Philosophy at the School of Advanced Study

Institute of Philsophy

The Chandaria Lectures 2016

Lecture 3 - The Future of Prediction

Professor Andy Clark

(University of Edinburgh)

The Institute of Philosophy is delighted to announce that this year's Chandaria Lecture series will be given by Professor Andy Clark of the University of Edinburgh.

The ‘predictive processing’ framework shows great promise as a means of both understanding and integrating many of the core information processing strategies underlying perception, thought, and action. But this leaves many questions unanswered. What is the true scope of this story – can it really be a theory of ‘everything cognitive’? Is it falsifiable? Can a story that posits prediction error minimization as cognitive bedrock accommodate the undoubted attractions of novelty and exploration? What can it tell us about specifically human forms of thought and reason? And what, if anything, does it have to say about the nature and possibility of conscious experience itself?

Andy Clark was appointed to the Chair in Logic and Metaphysics at University of Edinburgh in 2004. Prior to that he had taught at the University of Glasgow, the University of Sussex, Washington University in St Louis, and Indiana University, Bloomington. He was Director of the Philosophy/Neuroscience/Psychology Program at Washington University in St Louis, and Director of the Cognitive Science Program at Indiana University. His research interests include philosophy of mind and artificial intelligence, including robotics, artificial life, embodied cognition, and mind, technology and culture.

Institute of Philsophy

The Chandaria Lectures 2016

Lecture 3 - The Future of Prediction

Professor Andy Clark

(University of Edinburgh)

The Institute of Philosophy is delighted to announce that this year's Chandaria Lecture series will be given by Professor Andy Clark of the University of Edinburgh.

The ‘predictive processing’ framework shows great promise as a means of both understanding and integrating many of the core information processing strategies underlying perception, thought, and action. But this leaves many questions unanswered. What is the true scope of this story – can it really be a theory of ‘everything cognitive’? Is it falsifiable? Can a story that posits prediction error minimization as cognitive bedrock accommodate the undoubted attractions of novelty and exploration? What can it tell us about specifically human forms of thought and reason? And what, if anything, does it have to say about the nature and possibility of conscious experience itself?

Andy Clark was appointed to the Chair in Logic and Metaphysics at University of Edinburgh in 2004. Prior to that he had taught at the University of Glasgow, the University of Sussex, Washington University in St Louis, and Indiana University, Bloomington. He was Director of the Philosophy/Neuroscience/Psychology Program at Washington University in St Louis, and Director of the Cognitive Science Program at Indiana University. His research interests include philosophy of mind and artificial intelligence, including robotics, artificial life, embodied cognition, and mind, technology and culture.

Institute of Philosophy

The Chandaria Lectures 2016

Lecture 1 - Prediction Machines

Professor Andy Clark

(University of Edinburgh)

The Institute of Philosophy is delighted to announce that this year's Chandaria Lecture series will be given by Professor Andy Clark of the University of Edinburgh.

Biological brains are increasingly cast as 'prediction machines'; evolved organs forever trying to predict their own streams of incoming sensory stimulation. Rich, world-revealing perception only occurs, these stories suggest, when cascading neuronal activity is able to match the incoming sensory signal with a multi-level stream of apt 'top-down' predictions. This blurs the lines between perception, thought, and imagination, revealing them as inextricably tied together. In this talk, I first introduce this general explanatory schema, and then discuss these (and other) implications. I end by asking what all this suggests concerning the fundamental nature of our perceptual contact with the world.

Andy Clark was appointed to the Chair in Logic and Metaphysics at University of Edinburgh in 2004. Prior to that he had taught at the University of Glasgow, the University of Sussex, Washington University in St Louis, and Indiana University, Bloomington. He was Director of the Philosophy/Neuroscience/Psychology Program at Washington University in St Louis, and Director of the Cognitive Science Program at Indiana University. His research interests include philosophy of mind and artificial intelligence, including robotics, artificial life, embodied cognition, and mind, technology and culture.

Institute of Philosophy

The Chandaria Lectures 2016

Lecture 1 - Prediction Machines

Professor Andy Clark

(University of Edinburgh)

The Institute of Philosophy is delighted to announce that this year's Chandaria Lecture series will be given by Professor Andy Clark of the University of Edinburgh.

Biological brains are increasingly cast as 'prediction machines'; evolved organs forever trying to predict their own streams of incoming sensory stimulation. Rich, world-revealing perception only occurs, these stories suggest, when cascading neuronal activity is able to match the incoming sensory signal with a multi-level stream of apt 'top-down' predictions. This blurs the lines between perception, thought, and imagination, revealing them as inextricably tied together. In this talk, I first introduce this general explanatory schema, and then discuss these (and other) implications. I end by asking what all this suggests concerning the fundamental nature of our perceptual contact with the world.

Andy Clark was appointed to the Chair in Logic and Metaphysics at University of Edinburgh in 2004. Prior to that he had taught at the University of Glasgow, the University of Sussex, Washington University in St Louis, and Indiana University, Bloomington. He was Director of the Philosophy/Neuroscience/Psychology Program at Washington University in St Louis, and Director of the Cognitive Science Program at Indiana University. His research interests include philosophy of mind and artificial intelligence, including robotics, artificial life, embodied cognition, and mind, technology and culture.

Institute of Philosophy

Biological Identity Conference

Day Two

Metaphysics and the problem of biological individuality

Eric T. Olson

(Sheffield)

Discussions of biological individuality appear to concern the metaphysics of organisms. Yet these discussions typically ignore the substantial literature on the metaphysics of material things (or of any other metaphysical sort that organisms might belong to). This means that philosophers of biology are bound to make assumptions that many metaphysicians think they have strong reasons to reject, without being aware that these assumptions are in any way controversial. (Some philosophers of biology do not even seem to be aware that they are making metaphysical assumptions.) I don’t want to argue for or against any particular claim about the metaphysics of material things. I will argue that the way to formulate the problem of biological individuality, and the sort of thing that would count as a solution to it, depend on what metaphysical background claims are assumed. And the usual metaphysical assumptions clash with the most common formulations.

Recent debates in metaphysics on personal identity and material constitution have seen a rise of theories which appeal to a biological understanding of identity. So-called animalists claim that the puzzles of standard psychological theories of personal identity can be avoided by the insight that we are essentially animals or organisms rather than persons and that the necessary and sufficient conditions of our identity over time therefore are purely biological in character. Moreover, it has been argued (most famously by Peter van Inwagen) that if there are any composite objects at all in the world, then these are those studied by biology. According to this view, there are no inanimate things like stones or cars, strictly speaking, as these turn out to be just collections of particles; but there are living organisms, due to a special unity making them each one rather than many.

It is time to investigate whether, and if so how, the concept of biological identity can indeed serve the functions metaphysicians attribute to it. For that purpose, the conference will aim to confront the metaphysical motives for proposing biological conceptions of identity, diachronic as well as synchronic, with the scientifically informed research on biological identity which has been carried out within the philosophy of biology but which so far has been little noticed by the metaphysics community. The conference seeks to connect these two hitherto largely separate debates so as to put future metaphysical allusions to biological identity on more solid grounds and, at the same time, to raise awareness for the metaphysical implications of the empirically founded models of biological identity developed in philosophy of biology.

Institute of Philosophy

Biological Identity Conference

Day Two

Hylomorphism, foundationalist materialism, and emergence

Denis Walsh

(Toronto)

I contrast two approaches to individuating, and explaining, the properties of primary substances— hylomorphism and foundationalist materialism. The principal difference lies in the relation that each posits between a substance and its material constitution. According to hylomorphism, a primary substance is a complex of matter and form. According to foundationalist materialism a primary substance is constituted exclusively of its matter. The theoretically significant properties of a complex entity are fixed by the intrinsic, context insensitive properties of its matter. Foundationalist materialism has notorious difficulties accommodating the emergent properties of complex dynamic systems. This has become a genuine impediment to the proper understanding of the nature and function of biological systems, in which the function of the system confers certain causal properties upon its parts. I trace the problems back to the putative relation between a substance and its matter. These difficulties do not apply to hylomorphism. I conclude that hylomorphism provides a more appropriate model for the individuation and explanation of biological systems.

Recent debates in metaphysics on personal identity and material constitution have seen a rise of theories which appeal to a biological understanding of identity. So-called animalists claim that the puzzles of standard psychological theories of personal identity can be avoided by the insight that we are essentially animals or organisms rather than persons and that the necessary and sufficient conditions of our identity over time therefore are purely biological in character. Moreover, it has been argued (most famously by Peter van Inwagen) that if there are any composite objects at all in the world, then these are those studied by biology. According to this view, there are no inanimate things like stones or cars, strictly speaking, as these turn out to be just collections of particles; but there are living organisms, due to a special unity making them each one rather than many.

It is time to investigate whether, and if so how, the concept of biological identity can indeed serve the functions metaphysicians attribute to it. For that purpose, the conference will aim to confront the metaphysical motives for proposing biological conceptions of identity, diachronic as well as synchronic, with the scientifically informed research on biological identity which has been carried out within the philosophy of biology but which so far has been little noticed by the metaphysics community. The conference seeks to connect these two hitherto largely separate debates so as to put future metaphysical allusions to biological identity on more solid grounds and, at the same time, to raise awareness for the metaphysical implications of the empirically founded models of biological identity developed in philosophy of biology.

Institute of Philosophy

Biological Identity Conference

Day Two

Evolutionary individuals and their offspring

Ellen Clarke

(Oxford)

I present a concept of the biological individual that is used within evolutionary biology. I explicate the concept through a discussion of the theoretical roles that it is expected to play, and detail the constraints that these roles imply for the concept. The concept emerges from what can be described as a levels-of-selection approach to evolutionary individuality, since the entity is picked out primarily in terms of its capacity to undergo evolution by natural selection at one level rather than another. I’ll use two case studies to show the concept at work.

First, in the evolution of multicellularity in bacteria, second, in discussions about the role of sex in clonal plants. Finally, I will discuss the relevance and implications of this evolutionary concept for issues about biological identity. We can categorise three classes of biological identity relation. In the first class, an organism at time t is identical with an organism at time t+1. In another class, an organism at time t is completely different from an organism at time t+1 and counts as a separate individual. In between these cases is a third, in which an organism at time t is similar to, but still different from an organism at time t+2 such that the latter is an offspring of the former. I try to explicate the relevant senses of ‘similar’ and ‘different’ for marking these distinctions. But perhaps the most interesting point, in respect of interests about biological identity in general, is the finding that the boundaries between these three cases may not be sharp. The relationship between self and other, at least in the case in which parents are related to their offspring – can be gradient.

Recent debates in metaphysics on personal identity and material constitution have seen a rise of theories which appeal to a biological understanding of identity. So-called animalists claim that the puzzles of standard psychological theories of personal identity can be avoided by the insight that we are essentially animals or organisms rather than persons and that the necessary and sufficient conditions of our identity over time therefore are purely biological in character. Moreover, it has been argued (most famously by Peter van Inwagen) that if there are any composite objects at all in the world, then these are those studied by biology. According to this view, there are no inanimate things like stones or cars, strictly speaking, as these turn out to be just collections of particles; but there are living organisms, due to a special unity making them each one rather than many.

It is time to investigate whether, and if so how, the concept of biological identity can indeed serve the functions metaphysicians attribute to it. For that purpose, the conference will aim to confront the metaphysical motives for proposing biological conceptions of identity, diachronic as well as synchronic, with the scientifically informed research on biological identity which has been carried out within the philosophy of biology but which so far has been little noticed by the metaphysics community. The conference seeks to connect these two hitherto largely separate debates so as to put future metaphysical allusions to biological identity on more solid grounds and, at the same time, to raise awareness for the metaphysical implications of the empirically founded models of biological identity developed in philosophy of biology.

Institute of Philosophy

Biological Identity Conference

Day Two

What does autonomy tell us about biological identity?

Matteo Mossio

(Paris)

One of the central tenets of the autonomous perspective in biology is the idea that biological organisms are organized systems. Organization refers to a specific kind of regime, in which a set of constituents depend on each other for their own existence and maintenance; as a whole, the system can be said to realise self determination. It has been recently argued that biological organisation, understood in this way, provides a relevant ground for distinctive biological dimensions as teleology, normativity, functionality and individuation. In this talk, I explore to what extent biological organisation also provides useful criteria to think about biological identity. In particular, I suggest that the continuity of the organisation constitutes a central criterion, which maintains the identity of the organism in spite of various kinds of material, structural and functional changes that it might undergo. So far, however, the very idea of “continuity of the organisation” has not been spelled out in precise terms. I will make a contribution in this direction by examining whether and how this criterion applies to situations in which biological organisms undergo strong discontinuities: in particular, I will focus on examples involving metamorphosis and reproduction.

Recent debates in metaphysics on personal identity and material constitution have seen a rise of theories which appeal to a biological understanding of identity. So-called animalists claim that the puzzles of standard psychological theories of personal identity can be avoided by the insight that we are essentially animals or organisms rather than persons and that the necessary and sufficient conditions of our identity over time therefore are purely biological in character. Moreover, it has been argued (most famously by Peter van Inwagen) that if there are any composite objects at all in the world, then these are those studied by biology. According to this view, there are no inanimate things like stones or cars, strictly speaking, as these turn out to be just collections of particles; but there are living organisms, due to a special unity making them each one rather than many.

It is time to investigate whether, and if so how, the concept of biological identity can indeed serve the functions metaphysicians attribute to it. For that purpose, the conference will aim to confront the metaphysical motives for proposing biological conceptions of identity, diachronic as well as synchronic, with the scientifically informed research on biological identity which has been carried out within the philosophy of biology but which so far has been little noticed by the metaphysics community. The conference seeks to connect these two hitherto largely separate debates so as to put future metaphysical allusions to biological identity on more solid grounds and, at the same time, to raise awareness for the metaphysical implications of the empirically founded models of biological identity developed in philosophy of biology.

Institute of Philosophy

Biological Identity Conference

Day Two

Metaphysics and the problem of biological individuality

Eric T. Olson

(Sheffield)

Discussions of biological individuality appear to concern the metaphysics of organisms. Yet these discussions typically ignore the substantial literature on the metaphysics of material things (or of any other metaphysical sort that organisms might belong to). This means that philosophers of biology are bound to make assumptions that many metaphysicians think they have strong reasons to reject, without being aware that these assumptions are in any way controversial. (Some philosophers of biology do not even seem to be aware that they are making metaphysical assumptions.) I don’t want to argue for or against any particular claim about the metaphysics of material things. I will argue that the way to formulate the problem of biological individuality, and the sort of thing that would count as a solution to it, depend on what metaphysical background claims are assumed. And the usual metaphysical assumptions clash with the most common formulations.

Recent debates in metaphysics on personal identity and material constitution have seen a rise of theories which appeal to a biological understanding of identity. So-called animalists claim that the puzzles of standard psychological theories of personal identity can be avoided by the insight that we are essentially animals or organisms rather than persons and that the necessary and sufficient conditions of our identity over time therefore are purely biological in character. Moreover, it has been argued (most famously by Peter van Inwagen) that if there are any composite objects at all in the world, then these are those studied by biology. According to this view, there are no inanimate things like stones or cars, strictly speaking, as these turn out to be just collections of particles; but there are living organisms, due to a special unity making them each one rather than many.

It is time to investigate whether, and if so how, the concept of biological identity can indeed serve the functions metaphysicians attribute to it. For that purpose, the conference will aim to confront the metaphysical motives for proposing biological conceptions of identity, diachronic as well as synchronic, with the scientifically informed research on biological identity which has been carried out within the philosophy of biology but which so far has been little noticed by the metaphysics community. The conference seeks to connect these two hitherto largely separate debates so as to put future metaphysical allusions to biological identity on more solid grounds and, at the same time, to raise awareness for the metaphysical implications of the empirically founded models of biological identity developed in philosophy of biology.

Institute of Philosophy

Biological Identity Conference

Day Two

Hylomorphism, foundationalist materialism, and emergence

Denis Walsh

(Toronto)

I contrast two approaches to individuating, and explaining, the properties of primary substances— hylomorphism and foundationalist materialism. The principal difference lies in the relation that each posits between a substance and its material constitution. According to hylomorphism, a primary substance is a complex of matter and form. According to foundationalist materialism a primary substance is constituted exclusively of its matter. The theoretically significant properties of a complex entity are fixed by the intrinsic, context insensitive properties of its matter. Foundationalist materialism has notorious difficulties accommodating the emergent properties of complex dynamic systems. This has become a genuine impediment to the proper understanding of the nature and function of biological systems, in which the function of the system confers certain causal properties upon its parts. I trace the problems back to the putative relation between a substance and its matter. These difficulties do not apply to hylomorphism. I conclude that hylomorphism provides a more appropriate model for the individuation and explanation of biological systems.

Recent debates in metaphysics on personal identity and material constitution have seen a rise of theories which appeal to a biological understanding of identity. So-called animalists claim that the puzzles of standard psychological theories of personal identity can be avoided by the insight that we are essentially animals or organisms rather than persons and that the necessary and sufficient conditions of our identity over time therefore are purely biological in character. Moreover, it has been argued (most famously by Peter van Inwagen) that if there are any composite objects at all in the world, then these are those studied by biology. According to this view, there are no inanimate things like stones or cars, strictly speaking, as these turn out to be just collections of particles; but there are living organisms, due to a special unity making them each one rather than many.

It is time to investigate whether, and if so how, the concept of biological identity can indeed serve the functions metaphysicians attribute to it. For that purpose, the conference will aim to confront the metaphysical motives for proposing biological conceptions of identity, diachronic as well as synchronic, with the scientifically informed research on biological identity which has been carried out within the philosophy of biology but which so far has been little noticed by the metaphysics community. The conference seeks to connect these two hitherto largely separate debates so as to put future metaphysical allusions to biological identity on more solid grounds and, at the same time, to raise awareness for the metaphysical implications of the empirically founded models of biological identity developed in philosophy of biology.