How did Poland and Lithuania come to be joined together as one state? Here we answer that critically important question, as well as several others which go along with it. Of course, our story may begin in the year 1700, but we would be remiss if we didn't mention several threads of the story which brings the narrative to that point. Why did the Commonwealth have an elective monarchy? Why were the nobility so powerful? And perhaps the most pressing question - how did a pagan grand duke of Lithuania, the last of his kind, become engaged to the sole heir of Poland's Catholic Angevin King? It's a story which needs to be heard in full, so make sure you don't miss out! Thanksss so much for making Poland possible, and remember that by listening in, you're not just helping make it viable, you're also funding my PhD! I can't thank you enough!
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PINYL: A) Creating a Commonwealth Part 1

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1956 Episode 2.13 examines the final moments of peace between 25-29 October, as the conspiracy to attack Egypt and make it look like an accident developed further.
In Britain, the focus was on the legal argument still, even despite the clear problems which Britain’s legal advisors in the Foreign Office had in painting any British attack on Egypt as legally justified. While some less informed Cabinet members, like the Lord Chancellor, insisted that there was grounds for claiming that British rights were involved and intervention justified, the majority of the legal profession disagreed. Anthony Eden meanwhile sought to lie and deceive his way towards the conflict, letting no hints drop in the meantime that what was to come would profoundly affect Britain’s position in the world.
The French and Israeli governments were already actively mobilised for war, involved as each was in its own miniature struggle for supremacy which promised to tie into the Egyptian situation. For France, it was Algeria and President Nasser’s tireless support of the enemies of France. For Israel it was President Nasser’s threatening Pan-Arabism and his refusal to permit Israel to access the Suez Canal. While these schemes progressed, hints were dropped and Egyptian nerves were frayed.
Surely though, it would not be possible to initiate such a conflict – surely the UN, or the US, or NATO or something would prevent such a 19th century approach to international relations from taking place? Indeed, in this strange transition period between world war, decolonisation and the increasing focus on domestic matters, here were three powers about to turn back the clock in policy and behaviour, in the name of a plan which was soon to shatter world opinion, and dramatically alter the debate. Our story is heating up, so make sure you don’t miss a minute of this incredible instalment here! 
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1956 - The Suez Crisis #2.13: When A Plan Comes Together

1956 Episode 2.12 takes us to the 22-24 October 1956, where the war plan that would create the Suez Crisis was created, developed and signed by Britain, France and Israel in an unassuming Parisian suburb.
This process was, of course, far from straightforward or guaranteed to produce a result. It required the French reassuring both the Israeli and British representatives about the solid nature of their plan, and it also demonstrated the lack of tact which Selwyn Lloyd in particular seemed to possess. One of the most incredible scenes though comes near the end of the episode when, on the evening of 24th October, Britain’s representatives return home to Anthony Eden with a copy of the Sevres Protocol in hand, only to come under rhetorical attack for leaving this paper trail in the course of their top secret discussions.
Eden was well aware that there could be no evidence of what had been done at Sevres, and he would send these men back to France to track down and destroy any pieces of evidence that remained. The Prime Minister, of course, was already planning ahead to what he would say when word of the Crisis got out. For the sake of plausible deniability, Eden wished there to be no evidence and no written record of the collusion. Thankfully for historians since, Eden’s wishes were not fulfilled. Here was the last piece of the Suez puzzle being set in place, so I hope you’ll give it a listen and enjoy!
Remember history friends - you can get these episodes ad-free with scripts attached for just $2 a month - for a fiver you can access our PhD Thesis series, so come and nerd out with us! Get bonus content on Patreon Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

1956 - The Suez Crisis #2.12: Collusion And Delusion

1956 Episode 2.11 finally takes us to that controversial moment when Britain, France and Israel began to move closer together.
The Sevres Protocol was neither developed nor signed in a day, and in the first two weeks of October, negotiations critically important to the later conflict were underway. At first, Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd hoped to make use of the UN Security Council to gain British satisfaction in Egypt, and for a time he was successful in this aim, because Anthony Eden was ill and unable to order his subordinate around. Once Eden recovered though, Eden ramped up the pressure, and Lloyd was encouraged, alongside his French counterpart, to torpedo the negotiations in the Security Council which had aimed at a peaceful resolution.
While this peace effort was frustrated, a looming conflict aside from all these considerations began to develop. This involved Jordan, Britain’s firm ally in the Middle East, and he difficult relationship with Israel, the newly established ally of the French. Since neither the French nor British wished to see their newfound entente drift apart, the French government determined it would be better to spill the beans on what was being agreed with Israel rather than watch the different allies initiate an unwanted war in the region. Thus, the French travelled to Chequers, Anthony Eden’s swanky manor home, on 14th October 1956, to initiate the first step of the collusion which was to become infamous. At first hesitant, Eden was soon convinced of the genius of the plan – Britain, France and Israel would work together against the common Egyptian foe, and this partnership would surely sink President Nasser once and for all.
Remember history friends - you can get these episodes ad-free with scripts attached for just $2 a month - for a fiver you can access our PhD Thesis series, so come and nerd out with us! Get bonus content on Patreon Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

1956 - The Suez Crisis #2.11: A Protocol For War

1956 Episode 2.10 takes us to the Commonwealth, seen as so vital to British interests, but fracturing over the question of the best course of action to take against President Nasser.
The Canadian, Australian and NZ governments were all uneasy at the prospect of war, and some, like the Canadian Foreign Minister Lester Pearson, advocated a diplomatic approach. While Eden forged ahead with an aggressive policy, torpedoing another conference on the Suez Canal in the process, he increasingly began to alienate the Americans. The PM didn’t seem to care what other nations thought, though he was eager to make even better friends with the French throughout September. It was around this time in our story that things in France began to change – they were increasingly coming to provide weapons and support to a new ally – Israel.
Largely because of French prodding and intrigue, the Israeli element of the story became all important. While the British were not yet let in on the plan, Franco-Israeli military cooperation and supply deals were paving the way towards a more trusting, beneficial relationship which could soon be exploited. The Israeli government, led by David Ben-Gurion, was also desirous of a war with Egypt, that nation which had threatened his own with destruction time and time again. The dilemma was that Israel could not be seen as the aggressor, but how was such a war then to be crafted and set in motion? Scheming heads were set together, and before long, a solution more incredible than anyone could have imagined was brought into being… 
Remember history friends - you can get these episodes ad-free with scripts attached for just $2 a month - for a fiver you can access our PhD Thesis series, so come and nerd out with us! Get bonus content on Patreon Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

1956 - The Suez Crisis #2.10: Israeli Sneaky

1956 Episode 2.9 looks at that moment which has become infamous in history – the collusion between Britain, France and Israel.
We are almost ready to see these sneaky meetings take place, and for the infamous agreement take shape, but first, it is worth investigating another important and underrated angle of the Crisis. The key element of the Suez Crisis story that demonstrates how low Britain sank must be the manifest failure of the British Government to develop any legal argument in favour of their interventionist actions. In the past, formulating such an argument was simple – an act of aggression against British interests or allies was enough to provoke a war. Now though, the whole issue was a good deal trickier.
For one, the Suez Canal Company may have been a British ‘interest’, but it was also by no means damaged by the nationalisation of late July 1956. Second, try as he might, Eden failed in his efforts to convince the opposition and many of his peers that legally, Britain had a case in Egypt. Not only was Nasser working hard not to give Eden any excuse at this stage, but he had even compensated British shareholders in the Canal Company in previous months. While many would argue that Nasser’s use of force to nationalise the Canal Company was unsavoury, it was not, in the strictest sense, illegal, because Nasser was only taking what was in his country, and thus his to take.
In this episode we are introduced to Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, a person of foremost importance thanks to his legal work in the British Foreign Office. Fitzmaurice’s task was to find legal justification for an Anglo-French war in Egypt. This, as Fitzmaurice was made aware, was an impossible task. It was to Eden’s immense frustration that Fitzmaurice’s integrity was greater than his ‘loyalty’ or ‘patriotism’ – the legal officer refused to give Eden the legal justification he desired.
While on the surface this seems like an unimportant sequence of events, Fitzmaurice’s convictions here demonstrated clearly at the time, and speak loudly to this day, the fact that Eden’s interventionist policy in Egypt was baseless, and was devoid of the honour or noble intentions he would later claim. If the Prime Minister couldn’t even get his minion in the Foreign Office to see ‘sense’, then how on earth was he going to persuade the rest of the world? This question, as we’ll see, was far from Eden’s thoughts. If he couldn’t get legal approval, then he would move along with the plan regardless…
Remember history friends - you can get these episodes ad-free with scripts attached for just $2 a month - for a fiver you can access our PhD Thesis series, so come and nerd out with us! Get bonus content on Patreon Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

PINYL: A) Creating a Commonwealth Part 1

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