In this episode of SSI Live, Major Brennan Deveraux interviews Dr. Frank Jones, a distinguished fellow of the US Army War College, on his recently published book Obama and the Bomb: New START, Russia, and the Politics of post-Cold War Arms Control. The conversation explores the historical significance of this now expired bi-lateral treaty and Frank’s assessment of the conditions required to achieve this type of great-power cooperation.

Brennan Deveraux   

Welcome back to SSI Live. I’m your host, Brennan Deveraux, still filling in for John Deni. I’m joined today by Dr. Frank Jones, a distinguished fellow of the US Army War College, where he taught in the Department of National Security and Strategy. Previously, Frank had retired from the Office of the Secretary of Defense as a senior executive. He’s the author or editor of four books and numerous articles on US national security.

For this conversation, we’ll be discussing Frank’s recently published book, Obama and the Bomb: New START, Russia, and the Politics of post-Cold War Arms Control. Thanks for joining me today, Frank.        

Frank Jones  

Well, thank you for the invitation.      

Deveraux       

Obama and the Bomb is a detailed account of the administration’s efforts to negotiate a new version of one of the last remnants of the Cold War, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Or START. I guess, in this case, New START. The book follows the steps from concept through negotiation and eventually ratification, dropping readers behind the scenes of the frustrating bureaucratic process of debate and compromise required to formalize a treaty.

So, Frank, I’ll just jump right in. This is a pretty specific topic. I’m curious why you chose it.

Frank Jones  

Yeah, it’s a combination of interests. Really. The first aspect of it was I was just interested in international negotiations. I’d been doing some work on the Korean armistice, and I became fascinated with how negotiations occur. The second aspect was that I just published a few years earlier, a book on Senator Sam Nunn, who had been on the Armed Services Committee in the Senate. Chairman of that. He was very interested in arms control issues. And then the third reason really is I used to be in charge of a course here at the War College called “The Theory of War and Strategy.” I reintroduced or introduced into the curriculum nuclear strategy as a lesson. I felt that that had, in the post-Cold War era, had gone out of people’s mind.

But at the same time, Iran was looking to build a nuclear arsenal. And also, North Korea was in the news. So, I thought students in joint PME, professional military education, had to be aware of nuclear weapons again and the strategy and the theories of deterrence.

Deveraux       

It’s an interesting time for the conversation. I know over the past few years some of these treaties have gone away naturally. Some of them we’ve chose to walk out of. As a rocket guy, the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty, was a big one for me when we walked out of it. So I found this really interesting, which is why I kind of jumped on this opportunity.

So I appreciate you writing it. I really enjoyed the book. Thanks for sharing it with me. If you can, for listeners who are maybe a little less familiar with the treaty itself, can you just talk about the START Treaty? What it, what it is, what it was, what the New START is? And then today, being a pretty significant day, the treaty ended. So it expired. So now it’s a little bit more historical than the application.

Jones  

The New START Treaty, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, is a response by the Obama administration in 2009 through when the treaty went into effect in 2011, it was because a previous treaty, the START treaty, START One it’s often called, was going to expire in December 2009. And so that would have been an event that the Obama administration, President Obama himself, did not want to occur.

And so, through a convergence of interests between the United States and Russia, a decision was made by President Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev that they would go ahead and do a follow-on treaty to START, and that became the New START Treaty.

Deveraux       

This had been tried before. So in the 90s, there were a couple attempts to kind of maybe adjust the treaty or add to it, that didn’t get across the finish line?

Jones  

Well, yes. I mean, there was START Two and there were, as you mentioned, during the Clinton administration, some attempts as well. And then in the George W. Bush administration, there was a SORT treaty Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty, which was really for the reduction in terms of the number of warheads and missiles. One aspect of that treaty that was not addressed specifically was because it relied on the verification protocol or regime in the START Treaty, because that was robust.

And that was the other concern that everyone had in the United States. When your treaty expires, what insights do you have into the monitoring of the treaty and to your other party? And what also transparency do you have in terms of whether or not they actually are complying with the treaty?

Deveraux       

It’s the old “trust but verify” we tell all our young officers.

Jones  

Absolutely. And that that term, which comes from Ronald Reagan, is echoed in the Obama administration.

Deveraux       

I found that interesting. And we’ll get to it in a little bit. But there is an aspect of trust being a huge component of the challenge of making a treaty with someone like Russia. And we’ll talk about that later. But the inherent lack of trust that we might have for an adversary or competitor or however you view it, especially coming out of the Cold War.

Jones  

As you pointed out, part of the issue is how far do you trust someone to balance the tension between being transparent in a in a treaty and security at the same time, and attaining some type of strategic advantage? And then there’s also this whole idea that an anthropologist by the name of Phillip Gulliver talked about, which is that your, there’s a competitive antagonism. You don’t want to give away your national interests, but on the other hand, you have to cooperate to some extent and coordinate in order to achieve an agreement. And so that tensions or those two types of tensions are still in play.

Deveraux       

And reading about it, I can sense the frustration, kind of working through the process with all the players at the table, having to make some of those compromises, knowing which ones you can or can’t make, while looking at the other side, being like, “I know you can make a compromise.” “Oh, no, I don’t know, let me take this back home first.”

Jones  

The negotiations are never linear. You know, it’s not like A leads to B leads to C. No, there’s stops, starts, agreements. People were going back on that agreement, what they thought was a concession or whatever, and trying to sometimes figure out because there’s an audience, if you will, of, your the negotiators are there negotiating, but there’s an audience for them in a sense back in Washington or in Moscow that’s telling them and giving them guidance.

And, so they’re working within these parameters that they were given. But at the same time, they’re across the table for someone. And the difficulty of engaging with that.

Deveraux       

One of the aspects of success is finding this expert who can navigate these frustrating bureaucratic situations. And it’s more than just, and we’ll get to the table in front of you and the table behind you, it’s more than that. When there’s something as simple as understanding the cultural differences, the barriers, how we look at problems. For me, what might be seen as willing to compromise, to you might be seen as a weakness for you to pounce upon.

So even just understanding that dynamic makes the conversation more difficult.

Jones  

That was part of the analytical framework that I was working toward with this book, was to examine what are the real factors that may be, maybe, I use that word, maybe lead to success and one of them, as you mentioned, is that expertise and expertise in political culture, military culture, and the ability in this particular case, you had some Russian speakers on the American side which helped with the dialogue.

And, but you need that technical expertise not only at the table, if you will, in Geneva, where most of the negotiation took place. But you have to rely on experts back in Washington DC or elsewhere that have answers to questions you need to know about.

Deveraux       

And this was a very technical, treaty. When we start talking about the nuance of what is categorized as this type of weapon, if it’s on a system versus if it’s off a system, that shelf life. And as we looked at some of those things. So you definitely need a large variance of expertise. It’s not one person who’s just that superstar representing the team.

Jones  

No, I think in the book I talk about 70 or 80 people that are involved in this and the expertise is critical. Linton Brooks, who was one, the final chief US negotiators for the START Treaty. He talked about the necessity of technical expertise. And in particular, he said service personnel, Navy and Air Force were primarily involved in this, having them on hand in the delegation with you is critical because they understand the weapons systems, they understand the training involved, they understand the operational tempo issues, etc.

Deveraux       

No, that’s interesting. And we’re going to come back to the military aspect, when we kind of shift back to the narrative back home. But real quick, before we do that, there’s an un...

In this episode of SSI Live, Major Brennan Deveraux interviews Dr. Jacob Stoil, a research professor of Middle East Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute, regarding the ongoing operations against Iran. The conversation explores the historical context of tensions with Iran and examines current and futures challenges that region may face in light of recent events.

John Deni

Hello and welcome to SSI Live. You’ve long known the Strategic Studies Institute, or SSI, at the US Army War College, as the go-to location for issues related to national security and military strategy, with an emphasis on geostrategic analysis. SSI conducts strategic research and analysis to support the US Army War College curricula; assist and inform Army, DoD, and US government leadership; and serve as a bridge to the wider strategic community. Now, we are bringing you access to SSI analyses, scholars, and guests, through this, the SSI Live podcast series. Thanks for joining us.        

Brennan Deveraux

Welcome back to SSI Live. I’m still your host, Major Brennan Deveraux. Today, we’re talking with Dr. Jacob Stoil, a research professor of Middle East Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute. He’s also the chair of applied history at the Modern War Institute. Dr. Stoil specializes in applying lessons and understanding from military history to the contemporary and future operational and strategic environment, bridging the gap between academic knowledge and practitioner focused solutions.

He is a historian who received his doctorate from Oxford. And today we’re going to really push his looking back to looking forward method for this conversation. We’re exploring the ongoing US Israeli military campaign against Iran and its potential strategic implications. But before we jump in, I want to be clear that the views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

Thanks for joining us, Jacob.

Jacob Stoil

Thank you so much for having me. This is going to be, I think, a really fascinating talk.

Deveraux

Yeah. And I’ve actually tried to get you on just for a regular SSI Live podcast. But for obvious reasons, as we look to the Middle East, you’ve been quite busy.

Stoil

The Middle East does tend to be one of the hotter theaters, both in terms of temperature and activity.

Deveraux

You’ve done great so far at SSI, tied in with commands. I know you’ve worked with ARCENT (US Army Central), CENTCOM (US Central Command), [the] Joint Staff, and have taken some trips not just to their locations, but out to the Middle East itself.

Stoil

Yeah. And I think this is one of the strengths SSI really brings to the force is our ability to link academics who can then tie into academic networks, who have a practitioner focus in their work and bring it at the time and place of need, bring that academic and research background in whenever we can. So it’s one of the things I’ve really enjoyed about this position.

And I think really if this podcast can advertise that, not just me, but the entire team at SSI stands pretty ready to do this kind of work.

Deveraux

And we have every region represented. And you bring over a network you had built up, when you were working over at SAMS (School of Advanced Military Studies) out of Fort Leavenworth.

Stoil

Yeah, I had the privilege to be a SAMS instructor for nearly eight years. Five years on the AMSP (Advanced Military Studies Program), which dealt with the kind of majors and lieutenant colonels from the operational level planning and then three years with the O6-level program called ASLSP (Advanced Strategic Leadership Studies Program), working on the strategic level, which has the benefit of getting to visit every combatant command that the US military has and get briefed by them.

So it’s a great program for understanding kind of the strategic and integrating the strategic picture.

Deveraux

And I know when you talk to the some of the senior leaders, the uniform wearers, it also provides some instant credibility. Maybe, you know, the secret handshake. We like to joke about, but probably a nice, fun foot in the door. We’ll go ahead and transition. But before we get into what’s ongoing, and everyone, I think, is tracking what’s ongoing, we’ll talk a little bit about it in detail, can you offer up some historical context on the region? Why tensions are what they are and kind of how we got here without going too much into, you know, maybe a graduate seminar on the history of the Middle East.

Stoil

I think the key point to remember here is Iran has really been at war with the US for nearly 40 years. The US has not necessarily reciprocated being at war with Iran, but Iran has seen itself at war with the US since essentially the Iranian Revolution. Ayatollah Khomeini, in his writings, is very explicit about the US as his enemy.

As a really fun fact, when he was getting ready to take over in Iran. The US was very much in the Cold War frame. And so we thought of him as a religious leader and therefore an anti-communist, which was true. He didn’t have much love for the communists and was anti-Soviet, but we didn’t hold his rhetoric that he also hated America to be true, because in our mind, if you were a religious leader, you were anti-communist, and if you were anti-communist, you were pro-America.

The Soviets also backed him because they looked at all of his “Death to America” rhetoric and his revolutionary rhetoric and said, “well, if you hate America and you want death to America, then you’re obviously a Soviet.” Even if you say communism is evil. So, it’s really inbuilt into the idea of America as an enemy. Is really inbuilt fundamentally into the Iranian revolutionary ideology.

And it’s something they’ve been carrying out since the beginning. Obviously, a lot of our listeners might remember or be familiar with the Iran hostage crisis, where one of the first things the regime did when it took over with stormed the US embassy and take our diplomats hostage. Then there were a lot of times where they killed US personnel in Lebanon, both civilians and military, the Marine Corps barracks bombing, the embassy bombing, all our key parts of them.

And this didn’t stop. It continued going.

Deveraux

I think it’s important to note, when we say they’ve been at war with…, that’s tangible. There are tangible actions, not just Iran hates us. But we’ve seen historical events and even fairly recently, if we looked at, say, the global war on terror, I remember, very much finding weapons that were clearly supplied from, Iran. So good points on some of these more actual historical events.

Stoil

Yeah. And I think that’s really important, especially for our veterans who are veterans of the, global war on terror. They will know that Iran used that as an ability to, use that as an opportunity to target American service personnel and American civilians throughout the globe, though principally in Iraq. And we can talk about everything from some of the rocket systems that came in to the explosively formed penetrators.

Iran has been responsible for the death of potentially thousands of Americans over the years. So they very much took actual practical action on this war. And the US largely did not. And this leads to a historical context where after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran starts to look at more means to secure itself. That it feels that it might be in jeopardy, that there’s some US rhetoric coming after it, and it also is feeling kind of its strength that it’s been able to use its proxies to target America and target Israel for quite some time. And there hasn’t really been blowback against it.

And so it begins to invest very heavily towards a nuclear program and the alignment of three key aspects of their strategy. The development of the nuclear weapons program, long range missile and then drone strike and loiter munitions, and also the backing of proxies, really become the cornerstones of their approach to their global power.

And through the way they enter deals with Russia, and even now or until very recently on as Russia was fighting in Ukraine, they served as a strategic deep area for Russia, helping Russia with its drone production and some of the Shahab drones that have been raining over Ukraine are directly coming from Iran.

Deveraux

Similar to a lot of Western nations. Then, the Ukraine battlefield has been really a battle lab, potentially for Iran.

Stoil

They have taken lessons from it. It has been something of a battle, but it’s more of an area where they’ve been able to provide critical support to an ally. And in return, that ally was supposed to provide them critical support. It certainly provided them money. It’s provided them resources towards their nuclear program and of course, their air defense system, which as of now is in somewhat of tatters. Not a great advertisement for buying Russian product, I suppose, but, it less about a lab and much more of an opportunity to really integrate with an ally.

Deveraux

I think you make interesting point about the air defense, and I don’t think Iran had the most exquisite potential Russian systems. I know for a while they were sitting still on S-300. I don’t know their current capabilities and what we’re targeted. It kind of helps build a narrative that I had talked with, Evan Ellis about in here about Venezuela.

One of the takeaways was air defense is defeatable, which is something people kind of struggle with because there is a narrative that I have this gia...

MAJ Brennan Deveraux, COL Michael Long, and LTC Loris Lepri

In this episode of SSI Live, Major Brennan Deveraux interviews Army Strategists Colonel Michael Long and Lieutenant Colonel Loris Lepri to get their take on the recently released National Defense Strategy. The conversation explores the importance of the strategic document and is structured around its four lines of effort.

John Deni

Hello and welcome to SSI Live. You’ve long known the Strategic Studies Institute, or SSI, at the US Army War College, as the go-to location for issues related to national security and military strategy, with an emphasis on geostrategic analysis. SSI conducts strategic research and analysis to support the US Army War College curricula; assist and inform Army, DoD, and US government leadership; and serve as a bridge to the wider strategic community. Now, we are bringing you access to SSI analyses, scholars, and guests, through this, the SSI Live podcast series. Thanks for joining us.     

Brennan Deveraux   

Welcome back to SSI live. I’m still your host, Major Brennan Devereaux. I’m joined today by Colonel Mike Long and Lieutenant Colonel Loris Lepri. Colonel Long is an army strategist. He is the director of the China Landpower Study Center (CLSC) and will soon take over as the director of the Strategic Research and Analysis Department (SRAD) over at SSI becoming officially my boss instead of just a mentor.

Lieutenant Colonel Lepri is also an army strategist. He’s the director of the US Army War College Distance program resident courses. All of us have backgrounds in the Western Hemisphere working at Army North. And figured it’d be a good time to bring the crew together to talk about some of the stuff that recently populated in the National Defense Strategy.

And that’s going to be the focus of the conversation today. We’re going to be discussing that document, its impact, its implications, kind of what it means. So, Colonel Long, I’m going to start with you. On top of just being a strategist for, you know, a long time, being in these positions, having to adjust to, strategy as it comes out.

You also spent some time where I first met you at Fort Leavenworth teaching young majors about strategy, particularly talking about these documents, kind of how they nest. And recently, you also did a podcast on the CLSC Dialogues on the National Security Strategy. Kind of the overarching document. Can you talk a little bit about the NDS, what it is, what it means for kind of the community?

Michael Long

Yeah, absolutely. First, Brennan, thank you so much for having me here today. And, Loris, I appreciate you being here as well. It’s great to be able to sit down and talk to three other, to three total Army strategists and, kind of go over sort of our key seminal documents. So I appreciate that. So, let’s talk about this document, the National Defense Strategy, the one just posted, in January of this year.

So what is this document? If we kind of look at it holistically, the first thing I’ll say is the unclassified version that we’re looking at is really, like I said, an unclassified summary. The real document is a classified version that’s much longer, much more comprehensive. So there will be elements that are not necessarily included here that are going to be part of that classified document.

So, this document is nested to the NSS and I would argue that this specific National Defense Strategy that we’re going to talk about is the most nested to any NSS of any of the National Defense Strategies that we’ve seen so far. And there’s really three big, national level strategic documents that we like to talk about. Right?

So, we just talked about the National Security Strategy, just did a podcast on that on CLSC Dialogues. Please go listen if you’re interested. We’re talking right now about the National Defense Strategy, which we’ve said is necessary to it. And the next one is the National Military Strategy. But the National Military Strategy is not the only aspect of what comes from the National Defense Strategy.

So, National Defense Strategy Post, is prepared by the Secretary of Defense or Secretary of War, as he calls himself here, the, National Military Strategy is by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But there’s other, other aspects that flow from this. So, several other strategic documents. So that includes our service strategies come from this, as well as our combat command strategies and plans come from this as well.

Deveraux       

So this document just published, that’s going to start a lot of necessary movement for those big thinkers somewhere. The services and the combat commands, the think tanks who are looking at defense policy, it’s really starting a lot of kind of processes.

Long  

Yeah. Exactly. Right. And what’s unique about the National Defense Strategy is that it’s got a significant and, and, statutorily, implementation plan. And that’s really how does this document, how does this turn into action. Right. So this is what we as strategists see is the transition of strategic guidance into operational and tactical results. And so, when we look at this this is really institutional strategy mostly.

And that’s because it’s developed along budgeting this thing called global force management. Where do we put all of the military allocations? Like the stuff the tanks, the planes, the units. Where did this go around the world? What are they focused against? And this thing called defense planning guidance as well, which comes out of another, document that comes from this.

Deveraux       

Okay. So that’s the NDS as a whole. What about this specific NDS?

Long  

Yeah, that’s a that’s a really good question. And I this is what I really wanted to get into today. Like the NSS, the National Defense Strategy sees the world from a multi-polar perspective. And this is what Secretary [Marco] Rubio has talked about quite a bit. And so what we look at is, since the end of the Soviet Union, the fall of Soviet Union, the United States has really looked at the world from a unipolar perspective as the United States being the largest part of that.

Deveraux       

What they call the end of history. But only for a short period. Right?

Long  

That’s exactly right. Yeah. Francis Fukuyama would be very proud of you on that. And so when we look at this document, what we see is this is a multipolar perspective, right? There is rising hegemons across the world. And this document responds to that hegemonial rise. Right. So we have a lot of experience in, a bipolar world between the United States and the Soviet Union.

But this is a multipolar where we’re looking at really three main actors. But there’s some other rising actors in there as well. So this specific document is developed by the undersecretary for policy. So that’s, Elbridge Colby. So if, he’s pretty famous for writing, writing a book specifically on this, right, The Strategy of Denial, and looking at, the world from a very realist perspective.

And his perspective in this is you can see throughout the document. So if you’re a realist and you see yourself having a relative loss of hegemonic power, you’re going to make some specific actions. A lot of those decisions are made throughout this document. We’re going to talk about those here in a bit. I would contrast that significantly with the first Trump administration’s strategies nesting strategy document.

So that was really developed by H.R. McMaster. He’s got a kind of famous book called Battlegrounds, which he really looks at from a different perspective. Right. So his book is, counters your statement from Fukuyama about the end of history saying, hey, we really didn’t pay enough attention to these rising powers. And he he’s much less realist. He sees the power, the value of hard power, but that’s really not his focus. This document says it’s flexible, practical realism. But I think from a political science perspective, it’s pretty heavy realist. And again, that’s about that relative decline in power to a rising hegemonic.

Deveraux       

And you talk about the powers. I think instinctively we just go China, maybe Russia, depending on how you view Russia’s actions in Ukraine and where they’re heading the future. But there’s more than that. As we talk about, you know, what’s kind of out there and the document does start with looking at that security environment. We don’t know where we’re going if we don’t outline kind of what we’re looking at.

Can you talk a little bit about how they structure, just briefly, the security environment, the threat, what we’re facing out there.

Long  

Yeah, that’s one of my favorite parts of the document is the is the current state, as we would call it, if we were writing a strategy. And so it hits a couple pieces. Most of those are going to be very familiar to us. The first one is gets hit from a unique perspective. I’m not going to get too much into that, that’s Loris’ area there. So that pivot to America that we see, that’s a new look at homeland defense from, a perspective, that sees it as much more vulnerable than we have in the past. And these are mostly technological upgrades.

The second part of that is what we’ve seen in the past, and that’s China, as a threat. And that’s, the most powerful country relative to US since the 19th century. And it’s kind of took me some time to kind of think about what that means. 19th century is a long time ago, and what that rising hegemon means to us and how we’re responding to that. And I’ll get into that a little bit when we talk about that line of effort focused on the Indo-Pacific.

The nex...

In this episode of SSI Live, Major Brennan Deveraux interviews Dr. Richard Lacquement on his involvement in NATO’s Defense Education Enhancement Program as the Academic Lead for Morocco. The conversation explores how the US Army War College built its relationship with this NATO program and the varying roles the college’s professors play.

John Deni

Hello and welcome to SSI Live. You’ve long known the Strategic Studies Institute, or SSI, at the US Army War College, as the go-to location for issues related to national security and military strategy, with an emphasis on geostrategic analysis. SSI conducts strategic research and analysis to support the US Army War College curricula; assist and inform Army, DoD, and US government leadership; and serve as a bridge to the wider strategic community. Now, we are bringing you access to SSI analyses, scholars, and guests, through this, the SSI Live podcast series. Thanks for joining us.

Brennan Deveraux

Hello. Welcome to SSI Live. I’m still your guest host, Brennan Deveraux, as we wait for John Deni to finish up his sabbatical and hopefully put out a pretty cool book. I am joined today by Dr. Richard Lacquement. He is a research professor of national security affairs here with me at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). Dr. Lacquement earned his PhD from Princeton University School of Public and International Affairs.

He’s a retired US Army colonel who served as a field artillery officer and as a strategist. He has been at the Army War College in uniform and as a civilian for over 15 years. Dr Lacquement has published on ample topics related to national security and is SSI’s resident expert on the military profession. For this conversation, we’re going to be diving into Richard’s role with the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Defense Education [Enhancement] Program [DEEP] and his recent trips to Morocco.

Richard, thanks for coming. I’ll jump right into the questions. First, let’s just start from the beginning. What is the Defense Education Enhancement Program, sometimes referred to as NATO DEEP?

Richard Lacquement

Thanks. First off, thanks for having me. I look forward to the opportunity to share experiences and information and perspective on NATO’s Defense Education Enhancement Program. Really, it’s something I’ve been familiar with for a long time but had not participated in directly. It’s about 20 years old, a NATO initiative that kind of comes out of the Cold War, where, in the immediate wake, we were helping with former Soviet states.

And to this day, some of the countries in the DEEP program are some of those former Soviet states. [Currently] none of the programs [are] for any states that are part of NATO. Briefly, Croatia was part of it, while they were an early NATO member, but for the most part, it’s focused on countries that are partners with NATO, [to include] some remaining … former Soviet Republics like Kazakhstan and Armenia and Azerbaijan, some that are tied to what they call the Mediterranean Initiative, which is where Morocco comes in, [as well as], Mauritania, Tunisia. Some in the Middle East and then some, related to other, activities we’ve had. Iraq and Afghanistan had been a part of it before. And right now, a very active program supporting Ukraine. But the key point is sort of working [with] defense education institutions. So, helping out with professional military education, how to develop curriculum, develop faculty to teach about national security or security topics in general in these partner countries.

Deveraux

Okay. And I’m assuming that these are very much tailored not only to the country, but maybe to varying mission objectives on what that country is looking at for its threat or where it is technologically, along those lines. Is that a fair assumption?

Lacquement

That’s fair. And one of the, you know, taglines is that this is very much demand-driven by the country. Of course, it’s, you know, NATO has its interest. So, NATO is the partner [to] countries who have identified who we are working with. So, there is a US, you know, NATO national interest involved in every country [we work] with. But a lot of it is working with them to identify where we can help them.

So very much a kind of, you know, teaching, teaching folks how to fish, not fishing for them. Going to them and saying, here’s what we have in terms of, areas of expertise, curricula, model curricula that we’ve developed, as a group through this program and faculty development, English language training--because the language of instruction that we use is English.

And so we also help them in being able to do that. So, there’s some key skill sets that we’re looking to do. But then from the menu of things that NATO has been doing, which has been expanding a bit, the countries get to decide or ask kind of where they think they need some help. And so, for Morocco, for example, to be more specific, that program started in 2019, where they did kind of an initial assessment, and the Moroccans asked specifically for assistance with their NCO (noncommissioned officer) corps.

So, there’s a big program in Morocco helping on NCO professional development. And then they also, their war college and command in General Staff College, equivalent, essentially, it’s both of those together like the other [US] services other than the [US] Army. So, they’re in one location. Their War college and Defense college. Their ILE [Intermediate Level Education] and their senior service college, so to speak.

And they said, “hey, we would like some help with some key topic areas.” The first round was logistics, cyber security, and counterinsurgency. And future rounds include operational planning, intelligence planning, use of drones, concept of doctrine development. And so, these are all topics they requested. And then, as I’m the academic lead for the Morocco program, so we can get more into detail about how that works, but just a sense that I’m helping now to join a team, which has been around since 2019 to help meet the Moroccans needs.

Deveraux

No, that’s really neat. I think about my time doing a weird mission, doing kind of the security cooperation development. I remember my unit went to Africa and we did something similar where it was what that country needed. So we sent these small two-person or four-person teams out for exactly what you’re talking about. An NCO academy, a sniper training, a little bit more tactical focus, but it was very much here’s a menu of the skill sets we have. How can we be of assistance? One thing you talked about, the “we,” used it as the “royal we,” the NATO. But as you transition to that academic planner, I think the question comes up is, where does the Army War College fit into this?

Lacquement

So I would say the Army War College sort of fits the, the broader constellation of subject matter experts across NATO. So the folks doing a lot of the subject matter expertise support come from many different NATO countries. And as an illustration, let me back up just a second too, actually there are other Army War College folks who’ve been involved.

Actually, though, one of the people who stood this program up from inception was a former Army War College professor, Dr. Al Stolberg, who still lives in the area. But he created the National Security Policy Program, which is a program I still run for the resident education program of the Army War College. So there’s been several people from the Army War College involved throughout the, as long as DEEP has existed.

At this particular moment, the provost, [Dr.] Dave Dworak is an academic lead for Azerbaijan. Dr. Nelly Lahoud in the Department [of] National Security Strategy, is the academic lead for Jordan, and I volunteered to pick up—when somebody else retired—to be the academic lead for Morocco. So that’s the Army War College, we’re kind of volunteers, of sort of external service time to this broader NATO effort, to be part of this team. And so the Army War College has been literally in since the inception in many ways, like I said, particularly the leadership role that …Dr. Al Stolberg, has had with the organization.

Deveraux

Okay. And you kind of answered my follow up there, which is, you know, how did you get roped into this? I love that you volunteered versus the voluntold. Most of my security cooperation efforts were voluntold, as the uniform wearer. But, can I ask a little bit, why you kind of jumped on the opportunity?

Lacquement

Sure. So partly I was aware of it. I’ve seen opportunities in the past when they were looking for volunteers for different countries, and really just in terms of my commitments at the time, I didn’t see it as a good fit or didn’t feel like I had the capacity to sort of do that. This particular year when the call went out. “Hey, would somebody be interested in being the academic lead for Morocco?” And it was and again, you sort of compete for the job. It’s not just, hey, volunteer. And they said, … “you’re the person.” I mean, part of it is that I am a, I’ve had a lot of experience and professional military education. So I have a lot of expertise in key topics like counterinsurgency, stability ops, just teaching strategy in general, national security approaches.

I’d been the dean of the Army War College for eight years. So the sense that I also know faculty development and curriculum development. And so I was, you know, considered to be well-suited to be the academic lead, which is to oversee the academic components of all the things going on within the Morocco program. And given that it is the Defense Education “Education” Enhancement program, the idea that sort of education background, and it probably helps that ...

This episode discusses Latin American reactions to the recent US operation in Venezuela, noting that some governments expressed criticism but with notable restraint due to domestic political and economic considerations. Dr. R. Evan Ellis explains that the operation exposed the ineffectiveness of Russian and Chinese air‑defense systems in Venezuela, which may influence future military procurement and perceptions of US capabilities in the region. The conversation also explores how China, Russia, Iran, and other extra‑hemispheric actors may recalibrate their engagement in Latin America in response to renewed U.S. focus and pressure.

John Deni

Hello and welcome to SSI Live. You’ve long known the Strategic Studies Institute, or SSI, at the US Army War College, as the go-to location for issues related to national security and military strategy, with an emphasis on geostrategic analysis. SSI conducts strategic research and analysis to support the US Army War College curricula; assist and inform Army, DoD, and US government leadership; and serve as a bridge to the wider strategic community. Now, we are bringing you access to SSI analyses, scholars, and guests, through this, the SSI Live podcast series. Thanks for joining us.

Stephanie Crider

I’m in the studio with Dr. R. Evan Ellis and our guest host, Major Brennan Deveraux.

Ellis is a research professor of Latin American studies at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), with a focus on the region’s relationships with China and other non-Western hemisphere actors as well as transnational organized crime and populism in the region.

Deveraux is a US Army strategist serving as a national security researcher at the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute. He has three defense-related master’s degrees and focuses his research on military innovation, emerging technology management, and the characteristics of future warfare.

Brennan Deveraux

Okay, great. I’m looking forward to this conversation. Evan, a lot going on. The region, in Latin America, really interesting right now, not only with a resurgent US focus as we look at strategy, but everyone is tracking the operation in Venezuela.

And I don’t think we need to really go through the events and the lead up to and the why, I think that conversation has been had. But I’d like to pick your brain today because I don’t think we get many opportunities to really sit down with an expert on the region and talk about some of the broader implications, if that works for you.

R. Evan Ellis

Absolutely. It’s great to talk with you, Brennan.

Deveraux

So first, let’s just start with some general impressions then. How are other Latin American countries responding to the actions in Venezuela?

Ellis

It’s really a range of responses, many of which are what you would predict. So, you have Lula in Brazil, the president there who has indicated that this is unacceptable; he’s expressed reservations but with some degree of caution, understanding that he has elections coming up this October and thus doesn’t want to put himself too far on the left of the spectrum as the principal opponent to the US in the region. You have, predictably, Gustavo Petro, the current leftist president of Colombia, who has indicated this was a barbaric act. Indeed, under his instruction, Colombia called a special session of the UN Security Council to talk about this.

Indeed, some of that rhetoric got him on the radar screen with President Trump, who had suggested that maybe Petro, with his own lack of control over drug production in his country, could be the next, which precipitated Petro kind of backpedaling a little bit and turning down some of the tone. You have others in the region who have bet strongly on the United States, who have been extremely supportive.

I’ll just mention a handful. You have the Luis Abinader government in the Dominican Republic, who again provided access to important US air bases in his country that played a role in those operations again has been very supportive. You had the Kamla Persad-Bissessar government, the new UNM government in Trinidad and Tobago, which, again, went on a bit of a ledge to support the US in the lead up to the operation, and I say is now looking pretty good.

And then, of course, you have the traditional US allies in various parts of South America. So, Javier Milei in his government in Argentina, the Ecuadorian government of Daniel Noboa just to name a few, who will, again, have been relatively supportive. And so, again, those you’d expect to be critical have been critical, but I would say tempered in their criticism.

Another I would mention is the left-oriented Claudia Sheinbaum government in Mexico, who again have indicated that this was problematic. But again, Sheinbaum, understanding that they’re in a critical renegotiation of the US-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement and about 90 percent of Mexican exports depend on access to the US market, Sheinbaum has been tempered in taking criticism of what the US has done too far.

Deveraux

That’s a lot. And what it tells me is you are an expert in the region, and I know, I know this. I read a lot of your work, and you’ve been studying this region for a long time. I think what would really help for our listeners—did any of these reactions stand out to you? Was any of these unexpected? You talked Brazil. I know Brazil kind of sits the fence sometimes, but did anything really kind of catch you off guard by a country? Maybe someone not speaking out or speaking out overly aggressively? The Colombia, for example, was an obvious reaction. Is there any of that on the other side of that spectrum?

Ellis

I think to a degree, the restraint of those who you’d expect to be critical has been instructive. And so, again, the degree to which Lula in Brazil seems to be trying to avoid becoming, you know, too shrill or leading too much. The anti-US pushback in the region, I think, was a calculated decision or, you know, to a certain degree, the degree to which Claudia Sheinbaum in Mexico was very measured in her response, understanding that in ideological terms, this is something that goes against everything that she and Mexico stands for.

It’s instructive, if nothing else, the concerns and the desires for different reasons of different what you’d call left-oriented governments in the region to try to avoid conflicts with Washington for domestic political reasons, as well as to avoid, you know, being kind of on Washington’s target screen.

Deveraux

And that’s the two-level game we talk about a lot, right? It’s one thing to have a loud, boisterous opinion about something as it relates to your country, but you then have to turn internally and see what the country says, too. Then finding that balance is a unique skill set that politicians have.

So, I will shift us to the actual operation itself, not its conduct, but one of the things I heard you say, the operation in Venezuela highlighted the ineffectiveness of Russian- and Chinese-supplied air defense systems. And you’re not the only person to say it. I saw that in a couple of articles. I’m sure this is going to be a major topic for military analysts. More broadly, you know, what is the role of air defense? Is it penetrable? I know we do the big scary anti-access aerial-denial (A2/AD) stuff. I’m hoping you can actually talk it more specifically to Latin America.

If we’re looking at these countries that look to China or Russia for exquisite military equipment, or that might have the opportunity to now look to the United States for military equipment. Do you think that this is going to have some sort of shift in future military sales, as we look at the effectiveness of the operation and the ineffectiveness of the systems designed to stop it?

Ellis

I think, in part, there’s a difference between what you see in the media or in the political domain versus what the military decisionmakers who understand the details of these type of operations will decide to do. In general, I think there was a lot of media expectation that the Russian S-300, you know, medium-range air defense system, for example, would perform relatively well or at least present a clear threat to the US.

There is some other media references to, for example, the dispersed Igla-S man-portable air defense (MANPAD) that munitions that would create some sort of threat. And in the end, none of those really produced any significant effects whatsoever. But when you looked at the detail, what it was really all about was in part that we, at least what publicly been released, had a pretty sophisticated, you know, layered series of things that we did that had to involve information warfare, space, the electronic warfare space, of course, kinetic strikes against some of these sites. It’s about as much detail as I can get in this program.

I think, for military planners, there was never the expectation that the S-300s would be that effective, maybe a little bit more than they were. It wasn’t sure, you know, whether the Chinese JYL-1 one or JY27-A radars would be effective or really play a role at all. And so, I think it was interesting that they were just completely nonfactors.

Very few people who were actually military professionals thought that people carefully positioned with these MANPADs, you know, the Igla-S would do anything unless they just happened to get a lucky shot off. And so, I think at the end of the day, with respect to Russian equipment, there’s an understanding that already Russian equipment is problematic because the ongoing war in the Ukraine because of the, you know, difficulty in getting spares and, you know, Rosoboronexport, or Rostec’s, kind of poor record in, in doing...

In this episode of SSI Live, Major Brennan Deveraux interviews Colonel Kyle Marcrum and Lieutenant Colonel Paul Milas on the SSI-developed China Strategic Competition Seminar. The conversation explores the origin and relevance of the seminar, highlighting the initiative to educate Army officers on understanding how the People’s Republic of China implements its instruments of national power, its objectives, and its activities both in the Indo-Pacific and globally.

Brennan Deveraux

Welcome to SSI Live. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests, and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m your guest host, Major Brennan Deveraux, filling in once again for John Deni, who is on sabbatical this academic year.

I’m joined today by my SSI coworkers, Colonel Kyle Marcrum and Lieutenant Colonel Paul Milas. Colonel Marcrum is new to SSI, as well as to the China Landpower Studies Center (CLSC). He is an Indo-Pacific foreign area officer (FAO) who served at the Defense Intelligence Agency, the office of the Secretary of Defense, and as a military attaché in China, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Taiwan.

Lieutenant Colonel Milas is also a foreign area officer at SSI and has been our resident Director of African Affairs for the last few years. He previously served at the US Embassy in Rwanda and at the Defense Intelligence Agency.

For this conversation, we’re going to be exploring the SSI-developed China Strategic Competition Seminar (CSC). Colonel Milas, I’m going to start with you.

I’ll just start with the most straightforward question. What is the China Strategic Competition Seminar or what we call it around the office, CSC.

Paul Milas

Thanks, Brennan. So, the CSC seminar is designed to provide foreign area officers, FA [Functional Area] 59 strategists, and really the everyday warfighter with the tools really necessary to compete with China in this world of great power competition. The course focuses on understanding how the PRC implements its instruments of national power, its objectives, [and] its activities both in the Indo-Pacific and globally.

And the aim of the course is to identify opportunities for our army to counter China’s narrative, counter their initiatives, and advance US interests.

Deveraux

If I could follow up, what was kind of the spark that led to this class and how long has it been going?

Milas

So I became involved with this in early 2023 when I first got to SSI. The year prior, and sometime before that, some of the senior Indo-Pacific foreign area officers identified that there was possibly a gap in our China knowledge due to the reorganization and consolidation of the FAO areas of concentration in the Indo-Pacific. And they recognize that all Indo-Pacific FAOs really need to have a baseline knowledge of the PRC [People’s Republic of China] to better support the joint force.

And they saw that some of that was possibly lacking due to that consolidation. Brigadier General Pat Teague, the SDO-DATT (Senior Defense Official- Defense Attache) in Beijing at the time, has really been the main driver of this course and implementing this course. And so, again, a few years ago, about 2022 or so, the USARPAC (US Army Pacific Command) Security Cooperation Division wrote an information paper with an idea to create a course similar to the European Russia Way of War course, but [for] this one we focus on the PRC.

And so, during that whole process of thinking about a course, recognizing that we need more China expertise, they reached out to the Army War College and asked us to develop a curriculum because we are an academic institution. And at the same time all this was happening, SSI decided to stand up a China Landpower Studies Center.

And so it only made sense to bring them into the fold and start developing this course, leaning on their China expertise. And so with Josh Arostegui, the [chair] of the China Landpower Studies Center, we started developing a curriculum, the lessons, syllabus, schedule, and the program of instruction. And so we ran our first pilot course in February of 2024.

Deveraux

The course itself, who’s teaching, is this you and Josh who [are] teaching the course? How many students are out there? Is this a TDY [temporary duty] kind of experience?

Milas

So we run two courses per year. Each course is about two weeks long. Our first course was ten days. We adjusted that initial course, the pilot course, shortened it down to eight days. And then we finally settled on the nine-day model that we’re running now. And so we run that 9-day model twice per year.

And so this course is really geared to Indo-Pacific foreign area officers. And so we’ll TDY those individuals throughout the region back to Fort Shafter in Hawaii to attend the course. But then we also pull in individuals who are on island, some strategists that are on island, some typical normal warfighters that are on the island. Most recently, we had a 25th ID [Infantry Division], G-2 person that attended our course. And so it was great having her perspective within the course.

And so really, we’re pulling from anybody, captain, major, or even lieutenant colonels who really need China expertise, but focusing primarily on the Indo-Pacific foreign area officers. As far as our teaching team, we primarily rely on folks from our China Landpower Studies Center. So we’ve got a few research professors and instructors that will come out to the course to assist with the teaching.

But then we also bring in TRADOC (US Army Training and Doctrine Command) G-2 personnel. We rely on USARPAC personnel. We’ll have General Clark, the USARPAC Commander come in and provide his insights on the course. The Deputy Commanding General, Major General Winter, attended the course and provided his perspectives. And we’ll also bring in some of those other resident and island folks, strategists, G-5, G-2 personnel to help instruct the course.

Kyle Marcrum

I would also add that, you know, this was my first attendance to one of these courses, and I was really impressed with the fact that, you know, this is a course intended to teach FAOs about China, but then we also have the people, senior leaders, like the USARPAC commander, came to not only talk about what his goals and objectives are in the Indo-Pacific, but also to kind of talk about his perspective.

We had all sorts of senior leaders. We also had senior attachés from the field coming in, such as Brigadier General Teague, who’s currently, he was the senior defense official and defense attaché in Beijing. He’s now in New Delhi. But then we also brought in Colonel Warr, the Army attaché in Beijing. It allowed them to share their knowledge and experience and things like, you know, Colonel Warr, just talking about the recent Chinese parade that had just happened.

Maybe that means for the United States and others in the region, it really helps to bring that home for these brand new FAOs, which is really our target audience, is FAOs who are coming through the pipeline, really helps them to understand what’s going on inside the embassies and out in the field, as well as hearing from the commander, USARPAC, seeing how they can better inform the commander, help him to make his decisions.

Deveraux

When you start talking about the actual content of the class, what level of classification are you able to go to in there?

Marcrum

Yeah, that’s a great question. So we mainly do unclassified instruction, but we are able to go up to secret level. The main thing with it being primarily unclassified, and I’ll emphasize this almost all the time, is that the Chinese, there’s so much about China that’s out in the unclassified realm that we really can use to understand and better understand their decision-making process and their objectives in the region.

Milas

And with that classification level, the great thing about teaching, mostly at the unclassified level, is that when our students leave the course, they can share what they’ve learned in the course with either their other fellow soldiers, FAOs, but they could also share it with international partners as well. So we kind of get a common understanding and common learning through what we teach in the course with our partners and allies.

Deveraux

I think that’s a great point. And it’s not just the students’ ability to share, and this is one of the things I actually really like about CLSC, and it’s been really helpful for me learning about China is because we operate primarily in my unclassified side, we can put that information just out to the world, and it really builds on, instead of stuff being stovepiped, maybe in a G-2 shop or on island, where they’re really, that is their focus.

It gets it out to the force. And just as important, it gets it out to academia, it gets it out to other people who will weigh in back and say, “actually, no, I disagree. Here’s why.” And I think the CLSC really helps the conversation.

Marcrum

You talked about how the CLSC, you know, builds the knowledge and distributes it to the force. I think that the CLSC, as a group of full-time researchers, is able to expand and build on the US Army’s knowledge of China. And then this, among other forums, you know, our publications in this class and others helps us to bring that knowledge to the force.

And I think that that’s a key component is, you know, spreading the knowledge, making sure that we’re all aware of what we’re trying to achieve, what China’s trying to achieve, and how we compete with that.

Deveraux

I know for me personally, the aspect of them, almost all th...

In this episode of SSI Live, Major Brennan Deveraux interviews Dr. Brian Carlson, a research professor of Indo-Pacific security studies for the China Landpower Studies Center, on Central Asia. The conversation highlights two drastically different engagements Carlson recently had, one in Kazakhstan and the other at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in southern Germany. The discussion explores the nature of China-Russia relations and the significance of the Central Asian states in the context of great-power competition.

Keywords: Central Asia, China-Russia Relations, Great Power Competition, Color Revolution, Kazakhstan, Foreign Area Officer

Brennan Deveraux

Hello. Welcome to SSI live. I’m your guest host, Major Brennan Deveraux. I’ll be filling in this year for Dr. John Deni while he’s on sabbatical finishing his book. I’m joined today by Dr. Brian Carlson. He’s a research professor of Indo-Pacific Security Studies for the China Landpower Studies Center here at the Strategic Studies Institute. Dr. Carlson received his Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and his expertise lies in the China-Russia relations.

For this conversation, we’ll be diving into Brian’s recent travel and engagements abroad, with the aim to dive a little deeper into some of the nuance of studying Russia-China relations. And I’ll jump right in. You recently took a trip to Kazakhstan. Can you tell me about the event you attended and its significance to your work?

Brian Carlson

Sure. I went to Kazakhstan to attend the capstone conference for a program called US CARNet, that’s CARN Central Asia Research Network, and it’s sponsored by the State Department. The goal of this program is to build a network of Central Asian scholars who study China’s activities and influence in their region, and then to connect that network with American scholars who study similar topics.

And I’ve been involved with this program for about three years now. In April of 2023, before I was working for the Army War College, this program sent me to the region, and I went to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. And I was one of four American scholars who went there during that period. We went at different times. We all spoke about China’s activities in the region.

I spoke in particular about China-Russia relations in the region because that’s my research focus. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, I was able to speak at universities. In Tajikistan, the government wouldn’t allow that. I could only have individual meetings with scholars. And that’s probably because of all the Central Asian countries Tajikistan is the most “captured” by China. So that was two years ago.

Another part of this program is that they select four Central Asian scholars who focus on China’s activities in their region, and then they connect them with American scholars who also focus on such topics. And in this case, there were four scholars, two from Kazakhstan, two from Kyrgyzstan, and all of them spent one semester in the United States working with an American professor and then coauthoring an article.

I wasn’t able to take part in that part of it, but one year ago I went to [Washington] DC and met with them when they came to the United States at the start of their program. And so I’ve been familiar with their activities. This was the capstone conference. So all four of the scholars presented their research findings along with their coauthors.

And so that was the first day. On the second day, we had discussion roundtables about various topics in the region.

Deveraux

What were some of the major takeaways of the conference? Big points for our listeners.

Carlson

It was interesting on the first day to hear about some of the research that the scholars were doing. They were looking at topics like China’s investment in infrastructure in Kyrgyzstan, and to what extent that helps along China’s interests of expanding connectivity and serving the interests of the BRI [Belt and Road Initiative], and to what extent it helps Kyrgyzstan with its own economic development.

And the finding was that this infrastructure is really helping China with its goal of using Central Asia as a transit corridor, but it isn’t really benefiting Kyrgyzstan’s economic development to the extent that has been promised. So that’s just one example. Other topics looked at China’s use of history to try to support its narrative in the region, China’s use of Instagram in the region to promote its image, and then China’s use of education to try to expand its soft power in the region.

And so those were some interesting research projects. And then I’ll skip ahead to the third day, because the scholars talked about how they are facing an increasingly constricted environment in the region. It’s more and more difficult for them to speak openly about China and Russia and what they’re doing in the region. If they publish research that is in any way critical of China or Russia, they’re likely to face some resistance from the government.

And this is different from the way it was a few years ago. So the environment is becoming more constricted, and so that that is a concern. And that was one big takeaway of the conference. And also, that there is a kind of division among Central Asian scholars who look at China in the region. The ones who took part in this program are naturally a little bit more pro-Western. But there were also scholars in attendance who are more pro-Chinese and apparently in some of the side conversations, some of the more pro-Chinese scholars were critical of their pro-American or pro-Western counterparts for being true to pro-Western. So you see a real division emerging in the region. So that was a big takeaway. And then, I can go ahead and talk next about the presentation that I gave.

Deveraux

Yeah, sure. I am going to want to pull on that thread. But real quick, why don’t you talk about your presentation that you did at the conference.

Carlson

I spoke about China-Russia relations in Central Asia, and some of the basic points I made were that, number one, a lot of people have said that Central Asia could be a real source of tension in the China-Russia relationship. But so far, they’ve done a pretty good job of smoothing over those tensions and working together.

And I would argue that this is because, number one, their interests in the region largely coincide. They have some potential sources of friction. But they have a lot of shared objectives, like limiting American influence in the region, promoting stability, preventing color revolutions and so forth, and counterterrorism, of course. And secondly, they share an overriding objective of opposing the United States and trying to revise the international order. And so they don’t want to let possible sources of tension like Central Asia interfere with the pursuit of that larger objective.

I would say that some trends that we have seen recently are that China’s influence in the region is undoubtedly rising. And as I say, they’ve done a pretty good job of smoothing over any possible sources of tension with Russia that might result from this.

But, at the same time, there are indications that Russia’s influence might be weakening a little bit. It’s distracted by the war in Ukraine. It’s not necessarily able to play the main security role in the region that it’s always played. And so over time, the question is whether China will want to get more involved in regional security. And if they do that, how will Russia react?

Right now, China’s regional security presence is rather small. It’s confined mostly to a couple of military installations in eastern Tajikistan that are mostly designed to protect China’s western border and make sure that sources of instability don’t flow from Afghanistan through Tajikistan and on into China.

So that’s the big question for the future. How much will China’s influence in the region expand? How much will they use that influence to try to become more powerful in the region? And how will Russia respond? And will they continue to maintain a good relationship, or will there be tension that will emerge?

Deveraux

Okay. A lot to unpack there. It sounds like it’s a really fruitful event. There’s one thing I really want to kind of pull on [that] you talked about. First, you use this term captured, which I think is a really interesting thing. I’d like [for] you to talk a little bit more about that. But we talked about this idea that we’re having different conversations in the West than they might be able to have in Central Asia.

Western analysts and venues have long discussed the implications of the potential strengthening of Russia-China relations. We often use powerful words like partnership, collusion, although we never really say allies. How is this discourse surrounding the relationship being handled in Central Asia? You kind of already talked about the limited ability in certain places and the differing perspectives.

But more generally outside of the conference. Any thoughts on that distinction?

Carlson

Yeah. First, on the question about Tajikistan being captured by China. I think this is apparent in a number of ways. When I went there two years ago, I saw the new Parliament building that’s being built there in the capital, Dushanbe, and it’s being built by China. China is funding the construction of Tajikistan’s new parliament building, which is an amazing thing.

China has invested heavily in Tajikistan. They have gold mines and other mining operations there. They’ve built a lot of roads and tunnels and other infrastructure. And of course, as I mentioned already, they also have this, military presence in eastern Tajikistan, whi...

From January to August 2016, Army strategist and SSI National Security Researcher Major Brennan Deveraux served in Iraq in a strike cell as the theater-level rocket artillery liaison for Operation Inherent Resolve, firing over 500 rockets that killed hundreds of enemy fighters. His recently published memoir of that experience, Exterminating ISIS: Behind the Curtain of a Technological War, is a raw, unflinching examination of how the U.S. military leveraged its technological advantage to eliminate the ISIS threat… and the moral dilemmas that come with an unfair fight. Given the central roles that artillery and drones play on today’s battlefields in places like Ukraine, the publication of MAJ Deveraux’s book is particularly timely. Listen here, download to your device, or subscribe below.

A year and a half ago, Javier Milei shocked Latin America by winning a landslide election in Argentina. His libertarian approach and dogmatic style worried many as he assumed the presidency starting in December 2023 – so how have things turned out so far? Dr. Evan Ellis, SSI’s Research Professor of Latin American Studies, joined SSI Live host Dr. John R. Deni to discuss his recent trip to Argentina, during which Dr. Ellis had the opportunity to gauge perspectives on Milei’s track record to date. Listen here, download to your device, or subscribe below.

America’s European allies have played a critical role in providing military assistance to Ukraine. Can Europeans maintain that effort or even increase it if the United States reduces its role? What lessons can the United States learn from the role of its European allies in this war, which might be applicable to future rounds of strategic competition with Russia and China? The National Defense University’s Dr. Lisa Aronsson joined SSI Live host Dr. John R. Deni to discuss their recently published monograph, The Role of America’s European Allies in the Russia-Ukraine War, 2022–24. Listen here, download to your device, or subscribe below.

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