LEGACY LECTURE - January 15, 2014

When failure rears its ugly head, tough decisions must be made. In war, that means accepting defeat or trying a new strategy. In response to insurgencies, the U.S. Military's historical reaction has been to implement counterinsurgencies using a wide array of strategies and tactics. However, the benefits of the military's use of counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts are widely debatable. Colonel Gian Gentile was the first to expose the discord amongst military strategists, analysts, and academics in their philosophies regarding COIN and its effectiveness in accomplishing the U.S.'s goals in Afghanistan in his 2008 article, "Misreading the Surge," World Politics Review. In his new book, Wrong Turn: America's Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency, Gentile further explores the dissent surrounding COIN doctrine. Colonel (Ret) Gian Gentile is the Senior Historian for the Rand Corporation and recently retired from the U.S. Army where he served as a professor of history at the United States Military Academy. Gentile has served as a visiting fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, and is an award winning historian and accomplished author.

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