Pentagon Labyrinth

Former Army Chief of Staff Martin Dempsey issued a challenge to the Army in 2012 to change its institutional culture. In his transformative “Mission Command White Paper,” he wrote that “education and training are keys to achieving the habit of mission command; our doctrine must describe it, our schools must teach it, and we must train individually and collectively to it.”

But what is mission command? Its origins are found in the Prussian military reforms during the first decade of the nineteenth century following the humiliating defeat at the hands of Napoleon at the Battle of Jena-Auerstedt in 1806. Reformers within the Prussian Army understood that victory hinged on a flexible organization composed of units led by officers empowered to use their own judgement to act based on their appraisal of the situation at hand rather than rigidly adhering to a pre-set plan when their orders no longer fit reality. Instead, officers were expected to understand the overall intent of their commander and use the resources at hand to achieve the “why” of the mission even if it didn’t follow the “how” of the issued orders.

Bruce Gudmundsson and Don Vandergriff, two leading military historians, discuss the origins, implications, and challenges of mission command in today’s military.

Instructors at The Basic School, the Marine Corps’ six-month-long course for all newly commissioned officers, are using training methods used in institutions like Harvard Business School and Columbia University to make better decision-makers. The Case Method Project at Quantico, Virginia, uses decision-forcing exercises, or scenarios used to place students in the role of a person facing a difficult problem.

Navy LT Wes Van Dorn raised concerns for years about the safety of the MH-53E helicopters in his squadron. Aging equipment and shoddy maintenance plagued the entire fleet for years which he believed seriously jeopardized the lives of his crew. Tragically, he was proven correct when faulty wiring sparked a fire in his helicopter, causing it to crash off the coast of Virginia on January 8, 2014. LT Van Dorn, LT Sean Snyder, and Petty Officer Brian Collins all died from their injuries.

This incident is a tragic case-study that places into clear relief many of the issues we have been raising for decades. The 53-series of helicopters have been described by some as the deadliest aircraft in the United States inventory. Many of them have been pressed far beyond their anticipated service life because three programs intended to replace the MH-53’s mine countermeasure missions failed. Maintenance troubles have also plagued the program in part because the services often prefer to spend funds on the latest over-budget piece of gadgetry rather than adequately providing for the upkeep of what is in service today.

(Music: “Without Limits” Ross Bugden; Photo: Nicole Van Dorn / Investigative Studios, used with permission)

Officials in the F-35 Joint Program Office are doing paper reclassifications of potentially life-threatening design flaws to make them appear less serious, likely in an attempt to prevent the $1.5 trillion program from missing another schedule deadline and budget cap.

The Center for Defense Information at the Project On Government Oversight (POGO) obtained a document showing how F-35 officials are recategorizing—rather than fixing—major design flaws to be able to claim they have completed the program’s development phase without having to pay overruns for badly needed fixes. Several of these flaws, like the lack of any means for a pilot to confirm a weapon’s target data before firing, and damage to the plane caused by the tailhook on the Air Force’s variant, have potentially serious implications for safety and combat effectiveness.

After receiving his grades from the Army’s Command and General Staff College, Major Jamie Schwandt decided to assign his own grades for the instructors and the institution itself. He did not paint a flattering portrait of the school. He took issue with the school’s leadership, the course content, and even the method of taking attendance. When he published his assessment, the blog provoked a vigorous online debate. Many people agreed with his views, but at least as many came to the defense of the school and the Army’s education system.

Jeff Groom, a former Marine Corps helicopter pilot, recently published a highly satirical, and occasionally irreverent, account of his experiences in uniform, American Cobra Pilot: A Marine Remembers a Dog and Pony Show. He talks with POGO’s Jack Shanahan Military Fellow Dan Grazier about his transition from being a highly motivated and idealistic young officer to one who critically appraised the state of the current force. He also discusses life as a pilot who flies far fewer hours than he should to truly develop his skills and perform the combat function of his military occupational specialty. By his calculations, he figures the American people paid him $50,000 each time he actually performed his real job. The problem is, he did this only twice a year.

The F-35 has now entered an unprecedented seventeenth year of continuing redesign, test deficiencies, fixes, schedule slippages, and cost overruns. And it’s still not at the finish line. Numerous missteps along the way—from the fact that the two competing contractors, Lockheed Martin and Boeing, submitted “flyoff” planes that were crude and undeveloped “technology demonstrators” rather than following the better practice of submitting fully functional prototypes, to concurrent acquisition malpractice that has prevented design flaws from being discovered until after production models were built—have led to where we are now. According to the latest annual report from the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E), 263 “high priority” performance and safety deficiencies remain unresolved and unaddressed, and the developmental tests—essentially, the laboratory tests—are far from complete. If they complete the tests, more deficiencies will surely be found that must be addressed before the plane can safely carry our Airmen and women into combat.

The A-10 has proven itself to be one of the most venerable and capable aircraft in the U.S. arsenal. It is also an aircraft most people in the Air Force never wanted, and they have spent years actively working to send it to the scrap yard. It is the first aircraft ever designed from the very beginning to be solely dedicated to supporting ground troops. Generations of American soldiers and Marines have come to love the jet for its unique abilities to free them from jams and help accomplish the mission. The A-10 achieved this status through a set of fortuitous events and through the efforts of a few brave and dedicated individuals who dedicated themselves to making sure the men and women fighting on the ground would receive the support they needed from the air. Pierre Sprey, one of Robert McNamara’s “whiz kids,” played a key role in the creation of the A-10, and recounts the second part of this incredible story.

The A-10 has proven itself to be one of the most venerable and capable aircraft in the US arsenal. It is also an aircraft most people in the Air Force never wanted and have spent years actively working to send it to the scrap yard. It is the first aircraft every designed from the very beginning to be solely dedicated to supporting ground troops. Generations of American soldiers and Marines have come to love the jet for its unique abilities to free them from jams and to help accomplish the mission. The A-10 achieved this status through a unique set of fortuitous events and a few brave and dedicated individuals who dedicated themselves to making sure the men and women fighting one the ground would receive the support they needed from the air. Pierre Sprey, one of Robert McNamara’s “whiz kids,” played a key role in the creation of the A-10 and recounts this incredible story.

Congress has authorized—and the Pentagon has spent—nearly $40 billion purchasing approximately 189 F-35s that, in their current configuration, will never be able to perform the way they were expected to when taxpayer dollars were used to buy them. This is hardly the right way to do business. POGO’s Jack Shanahan Military Fellow Dan Grazier explores and explains this problem further.