In this essay, titled “Self-Knowledge and the Good,” Lloyd P. Gerson argues that self-knowledge, as understood, within Platonic philosophy, is knowledge of intellect, since intellect is the truest human self. Self-knowledge, in other words, is knowledge not merely of our occurrent subjective states, but of our ideal (read: most real) self. Self-knowledge, then, cannot be understood without inquiring into what is truly good for ourselves and, in the end, knowing the Superordinate Idea of the Good. The wisdom sought by philosophy as such just is self-knowledge, for self-knowledge is ultimately knowledge of the Good.

Chapter 7 considers the contributions of Aristotle to the completion of the Platonic project. Though Aristotle certainly dissented from many of Plato's claims, the focus of this chapter is on the principles the two share in common, as well as Aristotle's arguments for these principles and some of the illuminating things he had to say about the application of these principles. Aristotle was as opposed to Naturalism as Plato. His argument for the subject matter of "first philosophy", the science of being qua being, coincides with Plato's identification of the subject matter of "philosophy". The chapter discusses the significance of Aristotle's introduction of the category of potency before turning to his introduction of the immortal or agent intellect. The chapter argues that the immortal intellect is Aristotle's version of what Plato calls “the immortal part of the soul,” that which is separable from the body and capable of knowledge. Finally, the chapter examines Aristotle's own account of a unique first principle of all, the Unmoved Mover, which was to have an enormous influence on how later self-styled Platonists understood Plato himself.

Chapter Sections:

[7.1] Introduction (@00:00:19)

[7.2] Aristotle on the Subject Matter of Philosophy (@00:05:04)

[7.3] The Immateriality of Thought (@00:34:01)

[7.4] The Causality of the First Principle (@01:12:00)

Chapter 6 investigates the centrality of the Idea of the Good for Plato's ethics. Just as the Idea of the Good is largely ignored in the bulk of Anglo-American scholarship on Plato's metaphysics, so too it is given little attention in scholarship on Plato's ethics. In this chapter, Gerson demonstrates that any account of Platonic ethics will be deficient if the superordinate Idea of the Good is not the main focus and if the Good is not identified as the absolutely simple first principle of all, the One. The chapter considers the distinction of the superordinate idea of the Good from a coordinate Form of the Good and examines their respective functions within Plato's moral philosophy. Gerson examines the knowledge of the Forms of the Virtues and looks at goodness as integrative unity. Finally, the chapter discusses the connection, drawn explicitly by Plotinus, between eros and the Good.

Chapter Sections:

[6.1] The Form of the Good and the Idea of the Good (@00:00:59 )

[6.2] Virtue, Knowledge, and the Good (@00:30:44 )

[6.3] Platonic Ethics without the Idea of the Good (@00:48:44 )

[6.4] The Good, Ethical Prescriptions, and Integrative Unity (@00:59:37 )

[6.5] Eros and the Good (@01:13:07 )