Case Summary:

In the case of Yinnv Liu v. Monthly (Docket No. 25-2074), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on February 20, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:

Fact Summary

The litigation is a complex commercial and intellectual property dispute involving Yinnv Liu (the plaintiff/appellant) and the defendant company Monthly (associated with Monthly.com), along with several other entities including Joybuy.

The core factual conflict centers on a breach of contract and copyright infringement claim related to online educational content and digital assets. Monthly operates a platform that hosts creative classes and "learning experiences" taught by high-profile instructors.

A primary issue in the record involves the ownership and distribution rights of specific instructional materials. The plaintiff alleges that Monthly and its partner entities, such as Joybuy, exceeded the scope of their licensing agreements by sub-licensing or distributing her proprietary content across international markets without proper authorization or compensation.

The factual background includes a dispute over digital rights management (DRM) and the "terms of service" that govern how independent creators interact with the Monthly platform. Monthly contends that the plaintiff voluntarily entered into a broad "Master Services Agreement" that granted the company extensive rights to adapt and monetize the content in exchange for a percentage of subscription revenue.

In early 2025, a district court granted a partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that the plain language of the electronic contracts signed by the plaintiff shielded the companies from the majority of the claims regarding unauthorized international distribution.

The current appeal, docketed as 25-2074, challenges that interpretation. The appellant argues that the contracts were unconscionable adhesion contracts—meaning they were presented on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis with grossly one-sided terms that a reasonable creator would not have knowingly accepted.

The appellate record also scrutinizes whether the defendants provided an accurate accounting of the revenues generated from the plaintiff's specific content modules, a factual point that underpins the plaintiff’s claim for damages.

During the oral arguments on February 20, 2026, the Seventh Circuit panel focused on the "clickwrap" nature of the agreement and whether the specific clauses allowing for "global sub-licensing" were sufficiently conspicuous to be enforceable under Illinois and federal law.

In the case of Dickerson v. BPP PCV Owners LLC (Docket No. 24-3147), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on February 20, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:

The litigation was initiated by Gloria D. Dickerson, a pro se plaintiff and resident of Peter Cooper Village (PCV) in Manhattan, against the property owner, BPP PCV Owners LLC (a joint venture involving Blackstone and Ivanhoé Cambridge).

The core of the factual dispute involves allegations of housing discrimination, harassment, and retaliation related to the plaintiff's tenancy. Dickerson, a long-term resident, alleged that the management company engaged in discriminatory practices that affected her right to quiet enjoyment and equal access to housing services.

A significant portion of the lower court record focused on procedural hurdles; the defendant moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that the plaintiff's First Amended Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and was "vague and conclusory" regarding specific civil rights violations.

In early 2024, the district court granted the motion to dismiss but gave the plaintiff leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. A factual "comedy of errors" ensued when the pro se plaintiff attempted to file the new complaint at the wrong physical address in Manhattan (80 Worth Street), leading the court to provide additional time and guidance on proper filing procedures.

The case was eventually dismissed with prejudice by the District Court for the Southern District of New York after it found that the plaintiff’s subsequent filings still failed to satisfy the federal pleading standards, particularly the "Five Ws" (who, what, where, when, and why) required to establish a plausible claim of discrimination.

The current appeal, docketed as 24-3147, challenges that final dismissal. The plaintiff argues that the trial court applied an overly stringent standard to her pro se filings and ignored the substantive evidence of harassment she provided.

During the oral arguments on February 20, 2026, the Second Circuit panel examined whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff further opportunities to amend her complaint and whether the existing record contained sufficient factual "nuggets" to warrant a trial on the merits.

The defense maintained that BPP PCV Owners LLC acted within its rights as a landlord and that the plaintiff's grievances did not rise to the level of federal civil rights violations or actionable breaches of the lease agreement.

In the case of Immanuel Baptist Church v. City of Chicago (Docket No. 25-1951), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on February 20, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:

The litigation was initiated by Immanuel Baptist Church, a small congregation that had been leasing property at 1443 West Roosevelt Road in Chicago since 2011.

The dispute began in 2016 when the church attempted to purchase the leased property, but its lender required confirmation from the City that the building complied with local zoning and parking ordinances.

Under the Chicago Zoning Ordinance, religious assemblies were classified under a "Parking Group" requiring one off-street parking space for every eight seats of occupancy, which meant the church needed 19 dedicated spaces it did not possess.

The church alleged that the City’s enforcement was discriminatory because other secular assembly uses, such as public libraries and live theater venues of similar size, were exempt from these specific off-street parking requirements.

The factual record shows that after the church filed suit, the City passed a new ordinance in 2019 that reduced the church's specific parking requirement to zero, but the church argued the damage had already been done.

The church contended that the City’s initial refusal and the resulting two-year delay caused it to lose the opportunity to purchase an adjacent building and forced it to pay higher prices and insurance premiums, constituting a "substantial burden" on its religious exercise.

In late 2023, a district court ruled in favor of the church on the substantial burden claim under RLUIPA (Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act) but limited the damages to approximately $14,590 for specific out-of-pocket expenses.

The current appeal, docketed as 25-1951, involves a challenge to the district court's final judgment, specifically regarding the calculation of damages and the dismissal of the church's "equal terms" claims.

During the oral arguments on February 20, 2026, the Seventh Circuit panel examined whether the City’s application of "subjective" criteria during the zoning review process triggered the individualized assessment protections of federal law.

Case Summary:

Gemini said

In the case of Damri v. LivePerson, Inc. (Docket No. 25-964), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on February 20, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:

Fact Summary

The litigation is a federal securities class action brought on behalf of investors who purchased shares of LivePerson, Inc., a conversational AI company, between May 2022 and early 2024.

The core factual dispute involves the company’s February 2022 acquisition of WildHealth, a precision medicine startup, for approximately $150 million.

Plaintiffs allege that LivePerson and its executives made false and misleading statements regarding the financial health and growth prospects of WildHealth while simultaneously implementing significant capital cuts and layoffs that hindered the subsidiary's ability to generate revenue.

A central factual element of the complaint is the disclosure in early 2023 that Medicare reimbursements for a discontinued WildHealth COVID-19 testing program had been suspended, an event plaintiffs claim was known but withheld from investors to artificially inflate the stock price.

The factual record highlights a massive decline in LivePerson's market value, with the share price falling over 57% on March 16, 2023, following the company's admission of "material weaknesses" in its internal controls over financial reporting.

In March 2025, the district court dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice, finding that the plaintiffs failed to provide specific facts demonstrating "scienter"—the intent to deceive—or that the executives’ upbeat statements about WildHealth lacked a reasonable basis at the time they were made.

The appeal, docketed as 25-964, challenges this dismissal, with the appellant arguing that the trial court ignored testimony from confidential witnesses who alleged that the company’s internal metrics directly contradicted its public "business as usual" narrative.

During the oral arguments on February 20, 2026, the Second Circuit panel examined whether the company had a duty to disclose the Medicare suspension earlier and whether the executives' stock sales during the class period provided a sufficient motive for the alleged fraud.

The court also scrutinized whether the "material weakness" in internal controls, once admitted, provided retroactive evidence that the company's previous financial statements were factually unreliable.

Case Summary:

In the case of David McDonald v. Trustees of Indiana University (Docket No. 25-2366), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on February 19, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:

The litigation is a constitutional challenge brought by several tenured faculty members, including lead plaintiff David McDonald, an associate professor at Indiana University Bloomington, against the Trustees of Indiana University and Purdue University.

The core factual dispute centers on the enforcement of Indiana Senate Enrolled Act 202 (SEA 202), a state law effective July 1, 2024, which mandates that public universities implement policies to promote "intellectual diversity" and "free inquiry" among faculty.

The statute specifically requires that faculty members be denied tenure or promotion if they are deemed "unlikely to foster a culture of free inquiry" or "unlikely to expose students to scholarly works from a variety of political or ideological frameworks."

The factual record includes a new "post-tenure review" process established by the Act, requiring tenured professors to undergo formal re-evaluation every five years to ensure they are meeting these new ideological diversity standards.

Plaintiffs allege that the law is unconstitutionally vague and creates a "chilling effect" on academic freedom, as the statute does not define key terms like "intellectual diversity," leaving faculty unable to discern what pedagogical choices might lead to disciplinary action, including termination.

In July 2025, the district court dismissed the lawsuit on procedural grounds, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they had not yet suffered a concrete injury, such as a formal reprimand or denial of promotion, under the new law.

The appeal, docketed as 25-2366, challenges that dismissal, with the plaintiffs arguing that the "chilling" of their classroom speech and the immediate requirement to alter their curricula to comply with the law constitute an "injury-in-fact" sufficient for federal court jurisdiction.

The factual background is further complicated by the lead plaintiff’s personal history; David McDonald was previously arrested and temporarily banned from campus during 2024 protests, an event he cites as evidence of the university administration's willingness to use punitive measures against faculty for expressive activity.

During the oral arguments on February 19, 2026, the Seventh Circuit panel focused on whether the plaintiffs' fear of future discipline is "objectively reasonable" and whether the state’s interest in regulating the curriculum of public employees overrides the First Amendment rights of university professors.

Case Summary:

In the case of Kenithia Alston v. District of Columbia (Docket No. 25-7056), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on February 19, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:

The litigation was brought by Kenithia Alston, acting as the special administrator of the estate of her 22-year-old son, Marqueese Alston, who was fatally shot by D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) officers on June 12, 2018.

The incident began when MPD officers approached a group of individuals in the Ward 8 neighborhood of Southeast D.C., allegedly utilizing a controversial "jump-out" tactic intended to surprise and search suspects for illegal firearms.

A central factual dispute involves the pursuit into an alleyway, where officers claim they saw the outline of a gun through the decedent's pants and that he subsequently fired a weapon at them during the chase.

In contrast, the plaintiff cites witness accounts and video evidence suggesting that Marqueese Alston was unarmed, was carrying only a cell phone, and was shot between 12 and 18 times, including multiple wounds to his back.

The factual record highlights a controversy regarding the body-worn camera (BWC) footage, which the plaintiff alleges was withheld for years and, when finally shown privately, appeared to be heavily edited and inconsistent with the official police narrative.

Following the shooting, a firearm was recovered from a bush yards away from the decedent's body; however, the plaintiff contends the weapon was placed there by officers to justify the use of deadly force.

In March 2025, a district court judge denied the officers' motion to dismiss several claims, ruling that qualified immunity could not be granted at the pleading stage because the facts, as alleged, suggested a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The current appeal, docketed as 25-7056, focuses on whether the District of Columbia and the individual officers can be held liable for excessive force and municipal liability based on the "jump-out" practices and the subsequent handling of the investigation.

During the oral arguments on February 19, 2026, the D.C. Circuit panel examined whether the district court erred in allowing the case to proceed to discovery despite the officers' claims of immunity and the government's defense of its tactical operations.

Case Summary:

In the case of Norton Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Village of St. Bernard, OH (Docket No. 25-3265), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on February 18, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:

The litigation centers on a First Amendment challenge by Norton Outdoor Advertising, which has operated billboards in the Village of St. Bernard for decades.

The dispute was triggered when the Village revoked a permit for two billboards located at 130 West Ross Avenue after Norton converted them from static displays to variable-message LED signs.

The Village justified the revocation by citing a specific section of its municipal code that prohibits "multiple-message or variable-message" displays for off-premises advertising signs.

Norton filed a federal lawsuit alleging that the Village's sign ordinance was unconstitutional because it treated "on-premises" signs more favorably than "off-premises" signs and contained content-based exemptions.

In a prior phase of the case, the Sixth Circuit determined that while on/off-premises distinctions are generally content-neutral, the Village’s ordinance included a "public service" exemption that required officials to examine the content of a sign to determine its legality.

The appellate court previously ruled that this specific exemption rendered the ordinance content-based, thus triggering strict scrutiny, the highest level of judicial review for speech restrictions.

The current appeal, docketed as 25-3265, follows a remand to the district court to determine whether the unconstitutional "public service" exemption can be severed from the rest of the sign code.

The factual record involves a debate over legislative intent: the Village argues the code should remain enforceable without the exemption, while Norton contends the entire regulatory scheme is so intertwined with content-based distinctions that it must be struck down in its entirety.

During the oral arguments on February 18, 2026, the Sixth Circuit panel examined whether severing the exemption would fundamentally alter the Village's original goal of balancing traffic safety and aesthetics with free speech rights.

The court also scrutinized whether the remaining ban on digital billboards can stand independently if the underlying definitions used to categorize those signs are found to be constitutionally flawed.

Case Summary:

In the case of Abadi v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. (Docket No. 25-38), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on February 18, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:

The litigation was initiated by Aaron Abadi, a pro se plaintiff with a sensory processing disorder, against Greyhound Lines, Inc., following his inability to travel on the company’s buses during the federal COVID-19 mask mandate.

The core factual dispute involves the plaintiff’s request for a reasonable accommodation to travel without a face mask, for which he provided a medical note documenting his condition.

Greyhound’s response to the request required the plaintiff to adhere to a specific exemption procedure, which included providing current medical documentation and a recent negative COVID-19 test result.

The plaintiff alleges that he was unable to complete these requirements and was subsequently denied boarding, which he contends constituted a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act.

A primary legal and factual issue in the record is whether the plaintiff has standing to seek injunctive relief, given that the federal mask mandate expired before the case reached a final adjudication in the lower court.

In December 2024, the district court dismissed the complaint in its entirety, finding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a "continuing or imminent harm" necessary to maintain a claim for future relief.

The appeal, docketed as 25-38, challenges this dismissal, with the plaintiff arguing that Greyhound’s internal policies remain discriminatory and that his past exclusion created a cognizable injury that the court must address.

During the oral arguments on February 18, 2026, the Second Circuit panel examined whether the case had become moot following the expiration of the government mandate or if the plaintiff's claims under state and city human rights laws provided an independent basis for the suit to continue.

The court also scrutinized the "intracorporate bar" doctrine in relation to the plaintiff’s allegations that Greyhound conspired with government and industry entities to enforce the mask protocols against disabled individuals.

Case Summary:

In the case of Reginald Chapman v. Eileen O'Neill Burke (Docket No. 25-1311), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on February 18, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:

The litigation is a civil rights action brought by Reginald Chapman against Eileen O'Neill Burke in her official capacity as the Cook County State’s Attorney (having succeeded Kim Foxx).

The case centers on the fallout from the plaintiff’s prior criminal conviction and subsequent exoneration, with Chapman alleging that his constitutional rights were violated during the original prosecution and subsequent post-conviction proceedings.

A primary factual issue involves the "wrongful conviction" framework, specifically whether the State’s Attorney's Office maintained a policy or custom of withholding exculpatory evidence or failing to investigate credible leads that would have proven the plaintiff’s innocence years earlier.

The defendant, Eileen O'Neill Burke, moved to dismiss the claims based on prosecutorial immunity, arguing that the actions taken by her office—even if allegedly improper—were performed as part of the judicial process and are therefore shielded from civil liability.

The factual record explores the distinction between "administrative" actions and "prosecutorial" functions; the plaintiff contends that the withholding of evidence occurred during the investigative phase, where immunity is more limited.

In early 2025, a district court judge granted a motion to dismiss several of the plaintiff’s claims but allowed the central cause of action regarding the office's "disclosure policies" to proceed to the appellate level for clarification.

The appeal, docketed as 25-1311, focuses on whether the State’s Attorney’s Office can be held liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services for systemic failures in its Brady disclosure protocols that allegedly led to Chapman's prolonged and wrongful incarceration.

During the oral arguments on February 18, 2026, the Seventh Circuit panel examined whether the newly elected State’s Attorney can be substituted as a defendant in a way that maintains the plaintiff’s claims against the office as a whole.

The court also scrutinized whether the plaintiff’s allegations met the "plausibility" standard required to survive a motion to dismiss, specifically regarding the existence of a widespread pattern of misconduct within the Cook County State's Attorney's Office.