This year, 2013, marks the 100th anniversary of the Federal Reserve System, and central bankers are taking a historical perspective. That is “good advice in general,” Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke told attendees at the Fourteenth Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference, in Washington, D.C earlier this month.
“An appreciation of the parallels between recent and historical events greatly influenced how I and many of my colleagues around the world responded to the crisis,” Mr. Bernanke said.
He went on to describe the similarities between the banking crisis of 1907 – the one that inspired the formation of the Federal Reserve – and the more recent 2008 financial crisis.
Both fit the archetype of a classic financial panic, Bernanke said. Both crises started in an economy in recession and both suffered from a sudden lack of liquidity.
In 1907, money was tight in part due to the rebuilding of San Francisco. After the Bank of England raised its discount rate, causing more gold to flow out of the US, New York was left with unusually low monetary reserves just as it entered the cash-intensive harvest season, explained Ellis Tallman and Jon Moen in a 1990 article about the Panic in the Atlanta Fed’s Economic Review.
In the more recent crises, Bernanke explained, liquidity started to dry up when housing prices declined, and subprime mortgage defaults rose in 2007. As the underwriting weaknesses of subprime portfolios became known, banks stopped lending to each other, paralyzing credit markets. By 2008, losses from these portfolios were causing banks to fail.
In both crises, a tinder-dry credit environment made them vulnerable to sparks. In 1907, the fire started when F. Augustus Heinze and C.F. Morse tried and failed to corner the stock of the United Copper Company. The investigation into the scam revealed an intricate web of corrupt bankers and brokers. (Heinze was president of Mercantile National Bank, and Morse served on seven New York City bank boards.) When the president of the second largest trust in the country was implicated in the copper cornering con, depositors started a run on Knickerbocker Trust.
Without a central bank, the availability of liquidity depended on the discretion of firms and private individuals, Bernanke explained. The Lehman Brothers moment of 1907 came when New York’s financiers, led by J.P. Morgan, were unable to value the trusts, and refused to ‘bail out’ Knickerbocker. (Unregulated and a relatively new innovation, trusts were the ‘toxic assets‘ of the 1907 crises. Trusts, however, were financed by consumer deposits, while the toxic asset of 2008 were securities contracts held by investment banks.)
Their refusal prevented other institutions from offering aid, and depositors started a massive run on banks and trusts, exacerbating the liquidity crises. (In 2008 a loss of confidence in the banking system did not turn into a consumer run on banks primarily because of FDIC deposit insurance.)
Morgan et al realized that a failure of the trusts could spread to the entire financial system, and they ultimately convinced John D. Rockefeller and others to pony up enough cash to stabilize the markets.
Similarly, American lawmakers eventually agreed that failure of the nation’s largest financial institutions was not an option, and passed the $700 billion