the country,” Meirowitz explained. But internal Kurdish dynamics—particularly involving PKK, now in peace talks with Erdogan’s government—make full alignment with HTS and Syrian Kurds tenuous.

One of the more sobering insights from Meirowitz was the hypothetical scenario of Turkey, a NATO power, declaring a no-fly zone over Syria—potentially triggering Article 5 protections if hostilities break out with Israel. “That, to me, is the number one worry… that Israel and Turkey would come to conflict,” he warned.

He emphasized the ongoing “deconfliction meetings” between Israel and Turkey, and Israel and Syria—possibly triangulating with al-Jolani himself. But of all the moving parts, Meirowitz emphasized Turkey’s NATO status remains a critical leverage point: “Let’s be realistic here. If there was a skirmish…Article 5 could be on the table.”

The ongoing massacres of minorities, particularly the Druze in Suweida, raise urgent questions about al-Jolani’s power. “Has he lost control over the jihadis in his own ranks?” Meirowitz pondered, highlighting the grim possibility of Syria spiraling toward becoming a full-blown jihadi state.

“The optics are totally opposed to [the idea of moderation],” he said, noting public executions and forced beard-shaving of Druze men as disturbing parallels to Nazi visual propaganda. “Clearly, this is reprehensible. The United States isn’t going to stand for it,” he added, referring to conditional American Congressional support for lifting sanctions on Syria.

Turning inward, Turkey’s President Erdoğan is eyeing

Hussein Abdel Hussein, a distinguished research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, joined us today to share his expertise on Middle Eastern politics, particularly focusing on the Druze community and regional dynamics. As a leading authority on the subject, Hussein brings extensive knowledge about the complexities of Syrian politics, inter-community relations, and the broader geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. His insights have been particularly valuable in understanding the current situation facing the Druze community, their defensive mindset, and the intricate relationships between various regional powers. Hussein’s deep understanding of Middle Eastern sovereignty challenges and his experience in analyzing regional conflicts makes him uniquely qualified to address the complex issues facing Syria and its minority communities.

The meeting focused on the situation in Syria, particularly the Druze community and Israel’s intervention to protect them. Hussein Abdel Hussein, a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, explained the unique characteristics of the Druze, including their defensive mindset and loyalty to their host countries. He emphasized that the recent violence in Syria was not initiated by the Druze, who were instead defending themselves against invaders. The discussion highlighted the complexities of Middle Eastern politics and the challenges of prioritizing democratic elections and individual rights in a region with a different cultural and societal focus.

Hussain discussed the situation in Syria, focusing on the Druze community’s plight and the actions of the new leader, Ahmad Shara, who previously had ties to Al-Qaeda. He criticized the approach of giving Islamists financial support, citing past failures, and emphasized the need for conditions to be set for Shara to gain trust. Hussain praised Israel’s intervention to protect the Druze and expressed frustration with Western countries, particularly the UK and France, for not supporting the Druze and for their previous role in backing Shara. He also highlighted the importance of shared power and concessions from Shara to ensure the safety of minority groups in Syria.

Hussain and Shoshana discussed the situation in Syria, emphasizing the lack of a concrete plan for post-Assad governance. Hussain argued that the U.S. and its allies could support non-Islamist factions like the Druze, Kurds, and Christians without direct military involvement, focusing on diplomatic and economic support. They highlighted the roles of Turkey, Qatar, and Iran in supporting Sunni Islamists and the need to exclude these countries from any reconstruction plan. Hussain proposed aligning with allies like the UAE, Kuwait, Morocco, Israel, and Cyprus to create a stable, inclusive Syria under Assad’s presidency, with concessions made to him in exchange for cooperation.

Hussain discussed the brutal attacks on the Druze in Syria, highlighting the involvement of two major clans from the northeast, Gaddat and Naim, which he believes were orchestrated by Syrian intelligence and Turkish interests, rather than being a simple tribal revenge. Shoshana raised questions about whether Al-Shara was directing these attacks and expressed skepticism about the possibility of a lasting peace if the attackers are true Islamists. Hussain explained that the main driver of the conflict in Syria is the competition between Turkey and Israel, and he suggested that the attack on the Druze was part of Turkey’s strategy to establish a foothold on the border with Israel.

Shoshana and Hussain discussed the complex dynamics between the US, Turkey, a

The Jewish Policy Center hosted a webinar featuring Professor Harold Rhode, an expert in Middle Eastern history and culture, to discuss the recent developments involving the Hebron sheikhs, tribal dynamics in the West Bank, and the broader Middle Eastern context, including Syria and the Druze.

Key points from the discussion include:

The webinar underscored the need for nuanced understanding of local structures, the power of triba