On The Very Idea - A Philosophy Podcast

In this final epiosode of a three part series, I examine and critique J.L. Mackie's criticisms against moral realism that he lays out in his error theory. Mackie holds that since morality is derived from culture and culture is diverse across humanity, then we should see that there could not be any universal moral facts which humanity could know. This argument from cultural relativism is weakened if we look at Michael Walzer's division of thick and thin senses of morality. Humanity could be seen as sharing a thin sense of morality if construed generally enough which allows each culture's society and social interactions to be functional. Likewise, there seems to be evidence that many humans share some sort of universal moral framework in their preference for certain goods. I use the goods of rights and security offered by (many) liberal social democratic frameworks as an example. Also given the need of certain moral standards to exist for human social interaction to occur at all, I argue that facts about morality don't need to seem peculiar or strange as facts at all - at least no more than facts of logic or mathematics. I ramble alot here but hopefully something comes of it.

In this final episode of a three part installment on Hillary Putnam's lecture Realism with a Human Face, I look at Alfred Tarski's Theory of Truth developed to answer the Liar Paradox. I show how Tarski's hierarchal splitting of language into object language and the meta-language that describes and analyzes it creates the same problem encountered by quantum theory - the need for an observer that always stands outside the system. This leads to the impossibility of one ever being able to develop a god's eye view of the world. This cognitive barrier is a bit of a disappointing harness for the intellectual as they must always keep a certain modesty of scope in developing their theory within these confines. Lastly, I briefly look at the history of logical puzzles like the Liar Paradox in the history of philosophy and am surprised to learn that these puzzles were seen as mere parlour games prior to the advent of analytic philosophy and the movement towards a logic and linguistic-based endeavour from a more broader epistemelogical project found in earlier centuries.

In this second part of a three part series on Hillary Putnam's lecture Realism with a Human Face, I wrap up the discussion about quantum physics by looking at some of quantum physics' philosophical consequences and an interesting book from 80 years ago that relates quantum physics in highly understandable terms for the layperson. Then, I follow Putnam by looking at the liars paradox - that logical puzzle that says 'This sentence is false'. Is that senternce itself true or false? Anyway that you answer it, you are stuck in a bind. Grappling with this paradox led the Polish logician Alfred Tarski to develop a new theory of truth that allowed him to solve this paradox. Tarski's theory of truth was to have deep reverberations in the philosophical community and this all leads into the next episode where I look at how Putnam draws parallels between quantum physics and the the philosophy of logic and truth after Tarski. Also, the usual trivia and general rambling that you've hopefully come to tolerate.

First episode in a three part series where I look at Hillary Putnam’s lecture Realism with a Human Face. Putnam talks about quantum physics and the philosophical implications of it. Basically, Putnam sees quantum theory as providing scientific justification for putting an end to God’s Eye View conceptions of our knowledge of the universe. If we take quantum physics seriously, we must see that it implies that there can be no view from nowhere. Any perspective providing knowledge must be in some sense local - a perspective from somewhere. Quantum physics is a bit beyond my pay grade but hopefully a good conversation can come out of it.

In this second episode of a two part series on narrativity, I look to flesh out an account of how we can think of our life if we don't think of it as story. People who are non-narratives in this way are often episodic. They live their life in chunks or episodes giving limited thought about their past and future without being obsessed with either. Episodic people tend to live in the day and the week and the month that they find themselves in without trying to consciously weave their 'now' into a coherent story with their self from childhood or 5 years ago. Are episodics being irresponsible in living this way, something less than fully human? On the other hand, are narratives overly focused on the past and therefore prone to rumination and depression? Some questions I raise along with some heavy, heavy borrowing from Galen Strawson and some trivia and the usual ramblings. I also try to link the whole academic obsession with narrativity to neoliberalism for those who like politics.