Practical Wisdom

SOCRATES: Now, Nicias, tell me – or rather, tell us, since Laches and I are sharing the discussion between us – your argument is that bravery is knowledge of what is fearful and what is encouraging, isn’t it?

NICIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And this isn’t something everyone is aware of … unless they supplement their own knowledge with this particular kind. Isn’t that what you said?

NICIAS: Yes, it was.

SOCRATES: So, it’s actually not something any pig would know, as the saying goes, and a pig couldn’t be brave.

NICIAS: No, I think not. …

SOCRATES: I think that if one puts forward this theory, one is forced to deny that any animal whatsoever is brave. …

NICIAS: ‘Brave’ is not a word I use to describe animals, or anything else that’s not afraid of danger because of its own lack of understanding; I prefer ‘fearless’ and ‘foolish.’ Or do you suppose I call every little child brave because it doesn’t understand, and so is not afraid of anything? No, I think to be unafraid and to be brave are two quite different things. Bravery and foresight are, in my opinion, things a very small number of people possess; whereas being reckless, daring, fearless and blind to consequences is the norm for the vast majority of men, women, children and animals. So you see, what you and most people call brave, I call reckless: brave actions are those coupled with wisdom, as I said.

(Laches, 196d-197e)

The Philosophy Garden is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

“‘Come then, Epictetus, shave off your beard.’ If I am a philosopher, I answer, ‘I will not shave it off’ ‘But I will take off your neck.’ If that will do you any good, take it off. …

Only consider at what price you sell your freedom of will. If you must sell it, man, at least do not sell it cheap. But the great and pre-eminent deed, perhaps, befits others, Socrates and men of his stamp.

— Why then, pray, if we are endowed by nature for such greatness, do not all men, or many, become like him? What, do all horses become swift, all dogs keen to follow the scent? What then?

Because I have no natural gifts, shall I on that account give up my discipline? Far be it from me! Epictetus will not be better than Socrates; but if only I am not worse, that suffices me.

For I shall not be a Milo, either, and yet I do not neglect my body; nor a Croesus, and yet I do not neglect my property; nor, in a word, is there any other field in which we give up the appropriate discipline merely from despair of attaining the highest.”

(Discourses, 1.2)

“The blessed and indestructible being of the divine has no concerns of its own, nor does it make trouble for others. It is not affected by feelings of anger or benevolence, because these are found where there is lack of strength.

Death means nothing to us, because that which has been broken down into atoms has no sensation and that which has no sensation is no concern of ours.

The quantitative limit of pleasure is the elimination of all feelings of pain. Wherever the pleasurable state exists, there is neither bodily pain nor mental pain nor both together, so long as the state continues.

Bodily pain does not last continuously. The peak is present for a very brief period, and pains that barely exceed the state of bodily pleasure do not continue for many days. On the other hand, protracted illnesses show a balance of bodily pleasure over pain.

It is impossible to live the pleasant life without also living sensibly, nobly, and justly, and conversely it is impossible to live sensibly, nobly, and justly without living pleasantly. A person who does not have a pleasant life is not living sensibly, nobly, and justly, and conversely the person who does not have these virtues cannot live pleasantly.”

(Leading doctrines, 1-5)

“Away, then, with those follies, such as that it is miserable to die before our time. What time do you mean? That of nature? But she has only lent you life, as she might lend you money, without fixing any certain time for its repayment. Have you any grounds of complaint, then, that she recalls it at her pleasure? For you received it on these terms. …

Because there is nothing beyond old age, we call that long: all these things are said to be long or short, according to the proportion of time they were given us for.

Aristotle said there is a kind of insect near the river Hypanis, which runs from a certain part of Europe into the Pontus, whose life consists but of one day; those that die at the eighth hour die in full age; those who die when the sun sets are very old, especially when the days are at the longest.

Compare our longest life with eternity, and we shall be found almost as short-lived as those little animals.”

(Tusculan Disputations, I.39)

The Philosophy Garden is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

“Those fortunes that turn out in the contrary way restrict and even ruin one’s blessedness, for they both inflict pains and impede many activities.

Nevertheless, even in the midst of these, nobility shines through, whenever someone bears up calmly under many great misfortunes, not because of any insensitivity to pain but because he is wellborn and great souled. …

For we suppose that someone who is truly good and sensible bears up under all fortunes in a becoming way and always does what is noblest given the circumstances, just as a good general makes use, with the greatest military skill, of the army he has. …

And if this is so, the happy person would never become wretched. … He would not be unstable and subject to reversals either, for he will not be easily moved from happiness, and then not by any random misfortunes but only by great and numerous ones.”

(Nicomachean Ethics, I.10)

The Philosophy Garden is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

“It is to be expected, then, that we do not say that either a cow or a horse or any other animal is at all happy, for none of them are able to share in such an activity.

It is because of this too that a child is not happy either: he is not yet apt to do such things, on account of his age. …

As we said, both complete virtue and a complete life are required: many reversals and all manner of fortune arise in the course of life, and it is possible for someone who is particularly thriving to encounter great disasters in old age, just as the myth is told about Priam in the Trojan tales.

Nobody deems happy someone who deals with fortunes of that sort and comes to a wretched end.”

(Nicomachean Ethics, I.9)

The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

“The good Epicurean believes that certain events occur deterministically, that others are chance events, and that still others are in our own hands.

He sees also that necessity cannot be held morally responsible and that chance is an unpredictable thing, but that what is in our own hands, since it has no master, is naturally associated with blameworthiness and the opposite.

Actually it would be better to subscribe to the popular mythology than to become a slave by accepting the determinism of the natural philosophers, because popular religion underwrites the hope of supplicating the gods by offerings, but determinism contains an element of necessity, which is inexorable.”

(Letter to Menoeceus, II)

The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

“[Socrates] First of all, then, let’s try to say what bravery is, Laches; and after that we’ll investigate any ways of adding it to young men, in so far as it may be possible to do so by means of various activities and disciplines. So, as I say, try to put into words what bravery is.

[Laches] My word, Socrates, that’s not difficult! If a man is prepared to stand in the ranks, face up to the enemy and not run away, you can be sure that he’s brave. …

[Socrates] But what about another man, a man who still fights the enemy, but runs away and doesn’t make a stand?

[Laches] How do you mean, ‘runs away’?

[Socrates] Well, I suppose just like the Scythians are said to fight every bit as much in retreat as in pursuit. …

[Laches] Your point about the Scythians applies to cavalry – that’s the way cavalry go into action, but infantry operate as I described.

[Socrates] With the possible exception, Laches, of the Spartan infantry. At the battle of Plataea, so the story goes, the Spartans came up against the troops with wicker shields, but weren’t willing to stand and fight, and fell back. The Persians broke ranks in pursuit; but then the Spartans wheeled round fighting like cavalry and so won that part of the battle.

[Laches] That’s true.

[Socrates] Well, this is what I meant just now when I said it was my fault you didn’t give a proper answer, because I didn’t phrase the question properly; you see, I wanted to find out not just what it is to be brave as an infantryman, but also as a cavalryman, and as any kind of member of the forces; and not just what it is to be brave during a war, but to be brave in the face of danger at sea; and I wanted to find out what it is to be brave in the face of an illness, in the face of poverty, and in public life; and what’s more not just what it is to be brave in resisting pain or fear, but also in putting up stern opposition to temptation and indulgence – because I’m assuming, Laches, that there are people who are brave in all these situations.

[Laches] Very much so, Socrates.

[Socrates] … So try again, and tell me with respect to bravery first of all what the constant factor in all these situations is – or do you still not understand what I mean?”

(Laches, 190d-191d)

The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

“Happiness manifestly requires external goods in addition, just as we said. For it is impossible or not easy for someone without equipment to do what is noble: many things are done through instruments, as it were—through friends, wealth, and political power.

Those who are bereft of some of these (for example, good birth, good children, or beauty) disfigure their blessedness, for a person who is altogether ugly in appearance, or of poor birth, or solitary and childless cannot really be characterized as happy; and he is perhaps still less happy, if he should have altogether bad children or friends or, though he did have good ones, they are dead.

Just as we said, then, happiness seems to require some such external prosperity in addition.”

(Nicomachean Ethics, 1.8)

The Philosophy Garden, Stoicism and beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

“LACHES: I take courage to be a certain endurance present in one’s character, if I have to mention the element essentially present in all cases.

SOCRATES: Now, this is how it appears to me: by no means every kind of endurance, I think, can appear to you to be bravery. So endurance accompanied by wisdom would be both fine and good, wouldn’t it?

LACHES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: But what of it when accompanied by foolishness? Surely it’s quite the opposite, damaging and detrimental?

LACHES: Yes.

SOCRATES: So, according to your account, wise endurance will be bravery.

LACHES: So it seems.

SOCRATES: Let’s see now: wise, but wise in what respect? Perhaps in every respect, great or small? Suppose, for instance, someone showed endurance in spending his money wisely, because he realized that if he spent it, he’d make a profit: would you call him brave?

LACHES: Good heavens, I certainly wouldn’t!

SOCRATES: Well then, suppose during a war a man showed endurance by being prepared to fight: he has calculated his chances wisely and realized that others will support him, and that he’ll be fighting an enemy outnumbered and outclassed by his own side, and that he has the stronger position – now, which would you say is the braver, the man showing endurance with the benefit of this kind of wisdom and these resources, or a man from the opposing camp willing to show endurance in standing against him?

LACHES: I’d say the man in the opposing camp, Socrates.

SOCRATES: But surely his endurance is more foolish than that of the other?

LACHES: Yes, you’re right.

SOCRATES: Now, we’ve previously shown that without knowledge endurance and daring are disgraceful and damaging, haven’t we?

LACHES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: But now we’re claiming, on the contrary, that this disgraceful thing, endurance without knowledge, is bravery.

LACHES: Apparently so.

SOCRATES: Then do you think we’ve given a good account?

LACHES: Good heavens, Socrates, I certainly don’t. I’m not prepared to give up too soon, Socrates. I’m really annoyed because I can’t find the words to say what I’m thinking – I’m sure I can see what Bravery is, but somehow or other she has escaped me for the moment, so I can’t find the words to catch her and actually say what she is!

SOCRATES: Then do you mind if we invite Nicias here to join the hunt? He may be more resourceful than we are.

LACHES: Of course I don’t mind.

SOCRATES: Come on then, Nicias, your friends are floundering in a sea of words! We’ve got ourselves hopelessly confused, so you’d better give us some help, if there’s anything you can do. The hopelessness of our predicament is obvious; but if you tell us what you think bravery is, you’ll get us out of this hopeless state, and you’ll also confirm your own thoughts by putting them into words.”

(Laches, 192c-194c)

The Philosophy Garden is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.