Oral Arguments - The Supreme Court of the United States

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Facts

The case involves a challenge to the Biden administration's efforts to dismantle a Trump-era immigration program known as the "Remain in Mexico" policy (officially the Migrant Protection Protocols or MPP). The policy required certain asylum seekers arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border to wait in Mexico for their immigration court hearings. The Biden administration sought to terminate the program in 2021, but federal courts in Texas and Missouri blocked those efforts, finding that the administration had not adequately considered the policy's benefits or followed proper procedures. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in Biden v. Texas (2022) that the administration had the authority to end the program, but lower courts continued to entertain challenges from states claiming they would suffer harm from increased immigration. The current case, brought by the states of Texas and Missouri, argues that the administration's latest termination attempt still violates federal immigration law (8 U.S.C. § 1225) and the Administrative Procedure Act. Acting Attorney General Blanche defends the administration's position that the executive branch has broad discretion over immigration enforcement and that MPP is no longer necessary or operationally feasible. The district court sided with the states and ordered the reinstatement of MPP, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted review to resolve whether states have standing to challenge the termination and whether the administration acted arbitrarily and capriciously.

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Case Summary:

The FCC fined major wireless carriers over $100 million for unlawfully selling access to customer location data to third parties without consent. AT&T received a $57 million fine, and Verizon received nearly $47 million. The fines stem from an investigation prompted by reports that a Missouri sheriff obtained customer location data through a third-party service. The dispute reached the Supreme Court due to a circuit split on whether the FCC's forfeiture orders violate the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The Second Circuit upheld the FCC's fine, ruling that an initial penalty assessment is constitutional as long as the party can later challenge collection efforts in court. The Fifth Circuit ruled that the FCC's initial assessment of wrongdoing and fine deprived AT&T of its constitutional right to a jury trial. The carriers argued that the FCC's in-house proceedings created a "penalty-now-trial-later" system. The FCC argued that its orders are not binding because if a company refuses to pay, the agency must file a collection lawsuit in federal court where the company gets a full jury trial. The case arrived shortly after the Supreme Court's 2024 ruling in SEC v. Jarkesy, which invalidated the SEC's in-house civil fraud enforcement system for violating the Seventh Amendment.

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Facts

Ongkaruck Sripetch ran penny-stock "pump-and-dump" schemes, artificially inflating prices before selling to unwitting investors. He pleaded guilty to criminal securities fraud and served 21 months in prison. In a parallel civil proceeding, a California district court ordered him to pay $2.251 million in disgorgement plus over $1 million in prejudgment interest—approximately $3.2 million total. The court did not require the SEC to prove that specific investors suffered financial (pecuniary) harm.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that proof of pecuniary harm is not required for disgorgement. This deepened a circuit split:

• Second Circuit (SEC v. Govil): Proof of pecuniary harm required
• First & Ninth Circuits: No such proof required

The Supreme Court granted review on January 9, 2026, with both parties agreeing that resolution was needed.

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Background & Facts

The case arises from an SEC civil enforcement action against Ongkaruck Sripetch, who orchestrated a series of fraudulent "pump-and-dump" schemes involving penny-stock companies. Sripetch artificially inflated stock prices through manipulative trading and scalping campaigns before selling shares to unwitting investors at inflated prices .

Sripetch admitted to securities law violations and was sentenced to 21 months in prison in a related criminal case . In the civil proceeding, a California district court ordered him to pay over $2.251 million in disgorgement plus more than $1 million in prejudgment interest—totaling approximately $3.2 million . Critically, the court did not require the SEC to demonstrate that specific investors suffered pecuniary (financial) harm from Sripetch's conduct .

The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that a showing of pecuniary harm to investors is not a precondition for disgorgement under the relevant statutory provisions. This deepened an existing circuit split:

• Second Circuit (SEC v. Govil): Requires proof of pecuniary harm because disgorgement is equitable relief "for victims"
• First & Ninth Circuits: No such showing required; disgorgement is measured by the wrongdoer's gain, not victim loss

The Supreme Court granted certiorari on January 9, 2026, with the SEC's support—an unusual circumstance where both parties agreed review was needed .

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Case Summary:

In the case of Trump, President of the United States v. Barbara (Docket No. 25-365), argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on April 1, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:

Fact Summary

The litigation is a landmark constitutional challenge to an Executive Order signed by President Donald Trump on January 20, 2025, which seeks to end the practice of automatic birthright citizenship for children born in the United States to parents who are not U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents (specifically those present temporarily or unlawfully).

The lead plaintiff, Barbara, represents a certified nationwide class of infants born after February 20, 2025, who would be denied U.S. citizenship under the terms of the order. The challenge was brought by a coalition of civil rights groups, including the ACLU and the Legal Defense Fund.

The core legal and factual dispute centers on the interpretation of the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which states: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States."

The Trump administration, represented by Solicitor General D. John Sauer, argues that "subject to the jurisdiction" implies a requirement of "complete political allegiance." Under this theory, children of foreign nationals—who owe allegiance to a different sovereign—do not fall within the intended scope of the Amendment as it was understood by its framers in 1868.

The plaintiffs contend that the Clause codified the centuries-old common law rule of jus soli (right of the soil), where birth within the territory is the sole requirement for citizenship. They rely on the 1898 Supreme Court precedent United States v. Wong Kim Ark, which affirmed citizenship for a child born in the U.S. to Chinese parents who were not eligible for naturalization.

The factual record includes the administration's assertion that the order "restores" the original meaning of the Constitution to prevent "birth tourism" and the creation of a "permanent subclass" of individuals. Conversely, the plaintiffs provided evidence that the order would impact over 200,000 children annually, stripping them of access to passports, federal benefits, and protection from deportation.

In July 2025, U.S. District Judge Joseph Laplante issued a preliminary injunction blocking the order, ruling that it likely contradicts "a century of untouched precedent." The First Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed that the President lacks the unilateral authority to redefine constitutional citizenship.

During the oral arguments on April 1, 2026, the Supreme Court justices explored the "allegiance" distinction. Justice Amy Coney Barrett questioned whether the administration's logic would also exclude the children of tourists or diplomats, while other members of the Court scrutinized whether a change of this magnitude requires a Constitutional Amendment rather than an Executive Order.

The hearing was marked by the unusual presence of President Trump himself in the courtroom, highlighting the high stakes of what is widely considered the most significant constitutional case of the decade.

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Case Summary:

In the case of Pitchford v. Cain (Docket No. 24-7351), argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on March 31, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:

Fact Summary

The case involves Terry Pitchford, who was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in 2006 for his role in a 2004 armed robbery and killing of a store owner in Grenada County, Mississippi.

The core factual dispute centers on the jury selection process. During voir dire, the prosecutor—Doug Evans (the same prosecutor involved in the landmark Flowers v. Mississippi case)—used peremptory strikes to remove four of the five eligible Black potential jurors, while striking only three of thirty-six eligible White jurors.

When Pitchford's counsel raised a Batson objection, the trial court required the prosecution to provide race-neutral reasons for the strikes. The prosecutor cited various justifications, such as a juror being fifteen minutes late, another having a family member with a similar criminal record, and one being a "known drug user" according to police reports.

The trial judge accepted these reasons as credible and empaneled a jury that included only one Black member, in a county where the population is 40% Black.

A critical factual and procedural issue in the record is whether Pitchford's counsel properly rebutted these race-neutral reasons at trial. The Mississippi Supreme Court later refused to consider Pitchford’s arguments that the prosecutor’s reasons were "pretextual" (fake), ruling that he had waived his right to make those arguments by not presenting a detailed comparative juror analysis during the original trial.

Pitchford sought federal habeas corpus relief, arguing that the trial transcript shows his counsel was actually cut off by the judge while attempting to argue pretext. The Fifth Circuit reversed a lower court's grant of relief, finding that the state court's waiver ruling was a reasonable application of the law.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to a specific question under AEDPA (the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act): whether the Mississippi Supreme Court made an "unreasonable determination of the facts" when it concluded that Pitchford waived his right to challenge the prosecutor's justifications.

During the oral arguments on March 31, 2026, the justices focused on the "administrative reality" of trial practice. They scrutinized whether a defense attorney must exhaustively list every comparative example in the heat of jury selection or if a general objection to the prosecutor's strikes is sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.

The Court also weighed the significance of Prosecutor Doug Evans’s documented history of racial discrimination in jury selection, questioning if that history should have made the trial court—and subsequent appellate courts—more skeptical of his proffered "race-neutral" reasons in this specific case.

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Case Summary:

In the case of Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties (Docket No. 25-83), argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on March 30, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:

Fact Summary

The litigation began when Adrian Jules, a former employee of the renowned Chateau Marmont hotel in Los Angeles, filed a federal lawsuit in New York against hotelier André Balazs and associated entities, alleging wrongful termination and violations of federal and California labor laws.

Because Jules’s employment contract contained a mandatory arbitration clause, the district court stayed the federal proceedings under Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and directed the parties to arbitration.

The arbitration process was highly contentious; Jules unsuccessfully attempted to add new defendants and eventually attempted to withdraw from the proceedings. The arbitrator ultimately ruled against Jules, finding his claims lacked merit and issuing a sanctions award of approximately $34,000 against Jules and his attorney for bad-faith conduct during the process.

The "winning" party (Balazs) returned to the federal district court—where the original suit was still stayed—and moved to confirm the arbitration award under Section 9 of the FAA. Jules cross-moved to vacate the award, but he also challenged the court's subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the motions at all.

The core legal dispute centers on the "jurisdictional anchor" theory: Jules argues that under the Supreme Court's 2022 decision in Badgerow v. Walters, a federal court must have an independent basis for jurisdiction (like a federal question or diversity) to hear post-arbitration motions. He contends that the mere fact that a court previously stayed a federal-question case does not give it "ancillary" power to confirm the resulting award if the award itself doesn't involve a federal question.

The Second Circuit ruled against Jules, holding that because the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over the initial lawsuit and merely "stayed" rather than dismissed it, the court retained the authority to oversee the conclusion of the case, including confirming the award. This created a circuit split with the Fourth Circuit, which requires a fresh jurisdictional analysis for post-arbitration motions.

During the oral arguments on March 30, 2026, the Supreme Court justices grappled with the administrative burden of Jules's position. Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kavanaugh questioned whether it made sense to force parties to file a brand-new lawsuit in state court to confirm an award when a federal judge is already "sitting on" the stayed case.

The Court also scrutinized the statutory text of the FAA, weighing whether Section 3 (stays) and Section 9 (confirmations) are separate silos or whether a stay acts as a "hook" that keeps the case within the federal court's reach until a final judgment is entered.

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Case Summary:

In the case of Abouammo v. United States (Docket No. 25-5146), argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on March 30, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:

Fact Summary

The litigation involves Ahmad Abouammo, a former Media Partnerships Manager at Twitter, who was convicted of acting as an unregistered agent of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and falsifying records to obstruct a federal investigation.

The core factual dispute concerns a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1519. In 2018, FBI agents interviewed Abouammo at his home in Seattle, Washington, regarding his alleged receipt of luxury goods and $300,000 from Saudi officials in exchange for the private data of dissident Twitter users.

During that interview in Seattle, Abouammo excused himself, went to another room, fabricated a backdated $100,000 invoice to make the payments appear as legitimate "consulting fees," and emailed the document to the agents while they were still in his house.

The government prosecuted Abouammo in the Northern District of California (San Francisco), arguing that venue was proper there because the underlying federal investigation he intended to obstruct was based in San Francisco, where Twitter is headquartered.

Abouammo moved to dismiss the falsification count, arguing that under the Sixth Amendment and Article III of the Constitution, venue is only proper in the district where the "essential conduct" occurred. He contends that since the document was created and sent entirely within Seattle (the Western District of Washington), California was an unconstitutional venue for that specific charge.

In 2024, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that venue for a Section 1519 violation is proper either where the document was falsified or where the investigation it was intended to impede was located.

During the oral arguments on March 30, 2026, the Supreme Court justices appeared skeptical of the government's "intended effects" theory. Justice Kagan noted that if the court looks strictly at the "essential conduct elements" of the statute—the act of falsifying—Abouammo would win, as the email to San Francisco was evidence of intent but not a required element of the crime itself.

The Court explored the "vicinage requirement" and the historical origins of the Venue Clause, which was a reaction to the British practice of transporting American colonists to England for trial. The justices questioned whether allowing venue based on the location of a "contemplated effect" would give the government a "blank check" to manufacture venue by simply basing an investigation in a district favorable to the prosecution.

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Case Summary:

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In the case of Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock (Docket No. 24-935), argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on March 25, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:

Fact Summary

The litigation centers on Angelo Brock, an independent distributor in Colorado for Flowers Foods, the second-largest baking company in the U.S. (producer of brands like Wonder Bread and Nature's Own).

The core factual dispute involves the "last-mile" delivery of baked goods. These products are manufactured at out-of-state bakeries, shipped to a warehouse in Colorado, and then picked up by Brock for final delivery to local retail and foodservice customers within the state.

Brock filed a class-action lawsuit alleging that Flowers Foods misclassified him and other drivers as independent contractors rather than employees to avoid paying proper wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act and Colorado labor law.

Flowers Foods moved to compel arbitration, citing a mandatory arbitration clause in the "Distributor Agreement" signed by Brock. Brock countered that he is exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) under Section 1, which excludes "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."

A central factual and legal question is whether a driver who never crosses state lines can be "engaged in interstate commerce" if the goods they carry are in the "final leg" of a continuous journey from an out-of-state factory.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals previously ruled in favor of Brock, finding that his intrastate deliveries were part of a "continuous interstate journey" because Flowers Foods retained significant control over the products' pricing and destination throughout the entire process.

Flowers Foods argues for a bright-line rule: that the Section 1 exemption should apply only to workers who physically cross state borders or directly interact with vehicles (like planes or trains) that do. They contend that once the bread is unloaded at the Colorado warehouse, the interstate journey has effectively ended.

During the oral arguments on March 25, 2026, the Supreme Court justices explored the "Relay Hypothetical": a scenario where three different drivers move the same loaf of bread—one to the border, one across the border, and one (like Brock) from the border to the store. The justices questioned whether it was logical for federal law to exempt only the middle driver while the others performed the same essential transportation task.

The Court also scrutinized the "intended final destination" test, weighing whether a manufacturer’s intent to sell to a specific retailer makes the entire trip interstate, or if the stop at a warehouse creates a sufficient "break" in commerce to make the final delivery a purely local, intrastate event.

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Case Summary:

In the case of Noem, Secretary of Homeland Security v. Al Otro Lado (Docket No. 25-5), argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on March 24, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:

Fact Summary

The litigation is a class action challenge to the government's long-standing use of "metering" (or the "turnback policy") at Ports of Entry (POEs) along the U.S.–Mexico border.

The plaintiffs, led by the non-profit organization Al Otro Lado, represent asylum seekers who reached the international boundary line at U.S. ports of entry but were told by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers that the facilities were "at capacity" and they had to wait in Mexico.

A central factual and legal dispute rests on the interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), specifically 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158 and 1225, which mandate that any noncitizen who "arrives in the United States" or is "physically present" shall be inspected and permitted to apply for asylum.

The government, represented by the Secretary of Homeland Security (Kristi Noem), argues that individuals standing on the Mexican side of the international limit line have not yet "arrived in" the United States and therefore do not trigger the mandatory processing duties of U.S. immigration officers.

Al Otro Lado contends that "arrival" at a Port of Entry includes the process of presenting oneself at the boundary, and that the government’s practice of physically blocking or turning people back before they cross the literal line is an unlawful attempt to evade statutory obligations.

The factual record includes evidence of the "Transit Ban" (or "Third Country Transit Rule") and how it intersected with metering; plaintiffs argue that by forcing migrants to wait in Mexico, the government intentionally subjected them to new, more restrictive asylum rules that were implemented during their forced delay.

In 2024, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court ruling that held the turnback policy was unlawful, finding that the INA's protections apply to those "in the process of arriving" at a port, regardless of which side of the painted line they are standing on.

During the oral arguments on March 24, 2026, the Supreme Court justices focused heavily on the presumption against extraterritoriality—whether U.S. laws can be interpreted to govern conduct or create rights for individuals who are technically on foreign soil.

The Court also scrutinized the operational realities of border management, questioning whether a ruling in favor of the plaintiffs would strip the Executive Branch of its power to manage "orderly flow" and crowd control at busy international bridges.