This episode discusses Latin American reactions to the recent US operation in Venezuela, noting that some governments expressed criticism but with notable restraint due to domestic political and economic considerations. Dr. R. Evan Ellis explains that the operation exposed the ineffectiveness of Russian and Chinese air‑defense systems in Venezuela, which may influence future military procurement and perceptions of US capabilities in the region. The conversation also explores how China, Russia, Iran, and other extra‑hemispheric actors may recalibrate their engagement in Latin America in response to renewed U.S. focus and pressure.

John Deni

Hello and welcome to SSI Live. You’ve long known the Strategic Studies Institute, or SSI, at the US Army War College, as the go-to location for issues related to national security and military strategy, with an emphasis on geostrategic analysis. SSI conducts strategic research and analysis to support the US Army War College curricula; assist and inform Army, DoD, and US government leadership; and serve as a bridge to the wider strategic community. Now, we are bringing you access to SSI analyses, scholars, and guests, through this, the SSI Live podcast series. Thanks for joining us.

Stephanie Crider

I’m in the studio with Dr. R. Evan Ellis and our guest host, Major Brennan Deveraux.

Ellis is a research professor of Latin American studies at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), with a focus on the region’s relationships with China and other non-Western hemisphere actors as well as transnational organized crime and populism in the region.

Deveraux is a US Army strategist serving as a national security researcher at the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute. He has three defense-related master’s degrees and focuses his research on military innovation, emerging technology management, and the characteristics of future warfare.

Brennan Deveraux

Okay, great. I’m looking forward to this conversation. Evan, a lot going on. The region, in Latin America, really interesting right now, not only with a resurgent US focus as we look at strategy, but everyone is tracking the operation in Venezuela.

And I don’t think we need to really go through the events and the lead up to and the why, I think that conversation has been had. But I’d like to pick your brain today because I don’t think we get many opportunities to really sit down with an expert on the region and talk about some of the broader implications, if that works for you.

R. Evan Ellis

Absolutely. It’s great to talk with you, Brennan.

Deveraux

So first, let’s just start with some general impressions then. How are other Latin American countries responding to the actions in Venezuela?

Ellis

It’s really a range of responses, many of which are what you would predict. So, you have Lula in Brazil, the president there who has indicated that this is unacceptable; he’s expressed reservations but with some degree of caution, understanding that he has elections coming up this October and thus doesn’t want to put himself too far on the left of the spectrum as the principal opponent to the US in the region. You have, predictably, Gustavo Petro, the current leftist president of Colombia, who has indicated this was a barbaric act. Indeed, under his instruction, Colombia called a special session of the UN Security Council to talk about this.

Indeed, some of that rhetoric got him on the radar screen with President Trump, who had suggested that maybe Petro, with his own lack of control over drug production in his country, could be the next, which precipitated Petro kind of backpedaling a little bit and turning down some of the tone. You have others in the region who have bet strongly on the United States, who have been extremely supportive.

I’ll just mention a handful. You have the Luis Abinader government in the Dominican Republic, who again provided access to important US air bases in his country that played a role in those operations again has been very supportive. You had the Kamla Persad-Bissessar government, the new UNM government in Trinidad and Tobago, which, again, went on a bit of a ledge to support the US in the lead up to the operation, and I say is now looking pretty good.

And then, of course, you have the traditional US allies in various parts of South America. So, Javier Milei in his government in Argentina, the Ecuadorian government of Daniel Noboa just to name a few, who will, again, have been relatively supportive. And so, again, those you’d expect to be critical have been critical, but I would say tempered in their criticism.

Another I would mention is the left-oriented Claudia Sheinbaum government in Mexico, who again have indicated that this was problematic. But again, Sheinbaum, understanding that they’re in a critical renegotiation of the US-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement and about 90 percent of Mexican exports depend on access to the US market, Sheinbaum has been tempered in taking criticism of what the US has done too far.

Deveraux

That’s a lot. And what it tells me is you are an expert in the region, and I know, I know this. I read a lot of your work, and you’ve been studying this region for a long time. I think what would really help for our listeners—did any of these reactions stand out to you? Was any of these unexpected? You talked Brazil. I know Brazil kind of sits the fence sometimes, but did anything really kind of catch you off guard by a country? Maybe someone not speaking out or speaking out overly aggressively? The Colombia, for example, was an obvious reaction. Is there any of that on the other side of that spectrum?

Ellis

I think to a degree, the restraint of those who you’d expect to be critical has been instructive. And so, again, the degree to which Lula in Brazil seems to be trying to avoid becoming, you know, too shrill or leading too much. The anti-US pushback in the region, I think, was a calculated decision or, you know, to a certain degree, the degree to which Claudia Sheinbaum in Mexico was very measured in her response, understanding that in ideological terms, this is something that goes against everything that she and Mexico stands for.

It’s instructive, if nothing else, the concerns and the desires for different reasons of different what you’d call left-oriented governments in the region to try to avoid conflicts with Washington for domestic political reasons, as well as to avoid, you know, being kind of on Washington’s target screen.

Deveraux

And that’s the two-level game we talk about a lot, right? It’s one thing to have a loud, boisterous opinion about something as it relates to your country, but you then have to turn internally and see what the country says, too. Then finding that balance is a unique skill set that politicians have.

So, I will shift us to the actual operation itself, not its conduct, but one of the things I heard you say, the operation in Venezuela highlighted the ineffectiveness of Russian- and Chinese-supplied air defense systems. And you’re not the only person to say it. I saw that in a couple of articles. I’m sure this is going to be a major topic for military analysts. More broadly, you know, what is the role of air defense? Is it penetrable? I know we do the big scary anti-access aerial-denial (A2/AD) stuff. I’m hoping you can actually talk it more specifically to Latin America.

If we’re looking at these countries that look to China or Russia for exquisite military equipment, or that might have the opportunity to now look to the United States for military equipment. Do you think that this is going to have some sort of shift in future military sales, as we look at the effectiveness of the operation and the ineffectiveness of the systems designed to stop it?

Ellis

I think, in part, there’s a difference between what you see in the media or in the political domain versus what the military decisionmakers who understand the details of these type of operations will decide to do. In general, I think there was a lot of media expectation that the Russian S-300, you know, medium-range air defense system, for example, would perform relatively well or at least present a clear threat to the US.

There is some other media references to, for example, the dispersed Igla-S man-portable air defense (MANPAD) that munitions that would create some sort of threat. And in the end, none of those really produced any significant effects whatsoever. But when you looked at the detail, what it was really all about was in part that we, at least what publicly been released, had a pretty sophisticated, you know, layered series of things that we did that had to involve information warfare, space, the electronic warfare space, of course, kinetic strikes against some of these sites. It’s about as much detail as I can get in this program.

I think, for military planners, there was never the expectation that the S-300s would be that effective, maybe a little bit more than they were. It wasn’t sure, you know, whether the Chinese JYL-1 one or JY27-A radars would be effective or really play a role at all. And so, I think it was interesting that they were just completely nonfactors.

Very few people who were actually military professionals thought that people carefully positioned with these MANPADs, you know, the Igla-S would do anything unless they just happened to get a lucky shot off. And so, I think at the end of the day, with respect to Russian equipment, there’s an understanding that already Russian equipment is problematic because the ongoing war in the Ukraine because of the, you know, difficulty in getting spares and, you know, Rosoboronexport, or Rostec’s, kind of poor record in, in doing, you know, maintenance and other things. It’s already been a hard market for the Russians in general. So, I think this will contribute to some degree to that.

I think the Chinese, understandably, this probably took a hit to interest in some of their capabilities. But in general, there’s an understanding that the Chinese equipment is relatively cheap. It has, you know, some good performance in other places. For example, the Chinese J10 fighter, I believe it was, got some attention when it performed relatively well in the recent skirmish between the Indians and the Pakistanis. I believe it was. And so, I think military professionals looking at these systems in a more kind of technical context will, you know, continue to shy away from certain things but will not completely turn away from, you know, cheaper Chinese systems or mid-range Russian systems just because of what happens here. But, you know, it certainly doesn’t help the case for those trying to sell those systems.

Deveraux

And the inverse, it probably helps the case for those trying to sell some of the US systems, right?

Ellis

Absolutely, yes.

Deveraux

I think you bring up a really good point, though. So, I come from a field artillery background, one of the, you know, primary missions we talk about, as an observer, is suppressing those air defense systems and generally trained and accepted that they are defeatable.

I mean, best case scenario, you strike it with artillery round, it’s not going to do much anymore. But you saturate it. You understand it has limited access to things, limited time to execute, those kind of things. And, I think you hit a really interesting point that there is a perception outside of the professionals who are thinking about that, that thing where we talk about China’s A2/AD bubble. “We must operate with inside it.” “We have to penetrate.” I don’t want to get shot down, but it’s not, it’s not a 100 percent impenetrable shield either. And I think when we see images of Israel being able to shoot down hundreds of rockets coming in, so that’s what we think of when we think of this defense system and say, “Why don’t I have that?” But to your point, people are still going to buy equipment, and sometimes the cheapest equipment is the equipment that you can field at the time.

So, I’m going to shift us a little bit to some of those actors outside of just selling equipment. You’ve talked a lot about the impact that what you call these extra-hemispheric actors have in the region—the Russia, the China, the Iran, potential non-state actors as well. Any thoughts on how the recent US attention in Latin America, so, both highlighted in policy as we look at the National Security Strategy (NSS) as well as direct action, whether that’s moving vessels, and/or in the very visible Venezuela operation, are going to shift some of the desire of the regional nations—so putting it to the regional nations lens to look to these external influences, whether that’s for regime security, further economic partnership, you know, or just as a potential partner of choice?

Ellis

Absolutely. And I think it’s important to recognize that this will probably, you know, increase the hesitation by many to engage with China in certain areas known to be of concern with the United States. And that would probably include military-to-military cooperation, space cooperation, and maybe cooperation in some certain, you know, digital or other strategic sectors.

But I would go back to even the first Trump administration and the very clear pushback that you saw in the 2017 National Security Strategy. And certainly, with President Trump returning to power now and the new National Security Strategy highlighting our emphasis on the Western Hemisphere and the explicit intention to push back against extra-hemispheric actors, broadly understood to mean China, especially in the military space.

You know, Latin American nations can say they have been advised. And it’s interesting, in my own travels around the region, even last year, it was striking to see how certain partners that, for example, the Argentines who used to train Chinese, PLA (People’s Liberations Army) officials in their own national defense institutions have subtly stopped doing that, even though they send and continue to send people to their Chinese counterpart institutions in places like Nanjing for the command and general staff college, or, for example, the way in which Colombia or others, or even Mexico, have been flirting with Chinese liaisons in the space domain, however, again, have become much more cautious about doing so.

My sense is that, you know, certainly the fact that we just demonstrated our willingness to, you know, take out a foreign, you know, leader, Nicolás Maduro, you know, albeit one that we did not recognize as legitimate—and do so with a sophisticated military operation—kind of adds to that sense of, you know, the US, you know, if it sees certain things as problematic in the security domain, may act—maybe in economic fashion, maybe in military fashion.

But my sense is that even understanding that the US will act and, thus, with partners shying away from some of that military space cooperation, digital cooperation, they will still try to make money where they can, even our very pro-US partner Argentina, the Javier Milei, for example, still is selling a lot of soybeans and other agricultural goods to China, as well as allowing multiple Chinese companies in the lithium sector to invest there and exploit that for exportation of lithium to Argentina, just to give a few examples.

There are other actors who, frankly, try not to get, I mentioned Brazil before, too far on the US bad side, but still continue to engage with China, even understanding that is an item of concern. I mean, the Brazilians literally have named three out of their four attachés in China at the general officer (GO) level. You know, so even a colonel—that says you’re serious when you’re naming three GOs out of, you know, four attaché, it says that you mean it.

And, you know, the Brazilians, just about two years ago, hosted 13 Chinese GOs in their own national defense institutions. They had the Chinese into an exercise, Operation Formosa, that they… and so there are a lot of actors that may shy away from doing too many explicitly military or strategic things to the Chinese, but there are some actors in the region, Brazil, I think, explicitly, that will not be entirely deterred.

And, you know, that’s the message also that they want to send that they’re not going to stop doing these things with China just because they know it bothers Washington.

Deveraux

I think that’s okay. It’s okay to do something with China. So I, I would go back to a paradigm that I struggled to break out of, and I only did a couple years ago. And I think that it’s indoctrinated, not, I know that word has a connotation but really ingrained in American culture—and definitely in the military—when we look at a “us versus them” or “it’s us or them” kind of mentality and, and it comes out of the Cold War. You know, you’re either with the United States or you’re with the Soviet Union, you’re with the West or you’re not.

But that’s not reality, especially as we shift away from our backyard into China’s backyard. Right? Some of those nations aren’t going to have a choice not to deal with China, who’s right there economically. And I’d be curious, as we’re looking at those countries, and you already gave examples of, you know, some of the operations, some of the actions that these nations are doing with China, I’d be curious on kind of that lens, if they feel that there’s any sort of pressure to say, “I can’t do this because it looks like I’m against the US or against China,” or does China offer them the, “Hey, you can work with both of us. You don’t have to choose,” kind of mentality? Which is a real shift, I think, for how we approach the problem.

Ellis

It’s a great question, Brennan. And I think clearly there is an understanding of the pressure from the US, especially when there’s cooperation in the military and in other domains. I think, again, you know, some of those often-explicit threats, and again, it’s in our new National Security Strategy. And so, I think from the US, the message is very clear.

Now, on the Chinese side, it’s interesting to see that they’re playing a very different game. As a matter of fact, just three days after we published our NSS, the Chinese have published their third white paper toward Latin America. They’d released one in 2008, one in 2016, and, you know, this most recent one in which they basically said that they intend to continue full speed ahead, not only in economic initiatives, but also in areas such as governance, working, you know, not just on the bilateral level, but in the multilateral level through things like CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States), where the US is not present; working with congresspeople; working with politicians; also working in space and technology (SNT) collaboration and artificial intelligence; working in the security domain in areas like cybersecurity, which will cause a great deal of concern to the US; as well as other areas like money laundering and counter-narcotics; and, indeed, also talking about people-to-people exchanges. And so, the Chinese regularly bring over to the PRC (People’s Republic of China) everyone from, you know, police officials to military officers to judges to journalists to think tank personnel, and they basically indicated that they’re going to double down on some of these things, something that raises some pretty significant, you know, espionage concerns and in others.

Now, the Chinese in places like Venezuela, notably, have kind of rolled with the punches here. They made some comments about that, you know, that this was unacceptable. And, it’s interesting to see that the Chinese have tried to score points for themselves by discomfort about what the US is doing in their messaging to other countries and in the international domain.

But, what they don’t seem to be doing is showing either, you know, through their actions in Venezuela or elsewhere that they, you know, have their backs. I mean, the Chinese were nowhere to be seen in terms of any type of actual, you know, defense or role in the defense of Venezuela when the US came in. The Chinese have not been, at least, you know, publicly, you know, pushing back against, you know, what the US came out with in the NSS, you know, saying, you know, “You can work with us, we’ll protect you against the gringo” and, you know, pressure.

Again, they’re trying to score points on this, you know, speaking out against the, so to speak, US bullying. I would say they’re trying economically to take advantage of concerns about the United States. And so, this week, actually, Mark Carney, Canada’s prime minister is actually in China, I believe, meeting and talking with the Chinese.

Brazil has increased its sales of soy and meat and other products. And other countries are silently doing the same thing. China is kind of quietly taking advantage of this, but it is not overtly pushing back and trying to get countries to say, “Yeah, you push back against the United States, we’ve got your back.” You don’t see any of that from the Chinese.

Deveraux

It’s interesting. And China often has a pretty good narrative for this cooperation with countries, like in Latin America, like in Africa and some parts of Asia would be BRICs, the Global South, kind of an underlying narrative that not necessarily an “us versus them” mentality of the Cold War, but a “I’m one of you. We’re not the country that’s coming in and taking your resources.” And then they might come in and take your resources. But “we’re not the country that has historically done this to you. In fact, we’ve been a victim of this and moved to prosperity.” I’d be curious on your thoughts on that and how that kind of plays into, you know, what you just talked about.

Ellis

It’s a great point. It’s quite ironic because the same China that is imposing territorial claims on its neighbors almost up to their borders in the South China Sea with its famous, you know, 9- now 10-dash line, almost destroys Philippine Coast Guard and fishing vessels with water cannons, and other things that regularly, you know, contests US and other actors doing legitimate freedom-of-navigation [operations] FONOPs in that area that, you know, builds militarized islands, you know, in that area, China that has regularly, you know, ignored, you know, United Nations law on this, the UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) stipulations on those things now talks about, you know, the US, you know, bullying in its near abroad. And so, there is a certain amount of duality to what the Chinese are trying to do.

But beyond that, you know, my sense is that China tries to respond obliquely. It is not investing in the explicit defense of partners, especially those that it knows are going to lose. For example, and you alluded to some of this, China, through its Global Governance Initiative, that it first rolled out with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization but now has applied to Latin America in its white paper.

It’s basically saying, you know, we don’t think that anyone should impose rules upon the other, that there’s no, you know, right or wrong, etc., etc. The same thing with its Global Civilization Initiative. You of course, just mentioned the Global Development Initiative, in which China fundamentally says, “You know, we developing countries need to stick together to help each other work together. We understand each other and in ways that those developed nations like the United States and Europe,” they don’t exactly say that, but they imply that. “And thus, we China, you know, want to support you by essentially, you know, penetrating in, you know, in developing your market in areas like artificial intelligence, where we want to set standards that benefit our companies, where we want to come in and work with you on, on space, with the lure of taking some of your personnel to space. But in consideration, getting access to your Western hemisphere space facilities, etc., etc.”

And so, the Chinese are a very kind of sophisticated that in the name of things that sound good, like development, they are moving in and using that as an excuse to try to position themselves in these technology areas or other things that explicitly cause problems strategically for the United States in these sectors.

Deveraux

And back to that two-level game. They also probably sound really good to a domestic audience. “Look how we can advance. Look how we can be developed. Look how we can take advantage of this opportunity from an investment.” That’s really interesting.

Let’s flip the kind of focus. So, instead of the Latin American countries and their perspective, let’s go to those extra-hemispheric actors. What do we think about the motivation of China to come in and secure its strategic investments? Or, you know, we talk about an opportunistic non-state actor to disrupt US efforts to really, you know, secure the region. Does recent activity or US policy change how they might be looking at their approach to Latin America, even if the Latin American countries themselves might have shifted their, kind of, desire to have them in there?

Ellis

The first part of the question about, you know, China’s securing its strategic investments is interesting. In the short-term, they have certainly, again, rolled with the punches on Venezuela. For example, the embargoed oil, which was Chinese oil with their tanker The Centuries. There are some reports that maybe the fourth or fifth tankers that the US more recently has seized may have had some Chinese ownership tied to it. In addition to that, you see that the Chinese, again, you know, making some, you know, complaints. I mean, clearly some of that 50 million barrels of embargoed oil that is being put under US supervision and sold and put into account for the Venezuelans, apparently some of that was originally supposed to go to China. And I believe that some of the, the smaller what often are called “teapot refiners” in China that had been taking surreptitious deliver on this oil and paying for it in cryptocurrencies.

The Chinese government seems to have largely kind of sold those, you know, Chinese companies, you know, down the river. But even while it kind of rolls with the punches about what Washington is doing in Venezuela, it is good in the fine print of its contracts, whether it’s in the hotel sector, construction sector, or elsewhere, to make sure that it gets paid even when it’s things may not provide any net value.

I remember it had a disastrous performance on the Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric dam in Ecuador, but it was actually able to renegotiate that, saying basically, “Okay, we’ll give you some money and take responsibility for some of the bad work that we’ve done.” But oh, by the way, we’re also going to give you a, I believe it was $400 million line of credit. So, we’ll actually get more work out of this and more control of the facility for ourselves.

And so, the Chinese have a very good way of working through lawfare or subsequent negotiations of winning, even when they run into problems. And, I think you see this across the region, again, with also the relationships that they build with many government personnel. Sometimes, places like Nicaragua, where there are non-transparent contracts in the mining sector, in others, construction contracts, the Chinese get very, very generous rates of interest, very, very generous, arrangements on fees, indemnification things so that the less transparent, the more kind of anti-US and isolated the country, the more that whatever happens with the Chinese, they win.

Now, with respect to the second part of your question, whether there are impacts on the way that, you know, China or other extra hemispheric actors approach Latin America, I would say there’s different approaches from different actors. So, on the one hand, I think China’s kind of reeling in Venezuela in trying to figure out how to maneuver with whoever is the current government, to continue to make money there.

I remember during my time when I was at the State Department back in 2019–2020, that, you know, even while China was complaining that our pressure against Nicolás Maduro was bad at the time, they are also secretly negotiating with Juan Guaidó, the de jure president, so that whoever won, they would have a stake in the game. And, I suspect that they’re kind of quietly trying to make that adjustment in Venezuela right now.

I haven’t seen a broader effort to change their policies in other parts of Latin America, but I am sure that they’re reassessing some of the risks, trying to figure out where the US could act next. You know, could their positions in Cuba be at risk? Could their positions in Nicaragua, you know, be at risk if the US continues with action there? Now, with respect to, you know, Russia and of course, Russia’s has been a loser on the embargoed oil of its own, although it does have close ties to, you know, Delcy Rodriguez, Cuba as well has ties to some of the other actors working with Delcy.

And so, I suspect, although I don’t have firsthand knowledge about this, that Russia and Cuba are playing a delicate game of trying to figure out how to work with different power brokers to keep from being completely thrown under the bus.

I suspect that the actor that will wind up on the short end of the stick here—because they are weakened and they have limited options—is Iran and Hezbollah. Hezbollah, of course, their leadership being weakened after the Israeli strikes against their leadership in Lebanon last year. And of course, strikes against Iran itself. And now, US pressure and the virtual risk of a collapse of the Iranian regime. And so, to the extent that Iran, really beyond the oil sector and some arms, wasn’t really a key stakeholder for Delcy Rodriguez, nor are they much of an opposition, either Iran or Hezbollah, to help much. I suspect that of all the actors that to comply with US pressure that are greatest at risk of being thrown under the bus, with the least they can do about it, Iran and Hezbollah, if there is follow through by the US administration, is probably the most vulnerable at this point.

Deveraux

Let’s keep going with Iran and potentially a North Korea, or any really country like that. I’m sorry to ask you to step outside of the Latin America bubble, but what might they be thinking as we’re looking at, you know, an action that removes an adversarial, you know, regime from its country efficiently, quickly, quietly. And we see tension in Iran right now. We always, I mean, give me three or four months, we’ll see some tension in North Korea. Does this kind of change some conversations over there? Any thoughts? I know we’re outside of Latin America.

Ellis

I think it certainly does change some. So, the Iran case is particularly interesting because we can remember that just days before the decisive US action to capture Nicolás Maduro and bring him to justice in the United States, President Trump had made a threat against the Iranian regime, who in confronting, you know, protests of really unprecedented size, was looking towards using violence and, indeed, has subsequently used significant violence. I think there’s an estimate that maybe as many as 2,000 protesters in Iran have already been killed. But, you know, the question of, you know, did US willingness to act in Venezuela and previous US action, you know, the B-2 strikes against the Fordo complex and the other nuclear complexes in Iran, did that increase the credibility of the US threat and perhaps limit Iran’s repression against the protesters?

It would appear in that case, not so much. Although it may have caused some hesitation. Now, in other areas, you know, always hard to know what Kim Jong-Un is thinking in North Korea. I think as we look at other parts of the world, you know, certainly, I think the US has shown that its capabilities and its ability to use them in surprising ways might exceed what was previously calculated just by counting up the numbers of systems.

What he’s done in Venezuela, I’m sure also, as you know, China thinks about what the US might do with respect to Taiwan, or what, you know, potentially, you know, Russian and Putin think about, you know, what the US might do in in Europe, although that’s a harder issue. What’s happened in Venezuela, I think colors the interpretation of previously made or indirect threats in all other parts of the world.

Deveraux

So, if we could shift it off of what the US did, there was some commentary that came out right after the operation about what this actually means for what another country could do, the precedent’s set. Any thoughts on what a China is thinking about with relation to Taiwan or a Russia with Ukraine? Although I don’t think Russia has the capability to go in and snatch up President Zelensky at the moment. But thoughts on that as maybe a precedent or just in general what adversaries might be thinking about?

Ellis

That’s a great question. So, there’s the question of, you know, whether there is a quid pro quo and spheres of influence versus the ability to actually, kind of, copy the technical example. I would say more the quid pro quo than the ability to copy.

I think it’s a relatively unique situation that the US has done. You know, certainly China has long said even going back to the first, you know, Trump administration. “Well, sure, we’re willing to respect what you do in your near abroad if you respect, you know, our management of our own near abroad,” that, by the way, happens to include this, you know, pesky semi-autonomous, province of Taiwan and maybe other actors like the Japanese in the Philippines. “So, you know, we’ll respect you if you respect us.” And so those types of quid pro quos maybe get rehashed, but I’m not sure, you know, how much actual impact that they have.

With respect to the copy ability of it. I think a couple of unique considerations in Venezuela. Number one, you know, you have a situation where you know, however much the military leadership has, you know, stuck with Maduro because they don’t want to return to democratic accountability. That does not mean that they do not despise him, nor does it mean that the population, you know, does not understand that he is not legitimate. And so, I think, especially when you had the authorization publicly of, you know, CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) engagement and, you know, you sprinkle in there, you know, was a $50 million, you know, reward you had just for Nicolás Maduro, unprecedented.

So, you know, money plus a lot of people who are just dying to get rid of Maduro anyway and who don’t believe in his project. I think you get a lot of people willing to talk and cooperate in a lot of different ways. And so, I think it was no great surprise that we knew, you know, exactly where Maduro was, even, you know, according to some public accounts, you know, like what his dogs like to eat and things like that.

So, the question is obviously that, you know, with a country like Ukraine, with Russia, who has fought a bitter battle, I think you would be hard pressed to find, you know, 10 Ukrainians who would be interested in selling out Zelensky to help out the Russians. So, a little bit of a different context there. And frankly, if you look at the intelligence planning and you look at the amount of coordination in the systems that the US used to go in with precision.

And, oh, by the way, if you look at the geography of it, given that, you know, we had forces, you know, right there, you know, literally just miles off of the Venezuelan coast and supporting facilities in the continental United States are, again, you know, an hour or so, depending on the place, you know, flight away. And so, the ability to put lots of different types of forces, you know, on both in terms of, you know, intelligence, surveillance, the forces generating kinetic effects, etc., it was a lot easier versus, again, if you think about, you know, Russia flying halfway across Ukraine.

Now, arguably there could be a temptation of the Chinese, the PLA thinking, “Well, you know, why couldn’t we just, you know, grab William Lai? We probably have Taiwanese that we could, you know, in the name of being co-Chinese, with sprinkling a little money around your willingness, you know, to cooperate.”

Although my sense is that the, and of course, the geographic distances are similar, although my sense is that the level of sophistication of Taiwanese defenses, the level of patriotism that the Taiwanese feel, and in probably the differences in really what the high-end, best-of-the-best special operators in the US can do versus maybe where their Chinese counterparts are.

I don’t think the Chinese are quite there yet, nor are they willing necessarily to risk that, which involves, you know, not just taking the leader out and trying to bully the rest of the country but somehow, you know, hoping that, you know, once you take out one leader that, well, what do you do then?

And I think, you know, one of the big differences, even if the PRC could grab President Lai, is there’s an understanding of that’s not going to get you to, you know, Taiwan’s surrender. You know, you’re going to need an option for the PRC, much more boots on the ground rather than you just grabbing the leader.

Deveraux

And I think that’s a great point.

And I struggled when I saw that—the article—and then I saw some commentary on it as well. There is an idea that maybe you could try to do something. I don’t know their technical capabilities. I don’t know if they could manage it. Political objectives are inherently different. Right? And in all those situations, the Russian political objective against Ukraine doesn’t disappear just because you got the leader. Taiwan doesn’t necessarily just capitulate because you got their leader. It’s a different dynamic of what it is you’re trying to do.

I know we could talk a lot, and now we’re borderline getting into some speculation as we look at the future. And I know I’m asking a lot of you there. I want to thank you for the time. This has been great. I know that there’s a lot to look forward to coming out of the implications and coming out of your region, which is an exciting time for those who study Latin America. So, this has been great.

Ellis

Brennan, it’s always a pleasure to do this. And, and again, I think those of us who followed the region for quite some time, one of the things that’s refreshing is the perception that there is this understanding that there is no region in the world that most directly impacts US physical security, nor economic security, than the region which is adjacent physically to us. And so, the idea of getting some more focus on the region, some more military thinking, some more strategic thinking, I think these are welcome changes, but stay tuned for the ride, because I think we are only at the beginning.

Deveraux

Great. Thanks, Evan.

Ellis

Thank you, Brennan.

Deni

You can now find SSI Live on TunIn radio and on popular podcast directories like Stitcher—and at the iTunes Store. If you have any comments on our podcast, thoughts on what you’d like to see addressed, or a response to something you heard here at SSI Live, please go to our website. That’s SSI.armywarcollege.edu. Find me, John Deni, in the staff directory, and send me an e-mail. I look forward to hearing from you. For the SSI Live podcast series, I’m John Deni. Thanks for listening.  

In this episode of SSI Live, Major Brennan Deveraux interviews Colonel Kyle Marcrum and Lieutenant Colonel Paul Milas on the SSI-developed China Strategic Competition Seminar. The conversation explores the origin and relevance of the seminar, highlighting the initiative to educate Army officers on understanding how the People’s Republic of China implements its instruments of national power, its objectives, and its activities both in the Indo-Pacific and globally.

Brennan Deveraux

Welcome to SSI Live. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests, and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m your guest host, Major Brennan Deveraux, filling in once again for John Deni, who is on sabbatical this academic year.

I’m joined today by my SSI coworkers, Colonel Kyle Marcrum and Lieutenant Colonel Paul Milas. Colonel Marcrum is new to SSI, as well as to the China Landpower Studies Center (CLSC). He is an Indo-Pacific foreign area officer (FAO) who served at the Defense Intelligence Agency, the office of the Secretary of Defense, and as a military attaché in China, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Taiwan.

Lieutenant Colonel Milas is also a foreign area officer at SSI and has been our resident Director of African Affairs for the last few years. He previously served at the US Embassy in Rwanda and at the Defense Intelligence Agency.

For this conversation, we’re going to be exploring the SSI-developed China Strategic Competition Seminar (CSC). Colonel Milas, I’m going to start with you.

I’ll just start with the most straightforward question. What is the China Strategic Competition Seminar or what we call it around the office, CSC.

Paul Milas

Thanks, Brennan. So, the CSC seminar is designed to provide foreign area officers, FA [Functional Area] 59 strategists, and really the everyday warfighter with the tools really necessary to compete with China in this world of great power competition. The course focuses on understanding how the PRC implements its instruments of national power, its objectives, [and] its activities both in the Indo-Pacific and globally.

And the aim of the course is to identify opportunities for our army to counter China’s narrative, counter their initiatives, and advance US interests.

Deveraux

If I could follow up, what was kind of the spark that led to this class and how long has it been going?

Milas

So I became involved with this in early 2023 when I first got to SSI. The year prior, and sometime before that, some of the senior Indo-Pacific foreign area officers identified that there was possibly a gap in our China knowledge due to the reorganization and consolidation of the FAO areas of concentration in the Indo-Pacific. And they recognize that all Indo-Pacific FAOs really need to have a baseline knowledge of the PRC [People’s Republic of China] to better support the joint force.

And they saw that some of that was possibly lacking due to that consolidation. Brigadier General Pat Teague, the SDO-DATT (Senior Defense Official- Defense Attache) in Beijing at the time, has really been the main driver of this course and implementing this course. And so, again, a few years ago, about 2022 or so, the USARPAC (US Army Pacific Command) Security Cooperation Division wrote an information paper with an idea to create a course similar to the European Russia Way of War course, but [for] this one we focus on the PRC.

And so, during that whole process of thinking about a course, recognizing that we need more China expertise, they reached out to the Army War College and asked us to develop a curriculum because we are an academic institution. And at the same time all this was happening, SSI decided to stand up a China Landpower Studies Center.

And so it only made sense to bring them into the fold and start developing this course, leaning on their China expertise. And so with Josh Arostegui, the [chair] of the China Landpower Studies Center, we started developing a curriculum, the lessons, syllabus, schedule, and the program of instruction. And so we ran our first pilot course in February of 2024.

Deveraux

The course itself, who’s teaching, is this you and Josh who [are] teaching the course? How many students are out there? Is this a TDY [temporary duty] kind of experience?

Milas

So we run two courses per year. Each course is about two weeks long. Our first course was ten days. We adjusted that initial course, the pilot course, shortened it down to eight days. And then we finally settled on the nine-day model that we’re running now. And so we run that 9-day model twice per year.

And so this course is really geared to Indo-Pacific foreign area officers. And so we’ll TDY those individuals throughout the region back to Fort Shafter in Hawaii to attend the course. But then we also pull in individuals who are on island, some strategists that are on island, some typical normal warfighters that are on the island. Most recently, we had a 25th ID [Infantry Division], G-2 person that attended our course. And so it was great having her perspective within the course.

And so really, we’re pulling from anybody, captain, major, or even lieutenant colonels who really need China expertise, but focusing primarily on the Indo-Pacific foreign area officers. As far as our teaching team, we primarily rely on folks from our China Landpower Studies Center. So we’ve got a few research professors and instructors that will come out to the course to assist with the teaching.

But then we also bring in TRADOC (US Army Training and Doctrine Command) G-2 personnel. We rely on USARPAC personnel. We’ll have General Clark, the USARPAC Commander come in and provide his insights on the course. The Deputy Commanding General, Major General Winter, attended the course and provided his perspectives. And we’ll also bring in some of those other resident and island folks, strategists, G-5, G-2 personnel to help instruct the course.

Kyle Marcrum

I would also add that, you know, this was my first attendance to one of these courses, and I was really impressed with the fact that, you know, this is a course intended to teach FAOs about China, but then we also have the people, senior leaders, like the USARPAC commander, came to not only talk about what his goals and objectives are in the Indo-Pacific, but also to kind of talk about his perspective.

We had all sorts of senior leaders. We also had senior attachés from the field coming in, such as Brigadier General Teague, who’s currently, he was the senior defense official and defense attaché in Beijing. He’s now in New Delhi. But then we also brought in Colonel Warr, the Army attaché in Beijing. It allowed them to share their knowledge and experience and things like, you know, Colonel Warr, just talking about the recent Chinese parade that had just happened.

Maybe that means for the United States and others in the region, it really helps to bring that home for these brand new FAOs, which is really our target audience, is FAOs who are coming through the pipeline, really helps them to understand what’s going on inside the embassies and out in the field, as well as hearing from the commander, USARPAC, seeing how they can better inform the commander, help him to make his decisions.

Deveraux

When you start talking about the actual content of the class, what level of classification are you able to go to in there?

Marcrum

Yeah, that’s a great question. So we mainly do unclassified instruction, but we are able to go up to secret level. The main thing with it being primarily unclassified, and I’ll emphasize this almost all the time, is that the Chinese, there’s so much about China that’s out in the unclassified realm that we really can use to understand and better understand their decision-making process and their objectives in the region.

Milas

And with that classification level, the great thing about teaching, mostly at the unclassified level, is that when our students leave the course, they can share what they’ve learned in the course with either their other fellow soldiers, FAOs, but they could also share it with international partners as well. So we kind of get a common understanding and common learning through what we teach in the course with our partners and allies.

Deveraux

I think that’s a great point. And it’s not just the students’ ability to share, and this is one of the things I actually really like about CLSC, and it’s been really helpful for me learning about China is because we operate primarily in my unclassified side, we can put that information just out to the world, and it really builds on, instead of stuff being stovepiped, maybe in a G-2 shop or on island, where they’re really, that is their focus.

It gets it out to the force. And just as important, it gets it out to academia, it gets it out to other people who will weigh in back and say, “actually, no, I disagree. Here’s why.” And I think the CLSC really helps the conversation.

Marcrum

You talked about how the CLSC, you know, builds the knowledge and distributes it to the force. I think that the CLSC, as a group of full-time researchers, is able to expand and build on the US Army’s knowledge of China. And then this, among other forums, you know, our publications in this class and others helps us to bring that knowledge to the force.

And I think that that’s a key component is, you know, spreading the knowledge, making sure that we’re all aware of what we’re trying to achieve, what China’s trying to achieve, and how we compete with that.

Deveraux

I know for me personally, the aspect of them, almost all the researchers speaking Mandarin. Or reading Mandarin, I don’t hear them speaking it a ton, but I know they’re reading. It is invaluable for even projects I’m working on where I talk with Josh and he goes, “Oh, hey, actually, here’s what China thinks about that” and sends me over what China published on it.

That’s awesome, and it totally changes my assertion to here is actually what’s happening. I will transition us a little bit to this last class you guys just did. And actually, Colonel Milas, I think this is probably your last class. Colonel Marcrum you already said was your first. Can you talk a little bit just about the experience of this last class and you know, what you thought kind of handing off this big project?

Milas

Absolutely. So this was the fourth iteration of the course that we just executed. And it happened in early September at Fort Shafter. We had 17 students in this class. Total throughout the four classes that we’ve had, we’ve trained about 90 or so, foreign area officers and warfighters. And so this course model, we’ve refined each of our courses through senior leader feedback and from student feedback.

So I think this course was probably one of the better ones that we’ve executed in the model that we used. Just to let you know about kind of the construct of the course is that we start off with the PRC broad macro level, talking about PRC instruments of national power. Then we discuss PRC activities and relationships in a regional and also a global context.

After that, we transitioned more into the instrument, the military instrument of National power, focusing on the PLA [People’s Liberation Army]. And then the last part of the of course, we transitioned into understanding US strategy in the Indo-Pacific and the role of land power. And the last day and a half of the course, we do an exercise that allows the students to put everything that they’ve learned throughout the previous eight or nine days into practice in kind of an experiential exercise that they can apply to possibly what they’ll do in their future assignments.

Deveraux

If I can follow up, two things, I’ll start with, I know you get a lot of feedback, you said you get feedback from the students. I’ve seen you managing those surveys and putting together the nifty charts for the seniors. I’m curious. You’ve got 90 through the course now. Are you getting any feedback from the field? Have you had the, you know, that lieutenant colonel who was in seminar one or seminar two reach back and say, “hey, I really like this” or “hey, I’ve been telling people about,” or “this skill really applied to” kind of feedback, that real world post-course feedback.

Milas

We have. I’ve received several emails from students from previous classes just highlighting the importance of the course, how much they learned and how much it’s helped them in their positions that they’re in now. Most of the course right now is by word of mouth, and that’s how people generally find out about this course and the feedback that we’ve received, and the people who reach out to us have heard that it’s a great course from those people who have previously attended the course. So we do have plans to do, you know, long-term surveys to get a better understanding of how our material and how our lessons are impacting them in their future positions. But right now, anecdotally, yes, we’ve had a lot of good feedback and, and this, of course, being very beneficial.

Deveraux

I think that the anecdotal feedback might not look as good on a PowerPoint slide as that, that survey. But from personal experience, actually hearing someone say, you know, down the line “this was useful,” means so much more than, you know, “I checked box number four,” you know, “strongly agree,” which is also important, not to disparage it, but that longer-term impact, I think, is really valuable.

I know you’re limited on how many people are attending the course, and I don’t know if that’ll eventually adjust, but are these students provided some pre-reading material? And then looking at it from an interested candidate who would love to take a TDY to Hawaii but probably will not get approved, is there any way if, say, I wanted just the syllabus to kind of see what people are working or, or the reading, would you guys be opposed to having that be something that’s open to…

Marcrum

I would be very much open to it. One of the main things that we like to provide is the resources so others can do their own homework. We do provide pre-readings for the course and readings throughout the course, although it’s not very heavy. But what we do provide during the course is a lot of recommended readings for [the] future.

And so we could provide those to anyone that wants to reach out to us by email. And we can provide you with the full list. Definitely happy to help anyone, even if they’ve got a specific question or anything like that. We’re always, I mean, that’s what we do at the CLSC is we help the Army build their knowledge.

Deveraux

I think it might be worthwhile to even just pen a short little article on what the CSC seminar is for the CLSC website. And then, if you’re open to it, maybe even have the syllabus either available, or to your point, it could be by request, but I’d be curious to see it. So I might be one of those first to offer that.

Milas

So something that we have for the course and it’s really just for the students who have enrolled. We’ve got an MS Teams site, a Microsoft Teams site that is basically a repository of all the information that the students receive throughout the course, all the lesson plans of the PowerPoints, the readings, the syllabus, something that they can go back to.

And it’s still active even after they graduate the course. And we tell them upon completion of the course that they’re more than able to pull that stuff from those sites and share it with their counterparts. We do, like Colonel Marcrum said, we do think that the CLSC is that organization that is there to spread knowledge, and this course is just part of that sharing knowledge with the broader force.

Deveraux

Colonel Marcrum, if I can transition over to you, just real quick and you already kind of talked about it a little bit, but this was your first course doing the seminar, the CSC seminar. Can you talk a little bit about the trip out there, how you kind of fit into the puzzle?

Marcrum

One of the things I think, you know, as I said, I was really impressed with the senior leaders that are that participate in it, but also think that we’ve done a really good job. Paul’s done a really good job, of kind of shaping this to where we have the experts come in to teach. One of the things that I definitely impressed by, you know, I’ve a long time worked with Rick Gunnell. He was one of the instructors on this latest one, along with Peter Wood and they did it. Just their depth of knowledge really helps to bring that home. I think a big part of it is the students do the reading before. They come in, there’s a brief presentation, but the question & answers is where we really get a lot of knowledge that come from the instructors, help the students to learn more in-depth and more in their area.

I think that I was really impressed by the level of knowledge of these two individuals. I think that with my coming in, I can lend a little bit of that experience from the field. Although particularly my knowledge from Beijing is pre-COVID. It’s a little bit dated, but we have, you know, this I’m able to hopefully kind of tie together the research and the experience part of it.

I’m hoping that, in this next one, we can continue to make this seminar more practical. You know, these are the target audiences, the FAOs and the strategists going to the field kind of talking about how the competition will play in their future jobs. I’d like to see a little bit of that. I would definitely like to see a lot more students.

And we do have a limitation on the number that we can hold, but we’d like to be able to fill that in. And then one of the other things not kind of related to the seminar, the strategic competition seminar will stay, but also looking at more adaptive classes. We want to bring that knowledge to the field, thinking about how we can have versions of this seminar that we can export to other locations.

So kind of linking through all of those is where I see my role coming into this. Paul’s done a phenomenal job of shaping this one. I think the strategic competition seminar is fairly set with just the, you know, the practicality of it coming from, for these students. But I think that, going forward, it’s really kind of thinking about how we can get more people to learn this knowledge.

Milas

One thing, I’d be remiss not to say is that we, like Colonel Marcrum, said, we do rely on a wide variety of faculty. Like I mentioned previously, the TRADOC G-2 and Peter Wood, but the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies APCSS, that’s one of the organizations that’s been integral to developing this course and specifically Colonel Matt Kent out there.

He was involved early on with developing this course, and he opened up the APCSS doors and invited the course in. So each course we spend a half a day there at the center to hear from their experts as well from their faculty, provides us with a different perspective, not the military perspective, but more of an academic perspective.

And so it’s a real valuable visit and a real valuable time that that we get to spend out there to learn and hear from those experts as well.

Deveraux

COL Marcrum made a point about the kind of the mix of the academic and the professional. I think there’s something to be said that I remember going through the Basic Strategic Art Program for strategists, and one of the things we we’re very curious about as that coming into the new functional areas, “how do I communicate with the GO (General Officer)?” “What’s my role on the staff?” Some things like that.

So I think the inherent value of having a senior foreign area officer, even if it’s not in their region, but a senior foreign area officer, having the actual commander or a deputy commander come in, a G2 come in, really adds to what you’re already talking about with the hey, here’s the expertise that you’re getting from the academic side.

Marcrum

You know, one of the things, and Brigadier General Teague talked about this during the seminar, but one of the things, you know, particularly for the FAOs and the strategists, when you’re transitioning, you know, you’re a captain, you’re used to working at the battalion level. And then you suddenly transition to being a foreign area officer. You suddenly are thrown from the tactical to the strategic, grand strategic level.

And so, learning how to communicate at the strategic level, the interagency level, how do I talk to the ambassador as their advisor on military affairs on this country? And on the United States? How do I talk to the ambassador? What can I present to the USARPAC Commander that is useful information for him? Because, you know, he’s got a G2 that’s presenting him intelligence.

What am I lending to that commander or to whatever agency? What am I doing that is helpful to them? I think it’s such a huge change for the FAOs and the strategist and other officers as they transition to this strategic area, that it’s very helpful to hear from the seniors that have made that transition. The researchers and the academics have this fountain of knowledge, but translating that knowledge into practical, how do I use that in the field, is where these senior [leaders]come into play.

And that’s where I hope that I can continue to lend to the course.

Deveraux

Looking at my transition as a strategist, I was lucky enough to bounce to a couple of different organizations, but I had some peers whose most senior experience was at a battalion, a very tactical battalion, and their first job as a strategist was on the Joint Staff or at a combatant command. And they’re doing great, and they’re really smart people. That’s why they do their transfer. But you want to talk about a culture shock, just the ability to talk to a colonel in their field who’s done that transition, or to talk to a general officer who’s on that receiving end, who says, “here’s how I receive information,” or the G2 who says, “here’s how I integrate with the rest of the staff” I think is really valuable.

Marcrum

I was very fortunate in my FAO career. My first true FAO assignment was at the Defense Intelligence Agency. And I know some people will argue that that’s not an advantage, but I think it very much was because when I went to DIA, and I was studying Chinese leadership and decision-making, and then they had the 2012 leadership transition, and I was briefing all of these people in the Pentagon, all these senior officers.

I had a time of transition where, you know, I was able to learn and see how these briefings are done, and then I’m the one doing the briefing. It really did give me that transition time. But not all FAOs are able to have that kind of transition experience.

And particularly with some, you know, some countries that we have our senior defense officials in, and we go straight from you are a fully trained FAO major, and congratulations, you’re the SDO-DATT [senior defense official and defense attaché] at this embassy. And welcome to the deep end. And so I think that there is a lot of value to be said for that side of it as well.

I mean, again, our primary objective is to teach competition with China, right, and how that can play out in the field. But also making sure that they’re able to do that in a way that’s useful to the commander, I think is great.

Deveraux

I think all around the CSC seminar sounds really interesting, and I’m disappointed that in the two years I’ve been here, I’ve not been invited to Hawaii to attend. Like I said, I have been to presentations about the upcoming course, and I have seen lots of slides about how successful the course was. It’s awesome. It’s a good program.

And I love that SSI was able to take the lead on it, because I think that there is a perception that SSI, the Army’s think tank, is full of, you know, people locked in their office doing a bunch of research, which isn’t necessarily untrue, but it’s so much more than that, right. And so I thought this was a great opportunity to highlight how our researchers coordinate and work with and support the force, whether that’s through engagements that I know that they’re having or through the publications, you know, where they’re sparking conversation. And this was a unique aspect where it’s literally partnered with the force, going out to the island and teaching, not the War College students that, you know, we also work with and teach, but teaching the foreign area officers, the strategists, other folks on the island, you know, and sharing that expertise. So I think that was really valuable.

And then if I could ask one last question on the course. This sounds like such a good model, specifically for the Indo-Pacific FAOs. Do you think that it’s replicatable? You know, could this be something as a tool for Middle East FAOs? You know, for Europe FAOs? Is this something that big Army needs to relook and say, “hey, is there something else we need to add in the pipeline to try to make sure our FAOs are being exposed to this big thoughts, big thinking, strategic competition?” Beyond just the language, the culture and whatever else is in the pipeline.

Marcrum

I’m biased as a [Indo-Pacific] FAO that, you know, [a] Mandarin speaker, [that has] always been studying well, been studying China my entire FAO career. I think that all of our FAOs going to all embassies need to learn about how competition plays out across the globe, and I think that there’s something to be said about strategists, you know, being the Army’s planners, having you come in and learn how this goes, I think there’s a lot to be said for that. At the end of the day, though, you know, we are in a real world that has funding limitations.

And so I think that it would be great to say that every combatant command needs to be funding one of these courses designed for their FAOs or for their strategists or for their staff. It would be great to get all the staff. In the real world of funding and time constraints, I think that that’s a decision that the combatant commander would be better to make.

But again, I’m heavily biased. I think that if we want to really compete, if we really want to see US objectives succeed, I think that this combination of FAOs and strategists talking about how we compete overseas, having not only the instruction, but also getting those people in the same room where we can kind of talk through each of these problems. I think that’s hugely beneficial to the force.

I have, I talked earlier about how I want to do the adaptive courses, how we want to kind of get, you know, smaller, more boutique classes that can kind of some… maybe we can accomplish it that way. But yeah.

Milas

To echo what Colonel Marcrum said, this course is absolutely valuable for any FAO, regardless of their region, with the current model that we have, you know, we are limited in the number of students that we have due to financial constraints, but we have had other AOCs, other area of concentration FAOs, within the course. I think today we’ve had about ten outside of Indo-Pacific FAOs attend the course.

So we are hitting some of them as able. But I think there is definitely a need to have something like this at other combatant commands.

Marcrum

I think you brought up a great point, Paul, when you talked about the other regions being in the class. I think that also really lent a lot of value and helped feed a lot of discussion when we had, you know, the AFRICOM (US Africa Command) FAO there to be able to talk through a lot of those things. Not that you’re not there for that course, but it helps to feed those conversations as we continue to go.

I also want to emphasize, you know, we are limited on class space, but I want to encourage even non-FAO non-strategists that are in Honolulu to apply to go to the course. I think that there is a lot of benefit to having, like you said earlier, you know, we had a G-2 officer, we’ve had targeting officers, these individuals in the course helped to lend a lot to the value of the course itself.

But also we, you know, we want to get the knowledge out there. And if there’s room in the classroom, we definitely want to have those people as part of it.

Deveraux

I think there’s some underlying logic on how we build seminars at a Command General Staff College or the War College, where we get that diverse perspective for a reason, because we don’t all look at the problem, you know, and just see nails that we need to hit with our hammer. And that’s great. I love those guys, and I love having them in my group. But having those diverse perspectives is probably really valuable, just for the conversation.

Gentlemen, I really appreciate the time. I think that this is a valuable opportunity and I hope people take advantage of it. I hope to see it grow in whatever way we can. And maybe that first step is just helping people get access to some of the material. Material from the course or just material that we’re doing our best to put out, like we talked about on the unclassified side.

So, I would encourage our listeners to check out the China Landpower Studies Center website. You’ll see a lot of good stuff coming out of there. And maybe something on the CSC seminar. I don’t know, it’s not up to me, but I thank everybody for the time. Listeners, for more Army War College podcasts, check out Decisive Point, Conversations on Strategy, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.

In this episode of SSI Live, Major Brennan Deveraux interviews Dr. Brian Carlson, a research professor of Indo-Pacific security studies for the China Landpower Studies Center, on Central Asia. The conversation highlights two drastically different engagements Carlson recently had, one in Kazakhstan and the other at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in southern Germany. The discussion explores the nature of China-Russia relations and the significance of the Central Asian states in the context of great-power competition.

Keywords: Central Asia, China-Russia Relations, Great Power Competition, Color Revolution, Kazakhstan, Foreign Area Officer

Brennan Deveraux

Hello. Welcome to SSI live. I’m your guest host, Major Brennan Deveraux. I’ll be filling in this year for Dr. John Deni while he’s on sabbatical finishing his book. I’m joined today by Dr. Brian Carlson. He’s a research professor of Indo-Pacific Security Studies for the China Landpower Studies Center here at the Strategic Studies Institute. Dr. Carlson received his Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and his expertise lies in the China-Russia relations.

For this conversation, we’ll be diving into Brian’s recent travel and engagements abroad, with the aim to dive a little deeper into some of the nuance of studying Russia-China relations. And I’ll jump right in. You recently took a trip to Kazakhstan. Can you tell me about the event you attended and its significance to your work?

Brian Carlson

Sure. I went to Kazakhstan to attend the capstone conference for a program called US CARNet, that’s CARN Central Asia Research Network, and it’s sponsored by the State Department. The goal of this program is to build a network of Central Asian scholars who study China’s activities and influence in their region, and then to connect that network with American scholars who study similar topics.

And I’ve been involved with this program for about three years now. In April of 2023, before I was working for the Army War College, this program sent me to the region, and I went to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. And I was one of four American scholars who went there during that period. We went at different times. We all spoke about China’s activities in the region.

I spoke in particular about China-Russia relations in the region because that’s my research focus. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, I was able to speak at universities. In Tajikistan, the government wouldn’t allow that. I could only have individual meetings with scholars. And that’s probably because of all the Central Asian countries Tajikistan is the most “captured” by China. So that was two years ago.

Another part of this program is that they select four Central Asian scholars who focus on China’s activities in their region, and then they connect them with American scholars who also focus on such topics. And in this case, there were four scholars, two from Kazakhstan, two from Kyrgyzstan, and all of them spent one semester in the United States working with an American professor and then coauthoring an article.

I wasn’t able to take part in that part of it, but one year ago I went to [Washington] DC and met with them when they came to the United States at the start of their program. And so I’ve been familiar with their activities. This was the capstone conference. So all four of the scholars presented their research findings along with their coauthors.

And so that was the first day. On the second day, we had discussion roundtables about various topics in the region.

Deveraux

What were some of the major takeaways of the conference? Big points for our listeners.

Carlson

It was interesting on the first day to hear about some of the research that the scholars were doing. They were looking at topics like China’s investment in infrastructure in Kyrgyzstan, and to what extent that helps along China’s interests of expanding connectivity and serving the interests of the BRI [Belt and Road Initiative], and to what extent it helps Kyrgyzstan with its own economic development.

And the finding was that this infrastructure is really helping China with its goal of using Central Asia as a transit corridor, but it isn’t really benefiting Kyrgyzstan’s economic development to the extent that has been promised. So that’s just one example. Other topics looked at China’s use of history to try to support its narrative in the region, China’s use of Instagram in the region to promote its image, and then China’s use of education to try to expand its soft power in the region.

And so those were some interesting research projects. And then I’ll skip ahead to the third day, because the scholars talked about how they are facing an increasingly constricted environment in the region. It’s more and more difficult for them to speak openly about China and Russia and what they’re doing in the region. If they publish research that is in any way critical of China or Russia, they’re likely to face some resistance from the government.

And this is different from the way it was a few years ago. So the environment is becoming more constricted, and so that that is a concern. And that was one big takeaway of the conference. And also, that there is a kind of division among Central Asian scholars who look at China in the region. The ones who took part in this program are naturally a little bit more pro-Western. But there were also scholars in attendance who are more pro-Chinese and apparently in some of the side conversations, some of the more pro-Chinese scholars were critical of their pro-American or pro-Western counterparts for being true to pro-Western. So you see a real division emerging in the region. So that was a big takeaway. And then, I can go ahead and talk next about the presentation that I gave.

Deveraux

Yeah, sure. I am going to want to pull on that thread. But real quick, why don’t you talk about your presentation that you did at the conference.

Carlson

I spoke about China-Russia relations in Central Asia, and some of the basic points I made were that, number one, a lot of people have said that Central Asia could be a real source of tension in the China-Russia relationship. But so far, they’ve done a pretty good job of smoothing over those tensions and working together.

And I would argue that this is because, number one, their interests in the region largely coincide. They have some potential sources of friction. But they have a lot of shared objectives, like limiting American influence in the region, promoting stability, preventing color revolutions and so forth, and counterterrorism, of course. And secondly, they share an overriding objective of opposing the United States and trying to revise the international order. And so they don’t want to let possible sources of tension like Central Asia interfere with the pursuit of that larger objective.

I would say that some trends that we have seen recently are that China’s influence in the region is undoubtedly rising. And as I say, they’ve done a pretty good job of smoothing over any possible sources of tension with Russia that might result from this.

But, at the same time, there are indications that Russia’s influence might be weakening a little bit. It’s distracted by the war in Ukraine. It’s not necessarily able to play the main security role in the region that it’s always played. And so over time, the question is whether China will want to get more involved in regional security. And if they do that, how will Russia react?

Right now, China’s regional security presence is rather small. It’s confined mostly to a couple of military installations in eastern Tajikistan that are mostly designed to protect China’s western border and make sure that sources of instability don’t flow from Afghanistan through Tajikistan and on into China.

So that’s the big question for the future. How much will China’s influence in the region expand? How much will they use that influence to try to become more powerful in the region? And how will Russia respond? And will they continue to maintain a good relationship, or will there be tension that will emerge?

Deveraux

Okay. A lot to unpack there. It sounds like it’s a really fruitful event. There’s one thing I really want to kind of pull on [that] you talked about. First, you use this term captured, which I think is a really interesting thing. I’d like [for] you to talk a little bit more about that. But we talked about this idea that we’re having different conversations in the West than they might be able to have in Central Asia.

Western analysts and venues have long discussed the implications of the potential strengthening of Russia-China relations. We often use powerful words like partnership, collusion, although we never really say allies. How is this discourse surrounding the relationship being handled in Central Asia? You kind of already talked about the limited ability in certain places and the differing perspectives.

But more generally outside of the conference. Any thoughts on that distinction?

Carlson

Yeah. First, on the question about Tajikistan being captured by China. I think this is apparent in a number of ways. When I went there two years ago, I saw the new Parliament building that’s being built there in the capital, Dushanbe, and it’s being built by China. China is funding the construction of Tajikistan’s new parliament building, which is an amazing thing.

China has invested heavily in Tajikistan. They have gold mines and other mining operations there. They’ve built a lot of roads and tunnels and other infrastructure. And of course, as I mentioned already, they also have this, military presence in eastern Tajikistan, which is, by the way, is for the People’s Armed Police, not for the, main military force, not for a People’s Liberation Army base, but a PAP, People’s Armed police base.

But again, the objective is, is to prevent, instability spilling across China’s western border. So for all those reasons, China’s influence has grown very steadily in Tajikistan. Now, Russia has military, has a big military base in Tajikistan. And so it still has the ability to project influence. It’s a little bit unclear whether Russia is fully staffing that base right now, or whether it needs those forces for operations in Ukraine.

But the clear trend is that China’s influence there is growing and Russia’s is weakening. And it’s very hard for the United States to exercise influence there now. So that’s the first part of the question. Now on the overall relationship and how it’s perceived in Central Asia. I agree, I would not call the China-Russia relationship an alliance. At least not in the full sense of the term. They don’t have a mutual security guarantee that they offer each other. But nevertheless, they’re working very closely together. They call themselves strategic partners, and they are cooperating very closely, as seen most recently in the big military parade in Beijing that was attended by Putin as well as Kim Jong un and other leaders.

And they are they’re cooperating, as I say, to try to oppose the United States and weaken the existing international order and try to revise the international order in a way that gives them more sway, especially in their own regions and in the world at large. And so they’re very strongly committed to this relationship. Now, in Central Asia, the countries there have long, with varying degrees of success, tried to pursue what’s called a multi-vectored foreign policy.

So they want to not fall entirely in with one outside power or another. They want to try to be friends with everyone, work together with everyone, balance outside powers against each other so that they cannot be dominated by any external force, but in that way maintain their independence and sovereignty. And this is always a difficult balancing act for them.

I would say largely they’ve done a pretty good job. But it’s becoming more and more challenging, I would say, because China’s influence is expanding rapidly, which in some ways is a big opportunity for them. They can get Chinese investment in infrastructure and other areas that can help them with economic development. At the same time, they have always tried to kind of balance China and Russia against each other.

But now that’s difficult because China and Russia are so close to each other that it’s hard to sort of drive wedges between them or balance them or play that, play them off against each other. And, it’s very hard for the United States in Europe to play a really meaningful role there, because Central Asia is far away. It’s not high on the list of priorities.

Russia and China are right there. They, the Central Asian countries can’t avoid who, you know, they can’t choose their neighbors. And China and Russia [are] right there. And so they can’t afford to alienate either one of them. But interestingly, one notable thing is that the Russian invasion of Ukraine did cause some concern in Central Asia about Russia’s possible intentions toward the Central Asian countries, especially in Kazakhstan, which shares a long border with Russia and has a fairly large ethnic Russian population in the north.

So Kazakhstan worries that Russia could impinge on Kazakhstan’s sovereignty at some point in the future if the relationship went bad. And so three years ago, when Xi Jinping was in the region, he said that China supported the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and other countries in the region. And so that was seen, by some outside analysts, as an attempt by the Central Asian countries to enlist China in supporting their sovereignty and territorial integrity against any possible incursions by Russia.

So you still do see these attempts by the Central Asian countries to kind of play the two countries against each other. But at the same time, as I say, with China and Russia so close to each other, there’s not much room to kind of, play them off.

Deveraux

Yeah, not too many seams to drive in there.

You mentioned something I think is worth pulling on [is] the low priority, and I understand geography plays a factor. Geography is important for international relations. These Central Asian countries are right there in the sphere of influence, to your point, of these other great powers. But the West often talks about the battlegrounds of great power competition, not where we want to necessarily fight the war, but this battle for influence. And as we look at the areas, that the nations like United States, China, and Russia can be competing for influence. We often talk about Africa. South America definitely comes to mind. And I thought about, historically, some South American countries when you talked about playing the great powers off each other.

I think you and Evan Ellis could probably put together an interesting piece doing a comparison of that strategy and see how it plays out. Is Central Asia one of these competition spaces, or does geography really limit the West’s ability to have much more of a footprint in there, if that’s something that the United States or the West more broadly wanted to do?

Stated another way, is Central Asia getting the attention that it deserves?

Carlson

It is a challenging region for the United States because the priorities of US foreign policy, going back for decades now have really been Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. And that’s entirely understandable. And by Asia, I’m talking about mostly the western Pacific. And so it’s difficult for the United States to give high priority to Central Asia. But nevertheless, I would argue that it is an arena of competition.

And I made the point in my presentation in the region that there are certain things the United States should be concerned about when it sees China’s influence in Central Asia growing. And broadly speaking, I think these fall in three areas: international economy, international security, and international order. And so, in terms of the international economy, as China becomes more and more involved and a driver of economic development in Central Asia, there’s a risk that the Central Asian countries will become economically dependent on China, which will give China a lot of leverage over them.

And at the G7 summit a couple of years ago, there was a real emphasis on preventing economic coercion by China. And so that’s a concern that these countries could be subjected to economic coercion in terms of international security, there’s an idea going back more than a century to Helford Mackinder: he who controls the heartland controls the world, ultimately.

And so if Central Asian, if the Central Asian states become client states of China, and they become a resource appendage and a power base for China, that could enhance China’s overall power position in the in the coming competition with the United States. And so that’s a concern. It is already a big source of oil and gas for China, and it could be very valuable in the event of a US naval blockade of China to have those secure overland energy supplies.

It’s also a source of critical minerals. And so if China becomes so dominant in that region, it could enhance their power in ways that that could be detrimental to the United States. And finally, in terms of international order, as you say, China is trying to build influence around the world, in South America, and in Africa and other places.

And it’s trying to get these countries around the world to sign up to China’s vision of international order. And we saw that a couple of years ago when China held the first China Central Asia Summit with the heads of state of all of five Central Asian states. And during that summit, and this was held in Qian China.

During that summit, China got all of those leaders to sign on to China’s three global initiatives: the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative. And so that raises concerns that Central Asia will drift toward China and toward its conceptions of international order. And so it could end up helping China in its efforts to revise the international order, which, as I say, is, is one of the main points of cooperation with Russia.

So for all those reasons, I think Central Asia is really important. It just for reasons we’ve discussed, it’s difficult for the for the United States to compete effectively there. But I think the key is, work on soft power, people-to-people exchanges, encouraging Central Asians to come to the United States, like with this, CARNet program, with the scholars and, the United States traditionally has been a very strong, foreign direct investor in countries like Kazakhstan and other countries in the region.

So there’s . . . it still has some economic weight that it can throw around in the region. And so there’s still an opportunity for the United States to play a valuable role in helping those countries resist domination by China or Russia and to stand on their own two feet and protect their sovereignty, which is in their interests and ours.

Deveraux

Interesting. When you talked about that economic dependence, I thought a lot about Europe in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the conversations on how much Russia can be sanctioned and the damage it could potentially do to Western allies. I just I don’t know if Central Asia has, to your point with the geography, the ability to have as much of an out with the West or the United States as some of those countries closer to Russia did.

Question. As we look at the Central Asian states, you talk about, this becoming incredibly important to China as we look at national security, potential great power conflict. How is the stability in the region? And I think about the United States finding itself bogged down in a Vietnam, an Afghanistan, an Iraq, where the Middle East is very important for similar reasons, for access, for resources.

Is that a potential problem set for China? Or is that one China could easily either wipe its hands of and walk away? Or is stability not really going to be a major issue pending Russian aggression or something to kind of redraw some borders?

Carlson

China and Russia share a strong interest in Central Asian stability. They support the existing governments. They’re opposed to any kind of democratic revolt, or what they call a color revolution. They want to snuff that out as quickly as possible. And so, they believe that stability in the region and the stability of existing regimes is important to their conception of regional security.

If things would really get out of order there, if there would be a major uprising of a terrorist movement, if major instability would spill out of Afghanistan into the region, and if there would be revolts that would threaten the existing regimes in the region, then I think that that Russia and China would seriously consider intervening in the region to try to provide stability.

That’s one potential area where China and Russia might cooperate on some kind of military intervention. Now, they hope it will never come anywhere close to that. And China really doesn’t want to get heavily involved in regional security. But if it reached a level where it threatened to spill across the border into China’s northwest region of Xinjiang, then it’s something they would have to very seriously consider.

And so this is a big reason why more than 25. Well, about 25 years ago now, they actually it’s 2001. So just under 25 years ago, they established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, with China and Russia and Central Asian countries. It’s now expanded to several other countries. But the main mission really originally was to oppose what China calls the three evils of terrorism, separatism, and extremism.

And so the organization maintains that objective. So Central Asian stability is very important for China and Russia.

Deveraux

So an Arab Spring type event in Central Asia would be the most dangerous course of action for a China [or] Russia? Looking at the problem set then, they would, we would expect some sort of intervention, before something like that could spread and flourish.

Carlson

It depends on how it would happen. There have actually been things kind of like that already. Kyrgyzstan has had a number of revolutions, but it’s resulted in the replacement of the government with another government that China and Russia can work with. So it hasn’t required an intervention. But if it was more destabilizing than that, and it threatened to produce instability, that would spill over the border into China or through Central Asia into Russia.

And the situation really got out of control, then I think China and Russia would have to think about intervening. But in general, they don’t like these kinds of color revolutions or anything that threatens the existing regimes.

Deveraux

Interesting. I think when we talk about influence, and, how the great power competition is going to be played out, I think the region is definitely more important than we give it credit, especially when we look at it through that lens of, what could change in the region and what are the impacts to Russia and China versus what are the impacts to the United States.

If I could shift you took another trip recently, getting that travel in, part of the job. No hate. You took a trip out to Germany. A very different event. Can you talk to me a little bit about it? [About] how it was different from your trip to Kazakhstan and kind of what the objectives and purposes were?

Carlson

Yes. I went to the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen. That’s in southern Germany, in the Alps, in a beautiful valley.

Deveraux

Rough travel.

Carlson

Yes. Not a bad gig. And I was invited to speak to the FAO [foreign area officer] program for Eurasian Security Studies seminar.

Deveraux

That’s the foreign area officers?

Carlson

That’s right. So there were American foreign area officers in the class, but also military officers from several countries all around Eurasia, including Central Asia. And this seminar was all about or rather, the seminar was entirely about Eurasian security, broadly speaking. But there was one day that was all on China. And so I was speaking on that day. A former colleague of mine, who’s now a professor at the Marshall Center, spoke on China’s foreign policy and implications for Europe.

I spoke on the China-Russia relationship and implications for Europe. So I focused on several of the drivers of the China-Russia relationship, including their shared views on world order, which I’ve discussed a little bit already here. Defense and security cooperation, which has been a major driver of the relationship. Russia has been the main foreign supplier of weapons to China in the post-Soviet era. It’s played a major role in helping China with its military modernization. And China and Russia have also carried out a long-standing series of ground and naval exercises, which have been beneficial for China and again, in this military modernization. And then there are questions about what Russia might do for China in the event of a war over Taiwan or some other war in the Indo-Pacific region.

So I discuss some of that, and then I also discuss energy cooperation. Russia has lost a lot of its oil and gas markets in the West. And so it’s turning more and more to China. The Power of Siberia gas pipeline has been in operation for a few years now. It’s reached full capacity as of this year. And during the recent meeting between Putin and Xi, there was an announcement, at least on the Russian side, that an agreement has been built.

An agreement has been made to build the power of Siberia to send an even bigger gas pipeline. A lot of the details still have to be worked out. It’ll be years before construction begins, let alone, the pipeline is completed and reaches capacity. But if that happens, then Russia will be providing about 100 bcm (billion cubic meters) per year of gas to China, which is a major contribution to China’s energy security and also has a lot of significance in the event of a war over Taiwan or somewhere else in Asia, because if the Navy imposes a blockade on China at the Strait of Malacca and cuts off seaborne shipments of oil and gas, China will be very reliant on overland supplies of oil and gas from Russia and from Central Asia. And so, if this pipeline moves forward, it’s a very major deal. And, Russia already has an existing pipeline, oil pipeline to China. There’s discussion of building another one sometime in the future. And Central Asia, as I said, provides large volumes of oil and gas to China as well.

So those secure overland supplies of oil and gas are pretty significant. And so those are some of the topics I discussed. And then, I can also talk about what it means for Europe.

Deveraux

Question for you: If you could talk just a little bit about the tone, and the environment difference. So in Kazakhstan, you talked about, some of the pro-China team, you know, having some side comments about the pro-West team, the inability of certain people to say certain things. Just a very different kind of environment that I would assume you’d get at the Marshall Center.

Can you talk about that different environment? And then a little bit with kind of what’s going on in the world. I know tensions are high. It’s not necessarily just steady state operations in the Russia-Ukraine war. I know there was a little bit of an incident and a flare up while you’re out there having the conversation.

And I’d be curious how that kind of shifted the tone, or the environment from the, you know, the theoretical, to real world.

Carlson

Yeah. As it happened I was speaking on September 10th. So that was the day after Russia had sent drones into Poland during the night right before I spoke. And so, as we attended lectures and I gave my lecture that day, we were wrestling with what that meant. And so, yeah, that was a definitely a big question, you know, is this a major turning point in the war? What does it signal and so forth?

So yes, I of course, my trip to Kazakhstan and Germany were very different. They were similar in topic. I was talking about China-Russia, relations in both, including Central Asian dimensions. When I was in Europe, I focused more on implications for Europe. And yeah, as I mentioned in Kazakhstan, there was this definite tension between scholars who are more Western oriented and more pro-China oriented.

Deveraux

I’m assuming not too many foreign area officers are pro-China.

Carlson

That’s right. Didn’t really have that problem in, at the Marshall Center. But, you know, this, as I argued, I do think the China-Russia relationship does have big implications for Europe in a couple of ways. First, and this was really emphasized more by my former colleague who spoke before I did.

China is doing certain things to try to influence politics in Europe. They’re trying to co-opt politicians in Europe and try to get them to be more China friendly. They’re trying to drive a wedge between Europe and the United States. They want Europe to become economically dependent on China, both for supply chains of goods that they need, as well as export markets, so that they can expand their influence in Europe and try to prevent Europe from being fully on side with the United States in this confrontation with China.

So there’s that aspect to it. And we should watch for China and Russia to cooperate on that element. But then there’s also this big issue that as China and Russia cooperate more closely, and as Russia is already fighting a major war in Europe, and there’s a risk of China invading Taiwan or some other big flare up in Asia, there’s a big concern about what would happen if war’s major wars would break out in both Europe and Asia at the same time.

The 2018 National Defense Strategy said that the United States should have the capability to defeat one great power adversary while deterring another. So it sort of implies that the United States doesn’t have the capability at present to fight two great power adversaries at once. So this is a major question. What happens if wars would break out at the same time, or if a war would break out in one theater and then the other great power would opportunistically use that to mount aggression in its region, that would put major strain on the United States. And so the implication for Europe is that there has to be more burden sharing.

And we see this already. We see Europe rallying to increase defense spending and support Ukraine further. But there is a big concern that if China were to invade Taiwan and the United States would be very preoccupied in Asia, that it would be difficult for the United States to fully play the security role in Europe in the future that we’ve grown accustomed to.

And so Europe has to bear more of the burden of European security.

Deveraux

All right. I hope we don’t have to fight two great powers. In fact, I would be okay if we didn’t have to fight either of the great powers.

Carlson

Absolutely.

Deveraux

Brian, thanks so much. This was really informative. Educational. I am really understanding more about Central Asia, and the biggest thing I’m taking away here is that I don’t know enough. It is definitely going to be one of those regions that I think is much more important than people give it credit. I know I need to hit the books, and I look forward to seeing some of your upcoming research.

For our listeners, check out Dr. Brian Carlson’s work. You can look him up on the Strategic Studies Institute website. He publishes quite a bit. And you’ll catch him with the China Landpower Studies Center as well. Listeners, if you want more Army War College podcasts, check out Decisive Point, Conversations on Strategy, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.

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