In this episode of PING, APNIC’s Chief Scientist, Geoff Huston, discusses "a day in the life of BGP" -Not an extraordinary day, not a special day, just the 8th of May.

What happens inside the BGP system, from the point of view of AS4608, one ordinary BGP speaker on the edge of the network? What kinds of things are seen, and why are they seen?

Geoff has been measuring BGP for almost it's entire life as the internet routing protocol, but this time looks at the dynamics at a more "micro" level than usual. In particular there are some things about the rate of messages and changes which points to the problems BGP faces. A small number of BGP speakers produce the vast majority of change, and overall the network information BGP speakers have to deal with as a persisting view of the world increases more slowly. Both kinds of message dynamics have to be dealt with.

Can we fix this? Is there even anything worth fixing here, or is BGP just doing fine?

Read more about the dynamics of BGP on the APNIC Blog:

• A Day in the life of BGP (Geoff Huston June 2025 APNIC Blog)
• BGP topics at the APNIC Blog
• Geoff's archive of BGP data at bgp.potaroo.net

In this episode of PING, Doug Madory from Kentik discusses his rundown of the state of play in secure BGP across 2024 and 2025. Kentik has it’s own internal measurements of BGP behaviour and flow data across the surface of the internet, which combined with the Oregon University curated routeviews archive means Doug can analyse both the publicly visible state of BGP from archives, and Kentik’s own view of the dynamics of BGP change, along side other systems like the worldwide RPKI model, and the Internet Routing Registry systems.

Doug has written about this before on the APNIC Blog in May of 2024.

RPKI demands two outcomes, Firstly that the asset holders who control a given range of Internet Address sign an intent regarding who originates it the ROA, and secondly that the BGP speakers worldwide implement validation of the routing they see, known as Route Origin Validation or ROV. ROA signing is easy, and increases very simply if the delegate uses an RIR hosted system to make the signed objects. ROV is not always simple and has to be deployed carefully so has a slower rate of deployment, and more consequence in costs to the BGP speaker. Doug has been tracking both independently, as well as looking at known routing incidents in the default free zone, and therefore the impact on RPKI active networks, and everywhere else.

Read more about RPKI and BGP on the APNIC Blog, the web, and at Doug’s own blogging at Kentik:

• RPKI ROV reaches a Major Milestone (APNIC Blog, May 2024)
• Blog Articles by Doug Madory on the APNIC Blog
• The Oregon Routeviews Project
• Doug Madory’s blog posts at Kentik
• A shorter interview with Doug Madory on AS_SET problems features in an earlier PING episode, recorded at the ISOC Pulse “PIMF” session at APRICOT 2025.

In this episode of PING, APNIC’s Chief Scientist, Geoff Huston, discusses the root zone of the DNS, and some emerging concerns in how much it costs to service query load at the root.

In the absence of cacheing, all queries in the DNS (except ones the DNS system you ask is locally authoritative for anyway) have to be sent through the root of the DNS, to find the right nameserver to ask for the specific information. Thanks to cacheing, this system doesn't drown in the load of every worldwide query, all the time, going through the root. But, even taking cacheing into account there is an astronomical amount of query seen at the root, and it has two interesting qualities

Firstly, its growing significantly faster than the normal rate of growth of the Internet. We're basically at small incremental growth overall in new users, but query load at the root increases significantly faster, even after some more unexpected loads have been reduced.

Secondly, almost all of the queries demand the answer "No, that doesn't exist" and the fact most traffic to the root hunts the answer NO means that the nature of distributed DNS cacheing of negative answers isn't addressing the fundamental burden here.

Geoff thinks we may be ignoring some recent developments in proving the contents of a zone, the ZONEMD record which is a DNSSEC signed check on the entire zone contents, and emerging systems to download the root zone, and localise all the queries sent onwards into a copy of the root held in the resolver.

Basically, "can we do better" -And Geoff thinks, we very probably can.

Read more about the economics of the root zone and ZONEMD at the APNIC Blog and on the web:

• The Root of the DNS (Geoff Huston, APNIC Blog March 2025)
• ZoneMD: Message digest for DNS Zones RFC8976 (IETF RFC)

In this episode of PING, We’re talking to Leslie Daigle from the Global Cyber Alliance (GCA) again, discussing GCA’s honeynet project. Leslie spoke with PING back in January 2024, and in this episode we re-visit things. Honeynets (or Honey farms) are deliberately weakly protected systems put online, to see what kinds of bad traffic exist out in the global Internet, where they come from and what kinds of attack they are mounting.

In the intervening period GCA has continued to develop its honeyfarm, building out it’s own systems images, and can now capture more kinds of bad traffic. They have also bedded in the MANRS community, which is now supported by GCA worldwide.

In this episode, Leslie is actually asking more questions than providing answers. If we accept that there is now a persisting problem at scale, what kinds of approaches do we need to take to “get on top” of bad traffic? It used to be we thought of this in terms of technical solutions but increasingly Leslie feels we now need to broaden the conversation and take this into Public policy and governance communities, to understand what kinds of social cost we can bear, and what socially driven objectives we want to drive to. The problem is, this is one of the tasks technologists are often the least equipped to do: Talk to people.

GCA is showcasing the AIDE system, reachable at https://gcaaide.org/ as a way of opening up the conversation with national strategic policy makers, and the wider community. It’s a simple economy & region model summarising the state of honeynet detected bad traffic levels worldwide, and helps to set an agenda with which the individual ISPs and routing-active community can engage, for their locus of control.

Read more about GCA, Honey nets, AIDE on the APNIC blog and the web:

• The invisible War: Why securing Internet Traffic is Everyone’s Responsibility (Leslie Daigle, APNIC Blog May 2025)
• Global Cyber Alliance measurements (Podcast, PING at APNIC Jan 2024)
• Dealing with the undercurrent of unwanted Traffic (Leslie Daigle, APNIC Blog October 2022)
• AIDE: Addressing unwanted Internet Traffic at it’s source (GCA Website)

In this episode of PING, APNIC’s Chief Scientist, Geoff Huston, revisits changes underway in how the Domain Name System (DNS) delegates authority over a given zone and how resolvers discover the new authoritative sources. We last explored this in March 2024.



In DNS, the word ‘domain’ refers to a scope of authority. Within a domain, everything is governed by its delegated authority. While that authority may only directly manage its immediate subdomains (children), its control implicitly extends to all subordinate levels (grandchildren and beyond). If a parent domain withdraws delegation from a child, everything beneath that child disappears. Think of it like a Venn diagram of nested circles — being a subdomain means being entirely within the parent’s scope.

The issue lies in how this delegation is handled. It’s by way of nameserver (NS) records. These are both part of the child zone (where they are defined) and the parent zone (which must reference them). This becomes especially tricky with DNSSEC. The parent can’t authoritatively sign the child’s NS records because they are technically owned by the child. But if the child signs them, it breaks the trust chain from the parent.

Another complication is the emergence of third parties to the delegate, who actually operate the machinery of the DNS. We need mechanisms to give them permission to make changes to operational aspects of delegation, but not to hold all the keys a delegate has regarding their domain name.

A new activity has been spun up in the IETF to discuss how to alter this delegation problem by creating a new kind of DNS record, the DELEG record. This is proposed to follow the Service Binding model defined in RFC 9460. Exactly how this works and what it means for the DNS is still up in the air.

DELEG could fundamentally change how authoritative answers are discovered, how DNS messages are transported, and how intermediaries interact with the DNS ecosystem. In the future, significant portions of DNS traffic might flow over new protocols, introducing novel behaviours in the relationships between resolvers and authoritative servers.

Read more about DELEG on the APNIC Blog and the web:

• DNS and the proposed DELEG record (APNIC Blog, February 2024)
• DELEG Working Group Charter (IETF Website)
• Service Binding and Parameter Specification via the DNS (IETF RFC 9460)
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In this episode of PING, Professor Cristel Pelsser who holds the chair of critical embedded systems at UCLouvain Discusses her work measuring BGP and in particular the system described in the 2024 SIGCOMM “best paper” award winning research: “The Next Generation of BGP Data Collection Platforms”

Cristel and her collaborators Thomas Alfroy, Thomas Holterbach, Thomas Krenc and K. C. Claffy have built a system they call GILL, available on the web at https://bgproutes.io This work also features a new service called MVP, to help find the “most valuable vantage point” in the BGP collection system for your particular needs. GILL has been designed for scale, and will be capable of encompassing thousands of peerings. it also has an innovative approach to holding BGP data, focussed on the removal of demonstrably redundant information, and therefore significantly higher compression of the data stream compared to e.g. holding MRT files.

The MVP system exploits machine learning methods to aide in the selection of the most advantageous data collection point reflecting a researchers specific needs. Application of ML methods here permits a significant amount of data to be managed and change reflected in the selection of vantage points.

Their system has already been able to support DFOH, an approach to finding forged origin attacks from peering relationships seen online in BGP, as opposed to the peering expected both from location, and declarations of intent inside systems like peeringDB.

Read more about Cristel’s work, and their BGP analysis tools on the web:

• The Next Generation of BGP Data Collection Platforms (Best Paper Award at ACM SIGCOMM 2024)
• bgproutes.io (web portal to GILL, MVP and DFOH systems)
• Measuring Internet Routing from the Most Valuable Points
• A system to Detect Forged-Origin Hijacks (DFOH)

In this episode of PING, APNIC’s Chief Scientist, Geoff Huston, discusses the history and emerging future of how Internet protocols get more than the apparent link bandwidth by using multiple links and multiple paths.

Initially, the model was quite simple, capable of handling up to four links of equal cost and delay reasonably well, typically to connect two points together. At the time, the Internet was built on telecommunications services originally designed for voice networks, with cabling laid between exchanges, from exchanges to customers, or across continents. This straightforward technique allowed the Internet to expand along available cable or fibre paths between two points. However, as the system became more complex, new path options emerged, and bandwidth demands grew beyond the capacity of individual or even equal-cost links, increasingly sophisticated methods for managing these connections had to be developed.

An interesting development at the end of this process is the impact of a fully encrypted transport layer on the intervening infrastructure’s ability to manage traffic distribution across multiple links. With encryption obscuring the contents of the dataflow, traditional methods for intelligently splitting traffic become less effective. Randomly distributing data can often worsen performance, as modern techniques rely on protocols like TCP to sustain high-speed flows by avoiding data misordering and packet loss.

This episode of PING explores how Internet protocols boost bandwidth by using multiple links and paths, and how secure transport layers affect this process.

Read more about multipath network protocols on the web:

• IETF Draft on Multipath for QUIC (IETF, April 2025)
• Multipath TCP: Revolutionising connectivity one path at a time (Cloudflare Blog, January 2025)
• RFC 8684 (IETF, 2020)
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Last month, during APRICOT 2025 / APNIC 59, the Internet Society hosted its first Pulse Internet Measurement Forum (PIMF). PIMF brings together people interested in Internet measurement from a wide range of perspectives — from technical details to policy, governance, and social issues. The goal is to create a space for open discussion, uniting both technologists and policy experts.

In this second special episode of PING, we continue our break from the usual one-on-one podcast format and present a recap of why the PIMF forum was held, and the last 3 short interviews from the workshop.

First we hear a repeat of Amreesh Phokeer's presentation. Amreesh is from the Internet Society and discusses his role in managing the Pulse activity within ISOC. Alongside Robbie Mitchell, Amreesh helped organize the forum, aiming to foster collaboration between measurement experts and policy professionals.

Next we hear from Beau Gieskens, a Senior Software Engineer from APNIC Information Products. Beau has been working on the DASH system and discusses his PIMF presentation on a re-design to an event-sourcing model which reduced database query load and improved speed and scaling of the service.

We then have Doug Madory from Kentik who presented to PIMF on a quirk in how Internet Routing Registries or IRR are being used, which can cause massive costs in BGP filter configuration and is related to some recent route leaks being seen at large in the default free zone of BGP.

Finally, we hear from Lia Hestina from the RIPE NCC Atlas project. Lia is the community Development officer, and focusses on Asia Pacific and Africa for the Atlas project. Lia discusses the Atlas system and how it underpins measurements worldwide, including ones discussed in the PIMF meeting.

For more insights from PIMF, be sure to check out the PULSE Forum recording on the Internet Society YouTube feed

In this episode of PING, APNIC’s Chief Scientist, Geoff Huston, discusses the surprisingly vexed question of how to say ‘no’ in the DNS. This conversation follows a presentation by Shumon Huque at the recent DNS OARC meeting, who will be on PING in a future episode talking about another aspect of the DNS protocol.

You would hope this is a simple, straightforward answer to a question, but as usual with the DNS, there are more complexities under the surface. The DNS must indicate whether the labels in the requested name do not exist, whether the specific record type is missing, or both. Sometimes, it needs to state both pieces of information, while other times, it only needs to state one.

The problem is made worse by the constraints of signing answers with DNSSEC. There needs to be a way to say ‘no’ authoritatively, and minimize the risk of leaking any other information.

NSEC3 records are designed to limit this exposure by making it harder to enumerate an entire zone. Instead of explicitly listing ‘before’ and ‘after’ labels in a signed response denying a label’s existence, NSEC3 uses hashed values to obscure them. In contrast, the simpler NSEC model reveals adjacent labels, allowing an attacker to systematically map out all existing names — a serious risk for domain registries that depend on name confidentiality. This is documented in RFC 7129.

Saying ‘no’ with authority also raises the question of where signing occurs — at the zone’s centre (by the zone holder) or at the edge (by the zone server). These approaches lead to different solutions, each with its own costs and consequences.

In this episode of PING, Geoff explores the differences between a non-standard, vendor-explored solution, and the emergence of a draft standard in how to say ‘no’ properly.

At the APRICOT/APNIC59 meeting held in Petaling Jaya in Malaysia last month, The internet society held it's first PIMF meeting. PIMF, or the Pulse Internet Measurement Forum is a gathering of people interested in Internet measurement in the widest possible sense, from technical information all the way to policy, governance and social questions. ISOC is interested in creating a space for the discussion to take place amongst the community, and bring both technologists and policy specialists into the same room.

This time on PING, instead of the usual one-on-one format of podcast we've got 5 interviews from this meeting, and after the next episode from Geoff Huston at APNIC Labs we'll play a second part, with 3 more of the presenters from this session.

First up we have Amreesh Phokeer from the Internet Society who manages the PULSE activity in ISOC, and along with Robbie Mitchell set up the meeting.

Then we hear from Christoph Visser from IIJ Labs in Tokyo, who presented on his measurements of the "Steam" Game distribution platform used by Valve Software to share games. It's a complex system of application-specific source selection, using multiple Content Distribution Networks (CDN) to scale across the world, and allows Christoph to see into the link quality from a public API. No extra measurements required, for an insight into the gamer community and their experience of the Internet.

The third interview is with Anand Raje, from AIORI-IMN, India’s Indigenous Internet Measurement System. Anand leads a team which has built out a national measurement system using IoT "orchestration" methods to manage probes and anchors, in a virtual-environment which permits them to run multiple independent measurement systems hosted inside their platform.

After this there's an interview with Andre Robachevsky from Global Cyber Alliance (GCA). Andre established the MANRS system, it's platform and nurtured the organisation into being inside ISOC. MANRS has now moved into the care of GCA and Andre moved with it, and discusses how this complements the existing GCA activities.

FInally we have a conversation with Champika Wijayatunga from ICANN on the KINDNS project. This is a programme designed to bring MANRS-like industry best practice to the DNS community at large, including authoritative DNS delegates and the intermediate resolver and client supporting stub resolver operators. Champika is interested in reaching into the community to get KINDNS more widely understood and encourage its adoption with over 2,000 entities having completed the assessment process already.

Next time we'll here from three more participants in the PIMF session: Doug Madory from Kentik, Beau Gieskins from APNIC Information Products, and Lia Hestina, from the RIPE NCC.

• PULSE Forum recording (Internet Society YouTube feed)