By Zack Twamley
WDF examines how wars broke out, how they were concluded, and their consequences. Expect juicy diplomacy, sneaky intrigue, fascinating characters, and incredible drama. By Dr Zack Twamley, qualifie
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The podcast currently has 685 episodes available.
As Belgrade burned with rage following the death of Ambassador Hartwig, Berchtold was on the verge of his greatest triumph.
After several intense weeks of pressure, Stefan Tisza seemed finally to be seeing the light. A combination of factors, including German pressure, agitation from his subordinates, fear of Romania, outrage at Serbia, and probably exhaustion, all moved Tisza to accept a policy of war. Tisza was eager to clarify that this did not render him a hawk - he still wished for peace if this was possible. Yet, he no longer blocked the construction of an ultimatum designed to be impossible for Serbia to accept, and he no longer flew the lonely flag for diplomacy. How had Tisza been persuaded, and what did it mean for Berchtold, to finally have a united Cabinet behind him? Here we consider these critical questions, in a pivotal turning point of the July Crisis.
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Now that German support had been acquired, and the delivery of an ultimatum to Serbia was virtually guaranteed, Berchtold had one final mission - to persuade the Hungarian Premier Stefan Tisza of the necessity of war.
This was easier said than done, since Tisza had good reasons for resisting calls for a war which he believed was unnecessary and dangerous. But Berchtold was fortunate in that the Hungarian was in the minority - Tisza was the only senior Habsburg official to press for a diplomatic resolution to the assassination, and he knew he was alone in this. The pressure was bound to increase on him to make the 'right' decision, but just over the border in Serbia, a shocking incident momentarily jolted Berchtold away from his mission.
Nikolai Hartwig, Russian ambassador to Belgrade since 1909, arrived at the Austrian embassy in Belgrade to finally pay his respects. The date was 10 July 1914, and Hartwig was there to counter several unflattering rumours regarding his reaction to the assassination. Hartwig was also keenly interested in any news of Austria's intentions towards Serbia. It had now been a fortnight since the assassination, and surely Vienna did not intend to do nothing. But Hartwig never learned these secrets, because he dropped dead of a massive heart attack just as he and his Austrian colleague were getting down to business. Although what followed contained no shortage of farce and conspiracy, Hartwig's death was yet another red flag, and to Berchtold, it furnished yet more proof that Austria would never be safe so long as Serbia went unpunished.
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By 7 July 1914, Austria-Hungary's leading officials gathered in Vienna. The key item on the agenda was what to do about Serbia, but an unspoken item amounted to what to do about Hungary.
With German support for the punitive strike on Serbia now assured, all that remained was for the Habsburg government to maintain a degree of unity at such a crucial moment in its history. Yet, unfortunately for Berchtold, Stefan Tisza - the Hungarian Minister President or Premier - refused to give his approval for the kind of aggressive policy most in Vienna now wanted. Tisza feared the acquisition of more Slavic territories, which would dilute the Hungarian influence, but he was also fearful of Russian intervention on Serbia's side, and Romanian intrusions into Transylvania.
The solution, as Berchtold understood it, was to up the ante. Pressure would be heavily applied on the Hungarian holdout, and an impression of firmness would be presented to the German ally. After many years second guessing her ally, Germany had now signalled its willingness to support Austria regardless of the complications, and this gift could not be squandered. Yet still, Tisza's position was not irrational, and it was at least possible that the Hungarian could have an outsized impact on Austrian policy.
Indeed, as we will see, Stefan Tisza was instrumental in delaying the Austrian response, removing its element of surprise, and increasing the risks surrounding it. Berchtold could not change the 1867 Compromise which granted Hungary such powers, but he could use his contacts to wear Tisza down, and make him more amenable to a swift, firm response. Whether this was war, or diplomatic triumph, or whether an ultimatum should be sent at all, were matters which were still to be hammered out.
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With the blank cheque secured, Austria had received its ally's blessing to pursue a punitive strike against Serbia - what would happen next?
The morass of questions surrounding this development deserve greater examination, but you may be wondering, just how widespread was the pro-war party in Vienna? How many officials believed that only war with Serbia could fix the Empire's chronic problems, and why did they take this position considering the risks involved? In this episode we are introduced to a memorandum published on 6 July by Berthold Molden, a senior Habsburg author, philosopher and politician in the Austrian press office. If you've ever wanted to hear from an official contemporary source outside of the traditional coterie of conspirators, which historians have paid scant attention to in the past, then this episode is for you. Expect fascinating insights into Austria's psyche, damning indictments of Austria's position, and heavy condemnation of Serbia, Russia, and any other power who stood in Austria's way.
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Among all the controversies of the July Crisis, perhaps few compare to Germany's decision to provide Austria-Hungary with a 'blank cheque' for whatever policy it intended to adopt towards Serbia. In fact, word from Berlin suggested that the German government was impatient, and wanted Austria to strike Serbia as soon as possible. But, did this represent a German desire to launch a world war? As we see in this episode, the truth is more nuanced, but no less shocking. Germany was not seeking world war, but to repair the damage done to its ally by destroying the incessant Serbian threat once and for all.
But how would Vienna do this? Would she annex Serbia, or parts of it? Would she reduce her sufficiently to reorientate Serbian policy away from irredentist expansion in Bosnia? What divisions manifested themselves in Austria even as she strove desperately to recoup her position? More importantly, in the event of war between Austria and Serbia, could Russia reasonably be expected to stand aside? Incredibly, the status of Russia was not given nearly enough attention, but this was a sign of things to come, as the Habsburg grievance machine rumbled steadily onwards...
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Now that Vienna had decided to use war against its Serbian neighbour, the mission became one of guaranteeing German support. As we discuss in this episode, in Austria's estimation it was far from certain that Berlin would give this support. The record of diplomatic crises and cooperation in recent years suggested that Germany might even try to contain Austria's response, and prevent it acquiring the satisfaction it needed.
To confront this dilemma, Austrian Foreign Minister Count Berchtold rallied his colleagues around him, and plotted to confront the Kaiser once Franz Ferdinand's funeral took place. Unfortunately for him, the Kaiser was not coming. Vienna was too unsafe, it was said in private, and Germany would not risk its Emperor if the Serbs struck again. Such an embarrassing turn of events forced Berchtold to consider plan B. If Germany would not come to him, he would send his best men to Germany instead...
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With the shots heard round the world, how would Austro-Hungarian statesmen react to the news that the heir to their throne had been murdered in Sarajevo? In fact, as we see here, Austrian patience towards Serbia had been so exhausted by 1914 that a violent, warlike response was virtually inevitable. At least, Habsburg Foreign Minister Count Berchtold thought so. But what about the Hungarian element in the room?
Since the Compomise of 1867, Austria and Hungary had essentially become two cooperating entities, rather than an Austrian whole, so Hungarian approval from the Hungarian Premier would be necessary if any military policy was pursued. Berchtold would have to use all his skills of persuasion, but he would also call upon Emperor Franz Josef, and above all the Germans, to add greater pressure. Could he succeed? Austria's existence, Berchtold believed, hung in the balance.
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On 28 June 1914, Franz Ferdinand was assassinated by Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian Serb terrorist.
What followed was the July Crisis, as Austria-Hungary attempted to gain a measure of justice, or even revenge. No story of the July Crisis is complete without beginning here, but considering its infamy, what is there left to learn about this assassination and all that flowed from it? I would like to humbly invite you to join me, as I investigate how the act was carried out, what other assassination attempts in Sarajevo meant, why Franz Ferdinand's unique circumstances made the atrocity possible, and why the Austrians really should have seen it all coming...
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In this teeny tiny episode, we look at the Italian invasion of Libya and the Balkans Wars!
But first, get a load of these links!
How do you kill the status quo? By forming a league of extraordinary states, who want nothing less than to destroy the empire which has ruled over them for centuries. When the Balkan War began in October 1912, Europe was far from ready for the implications which would follow. The end of Turkish rule in Europe, and the expansion of young nation states eager to prove themselves appeared to guarantee that the peninsula would never be quiet again. Yet, aside from Europe, Russia had played a key role in bringing this league to life. To this, we may be tempted to ask why?
The answer is found in the Austro-Russian rivalry, but also in the opportunistic mood of the moment. The Balkan League's members - Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Serbia - were not traditional allies. Yet they were certainly capable of smelling blood in the water. In September 1911, Italy invaded Libya, and instigated a year-long war with the Ottoman Empire. Watching their overlord struggle with such a wide-ranging campaign, the Balkan League seized the moment, and attacked just as Italy met the Turks at the peace table.
What followed was the shocking disintegration of Turkish power in Europe, at a scale and speed no one expected. Yet, even though the League had won the day, the spoils proved harder to divide up among them. Hostility increased between Serbia and Bulgaria over the fate of Macedonia, and when a second war came, the ensuing dogpile by the Ottomans, Serbs, Greeks and Romanians shattered Bulgaria apparently for good.
By autumn 1913, a different question thus emerged. If the Balkan states were justified in throwing off the Ottoman yolk and expanding their powers, just how much expansion was too much? In Vienna's view, the Serbian threat had become intolerable. The only solution was to threaten her with ruin, and prevent Serbian occupation of Albania, including an Adriatic port. Germany stood behind her, Russia backed down, but this was the last such victory of the Central Powers.
In this episode we weigh up the impact of these pre-war conflicts, with a depth and obsession for nerdy details you've never seen before! Join me as I attempt to navigate such a turbulent world, where old assumptions were slain, traditional rivalries were reinforced, and a new order beckoned.
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In our second background episode, we cover the Bosnian Annexation Crisis from 1908-1909!
But first, get a load of these links!
From late 1908 to spring 1909, European attentions were intensely occupied by the Austrian decision to annex the province of Bosnia Herzegovina, which it had occupied since 1878. This decision spurred into life fascinating impressions and behaviours which became even more important in 1914. Russia was humiliated, Serbia was enraged, Austria learned the value of an ultimatum, and Germany stood resolutely by its ally. Meanwhile, the British and French looked on, concerned that the Balkans might activate the war they had been secretly preparing for behind closed doors. The annexation is thus a key point on our journey towards the war, so I hope you're ready to get into it!
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