Kane County Nuggets

People v. Schutz, 2017 IL App (4th) 140956 (June). Episode 379 (Duration 7:55)

Turns out all three of defendant's attorneys had a relationship with the jailhouse informant who testified against defendant.

Defendant was charged with sex offenses.

His attorney also represented another inmate in the same jail. This other inmate ended up testifying against the defendant as a jailhouse snitch.

When the attorney realized that one of her clients was snitching on the on the other client she withdrew from defendant’s case.

But Defendant’s new attorney also had represented the snitch in prior cases.

On appeal defendant now claims all three of his attorneys had conflicts of interests and his right to counsel was violated.

A per se conflict of interest exists where certain facts about a defense attorney’s status, by themselves, engender a disabling conflict.

An attorney labors under a per se conflict of interest where defense counsel’s past or present commitments raise the possibility that the attorney is unwilling or unable to effectively represent the defendant.

“Unless a defendant waives his right to conflict-free representation, a per se conflict is automatic grounds for reversal. A per se conflict of interest occurs:

(1) where defense counsel has a prior or contemporaneous association with the victim, the prosecution, or an entity assisting the prosecution;
(2) where defense counsel contemporaneously represents a prosecution witness; and
(3) where defense counsel was a former prosecutor who had been personally involved with the prosecution of defendant.

Here, defendant focuses on the second situation, where defense counsel has a contemporaneous relationship with the defendant and a prosecution witness.

In cases where defense counsel has represented a State’s witness, a per se conflict of interest will not be held to exist unless the professional relationship between the attorney and the witness is contemporaneous with defense counsel’s representation of the defendant.

However, a contemporaneous relationship does not require simultaneous representation of a defendant and the prosecution’s witness. Here, the attorney withdrew from defendant’s case then represented the snitch.

Thus, the question the court answered was whether a per se conflict arises by virtue representing a prosecution witness after withdrawing from defendant’s case.

In this case, the jailhouse informant was not disclosed as a prosecution witness, nor does the record suggest anyone was aware he would later become a prosecution witness.

The court concluded the first attorney did not contemporaneously represent a prosecution witness such that it would create a per se conflict of interest.

Additionally, to establish a conflict, the defendant must show some specific defect in his counsel’s strategy, tactics, or decision making attributable to a conflict. Defendant was unable to demonstrate that the attorney labored under an actual conflict of interest.

The court found no conflict of interest but did not condone counsels’ representation.

In the judicial system, where we seek to avoid even the appearance of impropriety and extol the notion of fairness, cases such as the one before us tarnish that image.

Simply stated, it can be inferred from the facts of this case that one attorney worked out a deal for one of her clients that was to the detriment of another client. The difficulties presented by this case are avoidable. Diligent record keeping as to client representation—along with communication among the trial court, counsel, and the defendant—would have prevented the problems that developed in this case.

Counsel should stay informed as to prior clients and disclose to the court and the defendant any prior representation of individuals related to the defendant’s case. This would allow the defendant to state any grievances or request new counsel prior to trial, and it would give the trial court the opportunity to resolve the matter.

As a better practice, the first attorney should have informed the trial court that she previously represented defendant and currently represented the informant, who was now a prosecution witness against defendant.

The two later attorneys should have disclosed their prior representation of the snitch, regardless of the nature or length of the representation.

While the court did not suspect or intend to suggest any wrongdoing on the part of any of the attorneys involved in this matter, it concluded that their proposed solution appropriately places the burden on counsel in light of their ethical obligations in matters before the court.

You may also want to check out…

• Episode 056 Ethical Violation After Meeting With Prosecutor
• Episode 039 Is It A Per Se Conflict of Interest When Trial Attorney Raises Ineffective Assistance on Himself?
• Episode 375 Nrupa Patel Helps Dissect Conflict Of Interest Confronting Former Prosecutors
• Episode 106 Did Drew Peterson’s Attorney Have A Conflict Of Interest When He Signed a Publicity Contract?
• Episode 176 Prosecutor Probably Had A Conflict of Interest (People v. Kibbons, 2016 IL App (3d) 150090 (April)

People v. Hardimon, 2017 IL App (3d) 120772 (May). Episode 378 (Duration 9:56)

Jury should not have seen that portion of the recorded interrogation where the police go at the defendant more aggressively.

This was a shooting right outside a club. The victim was shot and killed.

The jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder and UPWF. The court sentenced the defendant to 80 years’ imprisonment for first degree murder and a consecutive term of 14 years for UPWF.

Eyewitnesses and surveillance video all lead to defendant’s arrest.

Defendant was interviewed and the interrogation was recorded.

The original recording was more than four hours in length, and the State redacted approximately three hours of the video where the defendant was not actively interviewed.

Defense counsel did not object to the introduction or playing of the redacted video.

The defendant explained in the video that, on the night of the shooting, he went to Club Apollo with an individual he called “Unc,” whom Garner later identified as TC Driver.

Driver had died by the time of trial.

The defendant and Driver drove to Club Apollo in a black two-door Mitsubishi. The defendant explained that the Mitsubishi was owned by the defendant’s cousin.

At Club Apollo, the defendant and Driver sat at the bar, had a few drinks, played pool, and left after the bartenders announced the last call. The defendant was with Driver the whole night, and neither of them used the restroom during their time at Club Apollo. The defendant said that he did not get into any arguments while he was at the club and he did not own a firearm.

Around 3 a.m., the defendant was sitting in the Mitsubishi, which was parked facing Club Apollo, when he saw a group of men standing outside the club. The defendant heard gunshots, and he and Driver left the parking lot.

Later, Driver dropped the defendant off at his girlfriend’s house.

Approximately 26 minutes into the interview, Garner and Moore confronted the defendant with allegations that the defendant had been involved in an earlier argument at Club Apollo.

At this point, the detectives’ tone changed from one of fact gathering to pressing the defendant to tell them what happened.

The detectives told the defendant that other evidence indicated that he had been involved in an earlier argument at Club Apollo and he left the club in a Mitsubishi that matched the description of the shooting suspect’s vehicle. Moore explained that the case would be presented either as one of self-defense or cold-blooded murder. Garner encouraged the defendant to tell the detectives what had happened and to explain if the shooting was an act of self-defense.

The defendant repeatedly denied any involvement in the shooting.

During the interview, the detectives said the defendant was hiding in his girlfriend’s basement when the police came to bring him to the station. Garner noted that the officers at the house were prepared to send a canine into the house to force the defendant out. The defendant replied that he voluntarily came out of the basement and an officer thanked him for his cooperation.

Approximately 37 minutes into the video, Garner indicated that the defendant should “man[ ] up to what happened.”

The defendant maintained that he had done nothing wrong and reconfirmed that he left Club Apollo and went directly to his vehicle. Moore explained that the police had a different version of events that implicated the defendant in the shooting and the detectives could seek a lesser charge if the defendant explained that he acted in self-defense.

The defendant said he had not spoken to Hartwell on the night of the incident.

Approximately five or six minutes later, Garner and the defendant went over the defendant’s version of events. The defendant maintained that he was sitting in the Mitsubishi when the shooting started, at which point the defendant left the scene. Moore insisted that the defendant had left information out, and Garner implied that the defendant was involved in the earlier argument in the men’s restroom.

Moore said the surveillance video showed the defendant leaving Club Apollo before 3 a.m. and returning in a black Mitsubishi, which backed into a parking spot.

At that point, Garner alleged that the video showed the defendant getting into a dispute with Hartwell, firing several shots, and calmly walking back to the Mitsubishi. Garner then told the defendant that the defendant “showed no remorse for what happened. It’s like I don’t care. I’m gonna handle my business.”

The defendant said that he did not commit the shooting, and Garner replied “yes, you did. You can sit there and say that all day, but the facts is [sic] the facts.”

Moore said that a show of remorse or responsibility would go “a long way in Peoria County.”

Moore commented that the State would take this case to trial because “it is easy” and this type of case provided good publicity for the State’s Attorney and leads to “100-year, triple digit sentences.”

As an example of the damage caused by not showing remorse, Moore told the defendant that he worked a prior case involving a drug deal that turned into a shooting and attempted murder prosecution. The detectives did not have video recorded evidence of the shooting, but the individuals involved in the drug deal identified the shooter. Moore told the instant defendant that the detectives

“don’t blow smoke up people’s ass. We tell it like it is. Okay? Just like we are doing to you.”

Moore then returned to his anecdote stating the detectives interviewed the shooter and laid out the evidence against him.

The shooter showed no remorse and was convicted and sentenced to 95 years’ imprisonment.

Moore emphasized that the lengthy sentence was imposed even though the victim survived the shooting.

Garner told the instant defendant that “now is the time to talk.”

The defendant reiterated that he had told the detectives everything he knew and the detectives were trying to force him to make a different statement. Garner responded that he was not trying to make the defendant say anything. Approximately 54 minutes into the video, Garner said the detectives knew the defendant committed the offense and he needed to tell the detectives why he fired the shots.

The defendant again denied committing the shooting, and the following exchange took place:

“[Moore:] We don’t get people in here, okay, just to belittle them. We get people in here to get to the bottom of shit. Okay? We don’t lie to people. Because, you know, say something happens. Okay. You get convicted. Next thing you know, Judge Mary McDade says, uh, you know what I think he’s served his time. You know? He is claiming in his appeal that he was scared to death of this dude. You know? When they see the picture of the guy, sure that’s believable. So the next thing you know it gets overturned. Alright? And, or they say he’s served enough time, we’re going to make it second degree murder because he was scared of this dude. He thought dude was going to come after him. So they cut you loose. Alright? That might be 10 years from now. Okay? Him and I are working another murder case. Say it’s one of your family members that gets murdered. Are you going to want to talk to us if we have been blowing smoke up your ass? No. That’s why we don’t do it. Because we need people to talk to us.

[Garner:] Our rep, our rep is always important to us.

[Moore:] We don’t lie to people. We just tell—this is the way it is. You know? The damage is done. Now is the time to just make the best of it. That’s all you can do. But, given the opportunity, which is what you are being given now, is to tell your side, there is a reason that shit happens, so that they know what is going, the State’s attorney’s office. Now is the time to do it. That is just the way it is.

[The defendant:] You all are questioning me. I told you what I know.”

Moore then explained that Driver was also “going down for murder, too” on an accountability theory.

The defendant asked if he was personally being charged with murder, and the detectives responded that the defendant was being charged with murder.

Garner again told the defendant that this was his opportunity to explain his side of the story.

Moore then told the defendant that they were taking the case to trial because the prosecution wanted to “show this shit off” and it makes for a good trial.

Moore implied the video recording would have the jurors on the edge of their seats looking at the defendant with disgust. Moore implied that the news media would use the word “execute” next to the defendant’s picture.

Moore repeatedly implied that the prosecution had a strong case against the defendant, as the video clearly established his guilt, and the detectives were providing a favor to the defendant by seeking his honest explanation.

The defendant again insisted that he had told the detectives what had happened.

Approximately one hour and 13 minutes into the interview, Moore told the defendant that the next time he may see his son will be when the defendant is “passing [his son] in [the Department of Corrections] in 20 years *** because his dad is all locked up.”

Two minutes before the end of the video, Moore told the defendant that he was going to jail for first degree murder.

The detectives then exited the interview room.

Shortly thereafter, Moore returned and questioned the defendant about the coat he was wearing on the night of the shooting. Moore explained that if the defendant gave the prosecution his current version of events, they would “bend [him] over.” The defendant responded “how many times do I gotta keep saying it man. I told you what happened, man.”

Moore then left the room, and the video ended.

The defendant asserts that the detectives’ repeated statements regarding their theory and strength of the case constituted irrelevant and prejudicial evidence.

Specifically, approximately 20 minutes of the video contained the defendant’s relevant admissions about his location at the time of the shooting. The remainder of the video consisted of prejudicial statements that

(1) described, in detail, a scenario where the defendant shot the victim because he was afraid;
(2) attacked the defendant’s character and credibility, which included the State’s potential use of the words “liar,” “cold-blooded killer,” and “execute,” at trial;
(3) served to bolster the testimonies of the officers and other prosecution witnesses;
(4) described the contents of the surveillance video, while inaccurately vouching for the clarity of the video;
(5) claimed the case would be easily prosecuted; and
(6) indicated the defendant hid in his girlfriend’s basement when the police came to arrest him, which indicated knowledge of guilt.

Generally, statements made by an investigating officer during an interview with the suspected defendant are admissible if they are necessary to demonstrate the effect of the statement on the defendant or to explain the defendant’s response.

However, a police officer’s opinion statement regarding the ultimate question of fact possesses significant prejudice as the officer is a recognized authority figure.

An officer’s testimony or statement during a video recorded interrogation is ultimately subject to relevancy requirements, as well as the familiar test weighing probative value versus prejudicial effect.

A statement should be excluded from evidence where its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

Here, during the first one-third of the interview, the defendant and the detectives had a conversation about the defendant’s whereabouts and knowledge of the shooting at Club Apollo.

Around the 30-minute mark, the interview shifts from a conversational tone to accusations that the defendant committed the shooting.

During the remaining 50 minutes of the recording, the defendant adamantly denied the detectives’ accusations that he was involved in an argument at Club Apollo and was removed from the club. The defendant also consistently denied the detectives repeated assertions that the defendant returned to Club Apollo with a gun and shot Hartwell.

In spite of the defendant’s insistence, Garner and Moore goaded the defendant to confess to the offenses by suggesting that the defendant will receive more lenient treatment if he shows remorse and takes responsibility for the shooting. At several points during the interview, the detectives claimed that the evidence was so heavily weighed against the defendant that the prosecution would insist on taking the matter to a trial, where it would easily prevail, and the defendant would face a lengthy prison sentence.

The detectives told the defendant that the prosecution wanted to “show this shit off” and that the media would use the word “execute” next to the defendant’s picture.

The detectives further assured the defendant that they were not lying because they had a reputation to protect. Toward the end of the video, the detectives indicated that the defendant’s failure to implicate himself in the detectives’ version of events would prevent the defendant from seeing his son, at least until the defendant’s son also found himself in prison.

Moore also conclusively stated that the defendant was going to jail for first degree murder.

These and other comments from the interviewing officers served only to impermissibly bolster the State’s case and inflame the passions of the jury.

Because the defendant was adamant that he was not involved in the shooting and did not change his version of events throughout the interview, the final two-thirds of the interview had no probative value.

Rather, this portion of the video was highly prejudicial and, at times, removed the finding of guilt from the province of the jury as the detectives conclusively stated that the defendant was guilty of murder.

Therefore, we find that defense counsel’s performance was deficient for not filing a motion to further redact this portion of the video.

In coming to this conclusion, we acknowledge that during an interrogation, the police may use a variety of non coercive techniques, which include playing on a suspect’s ignorance, fears, and anxieties.

The instant detectives’ interrogation techniques are not at issue in this appeal.

Rather, the present issue concerns whether the interview, as shown to the jury, was relevant and not prejudicial.

Here, the statements in the final two-thirds of the interview were not relevant, as the defendant did not change his statement or admit to the offenses, and were more prejudicial than probative.

As a result, this portion of the video served only to paint the defendant as a “cold-blooded” murderer, bolster the State’s case, and disparage the defendant.

Only the first one-third of the recording was arguably relevant, as the defendant stated that he was outside Club Apollo at the time of the shooting. However, the trial evidence illustrated that numerous people were outside Club Apollo at the time of the shooting and the surveillance video does not clearly establish the shooter’s identity.

Moreover, the defendant’s presence in a vehicle outside Club Apollo at the time of the shooting does not establish any of the elements of the charged offense. Thus, the inclusion of the final two-thirds of the video prejudiced the outcome of the defendant’s trial.

Our finding of prejudice is supported by the totality of the evidence, which failed to directly connect the defendant to the crime.

No witness identified the defendant as the shooter, the defendant never admitted to committing the charged offenses, and the physical evidence did not directly connect the defendant to the offense.

The maroon coat that the police found in the Mitsubishi placed the defendant in a vehicle at the scene; however, the defendant acknowledged during the interrogation that he wore a maroon coat to Club Apollo and he rode in the Mitsubishi. This evidence did not conclusively establish the defendant’s guilt, as the surveillance video showed that the shooting suspect was not wearing a coat.

Additionally, Lyle's identification of the suspect’s vehicle did not establish the defendant’s guilt because Lyle's observation is consistent with the defendant’s testimony that he was sitting in the black Mitsubishi in the parking lot at the time of the shooting and he left after he heard the gunshots.

Lyles’s description also was not independently corroborated and did not identify the defendant as the shooter.

The only witness identification regarded the defendant’s role in an earlier altercation in the restroom of Club Apollo.

Finally, the surveillance video does not provide a conclusive identification of the shooter or the allegation that the shooter got into a black Mitsubishi with license plate No. L101306. The surveillance video provides, at best, a general depiction of the scene outside Club Apollo at the time of the shooting. The poor video quality and darkness of the night make any defining features indiscernible.

Given this evidence, the defendant’s guilt could only be established via inferences from the circumstantial evidence.

While proof by inference and circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict, in this case, the combination of the irrelevant and overly prejudicial portion of the video and the evidence has left us with little confidence in the verdict. The court, therefore, found that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to move to redact or otherwise exclude the final two-thirds of the video. 

This is the July 2017 Illinois criminal case law audio round-up (the fast case law summary). Episode 376 (Duration 18:41)

Click here to download the written summary of these cases:  July 2017 Round-Up 

Here's a quick snapshot of the top cases:

1. People v. Holmes

Illinois Supreme Court adopts the federal rule in holding that gun arrests before Aguilar are supported by probable cause.

2. People v. Harper

Business exception to hearsay did not cover these "you did it" text messages.

3. People v. Avelar

Can defendant be convicted of multiple acts of violation of order of protection when the crime involves one order of protection but three protected individuals?

4. People v. Jones

This SORA conviction is reversed because the state failed to prove defendant had a duty to register.

5. People v. In re B.G.

Minor is allowed to apply to end sex registration even though he had a new charge.

6. People v. Frazier

No error here where defense counsel waited to object to an insufficient complaint until after the trial started.

Episode 375 (Duration 23:20) - Former prosecutors who leave their office face uniques circumstances when they represent individuals charged by the same prosecutor's office. 

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"If there can be any possible conflict you get it in writing..." -- Illinois Attorney Nrupa Patel.

Attorney Nrupa Patel is a former Assistant State's Attorney from Macon County, Illinois. 

Since June 2017, she has been a partner at the firm of Bolen Robinson & Ellis in Decatur, Illinois where she represents individuals in criminal court.

✓ Do you know the 3 per se conflicts of interest defense attorneys have to worry about? Relax. Here they are: (1) Where defense counsel has a prior or contemporaneous association with the victim, the prosecution, or an entity assisting the prosecution (2) Where defense counsel contemporaneously represents a prosecution witness; and (3) Where defense counsel was a former prosecutor who had been personally involved in the prosecution of defendant.

✓ In Nrupa's real life scenario a prospective client was charged while she was still at the prosecutor's office. However, she did not prosecute the case, had no involvement and was pretty sure she didn't discuss the case with anyone. Should she or shouldn't she take the case? What other factors would you like to know about? 

✓ There's one thing most attorneys aren't doing that Nrupa is doing to avoid finding herself in sticky conflict of interest situations. Listen in to discover what she's doing different.

✓ In this area of the law the case law says one thing and the professional rules of responsibility say something else. Listen in to see how the cases and the rules relate to each other.

✓ Nrupa divulges her ultimate decision in an actual case. She also lets us know what details would have changed her decision. And she explains why she resolved an almost identical scenario quite differently. 

• Bolen Robinson & Ellis LLP
• Contacting Nrupa Patel
• People v. Fields, 2012 IL 112438
• Rule 1.11(a)(2) - Special Conflicts Of Interest For Former And Current Government Officers And Employee
• People v. Schutz, 2017 IL App (4th) 140956 (July)

You may also want to check out...

• Episode 039 Is It A Per Se Conflict of Interest When Trial Attorney Raises Ineffective Assistance on Himself?
• Episode 106 Did Drew Peterson’s Attorney Have A Conflict Of Interest When He Signed a Publicity Contract?
• Episode 176 Prosecutor Probably Had A Conflict of Interest (People v. Kibbons, 2016 IL App (3d) 150090 (April)
• Episode 056 Ethical Violation After Meeting With Prosecutor

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People v. Church, 2017 IL App (5th) 140575 (June). Episode 374 (Duration 7:55)

Defendant used facebook and text message to help a lady get drugs; she ends up overdosing.

After a stipulated bench trial in the circuit court of Effingham County, defendant, was convicted of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (heroin) (720 ILCS 570/401(d)(i)) under an accountability theory and sentenced to three years and six months in the Department of Corrections.

Jessica James, age 29, died as the result of a heroin overdose.

Defendant’s roommate sold her the drugs.

Defendant was involved in arranging the heroin purchase between the victim and his roommate.

Defendant admitted that his roommate, Jay, supplied heroin to James.

The state admitted facebook conversations between the victim and defendant where she was asking him for drugs. He said he could get her some.

There were also text messages between the two.

Many of the texts were from the victim, informing defendant that he was her only hope for obtaining drugs. Eventually, defendant puts her in contact with his roommate as the source for her to score her drugs. The roommate eventually found a ride to Decatur where he purchased the drugs that he sold to the victim.

The only point of contention during the stipulated trial was whether defendant was accountable for Jay’s delivery of the heroin to James.

 Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he aided, abetted, solicited, agreed, or attempt to aid another in the commission of the crime.

He further contends the State failed to prove he possessed the concurrent, specific intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense.

In the instant case, defendant was tried under the theory that he was accountable for the actions of Jay, who sold James the heroin that ultimately killed her.

In order for a defendant to be convicted under an accountability theory, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he or she (1) solicited, aided, abetted, agreed, or attempted to aid another person in the planning or the commission of the offense; (2) did so before or during the commission of the offense; and (3) did so with the concurrent, specific intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense.

720 ILCS 5/5-2(c).

A defendant may be found guilty on an accountability theory if the State establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal or that there was a common design or scheme.

Accountability focuses on the degree of culpability of the offender and seeks to deter persons from intentionally aiding or encouraging the commission of offenses.

It’s un-rebutted and stipulated for this transaction that Defendant received no money. It’s also not in dispute that the Defendant never touched the heroin.

The trial court said that had the Defendant simply told Miss James my friend has heroin, go talk to him. That may not have been enough to make him accountable.

That is not the case here.

The Defendant told Miss James that Jay Miller frequently had heroin and, in fact, called Jay Miller to tell him to expect Miss James’s call.

The reviewing court agreed that this was just enough for accountability to attach. Here, the victim began asking defendant to help her procure drugs, including heroin. Defendant told James about his friend who frequently drives to Decatur for drugs. Defendant gave James his new phone number and asked James to text her phone number to his new cell number. James complied. Then defendant sent the victim a text explaining she needed to pay for the drugs first because his roommate did not have any money. He then gives her his roommates number and instructs her to call him.

The court said when all the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the State, it shows that the drug transaction that ended up costing the victim her life could not have occurred without defendant’s involvement.

Defendant talked to both Jay and James and arranged for James to call Jay.

If defendant had not supplied James with Jay’s phone number, the drug transaction would not have occurred.

Contrary to defendant’s assertions, his involvement goes beyond the courtesy of informing his roommate that he had given his telephone number to someone with whom he was not acquainted, and she might be calling.

Under these circumstances, there was sufficient evidence for any rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty.

People v. Kent, 2017 IL App (2d) 140917 (June). Episode 373 (Duration 10:29)

Admitting this Facebook post leads to murder conviction reversal.

The victim was shot in his driveway.

He was the ex boyfriend and babydaddy of defendant’s current girlfriend.

The day before the shooting defendant and victim had engaged in a fist fight. DCFS removed defendant’s girlfriend’s children from the home after they investigated after the fight and found bullets in the home.

Two young juvenile delinquents testified that defendant committed the shooting, and that he elicited their help. He wanted them to call defendant or to get him to a park somehow.

When that didn’t work, defendant just went to his house.

Police took a picture of a Facebook post under the profile “Lorenzo Luckii Santos”.

The day after the murder, a detective took a screenshot of the post, which showed a photograph of someone allegedly resembling defendant and an undated post that read,

“its my way or the highway…..leave em dead n his driveway.”

At the hearing on the motions, the parties disputed whether the State could lay an adequate foundation.

The State represented that it would introduce evidence at trial that

(1) Santos was the last name of defendant’s mother,
(2) Donmarquis was killed in his driveway,
(3) the photograph resembled defendant, and
(4) “Facebook records will have an IP [internet protocol] address that belongs to defendant’s girlfriend.”

The court granted the State’s motion, ruling that the Facebook post was admissible “subject to foundational requirements” being met at trial.

Detective testified that he had been using Facebook for approximately one year.

He explained that a Facebook profile is “a visual display of personal information usually specific to a user” and that a post is a message created by a user that can be shared with a select group of people or with the general public. Anyone could set up a profile, using an e-mail address. Detective had created a profile under the name “Daquan Rogers,” which was used for investigations.

The profile contained a picture of someone other than the detective.

Detective Beets searched Facebook and found a profile under the name “Lorenzo Luckii Santos.”

A photo on that profile resembled defendant.

On the Santos profile, Detective saw a post that said,

“its my way or the highway..…leave em dead n his driveway.”

Detective testified that the profile name “Lorenzo Luckii Santos” was “associated” with this post, and he printed a screenshot of the post. The detective offered no testimony about when the post was created, but he testified that it was deleted later that day.

Following Detective testimony, the defense renewed its objection to the Facebook evidence, arguing that there had been insufficient authentication. Despite its pretrial assurances, the State had failed to link the name “Santos” to defendant or to present Facebook records to establish that the post originated from defendant’s girlfriend’s IP address.

The court overruled the objection, finding that the post was sufficiently authenticated with the name, defendant’s photo, and the statement about the shooting.

Authentication of a document may be made by direct or circumstantial evidence, which is routinely the testimony of a witness who has sufficient personal knowledge to satisfy the trial court that the item is, in fact, what its proponent claims it to be.

Illinois Rule of Evidence 901 provides that

“[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”

The parties have not cited, and our research has not uncovered, any Illinois case addressing the admissibility of a Facebook post allegedly attributable to a criminal defendant. While lower federal court decisions are not binding upon state courts, we may look to them as persuasive authority.

Having looked to such decisions, we conclude that United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014), best represents a line of cases that is on point and persuasive.

In that case a Russian social media print out was admitted.

The Second Circuit observed that the requirement is satisfied if sufficient proof has been introduced so that a reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity or identification; the ultimate determination as to whether the evidence is, in fact, what its proponent claims is thereafter a matter for the jury.

Rule 901 does not definitively establish the nature and quantum of proof that is required preliminarily to authenticate an item of evidence. Further, the nature and quantum of evidence needed is related to the purpose for which the evidence is offered and depends on a context-specific determination of whether the proof advanced is sufficient to support a finding that the item in question is what its proponent claims it to be.

The Second Circuit declared that “[t]he bar for authentication of evidence is not particularly high” and “the proponent need not rule out all possibilities inconsistent with authenticity, or *** prove beyond any doubt that the evidence is what it purports to be.”

However, there must be at least sufficient proof for a reasonable juror to find in favor of authenticity.

The proof of authentication may be direct or circumstantial, but the simplest and likely most common form is through the testimony of a witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be.

For example, some documents can be authenticated by distinctive characteristics of the document itself, such as its appearance, contents, substance, or internal patterns, taken in conjunction with the circumstances.

The Second Circuit concluded that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the web page without proper authentication under Rule 901 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

The court observed that “[t]he VK profile page was helpful to the government’s case only if it belonged to [the defendant]—if it was his profile page, created by him or someone acting on his behalf—and thus tended to establish that [the defendant] used the moniker ‘Azmadeuz’ on Skype and was likely also to have used it for the Gmail address from which the forged birth certificate was sent, just as Timku claimed.”

Although it was “uncontroverted that information about [the defendant] appeared on the VK page: his name, photograph, and some details about his life that were consistent with Timku’s testimony about him[,] there was no evidence that the defendant himself had created the page or was responsible for its contents.”

The Second Circuit hypothesized that, if the government sought to introduce a flyer found on the street that contained the defendant’s Skype address and was purportedly written or authorized by him, “the district court surely would have required some evidence that the flyer did, in fact, emanate from [the defendant].

Otherwise, how could the statements in the flyer be attributed to him?”

The Second Circuit rejected the notion that the mere fact that a web page with the defendant’s name and photograph happened to exist on the Internet at the time of the special agent’s testimony permitted a reasonable conclusion that the page was created by the defendant or on his behalf.

The parties agree that, despite its digital nature, the Facebook post qualifies as a document for admissibility purposes.

A party must lay a proper foundation before a document may be entered into evidence.

Detective Beets admitted that anyone can set up a profile using an email address, as illustrated by his creation and use of a fake profile for investigation purposes. The profile had a name and a photograph that were not his.

Despite claiming that Facebook records would show that the Facebook profile was associated with an IP address belonging to Kimiko, the State presented no evidence of circumstances surrounding the post’s creation to show that defendant was responsible for its contents.

The connection between the Facebook post and defendant in this case is even more tenuous than the connection between the VK web page and the defendant in Vayner.

The Facebook post was helpful to the State’s case only if it belonged to defendant.

If he or someone acting on his behalf created it, the State could argue that the statement “its my way or the highway…..leave em dead n his driveway” was a boastful admission by defendant that he murdered Donmarquis in the driveway of 1428 Nelson Boulevard.

However, the State offered neither direct nor circumstantial proof of authentication.

Defendant did not admit to creating a Facebook profile or making the post, and he was not seen composing the communication.

At the pretrial hearing, the State represented that “Facebook records will have an IP address that belongs to Kimiko.” From that evidence, the State might have argued that defendant, Kimiko, or someone else acting on defendant’s behalf created the post from her IP address.

However, the State presented no Facebook records at trial and even failed to establish that “Santos” was the last name of defendant’s mother.

Other than Detective Beets’s discovery of the post on the day after the offense, no circumstances surrounding the creation of the undated post were introduced at trial.

The authentication of social media poses unique issues regarding what is required to make a prima facie showing that the matter is what the proponent claims.

Creating a Facebook account is easy.

That’s precisely the problem. Anyone at least thirteen years old with a valid e-mail address could create a profile. Not only can anyone create a profile and masquerade as another person, but such a risk is amplified when a person creates a real profile without the realization that third parties can ‘mine’ their personal data.

Friends and strangers alike may have access to family photos, intimate details about one’s likes and dislikes, hobbies, employer details, and other personal information, and, consequently, the desire to share information with one’s friends may also expose users to unknown third parties who may misuse their information.

Thus, concern over authentication arises because anyone can create a fictitious account and masquerade under another person’s name or can gain access to another’s account by obtaining the user’s username and password, and, consequently, the potential for fabricating or tampering with electronically stored information on a social networking website is high and poses challenges to authenticating printouts from the website.

In this case, there was affirmative evidence that no identity verification is required to create a Facebook profile.

In fact, Detective Beets confirmed how easily he created a fake profile for investigation purposes, complete with a name and a photograph that were not his.

This was unlike other cases where emails have been admitted without IP address confirmation. In those cases, the prima facie case for authorship of a document included a showing that the writing contained knowledge of a matter sufficiently obscure so as to be known to only a small group of individuals.

With email it is often the contents of the email themselves.

Here, the State offered no evidence that defendant ever accessed Facebook or even used the Internet.

At best, the photograph and the name on the Facebook profile are about defendant and not evidence that defendant himself had created the post or was responsible for its contents.

There was nothing obscure about this information.

There was ample testimony that the police activity drew the neighborhood’s attention to the shooting, such that the information was not known by only defendant or a small group of people including defendant.

Any person could have created the post if he or she knew defendant by his alleged alias, knew about the shooting and the underlying feud, and had digitally mined an image of someone who looked like defendant.

The Facebook post in this case is no different from the hypothetical flyer in Vayner.

If a printout of the screenshot of the Facebook post had been found on the street, the trial court surely would have required some evidence that it was written or authorized by defendant. Otherwise, the statement on the printout could not be attributed to him.

The mere fact that a Facebook post on a profile with defendant’s alleged alias and photograph happened to exist on the Internet for a brief period after the offense does not permit a reasonable conclusion that the post was created by defendant or on his behalf.

The ease in fabricating a social media account to corroborate a story means that more than a “simple name and photograph” are required to sufficiently link the communication to the purported author under Rule 901.

For example,

(1) the purported sender admits authorship,
(2) the purported sender is seen composing the communication,
(3) business records of an Internet service provider or cell phone company show that the communication originated from the purported sender’s personal computer or cell phone under circumstances in which it is reasonable to believe that only the purported sender would have had access to the computer or cell phone,
(4) the communication contains information that only the purported sender could be expected to know,
(5) the purported sender responds to an exchange in such a way as to indicate circumstantially that he was in fact the author of the communication, or
(6) other circumstances peculiar to the particular case may suffice to establish a prima facie showing of authenticity.

“Evidence may be authenticated in many ways, and as with any piece of evidence whose authenticity is in question, the ‘type and quantum’ of evidence necessary to authenticate a web page will always depend on context.”

However, to argue that the Facebook post was tantamount to an admission that defendant killed the victim in his driveway, Rule 901 required “some basis” on which a reasonable juror could conclude that the post was not just any Internet post, but was in fact created by defendant or at his direction.

Without such a showing, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the Facebook post and Detective Beets’s testimony. This “admission” played big in the State’s opening and closing statement.

This error compels reversal of the conviction.

In Episode 372 (Duration 33:25), Evan Bruno of Urbana, Illinois dives into some of the current problems with modern discovery rules and procedures.

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"Don't tell me what's exculpatory or not. I may know something you don't know." -- Evan Bruno

Some of the most basic rules of discovery may not be fair nor make much sense. Hit play above to see what I mean.

Evan Bruno is a criminal law attorney in the Bruno Law Office in Urbana, Illinois.

Evan has clerked for Judge Robert Steigmann of the Illinois Fourth Appellate District. Evan credits the Judge for giving him "the law hook" and the "legal bug."

Evan now works alongside his father and his brother defending the criminally accused in federal and state court.  This aptly named legal office was founded by his father in 1980.

✓ "The fact that the police and the prosecution are the ones that make the judgment call as as to what is exculpatory, I have a real problem with that." 

✓ Defense attorneys as babysitters - not a good idea.

✓ Here's something you may not have thought about in cases where the accused is housed far away from his attorney's office and the court. 

✓ Why often the accused knows more than his attorney - and how the rules completely ignore the perspective of the person whose rights we're suppose to be protecting. 

✓ The reason why Rule 415 exists can be picked apart and recognized as ridiculous by a three year old. Yet, the rule persists, perhaps for other reasons.

✓ Thought experiment: Imagine before a big trial we lock up the prosecution team in a utility closet with no computers, phones, or electronic equipment of any kind and force them to prepare for trial in there...AND we allow the defense team to pace back and forth outside the door of the closet. Would that feel fair? 

✓ Has Evan identified one area where state court actually get it right and the federal court has it all wrong? 

✓ In almost every case where there is a disagreement the losing side can take it up with the appellate court as the final arbiter. Sometimes this is inadequate and most unfair.

✓ This "pink Cadillac" problem reveals exactly how the current rule has a huge gaping hole in its coverage.

✓ ...and finally, this often overlooked problem with the Brady rule of discovery has quite devastating consequences. Has the rule outlived it's usefulness? Its time may have come, and it's replacement is actually much simpler.

• Learn More About Evan Bruno
• Evan in the news
• Bruno Law Office
• Illinois Supreme Court Rule 415. Regulation of Discovery, "Any materials furnished to an attorney pursuant to these rules shall remain in his exclusive custody and..."

You may also want to check out...

• Episode 369 Part I With Evan Bruno - A Peek Behind The Illinois Appellate Court System With Evan Bruno
• Episode 020 Reasonable Doubt Demystified With Evan Bruno
• Episode 256  How Judge Steigmann Really Feels About Impeachment, Prior Inconsistent Statements, And 725 ILCS 5/115-10.1

Case law mastery is crucial to zealous and effective advocacy.

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Weaver v. Massachusetts, SCOTUS, No. 16-240 (June 2017). Episode 371 (Duration 14:16)

Right to public trial is a structural right, but it really matters when the issue is brought up.

Petitioner was convicted of murder.

When petitioner was tried in a Massachusetts trial court, the courtroom could not accommodate all the potential jurors. As a result, for two days of jury selection, an officer of the court excluded from the courtroom any member of the public who was not a potential juror, including petitioner’s mother and her minister.

Defense counsel neither objected to the closure at trial nor raised the issue on direct review.

Five years later, he filed a motion for a new trial in state court, arguing, as relevant here, that his attorney had provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the courtroom closure.

This motion was denied because he did not establish prejudice.

Given this was a structural error is reversal mandated?

There is disagreement among the Federal Courts of Appeals and some state courts of last resort about whether a defendant must demonstrate prejudice in a case like this one—in which a structural error is neither preserved nor raised on direct review but is raised later via a claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

This case requires a discussion, and the proper application, of two doctrines: structural error and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The two doctrines are intertwined; for the reasons an error is deemed structural may influence the proper standard used to evaluate an ineffective assistance claim premised on the failure to object to that error.

It is axiomatic that not every constitutional error requires reversal.

The Court recognized, however, that some errors should not be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. These errors came to be known as structural errors.

The purpose of the structural error doctrine is to ensure insistence on certain basic, constitutional guarantees that should define the framework of any criminal trial. Thus, the defining feature of a structural error is that it “affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds,” rather than being “simply an error in the trial process itself.”

For the same reason, a structural error defies analysis by harmless error standards. There appear to be at least three broad rationales.

First, an error has been deemed structural in some instances if the right at issue is not designed to protect the defendant from erroneous conviction but instead protects some other interest.

This is true of the defendant’s right to conduct his own defense, which, when exercised, “usually increases the likelihood of a trial outcome unfavorable to the defendant.” That right is based on the fundamental legal principle that a defendant must be allowed to make his own choices about the proper way to protect his own liberty.

Harm is irrelevant to the basis underlying the right.

Second, an error has been deemed structural if the effects of the error are simply too hard to measure.

For example, when a defendant is denied the right to select his or her own attorney, the precise “effect of the violation cannot be ascertained.”

Third, an error has been deemed structural if the error always results in fundamental unfairness.

For example, if an indigent defendant is denied an attorney or if the judge fails to give a reasonable-doubt instruction, the resulting trial is always a fundamentally unfair one.

Now then, the question is whether a public-trial violation counts as structural because it always leads to fundamental unfairness or for some other reason.

The cases teach that courtroom closure is to be avoided, but that there are some circumstances when it is justified.

The problems that may be encountered by trial courts in deciding whether some closures are necessary, or even in deciding which members of the public should be admitted when seats are scarce, are difficult ones. The fact that the public-trial right is subject to these exceptions suggests that not every public-trial violation results in fundamental unfairness.

A public-trial violation can occur simply because the trial court omits to make the proper findings before closing the courtroom, even if those findings might have been fully supported by the evidence.

Indeed, the Court has not said that a public-trial violation renders a trial fundamentally unfair in every case.

In the two cases in which the Court has discussed the reasons for classifying a public-trial violation as structural error, the Court has said that a public-trial violation is structural for a different reason: because of the “difficulty of assessing the effect of the error.”

After all, the right to an open courtroom protects the rights of the public at large, and the press, as well as the rights of the accused.

So one other factor leading to the classification of structural error is that the public-trial right furthers interests other than protecting the defendant against unjust conviction.

These precepts confirm the conclusion the Court now reaches that...

While the public-trial right is important for fundamental reasons, in some cases an unlawful closure might take place and yet the trial still will be fundamentally fair from the defendant’s standpoint.

In the case of a structural error where there is an objection at trial and the issue is raised on direct appeal, the defendant generally is entitled to “automatic reversal” regardless of the error’s actual “effect on the outcome.”

The question then becomes what showing is necessary when the defendant does not preserve a structural error on direct review but raises it later in the context of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.

To obtain relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant as a general rule bears the burden to meet two standards.

First, the defendant must show deficient performance— that the attorney’s error was “so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”

Second, the defendant must show that the attorney’s error “prejudiced the defense.” Thus, when a defendant raises a public-trial violation via an ineffective assistance-of-counsel claim, Strickland prejudice is not shown automatically.

Instead, the burden is on the defendant to show either a reasonable probability of a different outcome in his or her case or, as the Court has assumed for these purposes to show that the particular public-trial violation was so serious as to render his or her trial fundamentally unfair.

The reason for placing the burden on the petitioner in this case, however, derives both from the nature of the error.

As explained above, when a defendant objects to a courtroom closure, the trial court can either order the courtroom opened or explain the reasons for keeping it closed.

When a defendant first raises the closure in an ineffective assistance claim, however, the trial court is deprived of the chance to cure the violation either by opening the courtroom or by explaining the reasons for closure. When an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is raised in postconviction proceedings, the costs and uncertainties of a new trial are greater because more time will have elapsed in most cases.

The finality interest is more at risk.

The burden remains on the defendant to make the prejudice showing because a public-trial violation does not always lead to a fundamentally unfair trial.

In light of the above assumption that prejudice can be shown by a demonstration of fundamental unfairness the remaining question is whether petitioner has shown that counsel’s failure to object rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.

The Court concludes that petitioner has not made the showing.

Although petitioner’s mother and her minister were indeed excluded from the courtroom for two days during jury selection, petitioner’s trial was not conducted in secret or in a remote place.

The closure was limited to the jury voir dire; the courtroom remained open during the evidentiary phase of the trial; the closure decision apparently was made by court officers rather than the judge; there were many members of the venire who did not become jurors but who did observe the proceedings; and there was a record made of the proceedings that does not indicate any basis for concern, other than the closure itself.

There has been no showing, furthermore, that the potential harms flowing from a courtroom closure came to pass in this case.

In sum, petitioner has not shown a reasonable probability of a different outcome but for counsel’s failure to object, and he has not shown that counsel’s shortcomings led to a fundamentally unfair trial. He is not entitled to a new trial.

In the criminal justice system, the constant, indeed unending, duty of the judiciary is to seek and to find the proper balance between the necessity for fair and just trials and the importance of finality of judgments.

When a structural error is preserved and raised on direct review, the balance is in the defendant’s favor, and a new trial generally will be granted as a matter of right. When a structural error is raised in the context of an ineffective assistance claim, however, finality concerns are far more pronounced. For this reason, and in light of the other circumstances present in this case, petitioner must show prejudice in order to obtain a new trial.

Episode 270 Step-Grandmother Improperly Excluded From The Courtroom

Episode 351 We’re Still Figuring Out What Plain Error Means  

People v. Alexander, 2017 IL App (1st) 142170 (June). Episode 370 (Duration 6:43)

Illogical verdicts won't always require reversal.

The defendant-appellant was found guilty by a jury of first degree murder.

However, in a special interrogatory, the jury found that the allegation was not proven that during the commission of the offense of first degree murder, defendant personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused death of the victim.

The victim was sitting in his car when a man was seen in the back seat. The victim had two gunshot wounds to the left side of his head. The first bullet entered the skull and traveled through the brainstem causing death. The second gunshot entered the scalp; it traveled around the head between the scalp and the skull before exiting the back of the head.

The shooting started and the victim's mother saw the man get out the car and run away.

Police just happened to be in the area when they heard the shots. They turned off their lights and approached slowly. That’s when they find defendant in black clothing wearing a dark hooded sweatshirt running away. Police retraced his steps and found a black hooded sweatshirt and two gloves in the general area where he saw the person running. In the rear of that residence, he found a black semiautomatic Hi-Point .40-caliber handgun laying in the yard. This was the murder weapon. GSR was found on the gloves.

Defendant was arrested near the scene.

The trial court sentenced defendant to 40 years in prison on the first degree murder conviction.

In his first issue, defendant claims his first degree murder conviction must be vacated because the jury found the State failed to prove defendant personally discharged a firearm during the commission of the offense of first degree murder.

These findings were inconsistent.

Defendant argues that committing murder by personally discharging a firearm is an aggravated form of murder that the State must prove in total.

He says it would be nonsensical and unfair to allow him to be convicted as the principal shooter in a murder but found not to have personally discharged said firearm. He thus concludes that the State’s failure to prove the personal discharge element requires reversal of his murder conviction.

The reviewing court held that while it may seem nonsensical to allow the above situation to occur, both the Illinois Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court have stated that such an occurrence does not offend the constitution and such convictions can stand.

In our supreme court’s decision of People v. Jones, 207 Ill. 2d 122 (2003), it adopted the rule that convictions cannot be challenged because they are inconsistent with acquittals on other charges. In Jones, our supreme court adopted the rule enunciated by United States Supreme Court in United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984), that the United States Constitution does not require consistency in criminal verdicts.

Defendants in Illinois can no longer challenge convictions on the sole basis that they are legally inconsistent with acquittals on other charges.

In the end, despite inconsistent verdicts a court may not guess as to why a jury did what it did.

Additionally, Illinois courts have previously stated that even when a victim is killed via a gunshot, proving the defendant used a firearm is not required to sustain a murder conviction.

This murder conviction was affirmed.

Even when the victim is killed via a gunshot, the crime of first degree murder and the firearm enhancement contain separate elements.

Contrary to the defendant’s claim, these are separate crimes. More accurately, the defendant’s use of the firearm was not a crime in and of itself. The crime was the extinction of a human life….The gun was simply the method selected by the defendant to accomplish the crime, and the particular method selected subjects him to an additional penalty.

The State is not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used a firearm even when the victim dies from a gunshot. Liability for murder rises when there is a killing however it may have occurred.

As stated in the jury instructions and explained by the court’s, personal discharge of a firearm is not an element of first degree murder even when the victim dies from a gunshot.

In Episode 369 (Duration 29:56), Evan Bruno of Urbana, Illinois describes his experience working as a clerk in the Illinois Appellate Court system.

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"It's not cockiness...If you're willing to put in the work and do the research, sometimes the answer is just totally clear." -- Evan Bruno

Beware: By listening to this episode with Evan Bruno you shall be entering into a world of legal geek-ery unlike any other.

Evan Bruno is a criminal law attorney in the Bruno Law Office in Urbana, Illinois.

Evan has clerked for Judge Robert Steigman of the Illinois Fourth Appellate District. Evan credits the Judge for giving him "the law hook" and the "legal bug."

Evan now works alongside his father and his brother defending the criminally accused in federal and state court.  This aptly named legal office was founded by his father in 1980.

✓ "It's not about the subject matter. It's about the puzzles." 

What it's like to work for the man who knows the most about Illinois law? Sometimes there's guided instruction. Sometimes there's not. But the opinion is always based on the pure as driven snow, black-letter law.

✓ "Steigmann stage craft" revealed, and other appellate court processes unveiled.

✓ Here's some advice the judge once gave to Evan: "Sometimes you're gonna read an opinion, Evan, and whether you know it or not the judge who wrote it might have been full of crap." [language was cleaned up a bit]

✓ The one golden rule and the one mantra every appellate court tries to live by...We readers of their opinions should be grateful they follow this rule. 

✓ The criminal law attorney's dirty little secret: We don't have the time to keep up with the cases. Very few lawyers have the luxury of being able to envelope themselves in every legal issue they may confront. Evan divulges the solution.

✓ How the "game of telephone" method for setting precedent gets laid out, untangled, and turned inside out. When they're done the rest of us can stop pulling our hair out from the frustration of dealing with confusing legal precedent.

✓ The best way to get your legal juices flowing.

✓ The single most important thing that Evan learned by clerking for Judge Robert Steigmann of the Fourth Appellate District was this...

✓ ...and finally, Evan confesses to doing this one thing that only is done by true legal junkies and goes beyond any legal geek-ery ever demonstrated by the rest of us. (Hint: This involves accessing certain information made available on the web, and Evan has zero shame in doing it.)

• Learn More About Evan Bruno
• Evan in the news
• Bruno Law Office

You may also want to check out...

• Episode 372 Part II With Evan Bruno - Is It Time To Kill The Brady Rule? And Other Big Discovery Issues With Evan Bruno
• Episode 020 Reasonable Doubt Demystified With Evan Bruno
• Episode 256  How Judge Steigmann Really Feels About Impeachment, Prior Inconsistent Statements, And 725 ILCS 5/115-10.1

Case law mastery is crucial to zealous and effective advocacy.

I've come to believe that steady, persistent attention to the cases can increase any attorney's litigation skills.

If you're looking for the easiest way to keep up with the cases and ready to begin having a litigation advantage over your opponents then hit the link below.

Increase my litigation skills.
Easily identify winning scenarios. 
And get the most recent case law updates.

Subscribe Now

Show Me The Secret.