By Zack Twamley
WDF examines how wars broke out, how they were concluded, and their consequences. Expect juicy diplomacy, sneaky intrigue, fascinating characters, and incredible drama. By Dr Zack Twamley, qualifie
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The podcast currently has 712 episodes available.
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As they had done up to this point, the British continued to try to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis, even as the opportunities shrank before their eyes. Amidst warnings pinged between London and Berlin that under certain circumstances, their respective neutrality could not be guaranteed, the German Chancellor sent an ill-advised appeal for the British to stay out. The effort was likely influenced by the atmosphere of panic then building in Berlin, owing to news of Russian preparations.
As the scales were falling from the eyes of those that had always insisted on Russian neutrality, Bethmann Hollweg created headaches for himself with his explanation of German policy. Germany would not harm the Dutch, nor take any French territory. But what of French colonies, and what of Belgium? To this, Bethmann could make no promises, and here was perhaps his greatest error in the crisis. It seemed small on paper, but for those in Britain eager to weigh in on the Entente side, Bethmann's dishonourable bargain was just what was needed to raise suspicions against Berlin, and undermine the anti-war party.
They needed such German errors, because the British Cabinet remained divided and incredibly suspicious of any foreign entanglements. Though high profile agitators like Grey, Churchill, Asquith and perhaps Lloyd George worked in the background, the British public were against joining the war. Some Cabinet members longed for the opportunity to test their support in Parliament, perhaps even collapsing the government, but Grey would never let it get that far. He kept quiet and non-committal, even as time was drawing near for Britain to declare itself.
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The dawn of a new day did not bring any new peacemaking opportunities. In their own way, Austria, Germany and Russia were immovable in their main goal - they would not back down, even if it cost them everything.
That such a roadblock sat in the way of peace did not prevent Kaiser Wilhelm and Tsar Nicholas from engaging in their famed, eleventh hour telegram exchange. The Nicky-Willy telegrams have often been highlighted as an example of the inherent pacifism of these conservative monarchs, but what hope did this initiative really have?
One emerging issue was the increased tensions between Austria and Germany. Despite urging them to do so for several days, Vienna had not provided its ally with any plans for its post-war treatment of Serbia. Frustrated with Austrian intransigence and the refusal to grant concessions to Italy, the German Chancellor pursued a short-lived but incredibly fascinating mission - to drive it home to Austria that if she would not clarify her aims or help herself, Germany was not willing to do the work for her.
This potential fracture in the Austro-German camp would only be healed if Russia acted pre-emptively, and engaged in mobilisation. But then again, the Russians could ask, if Germany had not been able to stop Austria to this point, was there any hope she could stop her now? If German influence in Vienna had declined, German mediation may be of little use. And if Germany was still influential, why had she allowed matters to get this far, if she had not agreed with what Austria was doing?
It was lose lose for Berlin, and not even the spectacle of the two cousins hissing at each other through barely veiled good wishes could mask the fact that matters had gone very far indeed from the heady days of early July. Russia was mobilising, and though she had not prepared her entire army, she was clearly unwilling to let Austria away with it. Her motives for doing so, and the excuses made to justify such a provocative step, are worth examining, because they get to the root of the July Crisis quandary. Did these contemporaries know what they were doing, or were they blindly following the suggested script off the edge of the abyss?
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Although the Austro-Serb War was now a reality, Britain did not know this until the evening of 28 July. In the meantime, Sir Edward Grey was determined to do all he could to make the mediation scheme work. But not everyone Grey dealt with could be described as sincere, and this included members of his own Cabinet.
Churchill had acted provocatively and pre-emptively in mobilising the fleet and moving it to its battle stations. The Cabinet remained divided over whether to choose a side, but the dilemma was clear. If she declared herself for Russia and France, those powers would be emboldened, and might take greater risks. If, conversely, she declared neutrality, the same effect could be felt in Berlin and Vienna. The solution was thus - still - to keep her options open, but this did not mean British diplomacy slept on 28 July, far from it.
Although the goal was the same, the landscape was rapidly changing under her feet. It was difficult to reconcile Austro-German goals of a limited Serb war with the need Russians felt to defend their Slav brethren. It was at least clear that if the war could be contained, Britain could remain neutral. Yet the space for neutrality was shrinking in line with the escalation in Austro-Serb tensions. By the end of the day, the two foes were at war, and the peaceful hopes of so many had been shattered. The prognosis looked grim, but as had been the case for the last few weeks, Sir Edward Grey had to try.
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For two and a half years, Russia has been waging a full scale war against Ukraine. In response, the West has mobilised an economic coalition of states determined to level sanctions against the aggressor, ideally, to force it to the peace table. Clearly, Russia has not been deterred, but how much of an impact are the sanctions really having? In her book Punishing Putin, Stephanie Baker analyses the reality behind these measures, but also their sheer significance. Indeed, we have entered a new era of Russian relations with the west, and there is no going back.
Thanksss to Stephanie for joining me, please show your support by getting your excellent new book here [Amazon], also available in your favourite book shop!
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After weeks of delay, hesitation and complications, Austria-Hungary finally delivered its declaration of war on Serbia shortly after noon on 28 July 1914.
This, we are often told, represented the beginning of the First World War. But was it as straightforward as that? Contemporaries did not necessarily believe that all hope for peace had been lost. A degree of optimism remained, even in Berlin, where Russia's intervention was perceived possible, but not inevitable.
Now that Austria had made its choice, what would Russia choose to do? As we see, Sazonov was depressed and angry by the Austrian act. In this cynical mood, he took several steps which were designed to ratchet up the pressure on Vienna to hold back, and on Berlin to persuade its ally to do so. And there was no guarantee that Austrian and Serbian forces would even meet on the field.
Serbia had withdrawn its army to the interior, and Habsburg armies were only beginning to be mobilised. Another fortnight was required before the army would be ready, but where should this army go? Thanks to her poor infrastructure and woeful military durability, Austria found she had fewer options than expected once Russia refused to back down. The military and political aspects of her policy were thus intertwined, yet each was as badly understood as the other.
As Germany urged Vienna to give it some indication of what it would do, and Britain pressed for direct Austro-Russian negotiations, the world continued to operate as if yet another crisis in the Balkans would work itself out. Had it not happened before? In fact, this time the crisis was different, and the potential consequences far more catastrophic.
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The 28 July 1914 is best remembered today as the point of no return, as Austria declared war on Serbia.
However, as we will see in this episode, the announcement of this Austro-Serb war, made in the afternoon, and reaching Europe's capitals by the evening, did not ruin the prospects for peace as we might expect. Many contemporaries still believed that it was possible to preserve peace, and foremost among these was Kaiser Wilhelm II. Weeks before, he had given the green light to the blank cheque, but on this morning, Wilhelm finally read Serbia's reply to Austria's ultimatum, and in his view, all reasons for war were now gone.
Wilhelm now proposed a way out of the crisis - Austria would occupy Belgrade, in lieu of Serbia's commitment to dismantle the Pan Serb propaganda and fulfil Austria's remaining demands. This was the Halt in Belgrade, and it was to have a short, but fascinating shelf life, while experiencing several ups and downs before it was eventually killed. In this episode, we trace this idea, and why some in the German government worked hard to push for it, while their colleagues worked to undermine them.
The German policy was confused, but also impatient. German Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg was running out of patience with his Austrian ally, and in his view, Vienna needed to be given a stark warning. She must make amends with Italy, and present her war plan to her ally - did she want to annex Serbia, or not? It was vital that these questions were clarified, as it would make all the difference when dealing with Serbia's protector, Russia. Could Germany stop the ball rolling, or were their efforts, like so many others, hampered by delusions, misinformation, and mistrust? Find out as we begin our coverage of this watershed moment in our history.
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On this otherwise unassuming Monday in 1914, Austria-Hungary was preparing to declare war on Serbia.
The declaration would come the following day, but in the meantime, Germany assisted Austria in keeping up appearances. Those tenacious Brits were at it again, and Grey's mediation proposal still hung in the air. Could a rejection of this scheme worsen the crisis? Perhaps, so it was necessary to tread carefully. The mediation idea would be passed onto Vienna, albeit without much enthusiasm, and Austria could maintain its image as the power in search of justice. But other concerns were rising to the surface.
The Russians were furthering their mobilisation efforts, and looked determined to continue their pressure campaign against Austria. But still, an optimistic view of Russian intervention reigned in Vienna, which stressed that the Tsar would bark but not bite. All evidence to the contrary was ignored, and encouraged but not directed by Berlin, Austria prepared to cut through all this mediation noise, and shatter the expectations of contemporaries with a declaration of war. No one could stop her now.
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In this enormous episode, we examine the largely forgotten story of British efforts to resolve the crisis, and efforts at home to prepare the people for what might come next.
Although Austria's ultimatum had expired two days before, there was still room for diplomacy to work, and Sir Edward Grey was determined to give it his best shot. To preserve peace, Grey pressed his conference scheme to the European courts. When this was rejected, he modified his approach, and accepted other suggestions like bilateral Austro-Russian negotiations. Telegrams pinged back to London, reporting on the deteriorating situation, yet Grey held firm to the principle that Britain should not declare itself. She had more leverage, he believed, if she maintained her 'free hand.'
In his very short address to the Commons, Grey alluded to the conference scheme, and stressed the government's commitment to peace, as well as its freedom of action. Yet, he did not reject claims made by The Times and other papers, which emphasised Britain's ties to its friends, and the duty this entailed. He also remained quiet about the elephant in the room - Britain was tied to France, and military discussions between them had secretly bound Britain to French war calculations. This Grey wisely kept quiet from the Cabinet, as a split was inevitable if he did not tread lightly.
This is exactly the kind of deep dive analysis which this podcast is all about, and I can only thank you so much for making it possible!
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If Austria-Hungary wanted the war with Serbia, it would have to get its skates on. Europe was eagerly looking for any sign of a way out, even if Austria was not.
The British were central in pressing the need for mediation, but they knew that Germany's inclusion was key if it was to work. The Germans, it was reported, anticipated British neutrality. This was wrong, it was insisted, because Britain would tend to her interests. Even more, Britain had kept its fleet, mobilised through annual manoeuvres, intact as the crisis escalated. Did this not prove Britain's seriousness?
Whether Britain was sincere or not, it mattered less than what Austria did. By now it was widely known that Austrian armies were not marching, and if the rumours were true, and she could not march until 12 August, then that gave plenty of time for things to blow over. But before Sir Edward Grey could put the finishing touches on another Balkan conference, he first had to ensure German support, and this was proving impossible to obtain.
The German imperative of supporting Vienna in its swift Serbian war remained in play, even if Austria had not moved. Mediation would threaten this goal, and it had to be countered. Besides, reports from Russia were beginning to make Berlin nervous. Increased military preparations could ruin Germany's own strategic plans, so more information was vital. Just then it was learned that the Kaiser and his Chancellor were returning to Berlin.
Could they persuade Austria to move? If not, could they persuade her statesmen to participate in diplomatic efforts? Berlin did not want a conference, but neither she nor Austria wanted war with Russia either. Could Russia not stay in her lane and ignore the attack on Serbia, especially after all the Serbs had done? The fatalist Austrian view asserted that whatever the consequences, Serbia had to be destroyed. It might be disastrous for the Habsburgs, but as the saying went, it was better to endure an end in horror, than a horror without end.
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The podcast currently has 712 episodes available.
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