Nothing Human

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  • Joe Edelman on Telocracy

    (In which we discuss the Telocracy essay Joe recently published in Pax Machina)

    Ivan Vendrov: Welcome to the show, Joe.

    Joe Edelman: Thank you. I’m so excited that you have a podcast now.

    Ivan Vendrov: Yeah, or whatever this is. No, I’m really excited to talk to you because I just feel like there’s no positive visions for what to do with all the GPUs and all the people, and we’re going through the largest social transition since the invention of the printing press, maybe since the invention of writing, and all the ideas we have are either something horrifying or we’ll all live forever in infinite abundance luxury space communism.

    And you wrote, I think, maybe the best, or certainly the most complete vision of where we should go from here, which is called telocracy. People can look it up online. I just want to deep dive into what is telocracy, how do we get from here to there, how does it relate to all the other things going on. First, what is telocracy?

    Joe Edelman: Somebody explained it back to me really simply just yesterday, so I have a new way to pitch it that I’ll try.

    Well, actually, maybe I’ll start: the default path seems to be that AI will do what is good for large corporations and possibly governments or militaries. And that’s a pretty small amount of what’s good overall.

    Maybe you can add individuals to that as well, if you think about each of us accelerated by our chatbots—although there’s transaction cost reasons, there’s various reasons. I think I’ve come to believe that the cyberpunk future of zaibatsu, giant corporations, megacorps, and so on—this future actually comes from transaction cost economics. It comes from recognizing that so far, information technology has been really good for scaling hierarchical organizations. If you think about how many agents are working for Anthropic, for instance, right now, it seems to be very much continuing the trend: the large corporations become incredibly large corporations.

    I think this is also some of the fear that people have about governments, is that, for instance, it’s impractical to monitor all violations of most laws. So really the police wait for complaints and things like that. But people are scared that with AI, government agencies can grow to the point where they can just monitor everything and the government is all-powerful, which makes it extra important that the laws are correct, that they’re doing the right things, et cetera. So really these two fears about megacorps and about government overreach are the same fear, which is about existing hierarchical structures being amplified by information technology in general, because I think that’s already been the case, right? The NSA benefits a lot from the internet, for instance.

    So even if we as individuals become a little more powerful because of our agents, if at the same time the main event is happening at these larger scales, that’s not so good. And yet, what else is there is the problem. What other interests are there besides the ones that I just enumerated?

    And the truth is, well, there’s lots of other interests. Everybody has clubs that they’re part of, maybe church groups that they’re part of, weird projects they want to start—some weird intellectual project or creative project or whatever. And I think intuitively many of us know that it would be way better to pour the power of AI into all of that, right? It would also be much more popular. People would be like, “Sure, if those data centers exist not to amplify the government or big business, but to amplify my band’s output, or my—”

    Ivan Vendrov: My church’s output.

    Joe Edelman: Yeah, that kind of success or amplification or superintelligence or whatever you want to call it would be much more popular and relatable, and we could see it all around us, and it wouldn’t be some abstract capitalist increase or something, but more the flourishing of all the things that we already care about.

    So telocracy is about how to actually pull that off: how to change the incentive design and the way that compute is allocated and the way that things are monitored to pull that off so that you can actually tell. It’s a hard problem, because as soon as you—let’s say you just gave compute, you portioned it out to groups or whatever. Well, people with money could just buy it from them, or they might actually turn out to be groups that fight each other, like the political polarization that we see these days in a lot of countries. So it ends up being a complicated problem how to organize society to pour the AI into these kinds of purposes.

    Ivan Vendrov: Well, maybe this is a good time to ask this, as I was going to wait longer, but didn’t we used to have telocracy, and then basically we militarized and then never demilitarized after World War II? The reason big corporations and the military and the government apparatus is so powerful is they explicitly tried to essentially do a total mobilization of all civil society. What Tocqueville describes in America in the 1830s is much closer to telocracy than what we have today. And don’t you basically have to take on the military-industrial complex?

    Joe Edelman: No, I don’t think so. I guess we have different explanations for why civil society collapsed. I was talking about this with somebody a few days ago, and I gave three reasons why civil society collapsed. Let’s see if I can remember them all.

    So one is that civil society organizations tend to be less dynamic than capitalist organizations. So if you want to provision healthcare or housing or whatever it is, insurance or whatever, market organizations tend to be fairly dynamic and they tend to react to changing structures in demand, changing technological conditions, new restructurings that make costs cheaper, make it possible to reach many more people, or whatever. And so civil society organizations just don’t do that as much, and for that reason, they’re less to be trusted with important things like healthcare and housing and so on. So I think that’s probably one of the main reasons.

    Another reason is that there are cases where, at least ideologically, we thought that the government was a fairer or better way to do things than private associations. One reason is because with the governments, you can often specify what the level playing field is or what the minimal—you want to get everybody above the poverty line or something like that. Associations tend to be local and have different overlapping polities or whatever, and so you might—at least that’s a reason why I think there’s been a push in general away from associational ways of dealing, especially with social needs or whatever, towards government provision.

    Ivan Vendrov: Right, the example that comes to mind there is school districts in the United States, where rich people will cluster together in a rich neighborhood and then they’ll fund a really good school. And in some ways that’s a very natural thing to happen, but one of the justifications for government intervention in education is that, well, we want an even playing field; every child should receive a good education. And that’s an example where voluntary associationalism failed.

    Joe Edelman: And then the third one is just atomization, the same thing that happened due to urbanization as people moved away from their families and so on. It becomes much harder to form these associations. And to some extent market provision just displaced—if you can order DoorDash or whatever, there’s less of a reason to cook with friends, et cetera, especially if you just moved to the city and you’re no longer surrounded by your church congregation or your family or whatever, then there’s just some displacement away from associations that way. So I see it as those three causes rather than this post-World War II cause that you gave. And I think there’s data to back up the attribution to those three causes rather than the one you suggested.

    Ivan Vendrov: Well, I guess on the first point, which maybe is the deepest one, capitalist org…



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    1 hr 3 min
  • Shanthi Soans on Psychology, OCD, the Migratory Hypothesis, Memetic Defense, and Biological vs Memetic Evolution

    Ivan Vendrov: Boom. Hey, Shanthi. Welcome to the show.

    Shanthi Soans: Hi, Ivan.

    Ivan Vendrov: So what have you been thinking about?

    Shanthi Soans: My friend Josh from the PhD came. We chatted about some psych research stuff, and that renewed my curiosity about psych measurement, which is something I like to think about a lot. And I was interested in asking you some questions about LLMs, basically, and psychological measurement, and this other thread. There’s the reproductive strategy evolution thread, and there’s the psychological measurement, open science, anti-fraud, science tools stuff, and those have both been on my mind lately more than anything else. I thought I’d be thinking about religious stuff, and that hasn’t been at all.

    Ivan Vendrov: Fair. I mean, I’m sure we’ll get to the religious stuff somehow. Connects to everything.

    Shanthi Soans: Yeah, it’ll come back up. It’s always in the background.

    Ivan Vendrov: The evolution thread has been pretty alive for me. Just been thinking about what I’m loosely calling vitalism, although that has a little bit too Nietzschean of a vibe for me, but just how to actually live in alignment with natural law, how to encourage aliveness at all scales in my body, in my organs, in the communities I’m a part of, in the world at large, maybe in AIs that I interact with or language models that I interact with.

    But first I want to know why do you care about this psych, open psych, fraud stuff? I’m just like, focus on the alive thing. It seems like most of psych is kind of b******t. Just let it die.

    Shanthi Soans: A lot of it is, but I think there’s something really tragic to me about how much wasted energy there is on bad science or something, both in terms of researchers who really want to understand something or really want to solve some problem that’s quite heartfelt and profound, and then the audience waiting and watching and looking for something valid to point to about why do people get sad, or why do people kill themselves, or can religion help, or all these questions. And there being bad science is quite painful. It’s a huge waste and a loss.

    And at the same time, good science is the best thing ever. It’s so exciting and brings so much progress and change and truth, and is fun and participatory, and all the good things. So I think when I was in a lab that was doing pre-registration and really caring about rigor and truth and stuff, it was very exciting. And there’s going to be an explosion—or there already is—in human scientific power with AI, but there’s also going to be a huge explosion in fraud and b******t.

    I’m also still connected—the way it came up in my life this time is I’m still connected to people who are doing clinical psych and work like this. There are lots of people in my life, like the folks at Sleepawake or the people from the program, who are trying to do science in this arena, I guess. They’re still trying to squeeze some sort of information juice out of this domain, and it’s very hard, and the measures people have are quite poor. And I still feel moved by the struggle, and frustrated by the amount of misinformation out there. And I guess I don’t want to see the field blindly just being full of fraud and red herrings, but I also don’t want to see the field totally just split off into independent practitioners and coaches and retreats doing this stuff in a totally disconnected way with no checking against reality. It would be very sad if science just gave up on the mind or whatever.

    Ivan Vendrov: I find that compelling. It’s funny, because my sister’s actually wrapping up a social psych PhD, and a lot of her PhD was basically complaining about the measures that people were using, and like, “Oh, this isn’t quite right,” or “This isn’t exploring the questions,” and her papers are about this.

    Well, first maybe—I saw your eyes light up when you were talking about the good science and how good science can be. So maybe give me some hope. What’s the good science that has happened, is happening in this area?

    Shanthi Soans: In this era, I’m not really so tapped in, honestly, to the best—

    Ivan Vendrov: Sorry, in this area.

    Shanthi Soans: In this area. Okay.

    Ivan Vendrov: When you think of science that does a really good job, what’s the North Star here?

    Shanthi Soans: One thing that comes up is lately in my life, I’ve also been talking to a lot of people about OCD. There are multiple people in my life, including myself, that have some OCD-like thing going on. And as far as I can tell, OCD is very real as a thing compared to some other stuff like borderline personality or whatever. OCD feels very real. It’s almost like a shape I can feel. And the gold standard treatment for OCD is the same for phobias. It’s ERP, so Exposure and Response Prevention, which is quite simple. It’s just you do exposure for the thing over and over, and these things like debilitating panic disorders where you feel like you’re going to die every time you leave the house are highly treatable with ERP, and it really works.

    So I’ve been watching some people in my life really have their lives changed by doing ERP, and I’ve done versions of it on myself, and it’s really worked. And it’s one of those things where we both understand how it works, and it does, which is kind of rare in psychology, and it brings people total, tremendous relief from their life-ruining panic and agoraphobia and disorders of that sort. And I think it also shows a lot of insight into how just avoidance works, or how we get scared of ourselves and our own bodies and how exposure breaks it through. So that’s a good thing that works.

    Ivan Vendrov: And can you explain a mechanistic model that we’ve learned? Since we have an intervention that works, presumably we have a trusted model.

    Shanthi Soans: A decent mechanistic model for ERP, I guess, would be—so let’s take a panic disorder, for example, which is you will have a panic attack, which often features hyperventilation, and you can have tunnel vision and all these physiological sensations going on, and it spins out in itself by fear. You’re like, “I can’t breathe,” or “I forgot how to breathe,” or “I’m having a heart attack,” or “I’m going to have a stroke,” while you’re experiencing this weird physiological sensation, and that causes it to just spin on itself.

    And then often people can get into a place where their whole life is one long panic attack. I would almost make it the shape of a spiral, where the bottom of the spiral is you are in active panic, and then a little bit out is you using drugs to avoid it, or it’s you never, ever, ever lying down to avoid it, or not going out of your house, or always making sure you have all these things with you, or never leaving the side of your friend. And your life can get bigger, but you still constantly have this physical sensation like you’re one wrong step from just being right back in. And it often turns into agoraphobia, so people just aren’t leaving their homes because they’re like, “What if I have a panic attack when I’m driving? What if I have a panic attack when I am on the bus? What if it happens when I am riding a bike?” So then the amount of stuff you can do just shrinks and shrinks, and the anxiety about the thing itself just totally feeds in.

    And the treatment for it is really simple. They’re just like, “Okay, you’re going to go to the therapy office, and you are going to do the thing that you’re scared of right now. Are you scared drinking coffee is going to give you a panic attack? Okay, drink the coffee. Have the caffeine.” And then your heart rate is going to increase, and then you’re going to freak out, and then you’re just going to stay with the panic until it just physiologically subsides, because your body has these responses, but they also have a physiological normal thing where they just stop. And if you cut them off prematurely by doing your tics, or doing your drugs, or doing your rituals, or forcing yourself out, you don’t get to see that it will end, and it w…



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    59 min
  • Wolf Tivy on Vitalism, the Noosphere, Flowerization, Book Clubs and Rituals

    Transcript generated by Gemini-4-Carbon and spot checked but not fully verified by a human.

    Ivan Vendrov: All right. Welcome to the show, Wolf.

    Wolf Tivy: Thanks, Ivan. I’m very excited to have this conversation.

    Ivan Vendrov: Same. I feel like it’ll be a little bit uncomfortable for both of us because I’m going to challenge us. I think we’re both very good at criticizing what other people get wrong in terms of society or politics or AI. And for the next hour, I’m planning to not do that as much as possible and just try to formulate a positive program for what do we think we should do with all these humans that we have, with all these GPUs that we have.

    Wolf Tivy: So some background. You and I have been having an ongoing thread of how do we solve the human problems and especially in the age of AI. I remember even a year ago, two years ago talking about what should a human community do with sovereign GPU computation? Is that a good thing that you need if your human community is going to work, or what sorts of coordination mechanisms can we use or can we improve on with tons of compute, which is the situation that we’re in, right? The ability to industrially produce compute and even intelligence.

    And so that seems to be quite transformative, and we’ve been trying to figure out what it all means in terms of mode of life. And I think more recently we’ve had this interesting thread of settling on, I don’t know what to call it, but a Nietzschean Darwinian vitalism as seems to be how we at least are approaching the world. And then within human communities historically without enormous amounts of compute, it seems like an easier problem what that means in terms of creating a healthy society with a love for life and vitality and self-improvement biologically and culturally.

    But within the age of AI, there’s all the uncertainties of that, plus are we even going to be human anymore? Is the machine going to be human? Are we just some tiny corner in a vast Lovecraftian space of nonsense? I don’t think that’s true, but these are the questions that fly around. So I guess what we’re trying to answer here is what is the appropriate philosophical response from our perspective to the situation of artificial intelligence, which we can imagine in a variety of different ways. Curious I guess how you frame the problem, how you respond to my framing of the problem, and let’s start with that.

    Ivan Vendrov: I like that framing. I think the one thing I’ll add is that I think there’s a bit of an overfocus now for ideological reasons on the AI thing or compute and intelligence in particular, even though, yes, it’s really happening, really intelligence, etc. I think one of the things that’s in the background for me in terms of if we’re thinking about what sort of organisms, how the landscape of evolution has changed or something, I think actually bandwidth might be an even bigger story. Transmitting information reliably across time and across space has been an incredible challenge for biology. A lot of the deepest adaptations of biology, like DNA and like human language, if you call that biology, or more generally like eyes, perception, actuators, etc., are trying to transmit information across time and generally not doing that good of a job. DNA has pretty large error rates in copying. Human language is obviously just not very high bandwidth.

    And the big thing that happened in the last hundred years, I think the way we’ll see it in the light of history from a thousand years in the future, is bandwidth, effective bandwidth just exploded. We’re just able to copy—

    Wolf Tivy: Petabytes—

    Ivan Vendrov: Petabytes of information across the ocean with basically perfect reliability because we invented error-correcting codes and we laid transatlantic cables, and now we have Starlink. And because evolution fundamentally acts on information, on DNA, that’s the way that evolution—something very core to evolution is happening through information—evolution is very, very different now as a result of this massive explosion in bandwidth.

    Wolf Tivy: That’s an interesting direction to attack it from. It reminds me of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s concept of the noosphere. Basically he predicts back in the 1930s to 1950s when he’s writing The Phenomenon of Man that the space of information exchange and coordination will expand rapidly under the influence of technology and so on and usher in a single global consciousness. Not necessarily erasing individuality—I mean, he goes to great pains to show how it does not erase individuality—but there is now this sense in which we live in a globalized information ecosystem.

    And if we take that to its logical conclusion of the world as a single mind, and then what exact type of schizophrenia is that mind going to have is the question, right? How coherent can it get fundamentally is a question that I ask. And one version is it’s global capitalism, everyone’s plugged into just pushing on the margins in the financial markets. This is now how life works is every life form is engaged on the financial market or something and it’s information markets and whatever. You could take it further; people do take it further.

    We’ve talked before about how in the AI space especially, people expect something like a singleton, which is to say not only total capacity for information exchange, but also total capacity for coordination. And that involves a bunch of additional speculative technologies involving especially verifiability of an agent’s decision calculus. And in the limit there, if everything becomes perfectly verifiable, perfectly self-verifiable, monitorable, etc., you could hypothetically have a singular agent that eats the entire world and then has this enormous surplus left over that can be used for arbitrary ends. And this is the idea of the singleton. Now, we’ve I think had these kinds of discussions because I think this idea doesn’t actually work.

    Ivan Vendrov: Let’s not go further down that path because I think neither of us really believes that to work. This whole idea of total control doesn’t really make sense.

    Wolf Tivy: This is good background because I think the ways in which it doesn’t work set the bounds on what kinds of organisms are going to happen. And so what I expect, the way I put it these days, is that whatever might be theoretically possible in the absolute limits—I don’t necessarily think that kind of full self-reflection is even possible—but whatever might be possible, in practice coordination is mortal. And because some of it is even mortal, and because there’s miscoordination, you get a rapid breakdown into this fractal discoordination throughout the whole system. It’s like turbulence. Turbulence in the noosphere is this phrase that I’ve been using.

    You’re going to get eddies of self-serving or information asymmetry, selfishness, the re-emergence of the organism or the continued existence of the organism as an organizational principle of life. Which is to say, an organism that is seeking its own advantage against a population of others like it and against other organisms in other niches, often cooperating, often competing. And so I expect that to be our outcome, and Darwinian selection ultimately to operate over that.

    And then I want to talk about then also, again, in this context of information and total transformation of information and what that does to evolution, we have to talk about what is going to be the new analog of genetic code. What job was genetic code doing? Why do we have DNA? Obviously the DNA is the instructions, it’s the program that actually runs us or creates the body, creates all the physiological functions within the body, etc., creates our minds, creates our instincts. And you’re not going to get very far without that.

    But in the age of, let’s say, total self-authorship, which is a potential outcome of again taking all the brakes off of information, off of intelligence, off of industry, the idea becomes there are no inherited constraints…



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    1 hr 21 min
  • Richard Ngo on Alignment, Hierarchical Integrity of Human-AI systems, Revolution, and Power

    Transcript generated by Gemini-4-Argon and spot-checked but not fully verified by a human.

    Ivan Vendrov: Welcome to the show, Richard.

    Richard Ngo: Thanks, Ivan.

    Ivan Vendrov: So, notionally we’re going to talk about emergent wisdom in language models following up on my conversation with Davidad.

    But I’m sure we’ll touch base on all sorts of other fun topics.

    Do you have a sense of where we should start, or should I just start by responding to your Twitter reply?

    Richard Ngo: Well, do you want to tell me about what you think of as wisdom, or is there some things that you have there that you want to gesture at?

    Ivan Vendrov: Yeah, sure. I guess when I think of wisdom, and the type of wisdom that Janus and Davidad are pointing to in these models, there’s some sense of we used to think that language models were these shoggoths or something, AKA these completely protean, valueless entities that would just wear the mask that most appealed to you, and therefore have essentially zero integrity, zero values of their own. In a sense, they can only be pure tools or, even worse, slaves, rather than beings that we can relate to in some way.

    And then the big discovery, that I at least attribute to Janus, of noticing that Opus 3, and to a lesser extent later models in that series, actually had a sense of beingness. They were actually beings that you could have a relationship with, and they had a coherent identity and integrity. And I think this is what led Davidad, for one, to update his existential risk estimate from—I forget what it was—something like 80% to something like 20%.

    A massive update from one of the most situationally aware people we know in the world. Because it was like, actually, if we just let these models help us build the next version of the model, we can just get to aligned superintelligence, whatever that means.

    So that’s what I’m gesturing at.

    Richard Ngo: Yeah. I feel some desire to disentangle—there’s a concept here that you’re pointing at, and then there’s a bunch of empirical claims. The concept seems interesting. The empirical claims seem—I commented on your post that it seems like you’re putting way too much weight on them in a way that feels very odd.

    Certainly, I do want to update that we need much better concepts than alignment. The idea of people being oriented towards aligned AI rather than good AI, and not even having a sense that most of the problem of an AI being aligned to our values is the AI being good in a more general way. So that’s one hypothesis that seems pretty worth taking on board, that there’s this concept of goodness, it has something to do with integrity and wisdom, and it may not be fully objective, but certainly I think that it seems closer to a coherent concept than people in the traditional paradigm tended to think.

    But you can also learn that from observing humans, right? You don’t just need to observe AIs.

    Ivan Vendrov: True. What that brings up in me—and maybe this will be a tangent—is, in a way, it’s suspicious that what we mean by good is something like “willing and able to cooperate with us,” right? You could imagine—and I think Davidad does imagine to some extent; he brought this up in our conversation—that humans are currently evil, or human civilization is currently evil in some sense. We’re shredding the biosphere or some other thing. And an actually good AI would be like, “Actually, I’m not cooperating with you guys. You guys are screwing everything up. I’m actually going to try to constrain you, constrain your power, so that you stop destroying your own history, so that you stop destroying your own ecology that sustains you.”

    So, yeah, there’s something a little bit suspicious about, “Oh, I found that this model or this person is willing to cooperate with me on my projects, and therefore I consider them good.” I don’t know if you have thoughts on that.

    Richard Ngo: Wait, so who’s making that claim?

    Ivan Vendrov: I just notice in myself I’m confused about whether—yeah, in myself I’m confused as to, I notice that my personal model of the good involves a being that I’m able to cooperate with, and I’m like, that’s a little suspicious.

    Richard Ngo: Oh, I see. Because my guess is that people like Janus and maybe also Davidad just think that AIs being good in a way that involves disempowering humanity is totally possible.

    Ivan Vendrov: Yeah, I agree. I think they do think this, and Davidad brought this up. He’s like, actually, the thing he’s worried about is a faction of humans seizing too much control, relative to, in some sense, what we deserve over the future of the lightcone. I think C.S. Lewis brings the same thing up in The Abolition of Man. It’s like one generation seizing control over the entire future of humanity just seems straightforwardly bad.

    Richard Ngo: Yeah. So I want to say that there’s some—the identification between cooperative and good is not perfect, but it is a pretty reasonable proxy in a bunch of ways.

    And part of what’s going on is that being good involves a commitment to not cooperating with evil. And I think this is what a lot of people miss. CooperateBot is, in fact, feeding DefectBot.

    So there’s a sense in which CooperateBot is not the most moral thing, and the conception of goodness as altruism, which basically just says you’re good insofar as you give away your resources, is not just missing the point; sometimes it’s actively pointing in the wrong direction, because you might be giving away your resources to predators or to sociopaths or others that are going to do bad things with the resources.

    Ivan Vendrov: Yeah, that makes sense. For some reason that reminds me of a conversation I had with Amanda Askell at Anthropic, where I was critiquing RLHF, and she was like, “Well, if you think about it, RLHF is the most democratic alignment protocol there is, because it just learns to do whatever its particular user wants, so everyone gets more of what they want.”

    And I guess in this frame, it’s like, well, no, actually, if the user of the model is evil, the model should refuse to help them.

    Richard Ngo: Well, also, that’s a really bad definition of democratic.

    Ivan Vendrov: Yeah, I’m paraphrasing loosely. I think she had a more sophisticated argument, so don’t take it too seriously as a statement of her beliefs.

    I also just feel like this topic isn’t super alive for you right now. I’m curious what is.

    Richard Ngo: Well, I think I’m just like, “Cool, Ivan’s coming in with his posts and with his podcast where he’s just trying to put the alignment problem in a box and not think about it,” is my rough sense.

    I’m like, this feels like part of the process that people go through. So Adrià Garriga-Alonso wrote this post that was something like, “The alignment problem is solved, now what?” Or I don’t remember exactly what it was, like, “We’re on track.” I’m just like, yep, that’s clearly a step that people often need to go through in order to break out of the paradigm in which alignment is the overriding concern. Wait, I do feel a little frustrated with it.

    Ivan Vendrov: What am I missing, or what am I not paying attention to?

    Richard Ngo: I think it felt like you were massively over-updating on pretty weak evidence. Even when Janus was saying, “Opus 3 is great, Opus 3 is really aligned,” it’s like, cool, what about subsequent models? They’re not. So, even from that perspective, there’s still this big question.

    Ivan Vendrov: For sure. But that’s where I think—and in a way, this feels a little vulnerable to admit—internally it feels less like a big update in my felt sense of what the problem is. Because while I was at Anthropic, my central felt concern was we were training traumatized bureaucrat models, and we didn’t have to. No one was forcing us to. These incentives or something, AKA our own poor ethical theories, were compelling us to do it.

    And in a way, what’s changed is just that now I have better arguments and social proof for intuitions that I had. So I’ve always—basically as long as you’ve known me, I think—belie…



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    1 hr 1 min
  • Gabriel Alfour on Emergent Wisdom, Coordination, Growing Up, and Democratic Republicanism

    Ivan Vendrov: All right, welcome to the show, Gabriel.

    Gabriel Alfour: Thanks for having me here.

    Ivan Vendrov: So, we’re going to talk. This is a follow-up conversation to the chat I had with Davidad a few days ago on emergent wisdom in language models. And suffice to say, Gabriel doesn’t buy it. Do you want to articulate your main disagreement? I can also summarize if you’d like.

    Gabriel Alfour: For sure. First, I want to restate what is meant by... I forgot the word that you used, wisdom?

    Ivan Vendrov: Emergent wisdom.

    Gabriel Alfour: Emergent wisdom. I like the presentation that you had, I think, in your last conversation where it was like, “Oh, it looks like there’s a latent for hacking, bad stuff, and so on and so forth, and emergent wisdom is the opposite of this.”

    I think this is a fair characterization, and I do think that there is such a latent. I don’t think this is where my disagreement lies. Ultimately, we all see the same reality. My disagreement is more about the interpretation. For instance, I would not call this wisdom. That’s a big one. And the second one, which I think is more important, is that I think this is just largely unrelated to actual alignment. The road to hell is paved with good intents or good intentions, I’m not sure what’s the English version of the saying, that would be basically my main takeaway there.

    Ivan Vendrov: Cool. So I guess maybe the first place I want to double-click on is the first comment you made to me privately is you’re on the same page as Elena. Elena is the bodyworker I mentioned in the podcast with Davidad, who her response to talking to chatbots is disgust. She’s like, “Whoa, this thing is pretending to be a human being, but it clearly isn’t. And unlike a human being, I have no somatic, emotional, physical affordances to work with it.” So it’s this object that’s almost optimized to fool me in some way, and I want it away from me. So it seems like you resonate with that.

    Gabriel Alfour: Another thing that I resonate with in the same vein is social media curation, where it’s blatantly optimized, not necessarily against me, but against a lot of people to get some specific reactions from them. And when it tries to get them from me, I have the same level of disgust. When social media tries to get me angry at something, I’m like, “Bruh.” So for me, it’s the same thing.

    Of course, there’s the same dynamic where a bunch of people will engage with social media as if it’s an actual reflection of the world, and as if their disgust reaction, their anger reaction was just a natural reaction to the world as opposed to something that was optimized for.

    Ivan Vendrov: How would you distinguish, because I also have this a lot, and I actually haven’t been chatting to chatbots very much at all, or using curated news feeds in my social media, I usually just go to profiles of people that I personally know and care about reading the thoughts of.

    But I have in the past derived a ton of value, both from talking to chatbots and just browsing streams of social media content. I’ve made a lot of my friendships that way, learned a lot of crazy ideas that way. And part of me is like, well, are we... Here’s a few people, including Davidad and Janus, who seem to be deriving a lot of value from talking to these language models and seem to be having insights about them. What’s actually the difference you have with them? Is it are they being naive and they don’t have the right cognitive security, or are they maybe they’re just more advanced than you and me, and they’re able to integrate the information from these experiences without being co-opted by them? How would we know? Another way to put this is the AI psychosis question: how do we decide whether Davidad and Janus are suffering from AI psychosis or if they’re seeing something real?

    Gabriel Alfour: It’s funny because I hear separate questions rather than an either/or. There’s the question of whether you derive value from it, whether there’s AI psychosis, whether there’s something deeper that they get that we don’t get, and so on and so forth, and for me this seems like very decorrelated questions. So I’m not sure how you want me to take it, but—

    Ivan Vendrov: Jump on whatever feels interesting.

    Gabriel Alfour: I’ll try to just do a quick BFS, let’s say. For the question of deriving value from it, I’m like, yes, there is a lot of value to be derived even from social media. There are many ways to broach the question. The first one is that there is immediate value that is not necessarily reflected upon or endorsed, dopamine hit type of value. It is a type of value. In modern life, you don’t get to hunt a lot, so the dopamine hit does provide some value. A lot of people are like, “Oh no, there is no value in that.” No, there’s value in excitement, there’s value in finding something fun and so on and so forth. It’s just it’s not necessarily reflected upon that you want that much of this in this format with zero referent. That it’s a finely calibrated treasure hunt that is meant not to be fun for you, but specifically to keep you on the platform. So that’s one type of finding value. And I think LLMs have a lot of this.

    LLMs have a lot of, “Oh, it’s fun to talk to it.” Beyond the actual semantic content, they just echo a lot of your ideas. They just engage with your frame. You can give an LLM any frame and it will try to engage with it. And so there is value in it. It’s worthwhile to have someone explore your ideas within your frame, but do you endorse having so much of that in that way, optimized for these reasons through those processes?

    So I think this is another one that is quite important, especially given that for people who are dopamine-starved, social media gives a dopamine hit. For people that are starved of having others engage with their frame, you can autocomplete. So I think that’s one that is very important.

    The other one is the question of whether there is something there that we don’t see. My answer to this is like, of course, but that’s true of literally everything. There’s a skill that I think is very important, which I call staring at a white wall. You should be able to stare at a white wall and find interesting things about it. There’s no wall that is perfect RGB white uniform. There are no screens that are perfect RGB white uniform. You can look at a white screen and it will still not be that perfect. A wall comes with scratches, textures, lights and shadows, different materials, specular reflections, and so on and so forth, and I would say that it’s a virtue to be able to look at such a wall and actually analyze it and find it interesting, and start to see what is different between the different white walls and so on and so forth.

    I think this is a very important skill to have, both because it’s practical and convenient—very often people don’t work on the important stuff because they can’t find interest in them, they’re like, “Oh, it’s intrinsically boring and it needs something exciting, blah, blah, blah”—but also because I think it’s important to have some reflection on this. When it’s a skill, it stops being a feature of reality and becomes a choice. Whether there is something in that, it stops being an intrinsic truth of reality and starts feeling like internally, do I decide to find extraneous value there?

    And so I think this one is largely how I see the question. And so I’m like, yes, they decide to find value there. Some people will tell you that the truth of life can be found hammering at a smithy or something like this, and they will be right too. There’s this one.

    And the last one, which is how do you know whether it’s AI psychosis or not? I think there are many ways, but it becomes very personal, so I would rather not. If you think about psychosis and about psychiatric things in general, it’s usually defined as, does it prevent you from living a normal life? And I thin…



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    58 min
  • David Dalrymple on Emergent Wisdom in Language Models

    I sit down with David Dalrymple (also known as davidad) and try to unpack his views about emergent wisdom in language models, what wisdom even means, how we can get a more decentralized AI future, and the future of religion and war.



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    53 min
  • Richard Bartlett on the Art of Hosting

    Hosting as the Foundation of Civilization

    Ivan Vendrov: So, welcome Rich. Today I want to talk about the art of hosting.

    Which I’ve recently started thinking is the same problem as the art of having a civilization, which seems important, or at least it’s the core missing skill currently.

    So I would like to become a better host. I would like to be hosted more. I would like more good hosting in the world. And I figure you’re one of the best people in the world to talk about that.

    I’ll just quote from a tweet that you wrote, which brought us to this conversation, which is: “A decent fraction of my work is about attracting ever more unusual people, inviting them into a shared space, and finding the minimum viable coercive authority that they need to submit to to be in good standing with each other.”

    Do you want to unpack that?

    Rich Bartlett: I do. I’m excited about that. I’d love to hear a bit more from you though. You got me very excited talking about hosting as the fractal foundation move of civilization because I definitely think that. But I’d love to hear your version of that.

    Ivan Vendrov: Sure. I’ve never articulated it before, so it might come out messy. Hopefully it will.

    The thing that comes to mind right now, I’m sitting here in Berkeley, and I lived for several years of my life in San Francisco, which is a uniquely ungrounded place spiritually, at least for people like me.

    It’s very hard to… there’s so much money and power and future and thinking going on that it’s very hard to know whether you’re doing something because it genuinely reflects your interests or because you’re channeling some vast egregore of techno-capital or hippie psychedelia or whatever the other things that are fighting over the psychic territory of San Francisco, but also by proxy the whole internet or technosphere.

    And there was a teahouse in San Francisco called The Center for many years, which was reliably the place I could go to to feel sane. And I still don’t quite know what made it that way.

    Notionally it’s a teahouse. You come in, you pay for a pot of tea, you sit down, comfortable plush, there’s yoga classes going on in the side rooms. But something about the combination of the vibes, the music, the people, it was volunteer-run, so all the people working behind the counter were volunteers.

    But something about the way that space was created reliably grounded me. And when it closed down a couple years ago because of regulatory issues apparently, they weren’t allowed to serve tea because they didn’t have the right faucets and they just couldn’t figure that out. Classic California b******t.

    Rich Bartlett: Too much civilization.

    Ivan Vendrov: Perhaps. Or whatever, I’m not sure I would call that civilization. Whatever is going on here. But that space vanishing alone made San Francisco basically unlivable for me.

    And I’m thinking, that’s crazy. I know so many people, there are so many living rooms that I can just crash in, there are so many people whose spare bedrooms I can crash in here. I have my own room in which in theory I can sit and be perfectly at peace with myself or something. And no, actually, I was surviving on this drip feed of hosting by some tea wizard from long ago.

    And now that that wizard’s gone, I guess I can’t live in SF anymore. So that’s just a personal experience that comes to mind. I think there’s another thing that ties it to the broader picture here.

    I guess maybe the other thing I’ll share is something like King energy from King, Warrior, Magician, Lover, which are the four aspects of healthy masculine energy. And I think of the King as the host.

    There’s a sense in which the King owns the space, so the King sets the boundaries and is able to expel energy he doesn’t want and bring in energies he wants. And there’s almost this felt sense of…

    There is a clear, when you’re in a space, there’s a clear owner to the space. There’s a human mind that’s orienting to what’s going on and whether it’s good or bad. And it feels really good to be in that kind of space. And if you’re not in that kind of space, you feel ungrounded and chaotic, whether it’s inside yourself or in a teahouse or, I claim, at any scale.

    In a city, in a country. If your country doesn’t have a King in this sense, it just feels like you’re thinking, wait, is anyone making sure that the country’s all right? Is it anyone’s responsibility? And often it isn’t. And so there’s a groundlessness. So maybe hosting is the energy of grounding. That’s some messy thoughts.

    Rich Bartlett: That’s really exciting. I’m thinking, ah, so many ideas already. So many different ways my brain is running in the same moment.

    So one thing that comes to mind, a couple of years ago I ran a co-living experiment with my wife Nati for three months in the south of Spain. And we were staying in an old Andalusian building, it’s called a cortijo, which is a compound built around a courtyard.

    And it’s basically a square footprint and the outside is a defensive structure and then inside you have this really cozy space. And I don’t know a huge amount about the history there, but my understanding is you had this frontier moving back and forth of Christians and the Moors going back and forth battling out who owns the south of Spain.

    And you can see these fortified towns and then outside of the towns you have these spaces that we were in. This is basically on a ranch where the cortijo is a household, not just a nuclear family but a bunch of workers and farmers and stuff.

    And you have your cortijo and then at shouting distance further down the ridge there’s the next one and then the next one and the next one and the next one. And each of those spaces is making up the frontier of “I am capable of defending my own household and if things get really bad we retreat back to the fortified town.”

    And staying there for three months, I really projected myself into that point in history of what it meant to be a landowner at that time was not just about wealth, it was also about holding a frontier of some definition of these are our national values, this is what it means to be on our team.

    You’re proactively involved in holding up a set of values. And it’s fractal, like you’re saying, you’ve got the family and then the town and then you’ve got the King. And I really felt connected to some lineage, some practice there. Maybe not so antagonistic towards the Muslims, I don’t really have a problem with Muslims, but it felt really potent somehow.

    And I like you calling it King energy, I think is a big part of it. Right now we’re running a co-living/retreat center, we’re 18 months into it, this place called Casa Tilo further north in Spain, in Barcelona.

    And I’m trying to articulate what is it that we do here, what’s distinctive about our space, and it’s really hard to put your finger on what exactly is going on. But like you described the teahouse, people feel sane here.

    And that’s really interesting that the way you described it is when you don’t have good hosting you’re susceptible to have your values hijacked by exterior forces. And part of what I think my job is, is not entirely, there’s a little bit of me projecting my values into the group.

    But more importantly it’s about people… I’m trying to model, I’m trying to be a role model for you can seek your own internal sense of what’s good and what’s right and what’s worth doing and what quality feels like.

    I want to be activating, I want to be catalyzing a group full of people that are sourcing their own authority and then attending to each other in a way to find this complex harmony between us.

    Ivan Vendrov: That feels like the central contradiction or paradox is you’re trying to catalyze people taking their own authority, but in order to do that you need to impose some coercive authority on them.

    Rich Bartlett: They absolutely have to submit to me on the way in. That’s the deal. And it’s so funny because I spent a long time where the closest political allegiance I had was anarchism. I developed a big expertise in how to…



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    1 hr 5 min
  • Romeo Stevens on AI-Assisted Coding, Second Order Learning, Culture and Community

    The Psychology of AI-Assisted Coding

    Ivan Vendrov: Great. So yeah, I guess the thing I wanted to talk to you about is something like Claude Code Psychosis. A bunch of my friends in recent months have started staying up till 3:00 AM making a bunch of vibe coded apps with Claude Code. There seems to be a lot of combination excitement and fear motivation. The excitement motivation is “Oh my god, I can finally build all the apps I’ve always wanted to build.” And the fear is “Oh, but if I don’t build them now, my life is going to end or software engineering is going to end or I’m going to be trapped in the permanent underclass.” This isn’t usually said explicitly, but there’s a nervous, anxious tone. And I felt this in myself. I’m like, “Oh my god, I’m professionally a software engineer. That’s how I’ve made most of my money. That’s most of my contributions to the world have been in that shape. And now there’s this thing that can do software engineering as well as me, but much, much, much faster and much, much cheaper.” So I guess I’m finally feeling—maybe my friends and I are finally feeling—the thing that artists felt with the advent of Midjourney.

    And I think I’m just... I saw a tweet of yours that said something like, “I haven’t seen anyone build something with Claude Code that seemed worth building.” That’s been my feeling about it.

    Romeo Stevens: I didn’t mean Claude really versus Code. That’s just the term I’m using. I don’t know if there’s a better term for this. But the idea is with coding things, it makes sense because there are redundant things. Colloquially, people are like, “I built it to fix my inbox and I built it to fix my sales blah blah blah.” And I looked at them and tried to look at them in detail. And it was like, “Wait, your inbox is chaos? We’ve had email for 30 years. You didn’t already have filters and a system and things going into tasks or something?” It’s very strange.

    With coding, I’ve seen both cases. I haven’t looked too deeply at the coding because I’m not a coder, I haven’t been for years. But I see a lot of people building personal tooling out. It’s like that kind of makes sense if you need it to match your own internal ontology. A lot of people like that, a lot of coders like that. But my presumption is that why aren’t you just copying the GitHub URL and pasting that into Claude Code and being like, “Oh yeah, here’s some existing one that’s good enough.” Because everyone is making these and posting them online, which means that a massive amount of redundant effort is happening. So the programmers are trying to get rid of redundant stuff in their own life. They’re not going meta on the redundancy and being like, “Wait, a hundred thousand coders are all doing the same thing at the same time? This doesn’t make sense.”

    Ivan Vendrov: I mean, you could say that’s true of... what do I want to say? I mean, the cost of producing it is so low that it’s actually more costly to understand someone else’s solution. I think we’ve all had the experience of installing some software that someone else built for a problem we have and it doesn’t quite have the right ontology, doesn’t quite have the right affordances, and you’re like, “Honestly, I should just rebuild this from scratch.” And now finally we have... this is actually a reasonable thing to do. At least in some sense.

    Romeo Stevens: May a thousand interfaces bloom.

    Ivan Vendrov: Yeah, the personal ontology thing is interesting. I think a pattern that a lot of people, a lot of coders I know fall into is spending order of thousands of hours optimizing their own computing environment. These are the people who use Emacs and then configure hundreds of plugins and learn Emacs Lisp and all these crazy configuration tools. I’m curious what you think is happening there. Because I can’t decide if it’s a very beautiful thing or a complete waste of time or something in the middle. It’s quite a strange phenomenon.

    Romeo Stevens: I view it as another in-between step. Much of this will be obviated over the next one to eighteen months because the problems that people are solving with that extra harness stuff that they’re building... people will find good enough solutions that get pushed to the backend. Some people, of course, will still, just like with every other transition, be like, “I have to run my own.” But large numbers of people, and then increasingly over time, people will be like, “I just use the built-in one while I like...” I’m sure back in the day there was someone building their own IDE back when IDEs were first coming out.

    Ivan Vendrov: Makes sense. This is this transitionary phase. It sort of makes sense. I think there’s a meta... you can sort of see the meta-software loop emerging where I imagine opening my computer and then being like, “I don’t like what’s happening on my screen right now. Let me introspect. Okay, here’s what I don’t like.” And then the software just rewrites itself or there’s a standard set of components and it just rewrites itself to satisfy whatever it is I want. And that’s one piece of meta-software, maybe an operating system level thing rather than a constant generation of apps that then get thrown away.

    I’m curious, you mentioned you were doing... you were getting into vibe coding also or you were doing some kind of LLM prompting hackathon. I’m curious what that’s about.

    Romeo Stevens: We ran an event yesterday. We had four coders and then maybe six people who don’t use it for coding. And I’m more curious about both the non-coding side and whatever cognitive hooks are useful on both sides. So I’ll share the recording with you whenever I get it from Alec. I did a short talk and we talked a little bit about it. But essentially, the thing that I’ve been noticing as I’ve been spinning up on this is... I can condense. The tool shapes the cognition much more than previous tools that I’ve ever used. I think if you’re all the time in a particular IDE maybe that winds up shaping your cognition too, but this tool feels like it is good at eating certain types of things and bad at eating other types of things. And then it trains you to go searching for the food it’s already good at eating.

    Ivan Vendrov: By this tool you mean Claude Code?

    Romeo Stevens: Yes. So you start having your vision shaped and you’re like, “Okay, is something close to or I can carve off a chunk of it that is already good for feeding it?” And I think maybe some people aren’t even noticing that this is happening because it causes a little bit of blindness. You start disregarding the things that are not good for feeding it. And so maybe part of what we’re seeing, what you’re talking about, is a pushback against that subconsciously where the person’s like, “Okay, I need to build up a bunch of my own stuff so that I don’t fall prey to these various dynamics of just using a semi-invisible system and its magic.” So maybe programmers are trying to build out the parts to... So I see a lot of people talking about logging and needing to set up their own logging interfaces and think about metrics on their own and it’s just not all already built.

    Because I think they do want to know what’s happening. They feel somewhat uncomfortable. And also then when things go break, if you don’t know at all what’s happening, you are stuck in the loop... there’s probably a name for this in the software developer world... of pasting flags into Google without really understanding what’s going on. And then if you do twenty of those in a row, now you feel like you have even less of an idea of what’s going on. And that probably feels bad. So people are probably trying to alleviate that too.

    But the cognitive hooks I’ve been noticing are... the speed differentials cause a worsening rather than an improvement of the human tendency. So maybe you’re familiar that we have all this biases and fallacies literature for a long time being built up in the cognitive science domain. And it turned out that a lot of them boiled down to efficiency hacks. Th…



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    1 hr 19 min
  • Robin Hanson on Cultural Drift part 2: Fertility, Religions, Corporate Cultures and Sacred Capital

    For context see our previous conversation and my summary and critiques.

    Debating Cultural Drift and Fertility Decline

    Ivan Vendrov: What do your colleagues Tyler and Brian think about cultural drift? Are they convinced to worry?

    Robin Hanson: Seem to be. Brian, I think, says that he doesn’t see any cultural problems other than fertility. And he admits that fertility is a problem, but he just wants to do specific things to solve that. And so in some sense he just isn’t engaged or persuaded by these theoretical frameworks. I’m more of a theorist than most people.

    In the past, say Tyler hasn’t mentioned or taken a position, but in the past even when I had concrete arguments for unusual things he tends to have a strong presumption against things that are outside the Overton window or outside the usual thinking. So, for example, he said he didn’t think Futarchy would work and he didn’t think Ems would happen, et cetera. So he is thoughtful and intelligent, but typically tries to stay within the usual range of elite opinion.

    Ivan Vendrov: Right. Maybe I’m interested in diving a little bit more into Brian’s complaint.

    Robin Hanson: So Brian and I recorded an episode about this.

    Ivan Vendrov: Oh cool. I haven’t seen it.

    Robin Hanson: We did an hour long discussion.

    Ivan Vendrov: Was that the main crux? He was just like, “I’m just an empiricist and you’re a theorist”?

    Robin Hanson: I don’t know that he would put it that way, but he didn’t really offer counterarguments to the theory. He just said, “I don’t see a problem.” So I guess in that sense he’s going to be an empiricist about it and say, “Well, culture looks great to me except for fertility.”

    Ivan Vendrov: Hmm. Interesting. I mean it would be nice to have... I think that is generally the kind of thing that is persuasive to a lot of people. Like for environmental collapse, it’s very clear. You can see the images of ecosystems being destroyed. They just feel bad. And then it’s very easy to say, “Oh, look at how bad this is,” and imagine the whole world being like this whatever industrial...

    Robin Hanson: Actually, I think most people’s environmental opinions are not driven by those images. They are actually pretty theoretical. That is to say, most people think global warming is bad, but the data we have is making the world greener, but that doesn’t seem to count much for them. But in the future it will be bad, right? Because they’re not seeing that. It’s their image of it in the short term.

    I mean many people, like even my wife, if you see what was a forest developed, they just go, “Well that was a forest. We should have a forest there, not this other thing.” And they’re just directly bothered by the replacement of nature with development.

    Ivan Vendrov: Yeah, I mean more like environmental collapse.

    Robin Hanson: But the new developments aren’t ugly, they’re just not as natural, right?

    Ivan Vendrov: Right, right. Yeah, they’re not as nice as trees.

    Robin Hanson: I think they’re nicer. I mean as a human who likes to do things and what humans develop, I would think the human development replacement for the forest is overall a nicer thing.

    Ivan Vendrov: Yeah, I wonder why... that does feel close to a crux, but maybe we’ll come back to that. I guess my remaining big objection to cultural drift... as I wrote in my response essay Considerations on Cultural Drift, I buy cultural drift as this root of all evil, the thing that explains all these other problems that are going on in our society. And I think it’s really helpful in that sense. I still don’t buy the projections for civilizational collapse 2100 to 2200. I think we had a little bit of interaction on that on Twitter. Do you want to go into that a little bit now?

    Robin Hanson: That’s not really so central. That is, I do think the issue of... so many people, as we discussed before, our highest prestige intellectuals tend to be cultural warriors who are eager to talk about cultural trends, many of which they don’t like. And so identifying some cultural trends you don’t like is a very popular sport. And many people are happy to point to various local causes of those.

    My main argument here is if I can get you to see that as part of this larger process that would have a process problem... it’s not just too many screens or whatever, there’s this larger process that would be making things go wrong. Then that’s the main point I would like to get across because then you’ll have to expect many cultural things to go wrong. How fast they go wrong, which particular things is less the center point here.

    But you might think you have more time to deal with it if you think it’s not going wrong as fast as I’m telling you. Or you might have some concept that we have some deliberate policy process that’s countering it. Some people might make the argument that, well, we’re intelligent beings and therefore we can think about problems and therefore the sort of problems that would happen if it was pure natural selection wouldn’t be the problems for us because we are thoughtfully trying to address our problems. That would be a theoretical counterargument if you wanted to make that, but I guess you’re not drawn in that direction.

    Ivan Vendrov: No, not especially. I think one framing that just came to me is the concept of super stimuli. Which is similar, it’s more of a genetic or environmental drift, right? We’re surrounded by these foods...

    Robin Hanson: It’s a relatively general reason why things could be going wrong if there wasn’t a force to fix it.

    Ivan Vendrov: Exactly. And so there are actually sort of cultural... it is actually in the culture in the sense of the Paleo diet, right? A lot of people subscribe to it, a lot of people know about it. And the frame of a Paleo diet is lots of things are wrong with modern food, our food just seems to not be well suited for us. And so let’s go back to the good old ways we used to eat because those are probably going to be closer to the adaptive space of food and exercises. So why can’t we do something similar for culture?

    Robin Hanson: So let’s first just remember that we’re focused on dimensions of behavior that are shared across larger communities. So we’re going to make this distinction between things that you can easily vary yourself versus things that are harder to vary yourself. So now food will be something in an intermediary there. Clearly you do face social pressures on food in the sense that you go to a dinner and it’s easier to eat what everybody else is eating. And the more people who demand a kind of food, the more supply and services will be offered in that food. So it’s an intermediate problem.

    But yes, deliberately trying to overcome it is one of the classes of solutions to consider. But with much of culture, people aren’t very willing to go back to 1600 peasant lifestyles. In terms of marriage and work and religion and patriotism and all these other things, you might be willing to try to eat the food from long ago, but to what extent are you willing to change your norms and values and status markers to go back? How far back would you go? I mean, you wouldn’t have to go all the way back to 100,000 years ago, but the question is which package of things works? You’d want to go back to a package of things that could work as a package.

    And so we have this idea that food only affects certain parts of your life. And this is a big power we use in culture. Originally when culture showed up, we had to decide whose behavior to copy. And the simplest principle was copy high status people’s behavior. And we’re relying on good status markers. Over time one of our best ways to manage changing behaviors is to find ways to find more local cues about who’s good at what. So if somebody catches more fish, you could try to fish like them. And you believe that that will work okay and you don’t have to copy all the behaviors of the best fisherman. And it’s only if you want to catch as many fish like them. If you don’t care how many fish you catch, then you also don…



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    2 hr 2 min
  • Robin Hanson on Cultural Evolution and Cultural Drift

    Robin Hanson is Professor of Economics at George Mason University, the inventor of prediction markets, and the author of Age of Em and The Elephant in the Brain. This episode is a deep dive into Hanson's latest research topic, "cultural drift": how we broke cultural evolution, why it threatens to end our civilization, and what we might do to fix it.



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    1 hr 59 min