As the war in the Middle East spreads and intensifies, the one in Ukraine continues. While geographically some 2,500 km (1,600 miles) apart, the impact of US president Donald Trump’s latest military adventure on the Russian war against Ukraine will be acutely felt across several areas. In the short term, the Kremlin will probably feel emboldened to double down on its aggression, but this is unlikely to shift the dial significantly towards Russian victory in the long term.

The targeted killing of Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei by a precision US strike will likely have reminded the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, of his reportedly “apoplectic” reaction to the killing of the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, in 2011. Comments on social media from the likes of far-right nationalist Alexander Dugin, who posted, that “one by one, our allies are being systematically destroyed”, and former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, who alleged that the “talks with Iran were just a cover”, are unlikely to have steadied Putin’s nerves.

The Russian leader’s fears about being next after a string of US successes targeting foreign leaders may have been played up somewhat by the western media, but they are not completely unfounded. Putin continues to walk a fine line between paranoia and his outrage over the killing of Khamenei, which he condemned in a condolence letter to the Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, as a “cynical violation of all norms of human morality and international law”. But he did not mention Trump or the US as the culprits.

Concerns about his own longevity, however, will not be the only things weighing on Putin’s mind and compelling him to double down on his war against Ukraine. The escalation of violence in the Middle East also offers Russia several opportunities in its war of aggression against Ukraine — at least in the short term.

The sharp rise in oil prices throws Moscow a new lifeline for financing its ongoing war. Not only did prices spike — with Brent crude oil hitting $85 per barrel for the first time in almost two years — but the sudden, and likely lasting, inability of Iran to export oil will also have a major impact on China, which bought over 80% of all Iranian maritime oil exports, equivalent to some 13% of Chinese maritime oil imports.

China has large stockpiles of oil which will allow it to ride out current inflation. But Beijing is now likely to double down on its energy relationship with Russia. This will serve both countries well: Russia will deepen its economic ties with China and rebalance the relationship, while China will tap into a reliable supply line that will not be as vulnerable to being choked off as maritime supply routes in a future confrontation with the US.

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian strikes against oil and gas facilities across the Gulf countries have destabilised global energy markets. With some 30% of global seaborne oil trade and 20% of all trade in liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade affected, this represents a market opportunity for Russia and its shadow fleet of tankers, at least in the short term, given that Moscow retains sufficient refining and port capacity — despite a long Ukrainian air campaign against the country’s oil infrastructure.

Another likely benefit the Kremlin will reap are problems with weapons supplies to Ukraine. While insisting that the US had “virtually unlimited supply” of weapons and munitions, Trump also conceded that there were areas “at the highest end, (where) we have a good supply, but are not where we want to be”. This is a view echoed within the Pentagon where officials are keen to discuss an acceleration of weapons production with key arms manufacturers.

With large parts of western military support for Ukraine consisting of US weapons paid for by Kyiv’s European allies via NATO’s Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative, shortages on the US side will immediately impact the flow of vital equipment to Ukraine. Even deliveries already agreed could be derailed. In June 2025, during the so-called 12-day war with Iran, the US diverted some 20,000 missiles from Ukraine to the Middle East.

Russia is unlikely to face any similar constraints. On the contrary: a Russian-Iranian deal in late 2022 enabled Moscow to acquire technology from Tehran that allowed the Kremlin to kick-start domestic drone production based on the Iranian Shahed design. Not only has Russia improved the drones, it now also produces them faster and cheaper than Iran ever did.

If western military supplies to Ukraine now dry up even temporarily as a result of an increased focus of the US on the Middle East, Russia’s air superiority and the devastating impact its relentless campaign of missile and drone strikes has had on Ukraine is likely to continue unabated for now.

At the same time, however, this drives home the point that dependence on the US puts Ukraine and its European allies in an unacceptably precarious position. Ukraine’s own defence industry already meets half of the country’s needs, and the fallout from Iran war will likely further accelerate homegrown military production and innovation across Europe as the traditional US-European alliance frays.

In the short term, however, this ongoing transatlantic decoupling will serve Moscow’s interests more than Kyiv’s. European countries, including the UK, France, and Spain, have been critical of US and Israeli attacks on Iran, earning them the expected rebukes from Trump.

The White House might be too busy to follow through on threats “to cut off all trade” with Spain, but it will equally not put much effort into already fraught mediation efforts between Russia and Ukraine. Given the dismal performance of Trump’s own efforts and those of his negotiation team, as well as the pressure that the US had put on Ukraine rather than Russia to cut a deal, this may not be much of a loss.

But US diplomatic disengagement from the Russian war against Ukraine still poses a problem as Washington is the only player with the leverage to bring both sides together and — if Trump were to decide so — achieve a just and sustainable peace agreement between them.

Ukraine and its European partners may be able to prevent a Russian victory, but it will take some time for them to develop the military and political muscle to force Russia to make meaningful concessions that could pave the way towards a durable and acceptable settlement.

If nothing else, Trump’s war of choice in the Middle East is another factor in prolonging the war against Ukraine. Regardless of its short-term effects, it will not make a Russian victory more likely. But it has thrown the world into additional turmoil for no good reason whatsoever, and it will delay the much-needed restoration of peace in Europe.

An earlier version of this analysis was published by The Conversation on March 5, 2026.

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As Ukraine heads into a fifth year of defending itself against the unprovoked Russian full-scale invasion, the prospects of a just and sustainable peace agreement remain distant. On the ground, the land war continues to be in a stalemate, with the pace of Russian territorial gains now slower than some of the most protracted battles of trench warfare during the First World War.

In the air war, Moscow has demonstrated a ruthless and brutal efficiency in destroying much of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. The repeated destruction of power generation and distribution facilities has taken a serious toll on the Ukrainian population and economy. Yet beyond inflicting hardship, these strikes have not had the kind of strategic effect Russia needs to achieve in order to turn the military tables decisively on Ukraine.

All in all, the Kremlin narrative of inevitable victory looks more like Soviet-style propaganda than a reflection of battlefield reality. President Vladimir Putin, however, is not the only world leader guilty of wishful thinking. His American counterpart, President Donald Trump, at times, also appears to make policy untethered from the real world.

First, there was his claim on the campaign trail that he could end the fighting in Ukraine within 24 hours. Upon returning to the White House, Trump issued multiple ceasefire demands and associated deadlines that Putin simply ignored without incurring any cost. The latest plan from Washington is for a peace deal to be concluded between Moscow and Kyiv, approved by a Ukrainian referendum, and followed by national elections — all before June.

The timeline for the American plan aside, a US-mediated deal between Russia and Ukraine remains possible. However, it is unlikely that it will take the form of the just and sustainable settlement that Kyiv and its European allies demand. If it comes to pass as a result of the ongoing trilateral negotiations currently underway, it is highly probable that Ukraine will have to make significant concessions on territory in exchange for US-backed security guarantees and a mostly European-financed package of post-war reconstruction measures.

An additional bitter pill to swallow for Ukraine and Europe would be an unashamed US-Russia rapprochement with a simultaneous end to American sanctions on Russia, a flurry of economic deals between the two countries, and pressure on Ukraine’s other allies to follow suit, at least on sanctions relief and possibly on the release and return of Russian frozen assets.

The other — and more likely — possibility is that not even a bad deal will be forthcoming. The Russian side has given no indication that it is willing to make any significant concessions. Moscow’s position is that Kyiv should relinquish control over the entirety of the Donbas, including territory in Ukraine’s fortress belt that Moscow has so far been unable to take by military force. In return, or under the terms of what Russia refers to as the ‘Anchorage formula’ allegedly agreed between Putin and Trump at their Alaska summit in August 2025, the Kremlin is apparently willing to freeze the current frontlines elsewhere along the more than 1,000 km long line of contact.

Even at the very remote possibility that this was acceptable, or that Ukraine would be pressured into agreeing to such a deal, this would hardly seal a settlement, given that Russia continues to oppose the security guarantees currently on the table between Kyiv and its Western partners. Without them, territorial concessions make no sense for Ukraine, especially as there is no imminent danger of a collapse of Ukrainian defences.

The Hungarian blockage of the EU’s €90 billion loan to Ukraine — likely instigated by the country’s Prime Minister, Victor Orbán, at the behest of both Trump, whose Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, had visited the country just before the announcement, and Putin, with whom Orban has had close ties for a long time — is not going to change Kyiv’s calculations significantly. Not only is the EU surely going to find a work-around to deal with this blockage but Orbán’s days as Ukraine’s principal foe inside the EU might be numbered given that he is trailing in opinion polls ahead of April’s parliamentary elections. As any embrace of and by Trump and Putin is unlikely to improve Orbán’s prospects for another term, the Hungarian blockage might ultimately prove temporary regardless of the outcome of April’s elections.

If, as is therefore likely, Trump’s latest deadline passes without a deal being reached, the question arises what next? Trump could simply walk away from the war. He threatened to do so in the past but a likely mix of ego and the prospect of economic deals in the event of peace prevented him from doing so. Nothing suggests at the moment that this time will be different. There might be some angry exchanges and finger pointing, but after that, the current, deeply flawed negotiation process is likely to resume in some form because the alternatives are worse for all sides, Trump included.

The US President could walk away and finally realise that Putin is simply not interested in peace, no matter what is on offer. But this will not lead Trump to ramp up pressure on Russia in a significant way. He has had reason and opportunity to do so on multiple occasions since returning to the White House in January 2025. He has not done so then, and there is no reason to believe that he would do so now.

Trump could then instead pursue a bilateral deal with Russia. But without European participation, such a deal will be of limited benefit to both sides. The bulk of Russian foreign assets remain frozen in Europe and would very likely stay so in the absence of coordinated transatlantic action. Russia has little of value to export to the US and lacks the market conditions to make it an attractive destination for US foreign direct investment. Some US companies might return or expand their still existing operations in the country, but these will hardly be the trillion-dollar deals that Trump, and possibly Putin, envisage.

Even if any such separate US-Russia deal would be of limited economic value, it would still be politically damaging, especially to transatlantic relations. That, however, also makes it less likely to happen. By June, primaries in the United States ahead of the November midterm elections will largely have concluded and Republican candidates will be less susceptible to pressure from the White House. As was already obvious in the context of Trump’s threats to take over Greenland, if necessary by force, there remains a segment of foreign policy realists among congressional Republicans who, unshackled from the leverage Trump may have held over them in the primaries, are likely to push back more against his most disruptive foreign policy stances, including when it comes to any dealing with Russia reached at the expense of the transatlantic alliance.

All of these scenarios, and a likely myriad of more or less minor variations of them, contain the ingredients of a British and European strategy for what is probably another year of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

The first is the utmost importance of unity behind Ukraine’s defence efforts. Across the multiple overlapping multi- and mini-lateral formats of EU, NATO, coalition of the willing, etc., there needs to be a clear message to Russia, the US, and Ukraine alike: Russia’s aggression is also Europe’s problem and will be treated as such for as long as the threat from Moscow — not just against Ukraine but against the fundamental tenets of the European security order as such — remains credible.

This means, second, that Ukraine needs to be supported materially with military and economic aid and politically when it comes to pushing back against both American and Russian designs for a deal to serve the interests of the current incumbents of the White House and the Kremlin first. For a more effective political pushback, Europe needs to cultivate relations with those in the US foreign policy establishment who continue to see value in established alliance structures, especially if they reflect more balanced burden-sharing.

Third, the UK and its European allies also need to think beyond Ukraine — because this is what Russia is doing as well, despite the demands of its war of aggression. Though it need not be limited to the EU-Russia borderlands, this is where the focus needs to remain for the foreseeable future.

Moldova, for example, remains particularly vulnerable to Russian interference, notwithstanding the success of pro-European forces in the country in presidential and parliamentary elections in 2024 and 2025. Moscow still retains multiple channels of influence, including through the unresolved conflict in the Transnistrian region, which, if left to fester, could significantly impede Moldova’s EU accession process and provide opportunities for renewed destabilisation.

Similarly, parliamentary elections in Armenia in June will create an opportunity for the Kremlin to destabilise another of its neighbours that has increasingly turned away from Moscow and towards Brussels. Given the role of the US, and of Trump personally, in the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, this also offers an opportunity for the UK and Europe to cooperate with Washington in working towards constraining Russian influence in the South Caucasus region as a whole.

A fourth and final ingredient in an evolving British and European strategy is a focus on becoming a credible player in the emerging new international order. This requires a certain amount of realism and modesty in aspirations and messaging. The UK is not pursuing a fast track to rejoining the EU, but closer alignment and cooperation across the English Channel is essential.

Equally important is that declarations of intent, be they about a UK-EU reset or an expanding coalition of the willing, are followed with concrete action — especially on investment in defence and a more credible European deterrence posture. This means both a more capable defence industrial base and doctrine for the kind of war being fought in Ukraine and improved defence readiness and resilience at the level of society.

A reconstituted European alliance, with a coalition at its heart that is not just willing but also capable of deterring Russia, is not beyond the reach of the UK and Europe. It may not be, nor ever become, a traditional great power, but by continuing to back Ukraine today and integrating it tomorrow, it will feel, and be, less vulnerable to the whims of the current or any future mercurial leader in the White House or the Kremlin. Crucially, it preserves the opportunity to rebuild the transatlantic alliance in the future, and to do so on stronger European foundations.

An earlier version of this analysis was published by The Foreign Policy Centre on February 24, 2026.

We hope you’ll share Navigating the Vortex with anyone you think might find it of interest. Also, you can listen to our podcast editions via the website and on all major podcast platforms, including:

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On 13 February 2026, we spoke with John Nagle and Tamirace Fakhoury to mark the publication of the latest edition of Ethnopolitics — a special issue on Contesting Power-sharing: Contentious Politics in Divided Societies, co-edited by John and Simon Mabon, to which Tamirace contributed the article “How Do Semi-Authoritarian Regimes Defeat Uprisings? Lebanon’s 2019 Uprising and the Dramaturgical Performances that the Post-Civil War Regime Plays”.

John is Professor of Sociology at Queen’s University Belfast, as well as a Fellow of the Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice and an Associate Fellow at the Institute of Irish Studies. More information about him is available here.

Tamirace joined us from Massachusetts in the United States where she works as Associate Professor of International Politics and Conflict at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. You can find out more about her by following this link.

The articles we discuss in this episode can be accessed for free on our website:

* John Nagle and Simon Mabon, “Contesting Power-sharing: Contentious Politics in Divided Societies”

* John Nagle and Cera Murtagh, “Contesting Power-Sharing? LGBTQ+ Activism and the Sexual Citizenship of Consociationalism”

* Tamirace Fakhoury, “How Do Semi-Authoritarian Regimes Defeat Uprisings? Lebanon’s 2019 Uprising and the Dramaturgical Performances that the Post-Civil War Regime Plays”

The whole special issue, Contesting Power-sharing: Contentious Politics in Divided Societies (Ethnopolitics 25(2), 2026), can be accessed here.

John’s 2009 article, “Potemkin Village: Neo-liberalism and Peace-building in Northern Ireland?” (Ethnopolitics 8(2), 2009, 173-190), is available here.

We hope you’ll share Navigating the Vortex | Ethnopolitics Edition with anyone you think might find it of interest. Also, you can listen to our podcast editions via the website and on all major podcast platforms, including:

* Apple Podcasts

* Spotify

* Amazon/Audible

* PocketCasts

* Overcast

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The 25th Winter Meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) should have been a moment of celebration and of reflection on past successes in advancing the organisation’s broader goals of comprehensive, cooperative, and indivisible security. Yet, much like the 50th anniversary of the organisation in 2025, it was anything but. The OSCE continues to be in a deep crisis.

Triggered by the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, this is first and foremost a crisis of paralysis, with meaningful dialogue and decision-making among participating States in Vienna largely stalled.

The OSCE continues to function operationally, with at least some meaningful and substantive business being conducted in the organisation’s specialised institutions — the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), and the Representative on Freedom of the Media — as well as in its eleven field operations in eastern and southeastern Europe and Central Asia.

The existing crisis of paralysis is further compounded by the wider crisis of multilateralism and the deliberate dismantling of the rules-based international order, which did not begin with, but has significantly accelerated since, the return of Donald Trump to the White House 13 months ago.

The implications for the OSCE became particularly evident at the Ministerial Council in Vienna on 4 December 2025, when a representative of the US State Department called for “a reduction of at least €15 million in the annual budget by December 2026”, a shift in priorities away from politically contentious issues, and renewed engagement with Russia.

Implied, if not explicitly stated, was the threat of US withdrawal from the OSCE: “If the OSCE continues on its current path, the United States will continue to assess our participation and support.”

As with previous periods of institutional strain, the key question that arises from it is not new: can participating States reform the organisation and help it find a way back to being an effective contributor to security across its vast geographic area, stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok? And perhaps more importantly, should they?

The priorities of this year’s Swiss Chairpersonship under the theme “Dialogue – Trust – Security” certainly suggest that a serious attempt will be made. Key objectives include safeguarding the OSCE’s operational capacity (“preserve the basic instruments … and to ensure their financing”) and revitalising multilateral diplomacy (“foster an open dialogue on security”, “maintain channels of communication on security, including between States in conflict”).

Another priority — to work for lasting peace on the basis of the Helsinki principles (enshrined in the organisation’s 1975 founding act) — envisages that “the OSCE is mobilising its instruments across all three dimensions to support a just and lasting peace in Ukraine”. Not only does this naturally align with the very purpose of the organisation but it also could give the OSCE a new lease of life in light of recent developments in the war against Ukraine.

The prospect of elections, a referendum, and a possible peace deal could give the OSCE and its participating States an opportunity to bring to bear its experience and expertise in election observation, ceasefire monitoring, demining, on-the-ground mediation, and post-conflict institution building.

However, not all of the OSCE’s past experiences in these areas were stellar successes. Getting the organisation into a position where it could meaningfully contribute to a lasting peace in Ukraine will require pain-staking, detail-oriented work in the corridors of the OSCE secretariat and the Hofburg in Vienna, not the megaphone diplomacy that tends to take place in the meetings of the Permanent Council or the Forum for Security Cooperation.

For the UK, the OSCE – notwithstanding the organisation’s ongoing crisis – still represents an important forum to articulate and pursue its national interests. While just one among several mini-lateralisms that have recently emerged — including the ‘coalition of the willing’, the European Political Community, the Ukraine Defence Contact (or Ramstein) Group — it is unique in the sense that it is one of the few remaining fora where direct dialogue with Russia is not just possible but embedded in the organisation’s founding purpose.

Such dialogue must, however, serve a concrete purpose, and it needs to be based on clear principles. As Chair of the Forum for Security Co-operation in the last trimester of 2026, and as a member of the Forum’s Troika in the preceding and subsequent trimesters, the UK is well positioned to support the Swiss Chairpersonship’s reform agenda and to contribute to restoring the OSCE’s operational effectiveness. This is further enhanced by the fact that the Head of the UK Delegation to the OSCE, Ambassador Neil Holland, will also continue in his role as Chair of the Security Committee, one of the informal subsidiary bodies of the Permanent Council, specifically charged with discussing politico-military issues and supporting the preparation of the Annual Security Review Conference, which provides participating States with an opportunity to discuss regional security issues in plenary form.

The UK’s long-standing experience in multilateral diplomacy, its role as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and its still pivotal role at the nexus of Euro-Atlantic security create a unique opportunity for making a lasting contribution to making the OSCE relevant again as a forum for dialogue among all its participating States. This will not be easy and success will not be guaranteed, but it will be a worthwhile investment of UK diplomatic resources and capacity.

An earlier version of this analysis was published by The Foreign Policy Centre on February 20, 2026.

We hope you’ll share Navigating the Vortex with anyone you think might find it of interest. Also, you can listen to our podcast editions via the website and on all major podcast platforms, including:

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The inaugural meeting of Donald Trump’s board of peace in Washington on February 19 caps a busy week for US diplomacy — though not necessarily for the country’s professional diplomats, who have been largely excluded from the close-knit circle of the US president’s personal envoys: his former real-estate business partner Steve Witkoff and son-in-law Jared Kushner.

Earlier in the week, Witkoff and Kushner attended two separate sets of negotiations in the Swiss city of Geneva. They first sat down for indirect talks with Iran, before then leading negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, and eventually dashing back to Washington to attend the board of peace meeting.

At best, Witkoff and Kushner have a mixed track record of diplomatic success. Kushner was a key mediator in the Abraham accords during Trump’s first term in office. Designed to normalise ties between Israel and other states across the Middle East, the accords have failed to create sustainable momentum for regional peace and stability.

So far, only the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan have established full diplomatic relations with Israel. Saudi Arabia — the most influential player in the Middle East by most measures — has not followed suit.

Witkoff has been credited with playing a key role in mediating the January 2025 ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. He was also involved in the negotiations around the Gaza peace plan later that year, which, with endorsement from the UN security council, gave rise to Trump’s board of peace.

Both men have also been at the centre of efforts to end Russia’s war against Ukraine. Witkoff has been involved from the start of Trump’s second term, with Kushner joining more recently at the end of 2025.

Yet, neither Kushner’s addition to the team, nor a greater focus on a parallel track of negotiations between Washington and Moscow, focused on the mutual economic opportunities that peace between Russia and Ukraine would create, have brought the warring sides closer to a deal.

Taken together, the outsized roles that Witkoff and Kushner are playing in US diplomacy — despite their limited success — expose a fundamental misunderstanding of what peace making involves.

Peace deals are generally complex. To get one across the line requires mediators and support teams that are deeply knowledgeable about the conflict in which they are mediating and have a detailed understanding of how a plethora of issues can be resolved in a technical sense.

Above all, mediators need to be aware of what has driven the parties to conflict and what might induce them to cooperate. While material incentives, such as the promise of economic development in exchange for peace, are important, warring parties often also have symbolic and psychological needs. These also need to be addressed to ensure the parties sign on the dotted line and will commit to peace in the long term.

Having just two people with little prior experience of diplomacy and almost no expertise on either of the two conflicts they are currently mediating simultaneously is a recipe for failure. It is likely to lead to a deal being pushed that is simply unattainable in the short term because at least one party will not sign.

And if a deal, against the odds, is agreed because of high pressure on one or both sides, it is unlikely to be sustainable in the long term because at least one of the parties will probably defect from it, and violence will resume. This is particularly likely if a deal lacks sufficient guarantees and enforcement mechanisms, because this lowers the threshold for defection for parties who are not negotiating in good faith.

It is easy to see how such calculations apply in the context of the war against Ukraine. The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, has repeatedly made it clear that the Kremlin’s demands — especially Ukrainian withdrawal from territory in the east it has so far successfully defended against Russia’s aggression — are not something he will agree to.

Even if he did, such a deal would almost certainly be rejected in a referendum. It will be psychologically close to impossible for Ukraine and Ukrainians to accept the humiliation of giving up something they have not lost, to reward Moscow’s aggression, and to be sold down the river by Washington in pursuit of an economic side-deal with Russia.

Similarly, it is easy to see that Russia is not negotiating in good faith. Moscow is presenting Kyiv with an ultimatum, while destroying as much as possible of the country — both to weaken Ukraine’s will to resist and to undermine its future recovery. Add to that Russian resistance to credible security guarantees, and the true intent of Russia’s negotiation strategy turns out to be not the achievement of sustainable peace, but preparation for the next war.

If and when negotiations on Iran or Ukraine break down, or if and when the agreements they might achieve collapse, supporting frameworks will need to be in place that can manage the consequences. Trump’s board of peace, which looks like a privatised version of the UN, is unsuitable for such a task.

Not only does it lack the legitimacy the UN has. There is also no indication that its members — be they the countries attending the inaugural meeting or the people serving at Trump’s pleasure in the board’s executive structures — have the intent or capacity to take on any actual peace-making role.

The board’s membership is, numerically at least, far below Trump’s aspirations. Only 24 of the 60 or so invitations sent out have been accepted. Traditional US allies in Europe and the G7 are absent. Among the attendees at the Washington meeting were the likes of Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Egypt, and even Belarus, a country sanctioned by the US and Europe for its support of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

At the end of the day, the inaugural meeting of Trump’s board of peace may be mostly remembered for its chairman-for-life threatening Iran with war. Apart from that, it might be able to establish a free economic zone here or there and generate some real-estate development. But much of that will not be done to achieve peace, but to benefit its members’ wallets or egos — or both.

An earlier version of this analysis was published by The Conversation on February 19, 2026.

We hope you’ll share Navigating the Vortex with anyone you think might find it of interest. Also, you can listen to our podcast editions via the website and on all major podcast platforms, including:

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In a surprise announcement on February 10, Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, said that his administration was preparing to hold presidential elections in Ukraine before the middle of May. Alongside the elections, a referendum on a peace deal with Russia is also likely to be held.

This is a dramatic shift in Zelensky’s stance: the president had long resisted elections under conditions of war despite the fact that his mandate ran out in 2024. One possible explanation for the turn-around is that US pressure on Ukraine is having some real effects now. A few days ago, Zelensky himself indicated as much, saying that his US counterpart, Donald Trump, was pushing for a negotiated end to the war by June.

Trump’s timeline — probably with an eye towards mid-term elections in the US where the White House would like to present a Ukraine deal as another major foreign-policy success — is one thing. The feasibility of elections and even more so of a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine is quite another one.

In fact, there are so many uncertainties about both that whatever plan Trump’s team around Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner has dreamed up will very likely unravel very quickly.

The first problem is all about the logistics of the elections.

Who will be eligible to vote and where, and who might monitor the elections to ensure that they are free and fair? Apart from the hundreds of thousands serving in the trenches defending Ukraine against Russia’s aggression, there are also 3.7 million internally displaced Ukrainians and almost 6 million refugees abroad. And then there are the approximately 5 million Ukrainians currently living under Russian occupation.

Add to this the uncertainty over a Russian ceasefire to facilitate not only the conduct of the elections themselves but also of a free and fair election campaign, and the prospects of organising any vote, let alone one of such consequence for the country and its people, look worse than daunting.

In addition, there is the near-certainty of large-scale Russian election interference, similar to what Moldova experienced during its presidential elections and European integration referendum in 2024, and again during parliamentary elections in 2025. Russian attempts to influence the outcomes of all of these votes in Moldova were shown to have clear limitations, but this will not deter Russia from trying again, and harder, in Ukraine.

A second problem is the feasibility of any peace deal between Russia and Ukraine.

At present, it is hard to imagine that the gaps between Russia and Ukraine can be bridged in a meaningful way that does not cross either side’s red lines — especially on territory and on security guarantees.

And even if it were possible to find a form of words to which the Russian and Ukrainian presidents could both sign up, the third problem is the approval of any such deal in a referendum in Ukraine.

Likely to be held on the same day as the presidential elections, a referendum would face all the same logistical pressures. What is more, the question of who would be eligible to cast their vote would be even more acute. How legal and legitimate would the result be if large numbers of eligible people were not able to participate? This will be a particularly challenging question for those Ukrainians who currently live under Russian occupation. Their fate would most likely be determined in a referendum in which they had no say.

Nor is it clear what would happen if a majority of Ukrainians rejected the settlement put to them in the referendum. Would it mean a return to negotiations? Possibly. Or an immediate resumption of the war? Probably.

A third option would be the continuation of a shaky ceasefire and the implementation of parts of any settlement beneficial to both sides, such as prisoner exchanges. As was the case with the ill-fated Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015, a return to all-out war, however, would remain firmly in the cards.

So far, Ukraine’s European partners have mostly been on the sidelines of negotiations. They may not be a direct party to the war, but they clearly have a stake in the peace terms that might now be hammered out between Moscow, Kyiv and Washington.

The mostly European coalition of the willing is expected to play a key role in the implementation of American-backed security guarantees and to do the heavy lifting on Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction.

After more than 12 months of hostility from Washington towards Brussels, there is little trust left in the dependability of US backing for Ukraine.

The fourth problem, therefore, is that European acquiescence to a US-imposed peace deal cannot anymore be taken for granted.

This does not necessarily mean that a deal is impossible, but it will almost certainly be so without Europe having played a part in its negotiation.

The French president, Emmanuel Macron, recently dispatched a senior diplomat to Moscow for talks in the Kremlin. And the country’s former permanent representative on the UN Security Council, Nicolas de Rivière, has been appointed as the new French ambassador to Moscow. This clearly signals the importance that Paris assigns to direct contacts with Russia.

The EU, according to its foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, might also appoint a special representative for contacts with Moscow — but of course only after the bloc has agreed on the messages it wants to send, which could take some time. But despite the fact that Brussels holds some powerful cards, including frozen Russian assets and a wide range of sanctions, there is no indication for now that either Washington or Moscow are willing to grant the EU a seat at the table.

The fifth and final problem is whether Russia will accept even the best possible terms in a peace agreement and stick to it.

The US push to seal a deal in the coming months suggests that there is some confidence in the White House that a deal acceptable to the Kremlin can be forged and that Ukraine and its allies can be coerced into going along with it.

There is a lot in what has transpired over the last few days that will be much to the liking of Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin: the promise of presidential elections in Ukraine, the US using its support for security guarantees as leverage to push Kyiv towards accepting more and more compromises, and the parallel US-Russia negotiations on an economic deal.

Putin has got to this situation without making any concessions. He has played his US counterpart perfectly so far, and there is no indication that he is done playing him. Trump is almost certain to continue to do Putin’s bidding. If and when his grandiose plan unravels, he is more likely to walk away than to put pressure on the Russian president.

It is not clear what the back-up plan is for Zelensky and his European allies.

Given that there is little to suggest that the current American plan and timeline for a deal will lead to a happy ending, they need to come up with, and act on, credible contingencies very soon.

Offering logistically almost impossible elections and a referendum with a highly uncertain outcome would be a smart way for the Ukrainian president and his European allies to buy themselves the time they need for a new strategy.

Putin may think that he has successfully tricked Trump into doing his bidding. But on this occasion, Zelensky may have outsmarted them both, albeit at the price of the war against his country continuing.

An earlier version of this analysis was published by The Conversation on February 12, 2026.

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Russia, Ukraine and the US have met for a second time in as many weeks to discuss a possible cessation of hostilities. The meeting got off to the same familiar and depressing start as the first one: on February 3, the night before the three sides gathered in Abu Dhabi, Russia launched a massive barrage of 521 drones and cruise missiles, once again targeting critical civilian infrastructure in Ukrainian cities, including the capital, Kyiv. And while the talks were in full swing, Russia followed up on its nighttime strikes by deploying cluster munitions against a market in Druzhkivka, one of the embattled cities in what remains of Ukraine’s fortress belt in the Donetsk region.

This was clearly not the most auspicious start to talks aimed at stopping the fighting that has now lasted almost four years.

Add to that the fact that the basic negotiating positions of Moscow and Kyiv remain as far apart as ever, and any hopes for an imminent breakthrough to peace in Ukraine quickly evaporate.

The more technical discussions on military issues, including specifics of a ceasefire and how it would be monitored, appear to be generally more constructive. Apart from a prisoner exchange, however, no further agreement was reached. But even such small confidence-building steps are useful. And even where no deal is feasible for now, identifying likely issues and mapping solutions that are potentially acceptable to both Moscow and Kyiv is important preparatory work for a future settlement.

Without a breakthrough on political issues, however, it does not get the conflict parties closer to a peace deal. These political issues remain centred on the question of territory. The Kremlin insists on the so-called “Anchorage formula” according to which Ukraine withdraws from those areas of Donetsk it still controls and Russia agrees to freezing the frontlines elsewhere.

Kyiv has repeatedly made clear that this is unacceptable. US mediation efforts, to date, have been unable to break the resulting deadlock.

The political impasse, however, clearly extends beyond territory.

Without naming any specific blockages to a deal, Yury Ushakov, a key advisor to the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, recently noted that there were other contested issues holding up agreement. Very likely among them are the security guarantees that Ukraine has been demanding to make sure that Russia will not renege on a settlement.

These future security guarantees appear to have been agreed between Kyiv and its European and American partners. They involve a gradually escalating response to Russian ceasefire violations, ultimately leading to direct European and US military involvement.

The Kremlin’s opposition to such an arrangement is hardly surprising. But it casts further doubt on how sincere Putin is about a durable peace agreement with Ukraine. In turn, it explains Kyiv’s reluctance to make any concessions, let alone those on the current scale of Russian demands.

What complicates these discussions further is the fact that the US is linking the provision of security guarantees for Kyiv to Ukrainian concessions on territory along the lines of the Moscow-endorsed Anchorage formula.

This might seem a sensible and fair compromise, but there are some obvious problems with it. First, it relies on the dependability of the US as an ultimate security backstop. But confidence, especially in Kyiv and other European capitals, in how dependable US pledges actually are, has been severely eroded during the first 12 months of Donald Trump’s second term in the White House.

Second, Europe is moving painfully slowly to fill this confidence gap and the additional void left by the US decision to halt funding to Ukraine. The details of a €90 billion loan agreed in principle by EU leaders in December, have only just been finalised. It will take yet more time for money to be available and to be used, including for essential arms purchases for Kyiv.

Doubts — as voiced by Nato secretary-general, Mark Rutte — also persist about whether, even in the long term, Europe will be able to develop sufficient and sufficiently independent military capabilities outside the transatlantic alliance.

As a result, there are few incentives for Kyiv to bow to US pressure and give up more territory to Russia in exchange for security guarantees that may not be as ironclad in reality as they appear on paper. Likewise, it makes little sense for Moscow to agree even to a hypothetical western security guarantee for Ukraine, which could thwart future Russian expansionism, in exchange for territory that the Kremlin remains confident it can take by force if necessary.

Russia will feel further reassured in its assumption that it can outlast Ukraine on the battlefield and at the negotiation table by developments in both Washington and Beijing.

In the US capital, there is still no progress on a new sanctions bill which has been languishing in the US senate since last spring, and which was allegedly “greenlit” by the White House four weeks ago. In addition, Trump’s top Ukraine negotiators — Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner — are now also engaged in negotiations with Iran. This further diminishes already sparse American diplomatic capacity and the ability to devote the time, resources and dogged determination likely required to pull off a deal between Russia and Ukraine.

Following Xi Jinping’s public affirmation of Chinese support for Russia in a video call between the two countries’ presidents on the anniversary of the declaration of their “no-limits partnership” in February 2022, Putin is unlikely to feel any real pressure to change his position from Beijing either.

With Russia’s intransigence thus reinforced and Ukrainian fears to be sold down the river by one of its key allies further entrenched, any claims of progress in the negotiations in Abu Dhabi are therefore at best over-optimistic and at worst self-deluding.

Given that such claims currently come prominently from Putin’s envoy Kirill Dmitriev, this once more underscores that US mediation between Russia and Ukraine serves the primary purpose of restoring economic relations between Moscow and Washington. Like Kushner and Witkoff, and ultimately Trump himself, Dmitriev is first and foremost a businessman.

This parallel track of Russia-US economic talks explains Trump’s reluctance to put any meaningful pressure on Moscow. More importantly, however, it also betrays the deep irony of the US approach to ending the war. As Europe painfully learned over more than two decades of engagement with Putin’s Russia, economic integration does not curb the Kremlin’s expansionism. It enables it.

An earlier version of this analysis was published by The Conversation on February 5, 2026.

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The first official and direct three-way talks between the United States, Russia and Ukraine since the beginning of Moscow’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 had been a rare sign of progress in an otherwise bleak start to the new year. But they ended without a breakthrough on January 24, with follow-up discussions before too long likely, but not certain.

It is hardly surprising that a peace agreement continues to elude the negotiators and mediators.

The fundamental disagreement between Moscow and Kyiv over the status of territory remains. Russia formally annexed four regions of Ukraine in September 2022 — in addition to the Crimean peninsula which it has occupied illegally since 2014 — but still does not fully control them after nearly four years of fighting.

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears convinced that his troops will eventually be able to capture the remaining Kyiv-controlled parts of the Donetsk region — some 5,000 square kilometres — just as they have done with almost all of the neighbouring region of Luhansk. At the current rate of Russia’s military progress, this could easily take another year; so Mr Putin would likely prefer to get his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, to withdraw his forces.

Mr Zelenskyy rejects the idea of giving up any territory that Russia has not been able to take by force — not least because there is no guarantee that the Kremlin would stop there. Ukrainian public opinion is largely behind him on this. In addition, the Ukrainian president cannot simply give away territory on his own. The Ukrainian constitution requires that any such deal be approved in a referendum.

More important still are strategic considerations. Those areas in the Donbas that Ukrainian forces still hold are part of the country’s best developed defensive lines, including several so-called fortress cities. Handing these over would leave Kyiv much more exposed in the future and give Moscow an improved staging ground for renewed offensives.

This makes an agreement on post-war security guarantees all the more crucial for Ukraine. After meeting with his American counterpart, Donald Trump, at the World Economic Forum in Davos just a day before the talks in Abu Dhabi, Mr Zelenskyy said that an agreement on security guarantees from the United States had been finalised. That may be so, but it has not been officially signed as yet, making any Ukrainian concessions even more risky.

As a result of their respective calculations, neither side appears to be willing to budge.

All of this should be fairly obvious to any mediator, and it is hard to see how the American team, led by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, can be blind to these facts.

If they were hoping to apply pressure on either or both sides to make concessions, their strategy has not, for now, worked.

Even in the chaotic foreign policy process of the current administration in the White House, it seems clear that American pressure on Russia is unlikely to be forthcoming in any meaningful way — and the Kremlin appears acutely aware of this.

Mr Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, made it very plain before the start of the trilateral discussions in Abu Dhabi on Friday that Russia’s demand for full control of the Donbas remained in place. Overnight, Russia then carried out another devastating strike against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, which is already teetering on the brink of collapse.

In addition, Russia continues to frame its current ‘offer’ to freeze the frontlines in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia in exchange for full control of Donetsk as the “Anchorage formula”, a term the Kremlin uses to refer to the agreement that Mr Putin and Mr Trump apparently struck at their summit in Alaska last August.

By couching its territorial demands in terms of the “Anchorage formula”, Moscow tries to establish a fait accompli that gives the impression of a properly negotiated deal, and crucially one agreed by the American president. It flatters the dealmaker in Mr Trump, presents a potentially significant win for Mr Putin, and casts Mr Zelenskyy in the light of the unreasonable spoiler if he rejects an ‘agreement’ he had no part in negotiating.

These are not the signals of good-faith negotiations.

After more than a year of so far fruitless efforts, Mr Trump’s team also still does not seem to understand that pressure on Kyiv alone is not going to get them, or anyone else, closer to a deal. US support remains important for Ukraine and gives Washington leverage over Mr Zelenskyy, but it is no longer the only game in town.

Mr Zelenskyy’s European partners remain steadfast in their backing and are picking up their game, albeit only slowly. The fact that Europe stayed united and faced Mr Trump down over his threats to annex Greenland — if need be, by force — will also weigh positively in Mr Zelenskyy’s calculations. With an even deeper rupture in the transatlantic alliance avoided for now, Europe will be both less distracted by threats from America and more focused on becoming strategically independent from its erstwhile senior partner in Washington.

It is also not entirely clear that American mediators would be ready for an actual deal between Russia and Ukraine.

The agreement on American security guarantees Mr Zelenskyy spoke of after meeting Mr Trump in Davos still requires the leaders to sign on the dotted line. Given the way in which Mr Trump has treated America’s hitherto closest allies just over the past few weeks, one might wonder how much American security guarantees can really still be relied upon.

A deal on rebuilding Ukraine in the event of a peace agreement is also nowhere near in sight. Moscow balks at the idea of paying reparations to Kyiv and instead suggested that some US$5 billion worth of its assets that are currently frozen in the United States should be used for the reconstruction of the Ukrainian territories that the Kremlin has illegally occupied. This is clearly a non-starter for Kyiv and Brussels alike.

The fact that all sides agreed in Abu Dhabi that they will continue their discussions is undoubtedly positive. But whether this implies that an actual negotiation process will now get under way and what its format and direction will be, no one knows. And thus, as Ukrainians continue to suffer through a very harsh winter, a ceasefire, let alone a peace agreement, seem as out of reach as ever.

An earlier version of this analysis was published by Channel News Asia on January 27, 2026.

We hope you’ll share Navigating the Vortex with anyone you think might find it of interest. Also, you can listen to our podcast editions via the website and on all major podcast platforms, including:

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The week that marked the first anniversary of Donald Trump’s return to the White House for a second term as US president was particularly turbulent, even by his standards and especially for the transatlantic alliance. If there was even a hint of Trump being capable of self-reflection, one could add that it was a rather embarrassing week for him — on at least three counts.

First, after much bluster about Greenland, including hints that if push came to shove he would authorise a military operation to get his hands on territory of long-standing Nato ally Denmark, Trump made a first climb-down and ruled out the use of force in his speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos on Wednesday. He also dropped the threat of imposing tariffs on the eight European Nato members who dispatched a small number of military personnel to Greenland in a highly symbolic show of support.

Second, and contrary to earlier pronouncements that the American security guarantee for Europe was conditional on allies’ financial contributions to Nato, he insisted that the US would always be there for its Nato allies. But, as is usually the case with Trump, it was one step forward, two steps back as he cast doubt on them reciprocating in an American hour of need.

Worse still, in a subsequent interview with Fox News, he denigrated the sacrifices of allied servicemen and women in Afghanistan, prompting a chorus of justified outrage from across the alliance. After a phone call with the British prime minister, Keir Starmer, on Saturday, and an expression of concern in a message conveyed “through backchannels” from King Charles III, Trump changed his tune. He did not exactly apologise, but he used his TruthSocial platform to praise the bravery and sacrifices of British soldiers in Afghanistan. No other Nato ally has received even that acknowledgement yet.

Third, by the end of the week we were also reminded that progress on one of Trump’s flagship projects — making peace between Russia and Ukraine — is as elusive as ever. The US president appeared to have had a constructive meeting with his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, in Davos. But a much-touted agreement on US security guarantees has not been officially signed yet. And no progress has been made either on a deal for Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction.

Two rounds of talks between Russian and Ukrainian negotiators in Abu Dhabi over the weekend failed to produce any concrete results apart from an agreement to meet again the following weekend. While Trump’s mediators tried, unsuccessfully, to push Moscow and Kyiv to compromise over the future of Ukrainian territory claimed but not controlled by Russia, the Kremlin’s relentless air and ground campaigns continued unabated — to bomb Ukraine into submission now and increase the costs for its post-war reconstruction later.

Contrary to how swiftly he threatened the imposition of tariffs on supposed allies for sending a few dozen soldiers to Greenland, Trump failed, yet again, to get tough on Putin. There is still no sign of a vote on a bipartisan sanctions bill which Trump allegedly greenlit in early January. The bill, in the making since the spring, aims to cripple Russia’s ability to finance its war against Ukraine and “to provide sustainable levels of security assistance to Ukraine to provide a credible defensive and deterrent capability.”

One could, therefore, argue that it was a bad week for Trump and a much better week for the rest of the western alliance. After all, Nato is still intact. Europe seems to have discovered more of a backbone and, perhaps more importantly, that pushing back against Trump is not futile. The US president has neither abandoned Zelensky nor walked away from mediating between Russia and Ukraine. And Trump might soon get distracted by plans for regime change in Cuba or Iran, preventing him from wreaking any more havoc in Europe.

But such a view underestimates both the damage already done to relations with the US and that yet to come. Consider the issue of Greenland. Trump’s concession to renounce the use of force was, at best, only a partial climb-down. Throughout his speech, Trump reiterated several times that he still wants “right, title and ownership” of Greenland. And as it’s not at all clear what his framework deal actually entails, his closing comments on Greenland included an unambiguous warning to other Nato members that they can “say ‘yes‘ and we will be very appreciative, or ... ‘no’ and we will remember.”

There is already, it seems, some advance remembering happening in Trump’s renamed Department of War, which released its new national defence strategy on Friday night. According to the document, the Pentagon will provide Trump “with credible options to guarantee U.S. military and commercial access to key terrain from the Arctic to South America, especially Greenland, the Gulf of America, and the Panama Canal.”

On Nato, Trump’s ambivalence towards the alliance goes deeper than his most recent comments. Critically, it is the casual nature with which Trump treats this core pillar of international security that has fundamentally undermined the trustworthiness of the US as a dependable partner. Combined with the efforts to set up his board of peace as an alternative to the UN, there can be little doubt left that the US president has his sights trained on the very institutions that Washington spent decades building.

When it comes to Ukraine, meanwhile, it seems that Trump uses the promise of signing the agreement on security guarantees to get Zelensky to make concessions on territory that Russia’s president Putin can bank — before balking at any security guarantees. Trump, judging by past performance, is then likely to water down what he apparently agreed now in order not to jeopardise a deal with Putin and Zelensky is, yet again, left in the cold.

For Trump, ending the war more and more seems primarily as a way to enable future business deals with Russia, even if it means sacrificing 20% of Ukrainian territory and the long-term security of European allies in the process.

The conclusion for European capitals to draw from a week high drama should not be that Trump and the relationship with the US can be managed with a new approach that adds a dose of push-back to the usual flattery and supplication. After one year of Trump 2.0, America-first has become America-only, and Europe and its few scattered allies elsewhere need to start acting as if they were alone in a hostile world. Because they are.

An earlier version of this analysis was published by The Conversation on January 26, 2026.

We hope you’ll share Navigating the Vortex with anyone you think might find it of interest. Also, you can listen to our podcast editions via the website and on all major podcast platforms, including:

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Even before marking the first anniversary of his return to the White House, United States President Donald Trump doubled down on his controversial and highly damaging bid to take over Greenland, warning on January 19 that being snubbed for the Nobel peace prize last year has made him no longer obliged to think “purely of peace”.

Three days later, during a speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Mr Trump backed down — somewhat — and ruled out the use of force in his pursuit of the world’s largest island. It was a climbdown of sorts, even perhaps mildly embarrassing for the US president, and not the first time that a combination of push-back from Congress and NATO allies together with an adverse market reaction made him change course.

So, how did we get there and is this the end of the Greenland saga?

Buoyed by what he clearly saw as a successful military operation in Venezuela and the subsequent apprehension of a Russian-flagged oil tanker in the North Atlantic, the US president seemed determined to annex Greenland — a move he has claimed is essential to US national security — no matter the consequences.

And these consequences were beginning to look more serious than ever.

A meeting of officials from the US, Denmark and Greenland on January 14 had failed to reach any breakthrough. The following day, several European countries deployed small contingents of their armed forces to Greenland, an autonomous territory of NATO and EU member Denmark.

The public message attached to this was that the Europeans were serious about their commitment to Arctic security — allegedly one of Mr Trump’s key concerns. But combined with combative rhetoric about Danish sovereignty and Greenlandic self-determination, Europe also sent a message to Mr Trump that he had crossed a line that could and would no longer be ignored.

Europe’s tougher stance on Greenland’s future did not mean that war between the US and its erstwhile European NATO allies was imminent or that the end of the transatlantic alliance was nearing, although the latter suddenly seemed a much more realistic possibility.

Trump’s initial response to this European escalation — as he must have perceived it —was threatening to impose an additional 10 per cent levy on all goods imported from the eight European countries that he saw as the main obstacle between him and his ambitions in Greenland. These new tariffs were to take effect on February 1, before an increase to 25 per cent in June.

The European response, at least rhetorically, was swift and clear: Europe will not be blackmailed. Even Italy’s leader, Giorgia Meloni, who is relatively close to Mr Trump, said the tariffs “would be a mistake”.

What it lacks in military heft, the European Union makes up in economic leverage, and in a potential trade war, the EU would definitely be a more formidable opponent for Mr Trump.

It still has some €93 billion worth of tariffs on US goods at the ready which Brussels drew up in response to Mr Trump’s so-called “Liberation Day” tariffs last April.

The EU took a pause on the implementation of these retaliatory tariffs when it managed to iron out a trade deal with the US last August. That six-month pause is running out on February 7. Unless there is a vote to extend the moratorium on their implementation, they will automatically come into force. This is an important consideration for both Brussels and Washington: it removes the threat of Mr Trump’s European allies, like Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban, blocking their extension.

An EU retaliation could quickly lead to an escalating tariff war. Given European dependence on the US for exports and imports of US-made weapons, Mr Trump, in all likelihood, has escalation dominance in a transatlantic trade war. This could then force the EU to deploy its ultimate trade weapon or the “big bazooka” — the so-called anti-coercion instrument.

Initially devised to deal with China, the powerful but never-before-used instrument gives the European Commission powers in various areas, including restricting US access to EU public contracts, investment and even trade in services, one of the few areas where the US runs a surplus.

Brussels might have had stronger cards in an economic war with the US, but if push came to shove, it would probably still have lost. But a win for Washington would also have come at a high cost for the US, never mind the irreparable damage to the West as we know it.

So, given these likely and unpleasant outcomes, why was Europe pushing back so hard, and why now?

First, it seemed clear that the strategy of flattering and placating Mr Trump had reached its use-by date. Europe is unlikely to be able to prevent a determined American president from taking Greenland, but it clearly also no longer wanted to pretend that these were just cultural misunderstandings among friends that could be magically fixed.

Second, part of the European strategy was playing for time. Mr Trump is keen on Greenland now, but who is to say that he might not think of an easier win elsewhere that would be less controversial domestically, say taking on cartels in Colombia or Mexico, or pushing for regime change in Cuba or Iran?

The closer the US gets to the mid-term elections in November, the more Mr Trump, and key parts of the MAGA establishment, will want to avoid debates that are difficult to sell as “America First”.

Third, still with at least half an eye on the US mid-term elections, the thinking in Brussels very likely also was that time that Europe buys itself and Greenland now is also time that will help already obvious bipartisan opposition to Mr Trump’s annexation plans in the US Congress to become more effective.

Ultimately, it seemed likely that a case could be made that any security concerns regarding Greenland are best dealt with through NATO, while the consequences for the US for going it alone — including paralysis, if not the outright dismantling of the transatlantic alliance — would harm America in its competition with China and severely limit its ability to project power outside the Western Hemisphere.

These calculations appear to have borne fruit. By the end of Mr Trump’s anniversary week, the threat of a military operation to take over Greenland was off the table and the idea of imposing tariffs on European NATO allies had been abandoned.

But what has crucially not been abandoned is Mr Trump’s desire to get his way on Greenland. He still wants “right, title and ownership” of Greenland, warning NATO members in his speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos that they can “say ‘yes‘ and we will be very appreciative, or ... ‘no’ and we will remember.”

Europeans should also take note that the new national defence strategy of the US, released late on Friday night, commits the Pentagon to provide Mr Trump “with credible options to guarantee U.S. military and commercial access to key terrain from the Arctic to South America, especially Greenland, the Gulf of America, and the Panama Canal.”

European pushback against Mr Trump’s obsession with Greenland has produced some positive results for now.

It is not clear how long they will last, let alone whether Europe has done enough to persuade Mr Trump to change course permanently and look for other ways to deal with a shared north Atlantic security concern.

If nothing else, having discovered some spine in dealing with Mr Trump pushes Europe further down the line of learning to stand — and walk — on its own feet. And a more formidable European ally might suddenly look more alluring again to Mr Trump or whoever succeeds him in the White House in 2029.

An earlier version of this analysis was published by Channel News Asia on January 21, 2026.

We hope you’ll share Navigating the Vortex with anyone you think might find it of interest. Also, you can listen to our podcast editions via the website and on all major podcast platforms, including:

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