SCOTUS Audio

Does the National Labor Relations Act impliedly preempt a state tort claim against a union for intentionally destroying an employer's property in the course of a labor dispute? https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1449.html

1. Does the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, which empowers the Federal Labor Relations Authority to regulate the labor practices of federal agencies only, see 5 U.S.C. §7105(g), empower it to regulate the labor practices of state militias?

2. The second Militia Clause empowers Congress to "provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States." U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 16. Assuming the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 permits the Federal Labor Relations Authority to regulate the labor practices of state militias, is the Act unconstitutional in its application to labor practices pertaining to militia members who are not employed in the service of the United States?

LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1454.html

Whether a communication involving both legal and non-legal advice is protected by attorney-client privilege where obtaining or providing legal advice was one of the significant purposes behind the communication. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1397.html

Whether a State's judicial branch may nullify the regulations governing the "Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives . . . prescribed . . . by the Legislature thereof," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1, and replace them with regulations of the state courts' own devising, based on vague state constitutional provisions purportedly vesting the state judiciary with power to prescribe whatever rules it deems appropriate to ensure a "fair" or "free" election. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1271.html

May an individual be subject to liability for the fraud of another that is barred from discharge in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. (the "Bankruptcy Code") § 523(a)(2)(A), by imputation, without any act, omission, intent or knowledge of her own? https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-908.html

This case presents a clear, recognized, and intractable conflict regarding an important statutory question under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733.

When a relator files a qui tam action, the FCA puts the government to an initial choice: it "shall" either "(A) proceed with the action, in which case the action shall be conducted by the Government; or (B) notify the court that it declines to take over the action, in which case the person bringing the action shall have the right to conduct the action." 31 U.S.C. 3730(b)(4). The FCA then specifies the "Rights of the Parties to the Qui Tam Action[]" based on the government's initial choice.

This case involves the government's dismissal authority under 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A). The courts are sharply divided over whether, and when, the government can invoke this authority and dismiss a relator's FCA case after initially "declin[ing] to take over the action." The Seventh Circuit below held that the government could dismiss the case if it first intervenes and then satisfies Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)'s general standard. Other circuits expressly disagree on every single part of that determination.

The question presented is: Whether the government has authority to dismiss an FCA suit after initially declining to proceed with the action, and what standard applies if the government has that authority. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1052.html

In Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., this Court clarified that limitations on judicial relief should not be treated as jurisdictional absent a clear statement by Congress. At least six circuits have held that 11 U .S.C. 363(m) does not limit the appellate courts' jurisdiction to review unstayed bankruptcy court sale orders, but rather limits only the remedies available in such an appeal. By its plain terms, Section 363(m) presupposes a "reversal or modification on appeal" of a sale order, and specifies only that such reversal or modification "does not affect the validity of [the] sale" to a good faith purchaser, leaving the courts free to fashion other remedies without that effect.

In the present case, the Second Circuit held, to the contrary, that Section 363(m) deprived the appellate courts of jurisdiction over an appeal from a lease assignment order deemed "integral" to an already completed sale order, notwithstanding that: the sale order was not contingent on the assignment; the sale price was fixed without regard to whether the lease could be assigned; and respondent had expressly waived (in successfully opposing a stay) any argument that Section 363(m) would bar appellate review. A month later, the Fifth Circuit re-confirmed that it also treats Section 363(m) as jurisdiction-stripping.

The question presented is:

Whether Bankruptcy Code Section 363(m) limits the appellate courts' jurisdiction over any sale order or order deemed "integral" to a sale order, such that it is not subject to waiver, and even when a remedy could be fashioned that does not affect the validity of the sale. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1270.html

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Artist Lorie Smith is a website designer who creates original, online content consistent with her faith. She plans to (1) design wedding websites promoting her understanding of marriage, and (2) post a statement explaining that she can only speak messages consistent with her faith. But the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) requires her to create custom websites celebrating same-sex marriage and prohibits her statement--even though Colorado stipulates that she "work[s] with all people regardless of ... sexual orientation." App.53a, 184a.

The Tenth Circuit applied strict scrutiny and astonishingly concluded that the government may, based on content and viewpoint, force Lorie to convey messages that violate her religious beliefs and restrict her from explaining her faith. The court also upheld CADA under Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), even though CADA creates a "gerrymander" where secular artists can decline to speak but religious artists cannot, meaning the government can compel its approved messages. The questions presented are:

1. Whether applying a public-accommodation law to compel an artist to speak or stay silent, contrary to the artist's sincerely held religious beliefs, violates the Free Speech or Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.

2. Whether a public-accommodation law that authorizes secular but not religious exemptions is generally applicable under Smith, and if so, whether this Court should overrule Smith.

GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER APPLYING A PUBLIC-ACCOMMODATION LAW TO COMPEL AN ARTIST TO SPEAK OR STAY SILENT VIOLATES THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-476.html

Two Montana landowners filed a quiet title action seeking to resolve a dispute over the scope of an easement held by the United States that runs across their land and the federal government's duties under the easement. The District Court held that the Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations is jurisdictional, found that the landowners did not prove that their claims arose within twelve years of the lawsuit being filed, and dismissed the case. The District Court's treatment of the statute of limitations as jurisdictional-rather than a claim-processing rule- subjected the landowners to different standards for resolving the motion to dismiss, allowing the court to dismiss the case without holding a hearing to determine and resolve disputed facts.

In conflict with the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding the Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations is jurisdictional.

The question presented is:

Whether the Quiet Title Act's Statute of Limitations is a jurisdictional requirement or a claim--processing rule? https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1164.html

The application for stay presented to Justice Alito and by him referred to the Court is denied. The Solicitor General suggested that the Court may want to construe the application as a petition for certiorari before judgment. Doing so, the petition is granted. The parties are directed to brief and argue the following questions: 1. Whether the state plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Homeland Security’s Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law; 2. Whether the Guidelines are contrary to 8 U.S.C. §1226(c) or 8 U.S.C. §1231(a), or otherwise violate the Administrative Procedure Act; and 3. Whether 8 U.S.C. §1252(f)(1) prevents the entry of an order to “hold unlawful and set aside” the Guidelines under 5 U.S.C. §706(2). https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-58.html