Open Source Security

Josh and Kurt talk about public disclosure. We start out with a story about Canva, then discuss what do you do if you have a security incident? Who do you tell, what do you tell them. How do you tell your story? It's a really hard problem even if it's something you've done many times in the past.

Josh and Kurt talk about a new type of lockbox scams. We also discuss Slack being a target for nation state attacks. Do you consider your operations part of your supply chain?It's totally part of your supply chain.

Josh and Kurt talk about Microsoft. They're probably not the bad guys anymore, which is pretty wild. They're adding a Linux kernel to Window. Can we declare open source the unquestionable winner now?

Josh and Kurt talk about fire. We discuss the history of fire prevention and how it mirrors many of things we see in security. There are lessons there for us, we just hope it doesn't take 2000 years like it did for proper fire prevention to catch on.

Josh and Kurt talk about the security of money. Not how to keep it secure, but the security issues around using cash, credit, and bitcoin. We also talk about Banksy's clever method for proving something is original.

Josh and Kurt talk about the phone book (yeah, the big paper book people used to use). Kurt got one in the mail. While it's certainly a relic from another time, there were security tips in it among other wild things.

Josh and Kurt talk about what one could do if you find a USB drive. The context is based on the story where the Secret Service was rumored to have plugged a malicious USB drive into a computer. The purpose of discussion is to explore how to handle a situation like this in the real world. We end the episode with a fantastic comparison of swim safety and security.

Josh and Kurt talk about the difficulty of security. We look at the difficulty of the EU not observing daylight savings time, which is probably magnitudes easier than getting security right. We also hit on a discussion on Reddit about U2F that shows the difficulty. Security today is too hard, even for the experts.

Josh and Kurt talk about identity. It's a nice example we can generally understand in the context of how much security is enough security? When we deal with identity the idea of good enough is often acceptable for the vast majority of uses. Perfect identity tracking isn't really a thing nor is it practical.

Josh and Kurt talk about Brexit, voting, Firefox send, and toxic comments. Is there anything we can do to slow the current trend of conversation on the Internet always seeming to spiral out of control? The answer is maybe with a lot of asterisks.