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In this episode of Breaking Smart podcast, I want to explore what it means to say that Covid has accelerated everything. If so, it means we’ve done some time travel relative the old timeline. As the cryogenic lab tech said to Philip J. Fry on Futurama, when he landed in the year 2999, welcome to the world of tomorrow!

1/ Let’s set the stage a bit. We’re now in the early days of post-Covid for at least some people, in some parts of the world. We don’t yet know how costly the endemic management problem will be, in terms of treatment, vaccination, fatality prevention, and surveillance, but it feels like we have one foot out of the tunnel now.

2/ I don’t know about you, but I personally feel a bit like Fry in the pilot of Futurama. Right after he is greeted with “Welcome to the world of tomorrow!” he is assessed to determine what sort of “career chip” should be implanted in him, because in the bureaucratic future, everybody has a career determined for them.

3/ The joke is, he is assessed to be best fit to the job of “delivery boy,” the same job he hated in 1999, so he runs away from the career assessment officer, Leela. As it happens, by the end of the pilot, he ends up a delivery boy anyway, but with an illegal career chip, but is happy about it because he gets to work on a spaceship and has new friends.

4/ I hope to get my vaccine within the next few weeks, and the idea reminds me of the idea of Futurama career chip, including vaccine hesitancy. In many ways, this is not far wrong, what with all the talk of vaccine passports, green zones, and so on your vaccine status might shape your career. Unlike Fry, I don’t want to run from the career chip. I don’t have career chip hesitancy. I’m kinda looking forward to reinventing my life in ways that I didn’t expect to till 2031.

5/ Even the idea of a very bureaucratic future is not wrong. Given the amount of fiscal stimulus, the effects of new geopolitics with China, and vaccine nationalism, the role of states everywhere has become radically stronger. Like it or not, the world of tomorrow has governments everywhere getting more into your business, not less. Not least because governments effectively own a lot of assets through the loans they have provided for bailouts and stimulus.

6/ So the vaccine can be considered philosophically like a career chip for a new life in a future we’ve time traveled to, and are still getting used to. One of the signs for me has been that my Twitter feed, which is my main sense-making media feed these days, feels mis-tuned, and I’m re-tuning it. It feels like wearing glasses with the wrong prescription. Everything is a little blurry and distorted.

7/ Okay, so we’re in the future, and like Fry and other time travelers, one of our first questions should be, what year is it? Obviously, no provable answer is possible to this question, since we can’t actually run a believable no-Covid simulation. The new timeline might not even be comparable at all to the old one, because qualitatively different sets of things are happening or not happening. Maybe we’ve gone sideways rather than leaped forwards. Some parts of the world have definitely gone backwards.

8/ I do think the idea of an acceleration is well-posed though, and that we do overall have a forward acceleration rather than a sideways or backwards leap. I’m just going to propose 2031 as a strawman answer to what year it is, with the caveat that you shouldn’t anchor on it. The point of pretending we’ve time traveled 10 years in 1 year is to break old habits of thought and reorient. So how do we do that?

9/ One way to think of this is as a weighted average of trends by acceleration. So for example, if vaccines jumped ahead 20 years, but other kinds of medicine stayed the same, and public health for pandemics is 50% of all healthcare by cost, then you could say the average leap ahead is 10 years.

10/ But this is kinda silly, like applying a uniform rate of inflation even though your consumption basket may be very different from the consumer price index. In thinking about inflation, you should probably think about inflation in the specific range of goods you consume. So by analogy, in thinking about acceleration, you should think about the specific range of trends you’re riding, or not. A personalized basket of accelerations.

11/ For example, let’s say work-from-home would have progressed at a particular rate, such that we are now where we would have been in 2040 otherwise, which I think is true. What does that mean? Well for me, it doesn’t mean much, since I’ve been working from home since 2009. The big difference for me is actually being unable to work from Starbucks, and whatever acceleration is going to hit cafe culture.

12/ You can measure the importance of a particular acceleration in several ways. Like for WFH, you could talk about commute miles saved, C02 emissions from commute avoided, webcam sales, GDP of commercial vs. home office furniture, traffic at business district vs. entertainment district restaurants, etc. All these would be good macro measures of acceleration.

13/ At a personal level, you could simply think in terms of well-being improvements, and more time created due to not having to commute. The personal acceleration in this case could be an earlier arrival of lifestyle elements that you only expected with retirement, if at all.

14/ Some things are tricky when you talk about accelerations. For example, with a slower rate of shift to WFM, real estate would have evolved in sync, so commercial real estate would have shrunk, while residential square footage would have increased. But this takes time. Time we didn’t spend. So what are the implications of that?

15/ I recall reading somewhere that housing stock takes 70 years to churn, so if we logged 20 years worth of trend time in 1 year, then we have a churn-demand shock worth 1/3 of the total housing stock. Or to put it another way, 1/3 of real estate, both commercial and residential, is now either under distress from underuse or overuse.

16/ By a similar logic, car fleets take about 10-20 years to churn through, depending on the country’s laws about old cars. Public transit projects probably take about the same on average. WFH changed a lot of demand patterns overnight, so now you have idle cars and empty trains, and people rethinking their car situations earlier.

17/ When you look at all these individual accelerations, one thing that you might notice is that we’re talking about something very different from the acceleration due to Moore’s Law, the sort of everything-is-faster megatrend that gave rise to philosophies like accelerationism.

18/ This isn’t that. To the extent that was true, it is still going on. To the extent that was a shaky hypothesis, it still is. What we’re talking about is a different kind of acceleration from a one-time drastic shift, caused by a pandemic shocking the system into a new equilibrium that looks like the future we used to extrapolate.

19/ Let’s talk a bit more about how weird it is that we’ve leaped forward rather than sideways or backwards. A different kind of shock could have easily shifted us sideways into a kind of future we weren’t thinking about, a parallel timeline. Or it could have thrown us back into a more primitive past. But this one uniquely seems to have kicked us forward. Yes we’ve shifted sideways a little bit, and backwards a little bit, but the vector sum of all the accelerations seems to have been a global fast-forwarding effect.

20/ I think this is for two reasons. One, pandemics aren’t black swans. They’re not unknown unknowns. Not only do we have recorded histories of several examples to learn from, we’ve specifically had experts predicting this kind since SARS in 2003, and have even made what are in hindsight fairly realistic movies about it. Global civilization has a lot of cultural memory of pandemics, and ways of responding without being knocked off its historical course. This would not have been true of say an asteroid hitting earth or a major nuclear war.

21/ Second, many of the trends that have accelerated, such as WFH and climate action, were dealing with inertia effects. The pandemic did the equivalent of knocking out some inertia, causing a sudden, jerky leap forward. Kinda like dumping some cargo off an overloaded truck might cause it to leap forward.

22/ I think the right unit of analysis for thinking about acceleration is categories that have necessary, flexible roles in the world, with relatively linear evolution paths, no clear substitutes, and a lot of baggage available to shed. For example, cars, homes and countries. All are entities with steady rates of evolution, and loads of baggage.

23/ For example, cars were already undergoing dual trends of electrification and computerization, and on pre-pandemic timelines automakers were planning to fully transition to EVs in a decade or so. That’s probably accelerated because I suspect people will buy cars sooner now.

24/ EVs should be cheaper in the long run than IC engine cars, but in the short run, cars are actually getting way more expensive due to more compute elements. For example, cheap bumpers are now expensive to replace after an accident because they hold cameras and radars.

25/ So even though we’re probably in the same future qualitatively — more computerization and electrification is still going to happen, we’ve probably accelerated by at least a few years. Some things though, have shifted sideways. The idea of cars as a cloud-like on-demand service might take a hit, and more people might want to own cars. We’ve learned the importance of controlling some of your own physical assets and environments. Those who relied purely on rideshare or transit probably faced more risk last year.

26/ You can do a similar analysis for other stable units of our world. Countries are interesting. I’d say they were weakening before Covid, but have been made stronger. Vaccine development, public health management, and supply chain geopolitics have all strengthened the role of country-sized units.

27/ When you talk of more diffuse trends, without clear units, things get murkier. Two such examples are climate change and extremist politics.

28/ I think for a lot of people, Covid was a sort of prequel to how climate action might unfold. It doesn’t matter whether you believe in it or not, just as it didn’t matter whether or not you believed in Covid or vaccines. Enough people believe that there will be drastic responses. And I think Covid gave people sitting on a lot of capital a reason to start putting it into climate response investments. One example is the rise in SPACs. I suspect that’s going to be a lot more sideways than an acceleration though.

29/ It’s hard to judge what’s happened to politics, but I think it’s fair to say that both far left and far right currents got to crucial tests of their coherence and capacity to govern far earlier than they otherwise would have. Ideas that were outside the Overton window, like UBI got an early test through things like stimulus checks. I suspect the culture war overall accelerated by about 4-5 years at least. We’re already at the point in the conflict that might have otherwise arrived around 2025.

30/ To get back to the personal question, and the idea of a personal basket of accelerations leading to a personal estimate of how far in the future you’ve jumped, I think it’s a useful exercise to think about that, and also think about the question of what kind of new career chip you should install in your head, suited to the future you’re in, based on how far into the future you’ve leaped.

31/ How much of a jump have you made? I think looking at your typical sources of information and sensing how out-of-tune they feel, like with Twitter in my case, is a good starting point. The more weird your old pre-Covid news feed feels, the farther into the future you’ve leaped.

32/ Then you can think about the specific persistent units in your life, and how they might change or should change. In my case, I’m already thinking of living situations and travel plans in ways that I didn’t expect to be until 2031. I moved to a bigger apartment last year, and will probably look for a bigger place in a smaller city in the next few years. My domestic travel is probably going to go sharply down but my international travel and living might go up.

33/ I think the world of work has changed too. There is now more fat in supply chains, more resilience and sustainability in both production and climate senses. There is more national structure to industries. The story of vaccine nationalism might repeat in sectors like semiconductors and other critical and strategic ones. As a consultant, I’m rethinking how I approach my work.

34/ On this front, I am trying out patterns of work that I didn’t expect to see for years, such as more collaboration with other indies and free agents. I think relatively shallow managerial cultures are on their way out, and a more depth-oriented culture is on the rise, where people are expected to understand narrower parts of the tech stack, geographies, and markets more deeply. It’s an overall shift to a more vertical-grained global industrial structure, at the sectoral and national level. Again, this is what I expected with software eating the world, but not for another decade.

35/ Overall, I find this frame of a net acceleration, personalized to my context, very useful. The thought experiment of living in 2031, and installing a new career chip in my head, is very useful, and I recommend you try it.

So that’s it for this week, I’ll be back again next week with another essay for subscribers.

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit studio.ribbonfarm.com

In today’s episode of the Breaking Smart podcast, I want to discuss a concept I call demiurgical businesses that I think goes beyond the 3 kinds you may be familiar with: lifestyle, customer-driven, and product-driven.

1/ In the discourse around tech, both on the tech side and the techlash side, you’ll often hear the term “real problems” which should make you wonder what “unreal” problems are.

2/ When the term is used, it’s usually used by socially conscious people, whether builders or critics, who use “real problems” as the notional antithesis of whatever is behind what they see as bad, misplaced entrepreneurial priorities. Today it is NFTs, ten years ago it was apps.

3/ The term “real problem” is misleading because even though people who use the term will offer some cliched examples like climate tech or world hunger, the point of the term is to point at the thing being criticized, not the thing being aspired to.

4/ But if you take real and unreal seriously, you actually get an actually interesting train of thought. Usually, the thing being criticized is an example of a thing that doesn’t seem to solve any problem, whether real or made up.

5/ If you ask, “what problem does it solve?” about the thing being criticized, you’ll find that the people building it can’t even supply a bad, disingenuous, or morally indefensible answer.

6/ For example, if I answer the question, “what real problem does space exploration solve?” with “it helps discover better cancer drugs through zero-gravity biochemistry experiments,” you know that’s b******t. It is obviously a rationalization. It’s both a bad answer and a disingenuous one. If you claim it is a real answer, you’re either stupid or lying. I discussed the real answer for that a couple of weeks ago.

7/ For a morally indefensible example, let’s say I build luxury yachts with built-in torture chambers. The answer to “what real problem does it solve” would be, “the problem dictators have of partying and torturing their enemies at the same time.” Now that’s a bad and morally indefensible answer, but it is actually a real answer that points to a real problem that a real person has, just not a very pleasant kind of person. I’d want such a yacht if I was an evil dictator.

8/ If you think about it, there is no such thing as an unreal problem. If it can be posed as a problem at all, it’s real. You just may not share the motives or values of the person who wants to solve it.

9/ Or to put it more simply, the idea of a “real problem” is actually an expression of identity. Evangelizing “real problems” is a way to do identity politics by indirect means. The problem you choose reveals who you are, what values you prioritize, and what identity you’re attached to.

10/ An easy way to see this is to notice that “real problems” are actually a generalization of “customer-driven.” A real problem points to a real person who already has that problem — namely a customer. Whether it is hungry children or evil dictators.

11/ It might be quite abstract — for example, the “customer” for climate tech is people who believe in climate change and also believe it’s good to ensure the survival of as many humans and animals as possible, and will vote for politicians who will make policies in favor of that. But it’s still a direct equation between being customer-driven and focusing on “real problems.”

12/ I’ll even go further and say that all identities are in fact customer identities. So identity politics is actually customer politics. The only reason to have a stable identity is if you want to acquire something through it, whether it is through participation in family, community, the market, or politics. So things like race and ideology are customer identities just like preferring vanilla over chocolate ice cream is a customer identity. You buy things through those identities, even if it isn’t with money.

13/ If you’re familiar with the idea from Peter Drucker that the purpose of a business is to create a customer, this equivalence between “real problems” and pre-existing identities should be a red-flag for you. It means you’re talking about a world where innovation gets reduced to exceptional customer service through incremental improvements.

14/ So let’s ask again, what is the actual logical opposite of a “real problem?” We’ve already seen that “unreal problem” goes nowhere, and that “real” is just indirectly about affirming an identity, possibly while criticizing other identities.

15/ Here is my proposal: the opposite of a “solution to a real problem” — real to anybody, whether you think they are good or evil — is a “reality transformer.” Instead of solving a problem within reality as currently defined, in relation to a particular identity-based point of view, you make something that creates a new reality, forcing people to create new identities in relation to it.

16/ Twitter is my favorite example of a reality transformation business, or what I call a demiurgical business. Nobody asked for it, and even 14 years later it is unclear what problem it solves, and for whom. It was built because it was possible to build, and it ended up transforming reality for everybody. Now people have “real problems” within the expanded Twitter reality, such as being able to edit tweets.

17/ I used to think of this point of view as simply being “product-driven” instead of “customer driven” — see the potential within a new technological capability and work to realize it in a way that creates a new kind of customer, ie. catalyzes new identities in the market. I wrote a popular article about this in 2014, called Product-Driven vs. Customer-Driven, but that article now feels incomplete to me.

18/ The thing is, though product-driven businesses are in general more powerful than customer-driven things, most product-driven businesses are also often degenerate customer-driven things in disguise, where the customer is the entrepreneur. So you could call it entrepreneur-driven.

19/ An entrepreneur-driven business solves the problem of affirming the hardened, often narcissistic identity of the entrepreneur as the only real customer. They may want to put a dent in the universe, but typically they don’t want to put even a scratch on themselves. They want to transform without being transformed. Everything else is a side-effect.

20/ The side-effect is usually what we call product-driven: it creates a customer rather than serving an existing market. But the most important customer, the entrepreneur, remains unchanged.

21/ In my experience, I’d say about 90% of entrepreneurs are customer-driven. They build boring businesses that solve an existing problem for an existing customer, and make themselves and some others rich. About 9% are entrepreneur-driven: they work to validate the identity of the entrepreneur, and might distort reality for everybody else except the entrepreneur, via a reality-distortion product. That leaves the last 1%.

22/ This last 1% is what I think of as the truly powerful things. They transform reality for everybody, including for the person making it, forcing everybody to forge new identities. They transcend the product-driven vs. customer-driven dichotomy. Twitter is an example of this kind of business. It may have under-performed as a business compared to entrepreneur-driven businesses like Apple, Amazon, and Facebook, but it transformed reality more powerfully.

23/ It feels wrong to call the creators of such products mere entrepreneurs, since they are typically not about merely building a successful business or even validating their own identity. They act in the role of what the Greeks and gnostics called a demiurge. Not quite a god, and not quite human. Agents of transformation who are themselves part of the transformation process and subject to it.

24/ Demiurgical businesses tend to be far more powerful than either customer-driven or product-driven businesses, even when they make less money. The limiting factor for customer driven businesses is existing identities in the market that can be served. The limiting factor for product-driven businesses is the existing identity of the entrepreneur that must be affirmed. But a demiurgical business essentially has no limits besides the laws of nature.

25/ Demiurgical businesses often convey the impression of having escaped the control of their creators. I once described Twitter as occupying a business space that is too big to nail, a play on “too big to fail.” Just too large for any one business to fully occupy, and beyond the ability of any human CEO to govern. It’s not that the founders of Twitter were significantly less capable than those of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, or Google. It is that Twitter opened up a transformed reality that was too big to nail.

26/ In my experience, it’s definitely not the case that people who build demiurgical businesses are somehow more evolved or enlightened than regular entrepreneurs. Often, they are just as narcissistic and driven to validate their own fixed identity as product or customer-driven entrepreneurs. What happens is something like a natural accident. They stumble on an idea that is too powerful to be limited by their own identity. They have no choice in the matter. The thing they unleash transforms them, whether they want be transformed or not.

27/ You can reduce this whole idea to a 2x2: if the producer, or entrepreneur changes but the consumer doesn’t, you essentially have a lifestyle business. If neither changes, you have a commodity customer-driven business. If the consumer is transformed, but the producer is not, you have a product-driven business. If both are transformed, you have a demiurgical business.

28/ Personally, I like demiurgical businesses the most. They have the most powerful effects on our world, and are the only kind of business that can break humanity out of seemingly hopeless equilibriums, where everybody has locked-in identities, and is fixated on “real problems” instead of “transforming reality.”

29/ In fact, flipping things around, the things usually called “real problems” are in fact the most “unreal” of all. The fact that they exist as persistent, named conditions that seem to defy solution, and demand really virtuous behavior of humans suggests that there is a misframing going on somewhere. A problem that requires humans to be saints to drive solutions is not a problem. It is virtue blindness.

30/ Real problems are problems that real humans, not saintly ones, can solve. If existence is threatened by a huge problem that require us all to transform into saints to solve, then the problem is actually unreal since it involves imaginary, fictional human beings. The actual response to such problems is to transform reality in unpredictable ways through demiurgical businesses. That’s what can get the situations unstuck. Maybe in the transformed reality, the problem is actually possible for real humans to solve.

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit studio.ribbonfarm.com

Space exploration has an unusual side effect: giving us a sense of the value of money on earth.

1/ The Perseverance rover, shown touching down on Mars in the photo below, cost about $2.2 billion to design and build, and about $243 million to launch on an Atlas rocket.

2/ Now that it is on the ground, if all goes well, and it is able to operate, it will cost another $300 million to operate for two years. So that’s at least $2.7 billion overall, or about 54,000 bitcoins. Hopefully more, if the mission gets extended.

3/ For those who don’t track this stuff, it is the fifth Mars rover, not counting the early Viking missions in the 70s which were not rovers. The previous ones were Sojourner, Spirit, Opportunity, and Curiosity.

4/ Perseverance is very much like Curiosity — about the size of an SUV, and powered by an MMRTG — Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator. By contrast, Sojourner in 1997 was about the size of a lawnmower, and the MERS were about the size of golfcarts.

5/ Probably the most charismatically interesting thing about Perseverance is that it is carrying a drone helicopter called the Ingenuity, which will be a genuinely fascinating thing if it works. An aircraft on another planet — one with 1/6 the gravity, and about 0.6% the atmospheric density.

6/ So how should you think about the value of the Perseverance mission? Some people who are space-exploration positive are still kinda defensive about such things and try to make up rationalizations like R&D benefits for problems here on earth.

7/ I think this is not even wrong. When someone asks why we spend money on Mars missions when there are starving children on earth, the answer is neither to make up specious theories of how space science can lead to life-saving medicines on earth, nor to walk away saying values are different, but to talk about how money works.

8/ Money is the largest-scale coordination mechanism we have for negotiating differences in values of things, and is what allows us to define what the word “we” means. Its design has to accommodate everything humans might disagree about. Money that cannot value space exploration or art cannot value medicines or food very well either.

9/ So I think the simplest mental model is as a civilizational art project. 2.7 billion is about 0.013% of the GDP of the United States. This is actually pretty cheap by civilizational artwork standards.

10/ For comparison, at the height of the Mughal empire, the Taj Mahal cost about a billion of today’s dollars, and a double digit percentage of the empire’s GDP at the time. Possibly as high as 20-25%. According to some historians, it contributed to the bankruptcy and decline of the empire.

11/ A good question about civilizational art projects is — who is the art project for. Whether you’re talking medieval monuments or Mars rovers, it is easy to figure out who the artwork is by, but it’s not always easy to figure out who it is for.

12/ Pre-modern civilizational art projects were generally monuments to the narcissism of emperors and religious leaders. To get people to accept the fiscal burden to undertake them, you had to make up myths and religions.

13/ There is some of that in modern space programs. We still quote Kennedy’s speech about getting to the moon. But even the most powerful modern cults of personality, whether you’re talking Kennedy or Trump or Xi Jinpeng, pale in comparison to the cults of old monarchies and religions.

14/ Presidents get to bask in the reflected glory of space programs a little bit, but ultimately, they ultimately get only a small slice of the attention. If you add up all the attention we give to astronauts and Nasa, and the people who work on missions, you still get a big deficit. You’re left asking, who exactly asked for this?

15/ It’s not even national pride really. Space programs in the 1950s were strongly linked to national industrial bases, but today, a modern space program, even the US space program, sources talent, materials and technologies from all over the world.

16/ For example, NASA has been promoting a PR video around the rover showing immigrants from all over the world who have worked on it. And on a material level, the rover uses many components from outside the US. For example, the motors used on the rover are made by a Swiss company called Maxon.

17/ So as an art project, I think it makes most sense to think of space programs as art projects by and for global economic systems. They represent an economic system as an emergent entity admiring itself in the mirror. In the case of NASA missions, it is the Western economy. In the case of China, it is the Chinese economy.

18/ What they do is help calibrate what an economic system is capable of, when stretched to its limits, and how it compares to competing systems. And this, I think, is not just valuable, it is functionally necessary. Any kind of economic system can only work if it constantly tests the limits of its ability to price things against competing systems.

19/ A functional economic system isn’t about judging human choices and preferences, but to price them. Everything from cancer drugs and aid to disaster zones to climate change and space programs to luxury yachts and obscene extravagances by rich celebrities. If humans are capable of it, a real economic system should be able to put a price on it.

20/ One of the reasons cryptocurrencies aren’t taken seriously yet is that the economic system they represent is restricted to a very small set of activities. It hasn’t been calibrated against a large enough scope of activities. The equivalent of space programs for the cryptoeconomy is games on the Ethereum blockchain like CryptoKitties or the recent innovations in NFTs (non-fungible tokens). It has a long way to go.

21/ Many people want to translate their political and ideological interests into economic terms. They want to somehow design an economic system that makes, for example, Mars missions so expensive we don’t do them, and saving lives so cheap, we never fail save them. But this is fundamentally wrong-headed.

22/ If you can’t come to terms with the diversity and variety of things humans want and value, and are willing to work for, you will want to design economic models to coerce them to act differently. This is a version of what statisticians call the bias-variance tradeoff, which I’m using as a metaphor here. The more you try to bias an economic system to do certain things, the more you’ll narrow the overall range of things it can do.

23/ If you think people suck, and try to make an economy that prevents them from sucking, you’ll either oppress people, or create an economy that sucks, or most likely, both. The only way we know to avoid that is to keep recalibrating the scope of the economy — the things it is capable of pricing, at the weirdest extremes, without unraveling entirely.

24/ In other words, if the economy does things you think are horrible, and refuses to do things you think are necessary, you don’t have a problem with the economy. You have a problem with people, and you’re not willing to cop to the desire for coercive control.

25/ Yes the economy has lots of distortions, but it had even worse distortions in the past when it was the plaything of emperors building monuments to their own grief. To make the economy better you have to remove distortions, not add them. And the only way we know to do that is to constantly calibrate by letting it do weird things so it can look at itself in the mirror.

So that’s it for this free podcast edition. I’ll see you next week with another subscriber post.

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit studio.ribbonfarm.com

In this first 2021 episode of the Breaking Smart podcast, I want to talk about something that’s been on my mind a lot lately that I call anti-network effects.

1/ As I am recording this, governments around the world are working out the logistics problems of distributing billions of vaccine doses. It feels like a symbol of the times we are entering into, times that I think will be defined by anti-network effects.

2/ Vaccinations and mask-wearing are examples of anti-network effects. I’ll define these as effects that can slow down, regulate, arrest, or reverse the operation of network effects, and which might themselves be network effects.

3/ For almost 50 years, since the invention of the PC, the world has been riding one network effect after the other, all of which ride on top of the infrastructural network effect of the internet.

4/ To review, a network effect is when the power of a system grows faster than its size. The original form was called the fax-machine effect. One person with a fax machine is useless. Two people is one connection, three people is 3 potential connections, 4 is 6, and in general n nodes is n(n-1)/2 unique connections. So the power of the network grows as the square of its size.

5/ Network effects in computing infrastructure are deeply connected to Moore’s Law. When computers get cheaper, network nodes get cheaper too, and more things can get attached to computers, and then to each other via the network.

6/ This leads to a double effect. Every 18-36 months, the density of transistors doubles. This makes the cheapest computers based on the cheapest chips much cheaper, and what’s more, this allows whole new classes of even cheaper computer to be invented ever decade or so. So one compounding effect rides another. That’s how we we went from mainframes to Raspberry Pis, and from an internet of 2 computers to an internet of billions.

7/ There’s in fact a third effect. If computers get more powerful at a steady geometric rate, and industrial mass production lag is minimal, then the rate at which the network can grow is itself a function of network size. You don’t have to add 1 node at a time, you can bulk-add n nodes.

8/ Everybody with a home computer already had an internet connection, so with a router, everybody can add a wifi connected device at the same time. With software it’s even easier: everybody with a phone can download an app at nearly the same time, creating near-instantaneous soft networks.

9/ We’ve been riding this triple-punch meta-network effect for nearly 50 years. You’ve got Moore’s law, the basic network effect of devices, and then the network-size-proportionate growth effect. And for people about my age and younger, our entire lives have been spent on this ride. To the point where it is second nature.

10/ This is actually pretty unnatural. Think about the classic brainteaser to teach exponential or geometric thinking. If a lily plant doubles in size every day and on the 30th day covers the whole pond, when did it cover half the pond?

11/ The answer is of course, the day before, on the 29th day, and to people like us, this barely even counts as a brainteaser. In fact, for kids today, I suspect the expected wrong answer, which is the 15th day, will feel unintuitive. They deal with fewer important things that work that way.

12/ There’s a lot more to say about network effects and various formulations like Metcalfe’s Law and Reed’s Law, but we’ve been doing that for my whole life, so enough said. I’ll just add one more point: network effects are pretty dumb. I mean even viruses and lily plants on ponds can embody them.

13/ This is in general not true of anti-network effects. While some anti-network effects are themselves driven by network effects, most work on other principles. So let’s take an inventory.

14/ The first kind of anti-network effect is self-limitation, when a network effect self-neutralizes. For example, once you have had Covid, reinfections are unlikely and you’re immune for a while. This is why you get an S-curve ending in a plateau, though a lot of people have to die along the way.

15/ Then there are anti-network effects that are themselves network effects, but distinct from the original one. Like the idea of wearing a mask spread pretty fast. Faster than the virus itself. The production of masks also spread via network effect. Some people saw others making masks and started imitating their behaviors.

16/ But many important things are not driven by network effects. Like when non-trivial habits have to be adopted. For example, disinfection and washing hands are behaviors that took a really long time to spread, and are still not universal more than a century after germ theory.

17/ Atul Gawande wrote a great essay called Sharing Slow Ideas in the New Yorker in 2013, that talked about innovations that are like this. That don’t spread like wildfire via network effects, but require pretty painful and slow diffusion via deliberate efforts.

18/ The reason slow-spreading non-network effects can sometimes still beat fast-spreading network effects is that they can be governed more intelligently. They are not as dumb as network effects.

19/ For example, it would be nice if we had a really dumb kind of network-effect vaccine that could be transmitted by a cough, via some sort of good virus that can fight the bad virus. Then the two network effects could race each other in a pretty dumb way. Explosion and counter-explosion.

20/ Unfortunately we don’t know how to make that kind of vaccine, that spreads via a network effect. Good things seem to spread slower than bad things in general. Brandolini’s b******t asymmetry principle is an example: it takes an order of magnitude more effort to refute b******t than it takes to produce it.

22/ The kind we do know how to make have to be slowly scaled in production, painfully distributed and administered by a small group of trained people. The only reason it has a chance is that we don’t have to be random.

23/ So that’s why governments are being deliberate and strategic in the order in which they vaccinate people. Of course you can be too careful. New York was criticized for expecting senior citizens to complete a complex form with 50 questions and multiple attachments to get vaccinated, and most efforts have now gone much simpler. Still, unlike the virus spread, it’s not dumb or near-random.

24/ You see the effect in computers too. In cyber-warfare, you don’t attempt to shut down the enemy’s capabilities by knocking out random computers in their network. You target key chokepoint routers or undersea cables. If you are an authoritarian government, you install firewall technology at the network edges. So those are anti-network effects that win by being topologically intelligent.

25/ There is a broader theme here: network effects are dumb, indiscriminate and very, very fast. They rely on abundance and target rich-environments. They think one step ahead in time, and one step around in space. But for those very reasons they are also very fragile. They can run out of raw material and starve. They can run into boundaries. They can even be slowed by simple ideas like six-feet separation.

26/ Anti-network effects sometimes incorporate network effects of their own, but are generally more deliberate, intelligent, and actively governed. They are designed with scarcity in mind and are not so easy to starve out. They have long horizons and think many steps ahead in time, and can be spatially intelligent across entire topologies.

27/ They need all these abilities because otherwise network effects have incredible advantages. Anti-network effects are like the tortoise that can eventually catch up with the hare. But because they lack exponentially increasing impact, they need other features to spread.

28/ Things can get worse though. There are network effects that also benefit from intelligence. Well-designed computer viruses are an example. They don’t spread indiscriminately. They can carry a payload of navigational intelligence in space and time and spread very intelligently. This is why countering clever computer viruses is so hard.

29/ There’s one more important class of anti-network effects we haven’t talked about, namely in information flows. After the January 6th storming of the Capitol, we saw how an anti-network effect operated with kinda stunning speed.

30/ The highlights, as you know, were that Donald Trump was suspended from major social media platforms, and Parler was suddenly cut off at the knees by major infrastructure providers. A good reminder that when the topology of a network effect is fragile — in this case the Trump influence network with Trump himself as a single point of failure — what takes years to build up can take minutes to shut down.

31/ That raises other issues I won’t get into, but here I just want to note that the anti-network effect here — simply cutting off a major source of disinformation and noise — was both easy and instantaneously effective. If you’re on Twitter, you’ve probably noticed how much drama has been cut out overnight.

32/ I want to round out this set of examples with another big important class of network effects and their anti-network effects: markets and regulation. Markets are generally based on network effects. Everything from price information to manufacturing capacity to early adoption tends to have a network effect in it. The economy grows via network effects, which is why critics compare it to cancers and viruses.

33/ Anti-network effects in the economy on the other hand, are slower and more deliberate. Anti-trust mechanisms are like taking out a major node once it reaches a certain scale. Monopolies are a special case. In network theory terms, they are a single node cut point, where for example, removing a producer entirely disconnects demand and supply.

34/ The broader theme I’m getting at here is that after 50 years of riding a big meta-network effect, we are entering an era of anti-network effects. Slower, more deliberate, more intelligent phenomena that achieve effects in very different ways.

35/ This is neither a good or bad thing. It is just part of how the world works. In biology, technology, and economics, there seem to be phases of dumb growth driven by network effects, and phases of intelligent regulation driven by anti-network effects.

36/ In a way this is how intelligence evolves. The human brain is like this too. There is a network effect in a baby’s brain during gestation as neurons get very densely interconnected in a pretty dumb way. Then as the baby learns after birth, the connections start getting cut and the ones left behind embody what we think of as intelligence.

37/ There’s going to be a temptation in the next few decades to come at this ideologically, like regulation and damping of network effects is always bad, and network effects are always good. After all that’s the religion the world has run on for 40 years. I’ve been raised on Reagonomics like most of you. But that’s all it is, a religion.

38/ The smart thing to do is to simply start learning the physics of anti-network effects. It is going to be hard for most of us below 50 since we have no memories of a world that was not being driven hard by network effects, but I think we can learn. At least it will be a fun new kind of thinking to get used to. A world in which the lily plant does NOT go from 50% to 100% on the 29th day.

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit studio.ribbonfarm.com

Well, I guess 2020 is a wrap. I’m going to do a quick round-up of everything I published on Breaking Smart this year, and try to tease out the larger themes, but obviously no look back at the year can begin without acknowledging the 800lb virus in the room.

To quote J. Peterman on Seinfeld, in the episode where he takes back the reins of his company from Elaine after she mismanages it during his absence, kudos to all of us on a job…done. It’s a reference I’ve used before, in my 2018 annual roundup, but this time, I am really feeling it.

Whatever our personal successes or failures, as a species, the highlight of our collective performance is probably that we made it through the year without either sliding into apocalypse or going insane.

Well, most of us. As of this writing, 1.75m people are dead from Covid, and will not be seeing 2021. Against that backdrop, the best thing I can say about my writing and podcasting is that I continued doing it all, and that you guys continued to pay some attention.

On to the roundup.

It looks like we’re finishing the year pretty strong on this list, with just over 10,000 subscribers, and just over 500 paying subscribers.

I published 10 podcast episodes (free, with accompanying transcripts), 8 one-off essays, and 11 chapters or essays across 3 serialized projects. Let’s take a look.

Podcast Episodes (free)

* Beyond Optimism and Pessimism

* Defaults and Defaults

* How, What, and Where to Build

* The Medieval Future of Management

* From Story to Setting

* Big Moods, Little Moods

* The Next Experiments in Elitism

* The State of Business Play

* Fifth-Generation Management

* Involvement Capitalism

One-off Essays (paywalled)

* Life Go Brr

* Reimagining Publics

* Post-Covid Circularity

* A Bad Prequel

* Tunnelhead

* Notes on Textual Capital

* In the Wake of the Eighties

* Darker Things

The Great Weirding (paywalled)

* Into the Weirding: Part 1, Part 2

* Control Failure: Part 1, Part 2

After Westphalia (subscribers only)

* After Westphalia: Introduction

* The Descent of the Public

The Clockless Clock (paywalled)

* Chapter 1: Pandemic Time, Pandemic Time -2 (abridged free version in Noema)

* Chapter 2: Indoors in Time

* Chapter 3: Operating in Time, Operating in Time -2

This would count as a productive year if it were any other year besides 2020, but obviously, against the backdrop of everything going on, it feels marginal at best.

Still, thank you all for reading and listening, and here’s to the light at the end of the tunnel that we will hopefully emerge into sometime next year. I’m not going to wish you Happy Holidays or Happy New Year, since I personally find it kinda unseemly to even attempt to be festive this year, but I do wish you some productive introspection and contemplation, and perhaps a brief personal break from the bleakness.

I’ll see you again in January 2021. Have a good week.

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit studio.ribbonfarm.com

Welcome back. The Breaking Smart newsletter and podcast is starting up again after a very refreshing 6-week break.

I want to kick off the post-break programming with a podcast on a big question: if we are headed at least partially towards a post-scarcity world, as we seem to be, does it look more like the Star Trek universe, or the universe in Iain M. Banks Culture novels? Both are varieties of something I call involvement capitalism, which I think it’s going to emerge in the next decade one way or the other. The choices we make in the next few years will determine which flavor we end up with.

1/ Over my break, I had a chance to unplug from weekly writing, and reflect on the broader theme of this mailing list, while watching the news. In case you forgot my tagline for breaking smart, this broader theme is serendipity through technology, and in the last few years, that has been a murky theme to think about. Is it the best of times or worst of times? Hard to tell.

2/ I unplugged from writing, but not from media consumption. As you might know I don’t believe in that, especially when historic news is unfolding, and the last six weeks have of course been extra historic. Very much in the “weeks when decades happen” category, so I was very plugged in.

3/ The US elections happened, a second or third wave of the pandemic kicked off (depending on where you live), and multiple vaccines passed early trials, in the process pioneering a whole new class of mRNA vaccines.

4/ Closer to our own set of usual topics, bitcoin neared its historic all-time highs, a DeepMind AI sort of solved the protein-folding problem, SpaceX launched its first operational crewed mission, and also launched its beta Starlink broadband services.

5/ There was a small detail in that last news item that’s my jumping-off point for today. The Terms of Service for Starlink require you to agree that Mars is going to be a free planet, outside the jurisdiction of Earth governments, which is an interesting move with real consequences.

6/ The thing is, if SpaceX’s plans continue to succeed, they may put a Starlink constellation around Mars and offer very cheap launch services to Mars, which would lead to a broad-based democratized Mars access at least for rovers and robots, with low-cost communications once your rover is on Mars.

7/ Even if human settlement does not follow, we are on the cusp of creating at least a robotic telepresence society on Mars. And if you read between the lines of the Starlink ToS, SpaceX hopes to keep that presence an open, anarcho-capitalist zone of sociopolitical experimentation.

8/ What might that look like? Well, there are two precedents to consider, one fictional, one factual. The factual one is the current state of Earth oceans, which are essentially an outlaw zone. I highly recommend William Langewiesche’s brilliant 2005 book, The Outlaw Sea, for a deep look at how the world of oceans works. Shipping, piracy, law on the seas, ship-breaking, all sorts of cool stuff.

9/ The fictional one is the post-scarcity anarchist civilization called the Culture, in Iain M. Banks’ novels. We know SpaceX is inspired by that since they name their barges after Culture space ships: their current fleet of 3 comprises the drone ships Of Course I Still Love You, Just Read the Instructions, and A Shortfall of Gravitas.

10/ The two together paint a consistent portrait. The Outlaw Sea kinda does look like the fictional universe of Culture books, especially the margins of the civilization, where the Culture’s Special Circumstances agents, a sort of CIA, interfere in less advanced civilizations.

11/ The fictional plots of Culture books very much resemble British and American interventionist global foreign policy, enforced by naval power projected across the world’s outlaw seas, and directed at less-developed countries, over the last two centuries. Internally, the Culture is quite different from Britain or the US, but you could say developed US-UK societies are as close to the Culture as real earth societies get.

12/ So this brings me to the idea of Involvement Capitalism. I got the idea for the name from the Culture books, where the multiple species that engage with the Culture are called Involved species, which I think is a very powerful concept. I define it as capitalism based on money as a way to engage more deeply rather than disengage from society. So the opposite of f**k-you money. More like hello-world money.

13/ The core idea in the Culture books is that despite its post-scarcity abundance, the AIs and biological species of the Culture don’t retreat from the universe into either pure hedonism or spiritual retirement. They stay engaged, both with each other, and with less developed civilizations. They never stop experimenting, learning, growing, and interfering in the affairs of the universe. They are involved the way annoying parents are involved in their children’s lives.

14/ The Culture is both like and unlike the Star Trek Federation, which is also a post-scarcity society built around powerful spaceships and a multi-species civilization. While both are left-leaning, powerful, and militarist without admitting it, the Culture is what you might call a neoliberal anarchy with no real rules, unlike Star Trek, which is a benevolent paternalist civilization that takes its rules very seriously, closer to LBJ’s Great Society model if that had actually worked out.

15/ You could say the Culture is like the Star Trek Federation, except with AI Minds in place of charismatic captains, and no Prime Directive, only a history of interference and consequences to guide individual choices, and social consequences for making good or bad decisions as individuals. For example, there is a norm but not a rule against reading the minds of humans, and a ship that violates that law is ostracized and given a pejorative nickname.

16/ Star Trek captains try to avoid mistakes, and when they do make mistakes it’s a rare crisis. First do no harm, like doctors. Culture Minds try to learn from mistakes and come out net positive and win-win long term, but in the short term they are willing to play pretty dirty. Mistakes are not exceptional. It’s a startuppy fail-fast world with consequences. This is a pretty powerful attitude. Great power, great responsibility sort of thing.

17/ Not only are you willing to take risks, you are willing to take risks on behalf of others. They are willing both to commit sins, and then ask for forgiveness and atone for the sins, a kind of ask for forgiveness not permission culture, which is a very different, and in my view, much more alive posture.

18/ Compared to the Culture, the Star Trek Federation has what Bruce Sterling called an acting dead posture. Or equivalently, to use terminology coined by Samo Burja, the Culture is a live player civilization, while the Star Trek Federation is a dead player civilization.

19/ The Culture society reminds me of Hannah Arendt’s definition of a free public as one where freedom is experienced through involvement in mutuality, not going off by yourself with f**k-you money, and the moral universe is based on the risky posture of making mistakes driven by curiosity and growth motives, and then seeking forgiveness, rather than trying to avoid mistakes.

20/ Now the interesting thing is that both Star Trek Federation and Culture lack a meaningful scarcity-based capitalism based on money. The Star Trek has replicator credits, but they’re not really that important. They deal with lesser species like the Ferengi, which do have a concept of money in the form of latinum plates. There’s a good book about the Star Trek economy called Trekonomics, by Manu Saadia by the way.

21/ Within the Culture, again there’s no money. But sometimes there are fads and fashions that create money-like dynamics. Like in Look to Windward, where there is some trading based on scarce concert tickets. But again, for the Culture, money only comes into play when dealing with less advanced cultures. So overall, both the Federation and the Culture not just post-scarcity, but post-capitalist.

22/ Let’s connect all that up to the current state of the world. The interesting thing is that despite all the political strife and pandemic-related troubles and deaths, we are actually starting to hit post-scarcity dynamics for real. Money is rapidly losing all its traditional meanings, and behaving in new ways we don’t really understand yet. One obvious sign of that is that service economy workers are in the deepest s**t ever, while anyone holding stocks has been doing great. So there’s a dissonance there that’s going to get sorted out, and it’s probably going to get ugly.

23/ Governments across the world have taken fiscal measures that look like close to free money. Especially if you’re in an industry like airlines, hotels, or restaurants, money is now a weird new kind of government action. It doesn’t mean what it used to. We’ve also been able to throw massive resources at vaccine development and not just develop them in record time, but do so with an entirely new method, and with higher effectiveness. And chances are it will be distributed nearly free around the world. Amazing compared to past pandemics.

24/ Even better, despite the strongest efforts of the fossil fuel lobby, the renewables economy has continued to develop strongly through the pandemic, and energy is getting closer to free. And by that I mean really free, after factoring in the cost of externalities like pollution and carbon. That’s worth a bit of a bunnytrail.

25/ There’s a famous paper by Nobel laureate William Nordhaus, Do Real-Output and Real-Wage Measures Capture Reality? The History of Lighting Suggests Not, analyzing the cost of artificial lighting measured in human labor hours that has some interesting implications.

26/ Nordhaus shows that between prehistoric times and campfires, and modern compact fluorescent lamps (which are already obsolete btw, and being replaced by even more efficient LED lights) the cost of lighting really has dropped by a huge amount. The amount of work that bought 1 hour of light in prehistoric times now buys 53 years of light.

27/ When Nordhaus wrote the paper in 1994, you could argue it was kinda dishonest since it didn’t account for the cost of climate externalities. But now with the renewables revolution, the figure is much more honest.

28/ And it’s not just lighting. Anything based on computing and electronics has seen that trajectory. The picture in this episode has an LED, as well as a knockoff Arduino board, and it’s worth thinking about that: that board is a Chinese knockoff off an open-source project, and all the code is open source. If you bought an Arduino original, you’d pay a higher price out of goodwill for the open source.

29/ We’re already into 5nm semiconductors, which means extremely low-power computing, in watts/cycle terms, and coupled with renewables, you could get solar-powered bitcoin mining on ocean barges that is literally almost free energy, not just in money terms, but in all-inclusive environmental terms, in real units like human labor.

30/ So at least where artificial lighting, computing, and energy are concerned, we are getting close to Culture or Star Trek levels of post-scarcity, and the dynamics of our world are starting to reflect it. Vaccines are not free to develop today, even if they’re distributed free, but with that protein-folding breakthrough, that might go the same way.

31/ So why don’t we see all this and celebrate? The thing is, post-scarcity doesn’t quite look like we expect it to, in naively idealist-utopian terms. We think it looks like the orderly Star Trek Federation, but it looks more like the chaotic Culture universe.

32/ Right now the light at the end of both the Trump and Covid tunnels are visible, and it’s also very clear that the world on the other side is going to be very different on every dimension: political, economic, social, technological, legal, and environmental. We’re going to go straight from Covid to Climate as the next challenge.

33/ Those dimensions, by the way, define what is called the PESTLE analysis framework — political, economic, social, technological, legal, and environmental — which I learned about recently via a project I was doing with the Yak Collective, which is a network of free agents and consultants I helped start.

34/ We just launched a project called Future Frontiers, using the PESTLE framework that you might want to check out. One of the things I hope to do with the Yak Collective in 2021 is kick off an open-source Mars rover project, betting on cheap Mars access from SpaceX. I’m looking for hackers and makers to join, so if you’re interested you should sign up.

35/ A bit of product placement PR: Next week, on Thursday Dec 10 at 8AM Pacific, we’ll be doing our first Annual Meeting, and it will be a good chance for those of you who are interested to check us out.

36/ But to get back to the topic, the Yak Collective is actually one example of the sort of socio-political experiment that makes sense in an emergent post-scarcity economy of involvement capitalism, where the scarce commodity is not any kind of material resource, whether it is atoms, joules, or bits, but human involvement.

37/ Both the Star Trek Federation and the Culture represent involved postures. They don’t retreat. They explore and stay curious. They are neither individualist, nor collectivist, but try to manage that tension while remaining involved. For me, the Culture is the better model, since it is much more alive, but either model is a good one to think about.

38/ What makes the Culture different from every other model of post-scarcity post-capitalism is that it’s not idealistic or utopian. It aspires to good, but accepts the necessity of mistakes, forgiveness, and messiness in a chaotic universe. In the Culture, the ultimate sin is not making mistakes, but disengaging. Involvement is good. Like in regular capitalism, greed is good, in the Culture, involvement is good.

39/ Covid has shown us that traditional capitalism breaks when faced with an extreme coordination problem and necessary collective action. The US is the most powerful country on the planet, and the most powerful economy and innovation engine. Yet, it has already let almost a third of a million people die, and the number is likely to be half a million by the time we’re done.

40/ Capitalism itself is here to stay I think, but no flavor seems acceptable for the world we’re heading into, and the problems will only get worse than Covid, not easier, but also more and more things will be moving into the weird post-scarcity regimes, like lighting, computing, and energy. We don’t have a system for this.

41/ Democratic capitalism leads to tyranny of the majority. Socialist flavors of capitalism as in China may do better on problems like Covid, and we can’t ignore that, but they do come at the cost of authoritarian repression with an AI surveillance state.

42/ Any sort of consensus-based approach to capitalism, as in many kinds of cooperative schemes, ends up vulnerable to veto dynamics, while more individualist leaning flavors of capitalism, like libertarianism and anarchism, end up sucked into low-level endless political life, which is ironic since that’s what they set out to avoid. In New Hampshire for instance, libertarianism went off the rails and resulted in bears running wild in a small town.

43/ In all cases, I think the problem is twofold — not recognizing that post-scarcity, even in limited form, creates more chaos and confusion than a utopian peace, and the urge to retreat from involvement of any sort, which backfires, and sucks you into the worst kinds of involvement possible.

44/ So what do we do? I think what we must learn to do is involvement capitalism. Stay involved, don’t ignore collective action coordination problems, don’t be idealistic about what post-scarcity means in practice, and try to have fun while figuring it all out.

45/ In this newsletter, I’ve referenced a famous line, usually attributed to Stewart Brand, several times: “we are as gods, and might as well get good at it.” I want to wrap this episode with that, but with a twist: what sort of gods should we aspire to be? I think the answer is, we should aspire to be like the AI Minds that inhabit the spaceships in the Culture. The first step towards involvement capitalism is to give yourself a witty and sardonic god-name that keeps you hungry and foolish, like Steve Jobs said.

So that’s it for this week. Don’t forget, if you’re interested in the Yak Collective, check out yakcollective.org, and drop by our annual meeting on Thursday Dec 10, at 8 AM Pacific.

We’ll resume regular programming and subscriber-only posts next week.

Note to subscribers: Billing, which was paused during my break, will resume starting today.

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit studio.ribbonfarm.com

In today’s episode, I want to talk about an idea I call fifth-generation management.

1/ Fifth-generation management is an emerging style of management we don’t know much about because it doesn’t actually exist yet. But it is guaranteed to emerge post-Covid because historically, big sharp disruptions have reliably triggered discontinuous changes in management culture, and it is already clear that this one is doing that.

2/ The idea of generations in management, in the form I’m going to lay it out, is causally related to the idea of generations of warfare, and in particular the idea that contemporary styles of warfare strongly shape future styles of management. So if there are generations in warfare, they are going to cause generations in management. Military ideas are not the only cause of course, but I’m going to argue that historically they’ve been the strongest one. Strong enough to almost be determinative. During WW2 for instance, business and military culture became almost the same thing for a few years.

3/ This is not a universally popular idea because a significant number people find even the business-as-war metaphor distasteful, let alone the suggestion that military culture directly shapes business culture, or worst of all, that it is in fact the dominant source of business thinking. But personally, I’ll admit I’m enough of both a military nerd and a management nerd that I actually find the connection stimulating rather than depressing to think about. And I have a little bit of history here, my research during my PhD and postdoc fifteen-twenty years ago was on military command and control models, and a lot of my consulting work draws from that experience.

4/ For better or worse, the connection between military and business evolution happens to be historically solid, and seems set to remain true. In the past this was much stronger, due to a large number of men serving in wars and then entering business, and business being male-dominated. Today, the coupling mainly has to do with relative rates of technology adoption in military vs business evolution, and to a lesser extent, shared exogenous events affecting both military and business affairs.

5/ Before we get into it, a couple of caveats. First, as with any clean, linear, sequential or cyclic model applied to a messy branching, evolutionary reality, you have to apply it very tastefully. You have to think like a historical artisan, matching up the conceptual boundaries of a constructivist notion you’re working with to real history. And where they don’t line up, actual historical events should shape your thinking rather than the abstract idea of one sequence of generations driving another. Second caveat, don’t make the mistake of thinking that each generation fully displaces the previous one in either military or business. Instead, it adds a new layer, and the older layer simply gets confined to a small zone of the action. Generations accumulate like geological layers, they don’t displace each other.

6/ To understand the management version, we have to understand the military version first. The idea of generations of warfare was popularized by William S. Lind, who coined the term fourth-generation warfare around 1980. It became the dominant style in actual warfare after the Iraq War, which was probably the last major third-generation war.

7/ I have illustrated the generations in the lower half of the diagram. The story basically starts with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, after the Thirty Years War. The first generation lasted almost 150 years. The second generation lasted about 100 years from 1815 to 1915, the third about 65 years from 1938 to 2003. The fourth, I will argue, only lasted about 15 years, from 2003 to 2020, and Covid will trigger a shift to a fifth generation.

8/ The first generation was based on final abandonment of medieval warfare, and relied on early smooth-bore muskets. It utilized uniformed, paid armies fighting for nations rather than feudal lords, or mercenary companies. It involved what is known as line-and-column warfare. Think of armies marching in long columns towards strategic targets. Maybe a little large-scale maneuvering and flanking, but lacking the communications and intelligence capabilities to do more.

9/ The second generation stretches roughly a century from the end of the Napoleonic wars, around 1815 to World War I. It was based on the development of rifled breech-loading guns, interchangeable parts, and early electronic communications with the telegraph. Technology improved steadily so that WW1 was quite different from say the war of Mexican independence. But the broad style is what’s known as attrition warfare between roughly evenly matched forces in numerical and materiel terms. Armies bogged down in trenches or extended sieges. In second generation warfare, usually the side with the greater economic resources eventually prevails, as in the US Civil War.

10/ Third-generation warfare was developed primarily by the German military in the interwar period, and is what is usually called Blitzkrieg in the historical case, or maneuver warfare in more modern terminology. It makes use of fast-moving mechanized infantry, tanks, and sophisticated local communications to move very fast behind enemy lines, maneuver and reorient rapidly in response to changing situations, and collapse the enemy from the inside.

11/ This is the style that was developed and refined by John Boyd, and is roughly what lasted all the way through the Iraq War. In third-generation warfare, often an asymmetrically smaller and technologically primitive force can beat a larger, technologically superior force. This is the style that is based on the OODA loop, which we talk about a lot.

12/ This asymmetric outcome potential often creates a conundrum around how to establish the peace after the victory, because economic superiority may not line up with military superiority. In the case of WW2, eventually the Allies got better at maneuver warfare, the Germans got worse and backslid into 2nd generation to some extent, and economic superiority prevailed. And after the war, the Allies won the peace with the Marshall Plan, which was second-generation peace thinking. So in a way WW2 was actually a Generation 2.5 war.

13/ Third-generation warfare is also what is sometimes called total war, where you fight with unsentimental professional skill to win. It’s not about honor or fair-play, and deceit, cunning, and cheating are considered legitimate. This means it can get really ugly by design. In older styles of warfare, you would have a collapse of honor norms like “giving quarter,” but for third-generation warfare, which is an extremely rational kind of warfare, you had to have things like the United Nations laws and the idea of war crimes and trials. Because everything from gas chambers to concentration camps is otherwise on the table.

14/ Now fourth-generation warfare is best defined not by how war is fought, but by who fights the war. In some ways the Vietnam War for the US, and the Afghanistan War for the Soviet Union, were both early fourth-generation wars. But proper fourth-generation warfare requires non-state actors who can operate with near capability parity on many fronts, which requires the internet and cellphones. It also often has non-state actors with more legitimacy than mere third-generation terrorist groups, and state actors that have much less legitimacy than they used to in the past. In a way, the Peace of Westphalia made states the legitimate combatants, and the Great Weirding is reversing that legitimacy after almost 400 years.

15/ Of course, as we’ve all learned by now, fourth-generation warfare, since about 2003, also means dank memes, influence operations, fake news, and disruption of political processes, especially democratic ones like elections, using social media. A good example is modern conflict like Syria involves both state forces, in this case Syria and Russia, as well as ISIS and a people’s resistance. Or Ukraine. It is what is sometimes called hybrid or nonlinear war, and Russia has been the leading practitioner of it. Arguably, the West has been subject to a fourth-generation war attack for four years from Russia.

16/ And of course this mix has always been present in warfare in some form, but what distinguishes 4th-generation warfare is that guerrilla goals shape the conflict via leveraged high-tech digital means, instead of just being subject to first, second, or third generation logic, or limited to violent terror tactics. This also means guerrilla goals become top-level political goals, instead of being subsidiary to the goals of a sponsor state. Guerrilla goals are what Henry Kissinger described with his famous line: “The conventional army loses if it does not win. The guerrilla wins if he does not lose.”

17/ In other words, fourth-generation warfare brings guerrilla goals to the political table directly. It is not total war, but what I call infinite war: it brings infinite-game war goals, into the picture, the goal being to continue the game rather than win it (infinite game in the sense of James Carse). It’s a true fourth-generation war if at least one top-level combatant is fighting with the guerrilla goal of simply staying in the game, rather than trying to win formally in the sense of a declared war, getting the opponent to surrender, and doing so without a state sponsor. Sometimes of course, the guerrilla actually wins in a conventional sense, in which case they often struggle to transition from a stateless actor to a state actor, as with the Taliban.

18/ Okay, now that we have our four generations lined up, let’s talk about how that connects to generations of business management. To do that, I want to talk about an episode you may have heard of, called the Millennium War Games, but you probably haven’t heard anything like my spin on it.

19/ Briefly, the Millennium War Games were games held in 2002 in which the Blue Team, operating by a doctrine called Network Centric Warfare or NCW, was defeated by Red Team, led by Marine Corps Lt. Gen Paul Van Riper, operating by standard third-generation Boydian doctrines. NCW was basically a very high-tech model, using satellites and surveillance and tight synchronization. Basically “how would we fight a war with the internet on our side.”

20/ Van Riper avoided electronic communications and instead used motorcycle messengers to communicate, and attacks with fishing boats to destroy the Blue Team. Basically, using relatively low-tech and irregular forces to operate in the blind-spot of the high-tech larger adversary that was overconfident in its technological ability. Classic OODA loop style conflict.

21/ The normal interpretation of the outcome is that low-tech with superior strategic thinking beats high-tech with weaker strategic thinking, but this is simplistic. It also doesn’t explain why, 50 years after Blitzkrieg was recognized around the world, the Blue Team would operate against the logic of third-generation warfare. The key point to note here is that the war games were primarily naval, and NCW was a doctrine that emerged out of the US Navy and its relationship to technology, specifically from an essay by Admiral William Owens in 1996.

22/ This is not an irrelevant fact. Navies have historically been the highest-tech branch of the military, but not in the sense of adopting the newest, shiniest tech. They are the highest tech in the sense of using the most technology, in the most complete and systematic way, to vertically integrate operations all the way from satellites to bullets. They are platforms. Today for example, the US Navy operates carrier groups, the most advanced version of this thinking.

23/ Aircraft carriers are obviously the most sophisticated technology in military use. They run actual little air forces and missile defense and offense that are superior to the entire militaries of small nations. They use satellites. They have destroyers, submarines, anti-submarine capabilities, all operating in coordination. And this has been true going back centuries. Large capital ships were hugely expensive technological marvels even in the age of sailing ships, and money and technological superiority can overwhelm a historic maritime tradition sometimes, as happened in the 18th century when France under Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s administrative leadership briefly pulled ahead of more naval nations like the UK and the Dutch in capability.

24/ On the other hand, prototypical third-generation warfare is best exemplified by the US Marine Corps. It’s not exactly a low-tech force, but you could say it selectively uses a few really high-tech bits in an otherwise low-tech style of fighting. The same is true of special forces, but to a greater degree of tech early-adoption. Third-generation warfare you could say is an early-adopter of technology that uses it in a small-scale but highly leveraged and strategic way. It’s the military equivalent of a startup, while navies are the military equivalents of large enterprises.

25/ These military startups don’t just use new technology, they rapidly evolve tactics through trial-and-error in actual conflict, and build out strategies and doctrines bottom-up, in real-time, adapted to the current conflict. And this is not because they’re smarter than navies, but because they play a different role: usually offensive, high-speed, messy and ground level.

26/ Navies on the other hand, usually play a very different role. Their firepower is primarily deployed from a distance and with overwhelming scale, in what’s called stand-off mode. A modern carrier group will park itself outside a battlespace and send hundreds of sorties into the warzone, launch hundreds of missiles, conduct economic blockades or humanitarian activities, and in general create a sort of boundary condition for the rest of the war. Their job is to create and maintain boundaries, not maneuver within them.

27/ In fact, historically, navies have been most powerful when they simply stood off to the side and did nothing. This is one takeaway from Alfred Thayer Mahan’s classic The Influence of Sea Power Upon History. It also applies to nuclear power, which has a similar effect (so nuclear deterrence enforcing the peace). Notably, Boydian thinking emerged out of fighter warfare and doesn’t have much to say about that side of warfare. The point is that complex, systemic technological capability is just a very different sort of weapon, and you have to apply generational thinking separately to it.

28/ Sometimes navies play a more active, maneuvering type third-generation role, as in the Atlantic war against U-Boats, but in general, you could say that navies play a late-adopter, complex systems platform technology role in warfare, while marines and special forces play an early adopter, startup role. If you want to apply the four-generations model to navies, you have to do it separately. I won’t get into how to apply the four-generation model to these boundary-condition parts of the military, but it’s possible.

29/ The quick version is that both have a role to play in modern warfare, just as both startups and large companies have a role to play in the tech economy. If your takeaway from the Van Riper Millennium war games episode is that you should give up high-tech complex military capabilities and network-centric operations, and run a cheap military using motorcycle messengers, and fishing boats, you learned exactly the wrong lesson.

30/ In fact all the conflict since 2002 shows the opposite. Network-centric warfare is what’s actually dominating war zones, though not in the doctrinal sense Admiral Owens imagined. Russia, ISIS, China, and other actors who are good at this all operate in a network-centric way. It’s just not in the form that the US NCW doctrine envisioned, but much messier and bottom-up. Missing this point is like thinking all companies should be small startups and that the Googles and Amazons can’t possible work.

31/ A better way to think about it is that you should pursue hot military objectives with marines style startup action, but consolidate victories and preserve the peace with navy style network-centric type systemic capabilities. Both have a role to play in every generation of warfare. You could say marines win wars while navies preserve the peace. Though of course in modern conditions, there is never really clear hot war or cold peace, or cold war and hot peace, but a continuous partial warm chaotic conflict.

32/ Okay, that was a very long preamble, which was unfortunately necessary because most people make military-to-business connections without knowing much of the relevant military history. But we’re now ready to make the connection to business management generations. I’m going to state it in the form of two laws, and then describe the four generations in relation to the top half of the diagram.

33/ The first law is: On average, business management generations lag military generations by one.

34/ This is an average in two ways. The first is across branches of the military. Military startups, marines and special forces, might be 1.5 generations ahead of management cultur, innovating tactics based on the most promising new technologies. Air forces and armies might be 1 generation ahead, using more proven technology, and navies might be 0.5 generations ahead, deploying the most proven technology at the most complex scale.

35/ The second is across time. You may have heard the line that generals are always prepared to fight the last war. This means, every significant new war causes a paradigm shift. It’s like a staircase evolution, and on average, military management culture is ahead. And in a world like ours, where we’re nearly continuously at war somewhere, the saying actually is pretty meaningless.

36/ The second law is: The evolution of business management is driven by more frequent, but smaller magnitude, exogenous events. So it has a much smoother evolutionary profile. Every war is an exogenous disruption to business, but not every exogenous business disruption drives evolution in warfare. Business is also driven by political events, economic crises, financial crashes, and many more technologies than warfare. Every military crisis is a business crisis, but not every business crisis is a military crisis.

37/ For those of you who follow the computer industry, an analogy to laptops and phones versus gaming consoles is useful here. Gaming consoles are like military technology, they have sudden jumps in capabilities every few years, as specialized chips are designed and launched. But phones and laptops evolve more smoothly with smaller jumps. They eventually catch up and even briefly overtake the console market. But then the consoles jump ahead again.

38/ So if you apply these two laws, you get a description of four generations of management that loosely correspond to the four generations of warfare, but with roughly a lag of 1 generation, and a smoother evolutionary profile. So let’s take them in order, as shown in the diagram.

39/ First-generation management, which is roughly the mercantile era, overlaps with the first generation of warfare in time, but resembles medieval warfare in structure. It is a little longer by about 25 years, about 1648 to 1854, the London Crystal Palace World Fair. It relies on ways of running businesses that would be familiar to people in the 15th and 16th centuries. Medieval management.

40/ Second-generation management, which is roughly the Robber Baron era, roughly 1870 to 1930, loosely resembled first-generation warfare. It features paycheck employees, a traditional column and line type approach to business operations, and leadership that looked a bit like 17th century military leadership. It established large business empires that resembled colonial empires, and used relatively primitive communications based on mail and telegraph to maneuver a little but, but not a lot.

41/ Third-generation management, which is roughly the familiar modern managerial era in the old economy, resembles second-generation warfare. It stretched from roughly the Great Depression to 1997, and has two clear phases. In the first phase, about 1935 to 1980, we had a heavily state-regulated corporatist environment, and in the second phase, from 1980 to about 1997, we had a deregulated environment. But despite the differences, the key feature is that professional managers ran the show, and the competition had some of the trench warfare attrition characteristics of WW1. Competitors were roughly evenly matched and were trying to wear each other out in the market.

42/ Finally, getting into modern times, fourth-generation management, which is roughly the entrepreneurial era, resembles third generation warfare. It stretches from the dotcom boom and the rise of Clayton Christensen’s disruption model, which is really maneuver warfare for business settings, all the way to 2020. It features charismatic founder-entrepreneurs, rather than professional managers, setting the agenda. Just like third-generation warfare, it puts marines/special forces type startups in the center, and navy-like systemic capabilities on the margins. In the fourth-generation, HBR, Michael Porter and McKinsey took a backseat, while Silicon Valley and the VC blogosphere was in the spotlight.

43/ There’s a lot more to be said, but that’s the basic model. Take the military generations, subtract one, adjust boundaries, smoothen the evolutionary curve, and you get management culture.

44/ Which brings us to fifth-generation management. Obviously, Covid and what I call the Great Weirding have been a huge disruption for both military and business. Obviously, climate action is already starting to shape the agenda in a very significant way, and business-to-business or military-vs-military competition is almost taking a backseat while society-to-nature competition is front and center. We are fighting a two front war, with the virus on one front and climate on the other. Neither will be the same coming out the other end. So what can we expect?

45/ First, military affairs are in uncharted territory. The US military for instance, is dealing with dangerously unstable domestic politics where they might become a factor for the first time since the Civil War. Syria and Ukraine were fourth-generation wars, but already fifth-generation situations are cropping up all over the place, like the urban conflicts in Western cities, detention camps for refugees, and so on. I won’t go deep into military futures here.

46/ But business affairs are in somewhat of a clearer situation. By applying the first law, we can already predict that fifth-generation business will look at least partly like fourth-generation warfare, 2003-20. In other words, like Syria or Ukraine. Just as non-state actors shape fourth-generation warfare, non-business entities will shape fifth-generation business. This includes culture war groups fighting for social justice, climate action nonprofits, governments administering post-Covid recovery funds, and so on.

47/ There is also stuff that’s already been recognized, ranging from open-source communities and the gig economy, to the blockchain economy, and various moves towards home-based economic activity and work-from-home that is outside the financial economy.

48/ But the big thing is that there are a large number of reckonings that have to be dealt with. Besides climate, we have the trade war, we have China turning into a new kind of evil empire and surveillance state, we have the techlash, we have financialization on Wall Street, we have a world awash in fiscal responses to Covid. And in the middle of all this, we have supply chains breaking down, wildfires, and other climate-related disruptions.

49/ A lot of what I write about on this newsletter is looking at various aspects of all this. The three main projects I have going here all are about researching the background context against which fifth-generation management is emerging, though that’s not the main motivation. In the Great Weirding series, I’m looking at how the equilibrium has been destabilized over the last five years. In the Clockless Clock project, I’m looking at how new temporalities are displacing the clock-based temporality that has coincided with all four generations of war and business, since the invention of the pendulum clock in 1657. In the After Westphalia project, I’m looking at the future of the nation-state.

50/ Trying to figure out how to manage military or economic affairs against this complex backdrop is the task of fifth-generation management in both domains, and it will be probably take us all the rest of our lives to figure it out. But at least we now have a starting point and a sense of the nature of the challenge. A lot of this thinking came out of my last few years of consulting work, with clients who are already practicing fifth-generation management, and I’m currently trying to put together an online course based on this material. So if that interests you, stay tuned. There will be an update on that front soon.

This has been one of the occasional free podcast issues of the Breaking Smart newsletter, where I send out an essay a week. Usually an installment of one of my longer series projects, which I just mentioned, and occasionally one-off stand-alone essays. So if you liked the ideas in this issue, do subscribe.

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit studio.ribbonfarm.com

For today’s episode, I want to share an out-take from my consulting work, something I think might be interesting for anyone working in the technology industry. It’s a set of 20 questions that can help you uncover the current state of play in your business. The questions are mainly useful for technology companies for reasons I’ll get to, and are probably of limited value to non-technology businesses, but you’re welcome to try using them for non-technology businesses.

A caution: The only person who can usefully answer these questions for the company as a whole is the CEO. But it’s a fun game to play from any position, and useful to the extent you are close to, and aligned with, the CEO.

I put this list together in the course of some work I’m doing with a client, and in doing that, I realized that these are the questions I tend to explore free-form in the first couple of orientation calls with all new clients. I don’t explore these via an explicit Q&A, but more in a sort of bingo-card format, where I look for answers to these in a free-form conversation. For me, it’s a way to efficiently learn about the business, and for them, it tends to be a useful exercise to turn an unconscious sense of the state of play into a conscious one.

So here are the questions, with some commentary afterwards. Note that this is written text is a skeletal outline, not a transcript. The audio has me riffing on all these questions and explaining the logic of the sequence, so you’ll have to listen if you want the whole thing.

The Questions

* What is the primary operational bottleneck or "firefight" currently consuming the bulk of your attention? (eg: "growing schedule slippage on launch of product X" or "difficulty filling critical CxO position" or "PR damage control due to issue X")

* What is currently the biggest source of uncertainty/doubt/anxiety for the company? (Be specific, eg: "high failure rate of manufacturing process X" or "poor conversion rates of sales campaign for product Y" or "What customer Z will decide for their product P")

* What are the top 5-7 events coming up on the company roadmap in the next few years? (eg: key technology tests, decision points, product launches, sales drives, external events like elections) 

* Who/what are the top 5-7 most important external entities shaping your business sector environment? (key customers, value chain partners, government agencies etc. Name either individual entities, or classes that are as specific as possible, like "small food-service business owners").

* Which entity in the list from Q4 above exercises the MOST strategic control over the primary value chain of interest to the business?

* Which entity in the list from Q4 consumes the largest share of your personal attention? (can be the same as 5)

* What is the MAIN line of business (LOB) the company MUST win in, within the current business model, to be successful?

* What is currently the MAIN strategic metric/measure that tells you whether you're winning or losing in that LOB? (be specific, eg: "free cash flow" or "increasing yield rate from process X" or "rate of increase of production volume")

* Who is the ultimate customer/end user for the overall value chain this LOB is part of? (Be as specific as possible. Eg, "fast-food restaurant chains")

* Who is the immediate prototypical customer for this LOB for your business? (Eg, "commercial kitchen equipment manufacturers")

* What is ONE belief held by this prototypical customer that you would like to change, and what would you like it to change to?

* What they believe:

* What you would like them to believe:

* What is your "Thielean Secret"? ONE key belief held by you/your company that is NOT widely shared by the industry?

* What is working unexpectedly well, where you seem to be getting surprisingly lucky?

* What is working predictably badly, and seems hopeless/doomed?

* Overall, how well is the current business model working? Use a qualitative phrase in the range from "succeeding wildly" to "in big trouble"

* What do you estimate are the % chances you'll need to execute a major business model pivot within the next 3 years?

* If you do need to pivot, what is the most likely alternative business model you will be considering?

* What are the top 3-5 macro trends affecting your business environment (Be specific: examples: Covid, China trade war, climate change, software eating the world, input X commoditizing, industry structure going from horizontal to vertical…)

* What are the top 3-5 elements of the business environment that are NOT changing?

* Based on reflection on your answers to questions 1-19, list  between 3-5 problems that you consider to be the top strategic priorities. Describe each with a single sentence. They can relate to any aspect of the business: internal or external, relating to marketing, engineering, HR, sales, or cutting across functional boundaries. Try and state it in terms of key details that have strategic significance, not generalities (eg, "Get defect rate for manufacturing process X below Y%" not "Improve quality") 

These questions are specifically useful for technology businesses — businesses that develop and sell products or services that take significant engineering, and are driven by, and drive, technology trends. This is because technology businesses are strongly time-based, and have to evolve and maneuver in a marketplace where competition is based primarily on innovation, not supply and demand shifts due to macro factors in an otherwise unchanging market.

In other words, there is a sort of fast-evolving real history to technology businesses that’s not really there in non-technology businesses, like managing a corner grocery store or even a consulting business like mine.

These questions assume that the logic of the business is the logic of time-based competition, which means your approach will include things like OODA loops, S-curves, disruption, Simon Wardley’s Wardley Maps, Ben Thompson’s Aggregation Theory, and so on.

Even though the questions might seem banal and obvious, the thing is there’s a lot of banal and obvious questions you can ask about any business, like hundreds, and it’s not immediately obvious, at least to me, that these are the right ones.

These questions — in this rough sequence — are ones I’ve converged on through trial-and-error over nearly a decade of initial orientation conversations with new clients. Many other questions can be usefully asked once you have a sense of the answers to these basic questions, but skipping these and going straight to other questions is usually a recipe for frustration.

So that’s it for this episode. You’ve been listening to/reading a free podcast issue of the Breaking Smart newsletter, where I send out a longform piece for subscribers every Friday, usually an installment from one of my multi-part projects, and sometimes stand-alone essays. Once every 3 or 4 weeks, I publish a free public podcast like this.

In the previous 3 weeks, I published 3 subscribers-only essays:

* Control Failure -1 from my Great Weirding essay series, about the global transformation of the last few years.

* The Descent of the Public, from my After Westphalia essay series, about what comes after the nation-state.

* Operating in Time -2, the concluding part of Chapter 3 of my book project, The Clockless Clock.

Thank you for listening, andI’ll be back next week with another longform piece.

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit studio.ribbonfarm.com

A special episode, an audio roundup/summary of the last year’s podcasts. I cover the 19 episodes I did starting in June last year. A year of thinking out loud.

* The inaugural episode riffing on the like-new ethos of the industrial age and the transience/aging based ethos of the digital age. June 21, 2019: A Wabi-Sabi Technological Age.

* On the problem of how to repeatedly break into technology scenes. July 5, 2019: Following the Scenius.

* Plotting vs. pantsing, and setting the stage for creative, generative work vs. planning to finish something. July 26, 2019: Planning to Start, Planning to Finish.

* An episode on how marketing is now a bottom-up process with 3 layers: memes, brands, and missions. August 2, 2019: Memes, Brands, and Missions.

* On why social media favors positive behaviors such as clicking like buttons, but not negative ones like mute and block. August 23, 2019: Towards Subtractive Social Media.

* Investing in the things that make you ordinary rather than special, such as being an early adopter. August 30, 2019: Investing in Your Ordinary Powers.

* Probably my favorite thread of the first year, building an analogy between charismatic megafauna and technologies, built around a 2x2 of non-marquee vs. marquee, and smoke-and-mirrors vs. WYSIWYG. September 6, 2019: Technological Charisma.

* Riffing on the problem of how injecting AI into a system breaks learning curves for humans. September 20, 2019: Like Riding an AI Bicycle.

* Next up, another episode based on a 2x2, this one has normal versus weird on the x axis, and timid vs. bold on the y axis. September 27, 2019: The Direction of Maximal Derangement.

* Picking up the thread on charismatic technologies from September 6, an episode about an idea to replace the concept of Net Neutrality, based on the end-to-end principle, with one based on end-to-end encryption. October 4, 2019: Charisma Neutrality.

* A reflection on the death of Alexey Leonov and the first spacewalk with two women, Christina Koch and Jessica Meir. October 18, 2019: Spacewalks and the Species.

* Putting together ideas from Alan Kay, William Gibson to think about how December 6, 2019: Inventing Time

* Navigating time in ways that go beyond optimism and pessimism. February 21: Beyond Optimism and Pessimism

* The first pandemic episode. The word default has two meanings: failure to fulfill an obligation, and a preselected option. Both meanings became very salient with the pandemic. April 3, 2020: Defaults and Defaults.

* A riff on Marc Andreessen’s Time to Build essay which was doing the rounds then, based on a graphic I made up called the Builder’s Cone, comparing the relative rates at which you adapt versus society adapts. April 24, 2020. How, What, and Where to Build

* One of the things I’ve been doing with the pandemic is reading a lot of history that seems relevant. Through most of May and June, I was reading Barbara Tuchman’s A Distant Mirror. An episode inspired by that. May 8, 2020: The Medieval Future of Management.

* In May, we had the BLM protests and that seemed to bump the pandemic from the headlines. What was the significance of that? May 29, 2020. From Story to Setting

* Connecting the idea of big moods to emotional common knowledge, and a complementary concept I made up called little moods. June 19, 2020. Big Moods, Little Moods.

* Probably my most popular episode from the last year, a detailed look at the concepts of elites and elitism, how elites fail, and how to get better elites. July 10, The Next Experiments in Elitism.

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit studio.ribbonfarm.com

In today’s episode, in honor of Bastille Day next week, and Fourth of July last week, I want to talk about the ongoing evolution in elitism, and the problem of how the emerging new elites can be better than the old ones being toppled.

1/ Elites are a constant and arguably necessary presence in history. Political revolutions that try to do away with elites invariably seem to either fail quickly, or install new elites without meaning to. So the question for me is not how to get rid of elites, but how to try and ensure the ones we end up with are better than the last lot.

2/ I’m going to sketch out a rough theory of elitism and its dynamics, and then get to posing the question itself, and then propose an answer, from the perspective of both the new TBD elites, and the masses they define, so let’s get started.

3/ First, the concept of an elite is not dependent on a particular structure of society. Elites might be kings, nobles, elected leaders, bureaucrats, scholars, scientists, priests, cult leaders, media leaders, business executives, or subcultural inner circles. The prevailing idea of masses is induced by the prevailing idea of elites as a complement.

4/ So there’s always a subset that regards itself, and is regarded as, entitled to a sustainably better than average human condition, with attendant privileges. And importantly, it is a stable equilibrium. Those who are worse off, the non-elites, and think the elites don’t deserve their better conditions, still live with it. The masses rarely disturb the peace unless they are under extreme stress.

5/ Elitism and privilege go together of course. The word privilege literally means private law. Elites are a group for whom laws apply differently, or a different set of laws apply. In the most extreme case, they are formally above the law entirely. That’s the usual definition of a monarch and the dividing line between monarchs and ordinary nobles.

6/ The nobility might have a privileged code of law, but they are still governed by a rule of law, even if it’s not the same one as applies to non-elites. This special treatment has to be pretty special though, so I don’t use privilege in the broad social justice sense of the term, as in white privilege. That’s a different, more diffuse sense of privilege as a structural advantage. I’m talking narrow privilege where you can get exceptional, personalized treatment under whatever rule of law applies to you.

7/ For example, in medieval Europe, the nobility had hereditary property rights, governed by Church law, and the commoners mostly didn’t have the same sorts of property rights, only duties. But what made the law for the nobility special was that it was personally administered, with exceptions being more important. Laws honored in the breach rather than observance, as Shakespeare put it.

8/ So for example, there were laws against consanguinous marriages, but the Church did brisk business in allowing exceptions. Or you have indulgences absolving you of sins that are more easily available to nobility. Or in more modern times, draft exemptions. That’s what privilege looks like.

9/ So one way or the other, some subset of humans will create not only better than average conditions for themselves through private laws, they will even get exceptional treatment under that private law. Or a position above the law entirely.

10/ A big part of the stability of this condition is personal social capital: knowing the right people, with the right level of trust, to get rules bent or interpreted in your favor. Or being treated as an exception. Or in the extreme case, laws simply made to your specifications to benefit you and disadvantage others. In the most extreme case, they simply don’t apply to you.

11/ If you ignore human fallibility and corruption, and look at this as a systems design, it is actually kinda smart to divide the world into 3 zones this way: a zone where the rules apply absolutely, a zone where they can be bent and exceptions are possible, and a zone outside the laws. It gives you a broad ability to evolve the system.

12/ It’s like how, in The Matrix, the architect declared that the city of Zion, Neo, and the Oracle were as much part of the design of the system as Agent Smith. You could even argue that though the architect was God, Neo was the emperor, the citizens of Zion, both red-pilled and native-born, were the nobility, the Oracle was the chief priestess, and the bots like Agent Smith and the blue-pilled people in the Matrix were the non-elites.

13/ But back in our world, I asked my Twitter followers whether they consider themselves part of the current elites. Out of 468 respondents, 34% said yes, and 66% said no. Which seems about right since I write for a pretty privileged class of readers.

14/ Okay, so with this definition, if you look back at history, it looks like a series of experiments in elitism rather than a series of experiments in governance. Some of them end well, some end badly. But all of them end. The conceptualization of an elite class is not stable.

15/ Definitions of elites shift pretty slowly, and typically only move significantly when the technology of trust changes. It used to be about provably noble blood-lines. Then it was about visibly living by a particular code, noblesse oblige. Then it was about money, then it was about education. Maybe in the far future, it will be about being red-pilled out of an AI simulation, so the rules don’t apply to you.

16/ Now, while a notion of elite is stable, there is what Vilfredo Pareto called circulation of elites. He traced how two kinds of elites, which he called lions and foxes based on earlier terminology from Machiavelli, tend to simply take turns being the elites. Foxes rule by the power of the pen, lions through the power of the sword.

17/ As I have said, the economy of elitism is sort of system independent, and is based on personal trust and social-capital based computing within a calculus of privileges — exemptions from the law.

18/ A good model of this calculus is Selectorate Theory, which is described in The Dictator’s Handbook, compares all kinds of political systems in terms of 3 groups: influentials, essentials, and interchangeables. Influentials are always elites, interchangeables are never elites, and some essentials are elites. It doesn’t matter whether it is a dictatorship or democracy. This is how governance by elites happens.

19/ My final theoretical point is about knowledge. The relation among elites and masses is one usually based on what are called noble lies, where elites exploit their privileged access to ideas, information, and education, to craft false consciousnesses for the masses to inhabit. Think of them as blue pills. How you feel about these noble lies, or blue pills, is a big part of your philosophy of elitism.

20/ You can distinguish two basic approaches of elitism. There is what is sometimes called Straussian elitism, which is generally conservative, but not always, and is based on the paternalistic belief that elites lying to the masses for their own good is a good thing. So you get a distinction between esoteric elite red-pill knowledge and exoteric, non-elite blue-pill knowledge meant for the general public.

21/ The other approach, which you could broadly call pluralism, is more democratic in spirit, and eschews noble lying, at least conscious noble lying, based on the principle that even if it gets noisy, messy, uninformed, and ignorant, it’s a good thing to level the epistemic playing field, and not privilege some flavors of knowledge structurally. I’m pretty strongly in this camp. There is no blue versus red pill. Everything is available for anyone to learn.

22/ Okay, now that we have this basic historical sense of what elitism is, and how it works, we can ask, what makes for good elites versus bad elites? It is important to keep a sense of the real history of elitism when you talk about this question, because it is easy to get caught up in theories. In the collage image accompanying this podcast, I’ve included several famous historical examples.

23/ The storming of the Bastille, the American Declaration of Independence, the Magna Carta, and Lee Kuan Yew, Nehru, and Jomo Kenyatta giving their famous speeches. I also included a picture of Muammar Qadaffi’s corpse after he was killed by a mob — it is important to remember that elitism can end like that. So this is the gestalt of what elitism as a historical practice is. Or to use an esoteric word, the praxis of elitism as a consciously held philosophy.

24/ But we shouldn’t anchor too much on these iconic moments when one set of elites takes over from another, or when non-elites temporarily bring down elites altogether, creating a vacuum. The essence of elitism isn’t in these moments of creative destruction of elite power, but in quieter unaccountable workings away from public scrutiny.

25/ So think of closed-door board meetings, experts in a committee meeting setting health standards, Congressional committees hashing out the details of a bill, lobbyists waiting to meet a senator to push some agenda, unaccountable editors in a press room deciding which public figure to attack. Unaccountable tech leaders deciding how an algorithm should work. That’s day-to-day elitism.

26/ This unaccountability by the way, isn’t necessarily a bad thing. It is what it is. To the extent the elites are agents of the will of society at large, there is just so much detail involved in the exercise of actual power that there is no possible way all of it could be made transparent to everybody. At best you can be slightly less opaque and unaccountable than the last crowd.

27/ There’s also a middle-class, provincial version I don’t want to discount too much, like a local city leader calling in a favor with the local police chief, or a powerful business person talking to a school principal about their child. Any behavior that exercises privilege is elite behavior. The defining bit is not amount or scale of power, but the fact that it is exercised in privileged ways — private law, with a degree of unaccountability and exceptionalism.

28/ Now that I’ve painted a portrait, there’s a fork in the road. You can either accept that this is the way the world works and always will, or you can imagine some sort of utopia where there are no elites and no zone of society that operates on the basis of privilege.

29/ Whether you are a commune anarchist who believes direct democracy or consensus will get rid of elites, or a blockchain libertarian who thinks code-is-law will get rid of elites, down that road I think is mainly delusion. I’ll just point to a famous article, the Tyranny of Structurelessness and leave it at that. Getting rid of elites does not work.

30/ One reason is of course that elites have power and they use that power to keep themselves in power even as structural definitions and models of elitism change, become more or less informal, and ideologically different and so on. Angry masses understand this aspect of the persistence of elites. But this is not the biggest reason.

31/ The biggest reason, which revolutionaries routinely discount, is that humans seem to desperately want elites of some sort. Maybe not the current sort, or the current model, and definitely not the current specific people, but some elites. Maybe you want black instead of white, women instead of men, techies instead of lawyers, or trans instead of cis, the point is, you want elites.

32/ There may be strong preferences for a system of choosing elites. That’s kinda what ideology is. Or looser preferences. For example, I tend to prefer fox elites over lion elites, a large selectorate to a small one, and pluralism over noble lies. I also prefer strong mid-level mini-oligarchic patterns of power to either imperially centralized patterns or extremely fragmented, decentralized patterns.

33/ The psychological function of elites appears to be to model how life can and ought to be lived. But this is a pretty loose specification. Christians think in terms of What Would Jesus Do. Confucians in ancient China thought in terms of how to codify the will of the Emperor into law. Woke elites think in term of how to turn intersectional theory into prescription, and anti-Woke elites think in terms of making classical liberalism great again.

34/ It’s important to keep your definition of elites broad. For example, many people pretend that people like court jesters (and people often classify me as one) are among the non-elite. Maybe formally, but informally, they wield power and privilege — in my sense of access to exceptional treatment — in ways that makes them elite. So today in the US, the cast of Saturday Night Live, stand-up comics, and people like Jon Stewart and Trevor Noah are definitely elites.

35/ Anti-elite philosophy and philosophers are also necessarily elite simply by virtue of how their influence operates. So whether you’re taking about the Taoist sage Zhuangzi in ancient China or important figures like Robert Anton Wilson in the Discordian subculture of modern America, they’re all elites. Just because you laugh at other elites with sticks up their asses doesn’t make you not elite.

36/ There’s many theories of this psychological function. There is a basic ethics theory of people just wanting guidance on how to have a good life, and looking for teachers. There is the theory of elites as surrogate parental figures. There is the Girardian theory of mimetic envy. Each theory explains some aspects and some situations well, and others poorly, but the point is, that psychological function exists. Elites are models of how to live life.

37/ Okay, so now that we know what elites are, who counts as elites, how elitism and privilege work, and why they are both psychologically necessary for societies and structurally hard to eliminate, you can finally ask, what makes for good elites.

38/ It’s an important question to ask right now, because the current regime of elites is definitely nearing its end. Chris Hayes wrote a good book about this back in 2012, called Twilight of the Elites, and there’s been a lot of other writing about it, like Moses Naim’s End of Power, and Martin Gurri’s Revolt of the Public.

39/ The elites are of course not going quietly. My friend Nils Gilman wrote a great article about the reaction, called The Twin Insurgency, and there is in general a lot of attention on how the current elites are rapidly trying to secure what they have, and sort of batten down the hatches.

41/ But I think the old elites are kinda done for in the next decade. My hypothesis about this is a simple one about how elites fail. In general, elites fail when their relationships with each other become more important than their relationships with the world. Not just masses, the world. The inner reality of the elites absorbs all their attention: whether it is court intrigues, scholarly debates in journals, boardroom battles, product architecture arguments, rivalries among schools of economists, or media wars.

42/ Once an elite class has turned into this kind of inward-focused blackhole unmoored from the larger universe, it’s only a matter of time before it self-destructs. With or without help from the revolting masses. It doesn’t really matter how much power they have. Their hold on that power is a function of the strength of their connection to the world.

43/ This is one reason the function of policing is in the spotlight, because the job of the police is to enforce a particular relationship between elites and masses. When this enforcement gets particularly one-sided, they turn into a Praetorian Guard like in ancient Rome. So calls to defund, deunionize, or demilitarize the police, and theories of how policing itself can be ended as a function, are also part of new experiments in elitism.

44/ Whether it goes down in flames or more peacefully, change of some sort is coming. If my theories are correct, any non-elite period will be short-lived. The shorter, the bloodier. The current idea of power may be ending, but the role of elite power and privilege will not end. Policing as we know it may end, but some enforcement of elite-mass relationships will remain. It will simply take on a new form in the new medium.

45/ Already you see weird kinds of new elites, like online personalities, offline protest coordinators, skilled hackers, and people who are good at crafting spectacles like videos of bad “Karen” behavior. Much of this gets labeled populism, but it’s important to note that each of these manifestations of so-called populism comes with its own breed of new elites, mostly descended from old elites.

46/ I think the populist phase of the culture wars might even be over. The actual commoners are exhausted from decades of violence, both physical and cultural. They can at most come out to riot online and offline occasionally. The real battle now is between old and new elites, and within old and new group. And of course, it’s confused by lots of overlapping membership.

47/ For example, in the last few weeks, an open battle has broken out between tech industry thought leaders and media leaders. And right now there’s a weird letter doing the rounds on Harpers magazine, signed by a bunch of old elites denouncing a bunch of the new elites.

48/ The elite wars have really gotten going now, because everybody senses old institutions are dying, and emerging ones are at the point in their evolution where they are ripe for capture by one faction of wannabe elites or another.

49/ Basically, you could say a new era of experiments in elitism is about to get underway, with more or less blood on the streets around the world. The question again is, what experiments should you support? How can you minimize the bloodshed? How can you try and ensure the new elites are good. If you’re a candidate elite, how do you plan to be good?

50/ I don’t know the general answers to these questions, but I suspect I have an approximately equal claim to being a D-list member of the elite in both the old and new worlds. So I can only share my answer. I think the key to being a good elite is to take your function — serving as a model of how life should be lived — seriously. This means thinking more about your connection to the world than your connection with other elites.

51/ If you want to define this function more precisely, I think it has to do with the idea that humans are ideally the measure of the world, not the other way around, and privilege is about being among those who get to measure the world rather than being measured by it, and in doing so, create ways to measure non-elites. So if you voted to self-identify as an elite in my Twitter poll, ask yourself: how do I measure the world with my life.

52/ The price of your privilege — which, remember, is special, personalized treatment under private law via access to social capital — is that you are expected to be at the forefront of relating to the wider world, and taking its measure on behalf of all humans. Which means facing uncertainty, and taking on risks, physical, intellectual, and psychological. This is why there is a natural relationship between being a member of the elite, and being expected to lead in the fullest sense of the word.

53/ To lead is to ultimately function as a model to non-elites on how to live, and not just live, but live with, for want of a better word, courage. Since that’s what it means to be the measure of the world, take risks, and deal with uncertainty. Otherwise you’re just a parasite pretending to be a lordly predator. And there’s no real way to fake this. People can tell when you are living courageously.

54/ To be non-elite in 2020, on the other hand, is to be measured in a hundred different industrial-bureaucratic ways. The world measures you. Height, weight, gender, wealth, skin color, zip code, credit score, criminal record, degrees, job titles, parentage, and so on. This is what makes you part of the industrial-age masses. This idea didn’t come from nowhere, and is only a century or so old. It’s the complement of the industrial age definition of elites.

55/ Being utterly unique and specialized with your 100-dimensional address in society is pretty new. The Spanish philosopher Jose Ortega y Gasset studied how this industrial non-elite human differed from the peasants of the past. My gloss on his theory is that the masses were measured the way they were because the elites were measuring the world in a specific way: through science and rationality.

56/ One of the main proposals for new elites on the table right now looks like an extreme form of industrial bureaucratism, namely intersectional bureaucratism. The other one looks like a throwback to agrarian feudal elitism, with nobility and peasantry. Both are of course lazy and lousy, and you can tell because neither is in the least bit courageous, and both involve an existing set of elites primarily dealing with each other rather than with the world.

57/ If you think you aren’t elite now, or won’t be elite in the future, your part of the equation is to ask, first, whether you think elites are necessary, and if so what kind you want. A way to restate that question is to ask: how do you want to measure yourself against the world? The elites you want are the ones measuring the world itself in a complementary way.

58/ Whatever it is, it is a particular model of courage that inspires you enough to follow. Your main challenge is spotting real courage facing the world, which does not lie in facing competing elites. If your chosen elites are elites primarily by virtue of battling or beefing with the elites you don’t choose, they are not good elites, and you are not choosing particularly good elites to define who you are. Both of you are going to be miserable.

59/ The good news is, there’s never been such a culture of widespread experimentation in new modes of being elite, so you have a lot of choices. The bad news is, it’s going to get really ugly while it plays out. The future elites are going to be playing Game of Thrones for a while, and the future masses are going to be playing Hunger Games for a while.

60/ So all I can say is, may the best elites win, and may the best measure of the masses prevail.

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