Institute of Historical Research

The Declaration of London Revisited: Did the Admiralty Know What It Was Doing?

Dr Alan Anderson

Military History seminar series

Institute of Historical Research

The Origins of Chemical Warfare in the French Army - discussion

Dr Jonathan Krause

(University of Greenwich)

The opinion over the humanity or inhumanity of using gas as a viable weapon remains conflicted, with some claiming that it is no worse than the use of guns and mortars. Yet, the image of barbarism and evil attached especially to chemical warfare persists and remains. In the First World War, it was chemical warfare that was seen as most heinous and repulsive more so than heavy artillery and shelling.

Jonathan Krause begins his paper on the origins of chemical warfare in the French army during the First World War with a historiography that shows a wealth of content created over the century since the war but a wealth of content full of limitations and biases. For the French army the historiographical account argues that the French were generally unwilling to develop asphyxiating gas; that they paid only lip service to offensive systems when it came to chemical warfare. The evidence also suggests that when it came to defences to enemy gas attacks the French command come across as indecisive, short-sighted and unresponsive.

This is the current image: slow, confused and disinterested. Krause does not believe this to be the fault of historians themselves but more of the sources made available to them. Study of the French response to chemical warfare has been limited through the non-release of various documents. Certainly in 1975 vital documents had not yet been realised. Eleven years later vital documents were either still not available or just not organised enough to be found. Krause now looks at these documents for the first time which show that the French, whilst limited on their response to chemical warfare, did contribute one of the more effective uses for gas – that of being able to use it to neutralise enemy batteries.

Military History seminar series

Institute of Historical Research

The Origins of Chemical Warfare in the French Army - seminar

Dr Jonathan Krause

(University of Greenwich)

The opinion over the humanity or inhumanity of using gas as a viable weapon remains conflicted, with some claiming that it is no worse than the use of guns and mortars. Yet, the image of barbarism and evil attached especially to chemical warfare persists and remains. In the First World War, it was chemical warfare that was seen as most heinous and repulsive more so than heavy artillery and shelling.

Jonathan Krause begins his paper on the origins of chemical warfare in the French army during the First World War with a historiography that shows a wealth of content created over the century since the war but a wealth of content full of limitations and biases. For the French army the historiographical account argues that the French were generally unwilling to develop asphyxiating gas; that they paid only lip service to offensive systems when it came to chemical warfare. The evidence also suggests that when it came to defences to enemy gas attacks the French command come across as indecisive, short-sighted and unresponsive.

This is the current image: slow, confused and disinterested. Krause does not believe this to be the fault of historians themselves but more of the sources made available to them. Study of the French response to chemical warfare has been limited through the non-release of various documents. Certainly in 1975 vital documents had not yet been realised. Eleven years later vital documents were either still not available or just not organised enough to be found. Krause now looks at these documents for the first time which show that the French, whilst limited on their response to chemical warfare, did contribute one of the more effective uses for gas – that of being able to use it to neutralise enemy batteries.

Military History seminar series

Institute of Historical Research

The Origins of Chemical Warfare in the French Army - seminar

Dr Jonathan Krause

(University of Greenwich)

The opinion over the humanity or inhumanity of using gas as a viable weapon remains conflicted, with some claiming that it is no worse than the use of guns and mortars. Yet, the image of barbarism and evil attached especially to chemical warfare persists and remains. In the First World War, it was chemical warfare that was seen as most heinous and repulsive more so than heavy artillery and shelling.

Jonathan Krause begins his paper on the origins of chemical warfare in the French army during the First World War with a historiography that shows a wealth of content created over the century since the war but a wealth of content full of limitations and biases. For the French army the historiographical account argues that the French were generally unwilling to develop asphyxiating gas; that they paid only lip service to offensive systems when it came to chemical warfare. The evidence also suggests that when it came to defences to enemy gas attacks the French command come across as indecisive, short-sighted and unresponsive.

This is the current image: slow, confused and disinterested. Krause does not believe this to be the fault of historians themselves but more of the sources made available to them. Study of the French response to chemical warfare has been limited through the non-release of various documents. Certainly in 1975 vital documents had not yet been realised. Eleven years later vital documents were either still not available or just not organised enough to be found. Krause now looks at these documents for the first time which show that the French, whilst limited on their response to chemical warfare, did contribute one of the more effective uses for gas – that of being able to use it to neutralise enemy batteries.

Military History seminar series

Institute of Historical Research

The Origins of Chemical Warfare in the French Army - discussion

Dr Jonathan Krause

(University of Greenwich)

The opinion over the humanity or inhumanity of using gas as a viable weapon remains conflicted, with some claiming that it is no worse than the use of guns and mortars. Yet, the image of barbarism and evil attached especially to chemical warfare persists and remains. In the First World War, it was chemical warfare that was seen as most heinous and repulsive more so than heavy artillery and shelling.

Jonathan Krause begins his paper on the origins of chemical warfare in the French army during the First World War with a historiography that shows a wealth of content created over the century since the war but a wealth of content full of limitations and biases. For the French army the historiographical account argues that the French were generally unwilling to develop asphyxiating gas; that they paid only lip service to offensive systems when it came to chemical warfare. The evidence also suggests that when it came to defences to enemy gas attacks the French command come across as indecisive, short-sighted and unresponsive.

This is the current image: slow, confused and disinterested. Krause does not believe this to be the fault of historians themselves but more of the sources made available to them. Study of the French response to chemical warfare has been limited through the non-release of various documents. Certainly in 1975 vital documents had not yet been realised. Eleven years later vital documents were either still not available or just not organised enough to be found. Krause now looks at these documents for the first time which show that the French, whilst limited on their response to chemical warfare, did contribute one of the more effective uses for gas – that of being able to use it to neutralise enemy batteries.

Military History seminar series

Institute of Historical Research

Discussion

Navies, Internal Order and State-building in the Nineteenth Century

Carlos Alfaro Zaforteza

(KCL)

Military History seminar series

Institute of Historical Research

Butcher and Bolts or Hearts and Minds: Britain's Suppression of the Arab Revolt 76-1928: unlikely the children's champion?

Dr Matthew Hughes

(Brunel University)

Military History seminar series

Institute of Historical Research

Discussion

Butcher and Bolts or Hearts and Minds: Britain's Suppression of the Arab Revolt 76-1928: unlikely the children's champion?

Dr Matthew Hughes

(Brunel University)

Military History seminar series

Institute of Historical Research

The Second Battle of Artois, May 1915: the new turning-point

Jonathan Krause

(KCL)

The Second Battle of Artois was a failure in the long term with initial victories by the French army draining away by the battles end leading to stalemate. Fought in the spring of 1915 mainly by the French army under General Philippe Pétain (with the British contribution at the Battle of Aubers Ridge), the Second Battle of Artois was the final allied offensive in World War One until September 1915. Back in May 2010 Jonathan Krause argued at the Military History seminar that this battle was a turning point in trench warfare, where the French worked out a strategy which held good until the Germans strengthened their fortifications later in the war. Nevertheless, the doctrine behind French warfare of 1915 was largely rhetoric with little keen strategic knowledge. Krause looks at Note 9579 to understand the strategy and beliefs behind the French push in the Second Battle of Artois. In particular, Krause notes the importance given over to artillery as the primary means of weakening the enemy before sending in the soldiers.

Military History seminar series

Institute of Historical Research

The Second Battle of Artois, May 1915: the new turning-point

Jonathan Krause

(KCL)

The Second Battle of Artois was a failure in the long term with initial victories by the French army draining away by the battles end leading to stalemate. Fought in the spring of 1915 mainly by the French army under General Philippe Pétain (with the British contribution at the Battle of Aubers Ridge), the Second Battle of Artois was the final allied offensive in World War One until September 1915. Back in May 2010 Jonathan Krause argued at the Military History seminar that this battle was a turning point in trench warfare, where the French worked out a strategy which held good until the Germans strengthened their fortifications later in the war. Nevertheless, the doctrine behind French warfare of 1915 was largely rhetoric with little keen strategic knowledge. Krause looks at Note 9579 to understand the strategy and beliefs behind the French push in the Second Battle of Artois. In particular, Krause notes the importance given over to artillery as the primary means of weakening the enemy before sending in the soldiers.

Military History seminar series