Siegel v. Fitzgerald | Case No. 21-441 | Date Argued: 4/18/2022 | Date Decided: 6/6/2022

Background: This case presents a clear and acknowledged conflict over the constitutionality of a federal statute governing the quarterly fees in large Chapter 11 bankruptcies. The Bankruptcy Clause authorizes Congress to "establish * * * uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." Notwithstanding this directive, Congress has divided the nation's bankruptcy courts into two distinct programs: 88 judicial districts operate under the U.S. Trustee program, and 6 judicial districts (all in North Carolina and Alabama) operate under the Bankruptcy Administrator program. Each program generally performs similar tasks, and each program-until recently-imposed the same quarterly fees on Chapter 11 debtors in their districts. In the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017, however, Congress adopted a five-year increase in quarterly fees paid only in U.S. Trustee districts-increasing the maximum fee from $30,000 to $250,000 for all pending cases. 28 U.S.C. 1930(a)(6)(B) (2018). That same increase was not imposed in Administrator districts until nine months later, and it applied only to cases filed after that date. The result is a wide disparity in fees paid by identically situated debtors based solely on the geographic location of their bankruptcy. The total difference exceeds $100 million in aggregate fees in Chapter 11 cases nationwide. In the decision below, the Fourth Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit (each over dissents) in upholding these non-uniform fees; the Second Circuit has rejected those decisions and declared the 2017 Act unconstitutional.

Question Presented: Whether the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act violates the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause by increasing quarterly fees solely in U.S. Trustee districts.

Holding: Congress’ enactment of a significant fee increase that exempted debtors in two States violated the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause.

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Daniel L. Geyser, Dallas, Tex. For Respondent: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana | Case No. 20-1573 | Date Argued: 3/30/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022

Background: In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011), and Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2018), this Court held that when parties agree to resolve their disputes by individualized arbitration, those agreements are fully enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). Courts are not free to disregard or "reshape traditional individualized arbitration" by applying rules that demand collective or representational adjudication of certain claims. Epic, 138 S.Ct. at 1623. The FAA allows the parties not only to choose arbitration but to retain the benefits of arbitration by maintaining its traditional, bilateral form. While California courts follow Concepcion and Epic when a party to an individualized arbitration agreement tries to assert class-action claims, they refuse to do so when a party to such an agreement asserts representative claims under the California Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA"), which — like a class action — allows aggrieved employees to seek monetary awards on a representative basis on behalf of other employees. See Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 327 P.3d 129 (Cal. 2014). As a result, Concepcion and Epic have not caused bilateral arbitration to flourish in California, as this Court intended, but have merely caused FAA-defying representational litigation to shift form.

Question Presented: Whether the Federal Arbitration Act requires enforcement of a bilateral arbitration agreement providing that an employee cannot raise representative claims, including under PAGA.

Holding: The FAA preempts the rule of Iskanian insofar as it precludes division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate.

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan and Gorsuch joined in which Chief Justice Roberts joined as to Parts I and III and in which Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett joined as to Part III. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Scott L. Nelson, Washington, D.C.

Torres v. Texas Dept. of Public Safety | Case No. 20-603 | Date Argued: 3/29/2022 | Date Decided: 6/29/2022

Background: In the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), Congress gave the over 19 million military servicemembers — including over 800,000 who work for state and local government employers — a cause of action to remedy adverse employment actions taken because of their military service. It enacted USERRA pursuant to its constitutional War Powers, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16, recognizing that unremedied employment discrimination by state employers based on military service could interfere with the nation's "ability to provide for a strong national defense." H.R. Rep. No. 105-448, at 5 (1998). USERRA's cause of action against state employers may be pursued only in state courts. In a sharply divided decision that conflicts with the Constitution's text, structure, and history, the court below, a Texas intermediate appellate court with jurisdiction over more than 2 million Texas citizens, held that USERRA's cause of action is unconstitutional because Congress lacks the power to authorize lawsuits against nonconsenting states pursuant to its War Powers.

Question Presented: Whether Congress has the power to authorize suits against nonconsenting states pursuant to its War Powers.

Holding: By ratifying the Constitution, the States agreed their sovereignty would yield to the national power to raise and support the Armed Forces. Congress may exercise this power to authorize private damages suits against nonconsenting States, as in USERRA.

Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Kagan filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Andrew T. Tutt, Washington, D.C.; and Christopher G. Michel, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Judd E. Stone, II, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

LeDure v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. | Case No. 20-807 | Date Argued: 3/28/2022 | Date Decided: 4/28/2022

Question Presented: [cannot locate]

Holding: [NO INFORMATION]

Result: Voting information not found

Voting Breakdown: ?-?. Voting breakdown not found

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.; and Colleen E. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: J. Scott Ballenger, Washington, D.C.

Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon | Case No. 21-309 | Date Argued: 3/28/2022 | Date Decided: 6/6/2022

Question Presented: Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") provides that the FAA does not apply "to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1. In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), this Court held that Section 1 applies only to interstate "transportation workers." The Court did not define the term "transportation worker."

Holding: Saxon belongs to a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” to which §1’s exemption applies.

Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.

Voting Breakdown: 8-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined except Justice Barrett, who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Jennifer D. Bennett, San Francisco, Cal.

Golan v. Saada | Case No. 20-1034 | Date Argued: 3/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022

Question Presented: Whether, upon finding that return to the country of habitual residence places a child at grave risk, a district court is required to consider ameliorative measures that would facilitate the return of the child notwithstanding the grave risk finding.

Holding: A court is not categorically required to examine all possible ameliorative measures before denying a Hague Convention petition for return of a child to a foreign country once the court has found that return would expose the child to a grave risk of harm.

Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Karen R. King, New York, N.Y. For United States, as amicus curiae: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Richard Min, New York, N.Y.

Golan v. Saada | Case No. 20-1034 | Date Argued: 3/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022

Question Presented: Whether, upon finding that return to the country of habitual residence places a child at grave risk, a district court is required to consider ameliorative measures that would facilitate the return of the child notwithstanding the grave risk finding.

Holding: A court is not categorically required to examine all possible ameliorative measures before denying a Hague Convention petition for return of a child to a foreign country once the court has found that return would expose the child to a grave risk of harm.

Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Karen R. King, New York, N.Y. For United States, as amicus curiae: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Richard Min, New York, N.Y.

Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. | Case No. 21-328 | Date Argued: 3/21/2022 | Date Decided: 5/23/2022

Background: Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right and, in the context of contracts, occurs when one party to a contract either explicitly repudiates its rights under the contract or acts in a manner inconsistent with an intention of exercising them.

Question Presented: Does the arbitration-specific requirement that the proponent of a contractual waiver defense prove prejudice violate this Court's instruction that lower courts must "place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts?" AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011).

Holding: The Eighth Circuit erred in conditioning a waiver of the right to arbitrate on a showing of prejudice. Federal courts have generally resolved cases like this one as a matter of federal law, using the terminology of waiver. The parties dispute whether that framework is correct. Assuming without deciding that it is, federal courts may not create arbitration-specific variants of federal procedural rules, like those concerning waiver, based on the FAA’s “policy favoring arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 24. That policy “is merely an acknowledgment of the FAA’s commitment to overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate and to place such agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.” Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 561 U. S. 287, 302 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, a court must hold a party to its arbitration contract just as the court would to any other kind. But a court may not devise novel rules to favor arbitration over litigation. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U. S. 213, 218–221. The federal policy is about treating arbitration contracts like all others, not about fostering arbitration. The text of the FAA makes clear that courts are not to create arbitration-specific procedural rules like the one here. Section 6 of the FAA provides that any application under the statute—including an application to stay litigation or compel arbitration—“shall be made and heard in the manner provided by law for the making and hearing of motions” (unless the statute says otherwise). A directive to treat arbitration applications “in the manner provided by law” for all other motions is simply a command to apply the usual federal procedural rules, including any rules relating to a motion’s timeliness. Because the usual federal rule of waiver does not include a prejudice requirement, Section 6 instructs that prejudice is not a condition of finding that a party waived its right to stay litigation or compel arbitration under the FAA. Stripped of its prejudice requirement, the Eighth Circuit’s current waiver inquiry would focus on Sundance’s conduct. Did Sundance knowingly relinquish the right to arbitrate by acting inconsistently with that right? On remand, the Court of Appeals may resolve that question, or determine that a different procedural framework (such as forfeiture) is appropriate. The Court’s sole holding today is that it may not make up a new procedural rule based on the FAA’s “policy favoring arbitration.”.

Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Karla A. Gilbride, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Paul D. Clement, Washington, D.C.

Berger v. North Carolina State Conf. of NAACP | Case No. 21-248 | Date Argued: 3/21/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022

Background: The leaders of North Carolina's Republican-controlled legislature retained a private attorney to represent them, purportedly on behalf of the State, to defend the constitutionality of North Carolina's voter-ID law. Rather than allowing both Executive Branch officials and legislative leaders to speak on behalf of the State as they did at the district court, the Fourth Circuit ordered the dismissal of the legislative leaders from the case on appeal.

Question Presented: Whether a state agent authorized by state law to defend the State's interest in litigation must overcome a presumption of adequate representation to intervene as of right in a case in which a state official is a defendant.

Holding: North Carolina’s legislative leaders are entitled to intervene in this litigation.

Result: Judgment REVERSED.

Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioners: David H. Thompson, Washington, D.C. For NAACP Respondents: Elisabeth S. Theodore, Washington, D.C. For state Respondents: Sarah Boyce, Deputy Solicitor General, Raleigh, N. C.

Egbert v. Boule | Case No. 21-147 | Date Argued: 3/2/2022 | Date Decided: 6/8/2022

Question Presented: [cannot locate]

Holding: Bivens does not extend to create causes of action for Boule’s Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim and First Amendment retaliation claim.

Result: Judgment REVERSED.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

For Petitioner: Sarah M. Harris, Washington, D.C.; and Michael R. Huston, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Felicia H. Ellsworth, Boston, Mass.