Journal Entries
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Journal Entries episodes

  • Redefine Statistical Significance with Edouard Machery

    Are decisions made by scientists one century ago still with us and weigh down science? One decision involves the rules scientists play by when it comes to statistical significance, and more specifically, the rule that results fall below a .05 threshold to count as significant. The point of this threshold is to help minimize false positives. But .05 is consistent with at least 33% of results being false...or worse!

    Links and Resources

    • Edouard Machery
    • The paper
    • What a nerdy debate about p-values shows about science — and how to fix it
    • The Alpha War by Edouard Machery
    • Justify your Alpha by Lakens et al.
    • Should We Redefine Statistical Significance? A Brains Blog Roundtable
    • Abandon Statistical Signifcance by McShane et al.
    • Paper Quotes

      "Ronald Fisher understood that the choice of 0.05 was arbitrary when he introduced it. Since then, theory and empirical evidence have demonstrated that a lower threshold is needed. A much larger pool of scientists are now asking a much larger number of questions, possibly with much lower prior odds of success. For research communities that continue to rely on null hypothesis significance testing, reducing the P value threshold for claims of new discoveries to 0.005 is an actionable step that will immediately improve reproducibility."

      Special Guest: Edouard Machery.

      52 min
    • Stop Talking About Fake News! with Joshua Habgood-Coote

      What, if anything, does "fake news" or "post truth" actually mean? Are they thinly veiled political strategies that do as much harm to democracy as the things they attempt to describe? And if so why did so many academics and philosophers get caught up in using a series of terms with such serious problems?

      Links and Resources

      • Joshua Habgood-Coote
      • The paper
      • Blog version of the paper
      • Response articles to the original paper by Etienne Brown and Jessica Pepp, Eliot Michaelson & Rachel Sterken
      • Wardle: Let's retire the phrase 'fake news' and Fake news. It's complicated.
      • The Trouble With ‘Fake News’ by David Coady
      • Fake News: A Definition by Axel Gelfert
      • there’s no such thing as fake news (and that’s bad news) by Robert Talisse
      • What to Do with Post-Truth by Lorna Finlayson
      • Fake Democracy, Bad News by Natalie Fenton and Des Freedman
      • How Propaganda Works by Jason Stanley
      • Algorithms of Oppression by Safiya Noble available on JSTOR
      • Linguistic Disobedience by Yuliya Komska, Michelle Moyd, and David Gramling
      • Paper Quotes

        According to all these diagnoses, communication using ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’ is problematic. If the terms are nonsense, any communication using these terms simply fails. If they are contested we face problems with talking across contexts, and if they are contested, we face the possibility of mistaking metalinguistic disputes for first order disagreements. ‘Fake news’ and ‘post-truth’ are perhaps better off than ‘bryllg’ – we do at least have some sense what kinds of things might constitute their extensions – but they are very different from established terms with clear meanings like ‘cat’ and ‘blue’. Some basic questions about the extensions of these terms are up in the air. I haven’t come down on which diagnosis is correct – people with different views in the philosophy of language will be attracted to different diagnoses – but I think that because it is the worst outcome, we should take extremely seriously the possibility that ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’ are nonsense. This suggests a short argument for abandonment: if we want to be sure that we are saying something by our sentences, we should avoid using ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’.

        Special Guest: Joshua Habgood-Coote.

        35 min
      • On Having Bad Persons as Friends with Jessica Isserow

        "Nietzsche was friends with Wagner, Copperfield with Steerforth, Rick

        Blaine with Louis Renault...one who enters into a friendship with a bad person very much seems to have gone wrong somewhere," writes Isserow. But what is wrong, exactly, with choosing to make friends with bad people? Does it tell us something important about ourselves and could this fact maybe even reveal a glimmer of truth about cancel culture?

        Links and Resources

        • Jessica Isserow
        • The paper - "On Having Bad Persons as Friends"
        • Background on philosophy of friendship
        • Interview with Alexander Nehamas
        • Paper by Cocking & Kennett "Friendship and moral danger"
        • Recent work in philosophy of friendship
        • Paper Quotes

          "Some values are incredibly weighty, and as such, they ought to occupy an
          important role in our moral priorities. One could understand an individual who was willing to forgive a friend’s failure to recycle; for this is a fault in spite of which we could plausibly accept someone. But an individual who discounted a friend’s rampant racism would suggest to us that she could not care less about the values which tell against racism, or for the potential victims of racist attitudes. At the very least, she would suggest to us that she does not stand for (or is not standing up for) such values in the fullest sense. Her willingness to discount vices of this extreme sort would suggest that there are certain values to which she is not properly responsive."

          "I think that this gets right to the heart of where our individual goes wrong in

          counting a bad person as a friend. The problem is that she likes him in spite of his shortcomings, and the shortcomings in question are incredibly weighty. But it would seem that they are not sufficiently weighty for her, and this points towards something worrying about her moral priorities. In choosing to pursue a friendship with a bad person, she effectively suggests that a serious moral flaw—vehement racism, say—is a minor vice that can be outweighed by a person’s other recommending qualities."

          Special Guest: Jessica Isserow.

          29 min
        • Causing and Nothingness with Helen Beebee

          Can the absense of something ever be a cause? For example, image you forget to water your plants and your plants all die. Did your failure to water them cause the plants to die? Many people report the intuition you obviously have caused your plants to die, but shocking as it may at first seem, could this intuition actually be wrong?

          Links and Resources

          • Helen Beebee
          • The paper - "Causing and Nothingness"
          • The volume - Counterfactuals and Causation
          • Background on The Metaphysics of Causation
          • On the Notion of Cause 'Philosophically Speaking' by Helen Steward
          • Background on the philosophy of David Lewis
          • Overview paper by Sara Bernstein "The metaphysics of omissions"
          • New work in cognitive science by Henne et al. "A Counterfactual Explanation for the Action Effect"
          • "A Demonstration of the Causal Power of Absences" by Tyron Goldschmidt (via DailyNous) get ready to lol
          • Paper Quotes

            "The causal history of the world is a mass of causal processes: events linked by a vast and complex web of causal relations. In order that the causal history of the world should look the way it does look, rather than some other way, there must have been no extra events impinging on it - for those extra events would have had effects that would have changed the causal history of the world in various ways. If Godzilla had impinged upon the causal history of the world, that causal history would have gone very differently. We might even, if circumstances demanded it, want to explain happenings in the world by citing Godzilla’s absence (though it’s hard to imagine that we should ever want to do so). But I see no need to think of Godzilla’s lack of impingement as a kind of causation."

            "There just isn’t any objective feature that some absences have and others lack in virtue of which some absences are causes and others are not. So any definition of causation by absence which seeks to provide a principled distinction between absences which are and are not causes is bound to fail: no such definition will succeed in carving nature at its joints."

            Special Guest: Helen Beebee.

            40 min

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          Go behind the scenes with philosophers and cognitive scientists to get their take on published journal articles, what they like about papers, what they maybe don't anymore, and where inquiry should…