This is the fourth and last in a series of four short lectures that describe the similarities and differences between the early work of the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard and the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche.

The lectures will focus on Kierkegaard's book Enten Eller and two of Nietzsche's books Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik and Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen. All lectures include short readings from the original text in Danish and German simultaneously translated and explained in English.

This lecture focuses on the second difference between Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. Nietzsche views life as an endless honorable struggle while Kierkegaard views life as a boring and mundane experience, full of self-reflection and regret.

This is the third in a series of four short lectures that describe the similarities and differences between the early work of the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard and the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche.

The lectures will focus on Kierkegaard's book Enten Eller and two of Nietzsche's books Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik and Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen. All lectures include short readings from the original text in Danish and German simultaneously translated and explained in English.

This lecture focuses on the first difference between Nietzsche as a representative of a universal worldview and Kierkegaard as a representative of a very parochial worldview grounded in the Danish culture.

This is the second in a series of four short lectures that describe the similarities and differences between the early work of the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard and the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche.

The lectures will focus on Kierkegaard's book Enten Eller and two of Nietzsche's books Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik and Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen. All lectures include short readings from the original text in Danish and German simultaneously translated and explained in English.

This lecture is dedicated to the second similarity between the two philosophers. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche both explain life as a struggle between two opposing forces, even though they define these forces in a somewhat different way.

This is the first in a series of four short lectures that describe the similarities and differences between the early work of the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard and the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. 

The lectures will focus on Kierkegaard's book Enten Eller and two of Nietzsche's books Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik and Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen. All lectures include short readings from the original text in Danish and German simultaneously translated and explained in English. 

This lecture is dedicated to the first similarity between the two philosophers.  Kierkegaard and Nietzsche both criticize large philosophical systems, exemplified by the work of Hegel and offer an alternative way to do philosophy. 

The Conclusion describes briefly the contents of Chapter 7 of the book that is focused on contrasting the theories in the book with established theories of domestic judicial review and on presenting different paradigms for explaining international courts. Most of the presentation is dedicated to explaining how the arguments in the previous chapters combine when a really complicated case arises.

Chapter 6 faces the final challenge to international courts' intervention, the fear that their intervention would lead to bad outcomes because it would change the incentives of relevant parties. It is true that domestic officials operate under the shadow of potential international intervention and this may give them bad incentives. The chapter demonstrates how the rules of admissibility used by international criminal tribunals can affect the incentive of national authorities on the one hand and individuals on the other hand. Understanding the interaction of officials on several levels helps to determine which rule of admissibility will lead to greater deterrence of international crimes. This admissibility rules can also determine the willingness of countries to submit to the jurisdiction of international courts, to begin with. This separate paper describes the key arguments in the chapter: https://privpapers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1956534

Chapter 5 is focused on the risk of capture of international courts by NGOs. The chapter reviews the advantages and disadvantages of NGO involvement in international courts' proceedings either as direct applicants, through filing amicus curiae briefs, or informally. Different procedures are recommended for different international courts depending on their circumstances. The second part of the chapter is focused on the reputational sanctions NGOs can create after an international court issues its judgment. Drawing on quantitative and qualitative empirical research I conducted and on insights from Social Network Analysis, the chapter argues that international courts can create conditions in which NGOs process shaming information accurately. This separate paper describes the key arguments in the chapter: https://privpapers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2774040

Chapter 4 replies to the argument that international courts who decide important policy decisions take them off the public agenda and therefore stifle public debate. The chapter explains that an international judgment is often just the entry point into a public discussion and a dialogue with the relevant authorities. In fact, the ensuing public deliberation may be superior to what would happen absent international courts' intervention. International courts shift the discussion from interests and naked power to rights, and they change the social settings in a way that processes and disseminates information well to wider segments of the public. International courts create friction with the executive, guide the legislator, and can help the national judiciary, all leading to a more vibrant debate. Finally, international courts provide numerous lawyers with vital training that they can use to better the public discourse. This separate paper describes the key arguments in the chapter: https://privpapers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2968850

Chapter 3 targets another challenge to international courts' intervention: the argument that international courts do not make better decisions than national bodies. The chapter identifies a set of circumstances in which international courts, solely because of their institutional position and regardless of the proficiency of their judges, are actually able to make better decisions than national courts. The core of the argument is the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which suggests that a majority decision within a group is likely to be superior to the decision of each individual decision-maker, provided that each decision-maker decides independently. If national judges try to learn from comparative law, they violate the independence condition because they learn from courts who followed other courts instead of deciding independently. If instead, national courts decide independently and an international court follows the majority position—as the ECHR does when it uses the Emerging Consensus doctrine—the decisional benefit of the Jury Theorem is fully realized. The chapter goes through several judgments and judicial doctrines to demonstrate how doctrine can be used to maximize the decisional advantage of international courts and counter some harmful incentives of the countries involved. This separate paper describes the key arguments in the chapter:  https://privpapers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597949

Chapter 2 addresses the legitimacy of intervention by international courts—unelected international bodies—in the decisions of democratically elected domestic officials. The chapter starts by delineating the commitment of international courts to the text of treaties that regulate their jurisdiction. It continues by explaining when expansive interpretation of these treaties is legitimate because the process of negotiation or revision of treaties gives certain countries an unjustified power to limit the treaty obligations of all member countries. Finally, the chapter explains that even if a country fully controls its treaty obligations it may not properly represent the interests of all parties affected by the treaty because of so-called democratic failures, justifying the use of expansive interpretation by international courts. This separate paper describes the key arguments in the chapter: https://privpapers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3241331