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In five days, three of the systems American business runs on failed in a row — Microsoft 365, the national airspace, and the banking network — and every operator insisted it was not an attack.
In this briefing we separate what is confirmed from what is speculation, and then get to the part that actually matters for your organization: the dependency risk these outages exposed, and the plan that prepares you for the next one.
The uncomfortable truth is that most businesses are far more dependent on a single vendor than they realize, and they find out the hard way. This is how you find out on your own terms instead.
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In the military, a radio that transmits in the clear is not a working radio. It functions. You set the frequency, you key the handset, the other end hears you. And you still cannot take it on an operation, because configuring the radio and securing the radio are two separate jobs.
That is the gap we take apart in this episode. Companies hire an IT provider, get told the network is configured, and start using it without ever asking the second question. Our CISO explains what an MSP contract actually obligates anybody to do, where the vulnerabilities hide in that contract, and why the failure stays invisible for years before it arrives all at once.
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Three weeks ago somebody pushed a malicious file into 318 code repositories in sixteen minutes. No password was cracked. Nobody was phoned. The attacker had a leaked token, and a token does not ask who you are.
In this episode we take apart the credential problem underneath that campaign, and then the thing the industry is selling as the fix. Passkeys are genuinely better than passwords. They also concentrate risk in places nobody is explaining to the people turning them on, and for a startup with a product that has a login, those decisions are being made right now by default.
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Last month the FBI searched more than 40 houses in Texas and carried out roughly 187 laptops. Every one of them was issued by a company to somebody it believed it had hired. The machines were encrypted, patched, and enrolled in management. The people using them were in another country.
In this episode we take apart the two failures that sit on either side of every remote worker. You control the hardware and cannot verify the human. Or you trust the human and have never seen the hardware. For a healthcare organization, the device in the middle is not just an endpoint. It is a workstation with a federal definition and safeguards attached to it, whoever paid for it.
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Last week CISA told organizations to patch a tool whose entire job is privileged remote access. The vendor had already shipped the fix. The companies that got compromised were the ones who never turned the updates on.
In this episode we work through why that keeps happening. Not because anyone was careless, but because the reasons organizations delay updates are mostly reasonable and the reasons nobody reviews a configuration are almost entirely structural. Then we get to the part that should concern every defense contractor listening: the score you posted to the federal government describes systems you may not actually be running anymore.
By the end you will know the difference between owning a security tool and operating one.
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This week we are covering the third one nobody plans for: if your vendor stops, you stop.
In May, a cooling system failed in one building in Northern Virginia. Coinbase went dark for about seven hours. FanDuel went offline in the middle of an NBA playoff game. Five months later, Microsoft lost gateway networking across eighteen Azure regions. No ransomware. No stolen credentials. No attacker at all. Just a cooling system, a maintenance process, and thousands of businesses that had a day they had no control over.
Most executives run a vendor security program and have never built a vendor dependency program. Those are two different questions about the same vendor, and only one of them has an owner.
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Ten million records walked out of Match Group this year, and the attacker never touched the product. Not Tinder's database. Not Hinge's. The data came out of a marketing analytics tool.
This week we walk the full chain: the vishing call, the lookalike domain, the Okta single sign-on credential, and the third-party platform that turned one compromised identity into the largest consumer dating breach of the year.
Then we get into the part that should worry every founder listening. Your product can be secure, your database locked down, your engineers flawless — and the breach still happens inside a tool your marketing team bought with a company credit card. We cover who owns that, what it costs, and why the default configuration on almost every analytics platform is set to collect the maximum.
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One attack stopped milk production at four plants. The other took 1.4 terabytes out of Nike and never encrypted a single file.
This week we break down two of the biggest cyber events of 2026, and they failed in completely opposite directions. Coca-Cola's fairlife subsidiary lost its production systems to the Anubis ransomware group and chose not to negotiate. Nike lost product designs, supplier lists, and pricing to WorldLeaks — a group that has largely abandoned encryption entirely, because there is nothing to restore when nothing was locked.
What connects them is uncomfortable. In both cases, what got taken was not what the security program was pointed at.
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A cloned badge gets somebody through the door. An unlocked laptop gets them onto the network. Not one cyber control has to be defeated for that to happen.
This week we go the other direction from our usual briefing. Your security awareness training covers phishing and passwords and says nothing about the card hanging around your neck — and that gap is structural, because physical security and cyber security have always lived in different departments.
We cover what a badge broadcasts when it leaves the building, how little it costs to clone one, what an attacker does in the twenty minutes after they walk in, and the section of the HIPAA Security Rule most healthcare organizations have never read.
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The board wants AI controls. Procurement is writing AI clauses into contracts. And inside most organizations, nobody is sure which framework to commit to.
This week we lay out what is actually on the table. ISO 42001, the NIST AI Risk Management Framework, COBIT and the ISACA credentials, and GRAICE — the Global Responsible AI Compliance and Ethics framework from the Global Council for Responsible AI, which our CISO has been working with directly.
But the most useful answer in this episode is that the framework is not where you start. You cannot put a standard around something you have not found, and most organizations have no idea how much AI is already running inside software they already bought.
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