Supreme Court of Canada Hearings (Floor Audio)

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)

The appellant, a police officer, was temporarily off work because of medical problems. During a meeting with a physician-arbitrator who was to determine whether his disability was permanent, the appellant misrepresented his work activities with his former spouse’s travel agencies. The physician-arbitrator found that his disability was permanent, and the appellant was therefore entitled to permanent disability benefits from his employer. The employer knew of some of the appellant’s work activities but did not tell the physician-arbitrator about them.

The trial judge found that all the elements of the offence of fraud over $5,000 had been established. The appellant was convicted of one count of fraud. The majority of the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision, while the minority would have substituted a verdict of attempted fraud.

Argued Date

2024-01-17

Keywords

Criminal law — Offences — Elements of offence — Fraud — Deprivation — Concurrence between actus reus and mens rea — Proof of causation — Whether Court has jurisdiction to hear appeal as of right under s. 691(1)(a) of Criminal Code — Whether majority of Court of Appeal interpreted essential element of deprivation too broadly — Whether victim’s prior knowledge of scheme prevents deprivation from being shown — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 380(1).

Notes

(Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Appellant Daniel Hodgson was charged with second-degree murder following a death at a house party. The victim, a large man, had become aggressive towards the house owner and refused to leave. Mr. Hodgson, who had been sleeping in a nearby bedroom, was asked by a guest to help remove the victim from the house. The victim died after Mr. Hodgson applied a one-arm choke hold on him.

Mr. Hodgson was acquitted at trial. The trial judge had a reasonable doubt as to whether Mr. Hodgson had the requisite intent for murder. On the lesser included offence of manslaughter, the trial judge concluded that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hodgson did not act in self-defence pursuant to s. 34 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

Argued Date

2024-02-15

Keywords

Criminal Law — Defences — Self-Defence — Appellant charged with second-degree murder following an altercation at party — Trial judge finding no intent to murder, and Crown failing to disprove self-defence on the lesser included offence of manslaughter — Appellant acquitted — Court of Appeal setting aside acquittal and ordering new trial — Whether Court of Appeal exceeded its jurisdiction in concluding that the trial judge’s failure to infer intent for murder was a reviewable legal error — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that the trial judge was required to infer the intent for murder — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that the trial judge erroneously approached the issue of the reasonableness of the Appellant’s response from a purely subjective perspective — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 34.

Notes

(Nunavut) (Criminal) (By Leave)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(Publication ban in case)

In the Court Martial, a military judge acquitted the respondent, Private D.T. Vu, of sexual assault under s. 130 of the National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-5 (“NDA”), that is to say, s. 271 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. It is alleged that the respondent performed a sex act on the complainant who was incapable of consenting to the act by reason of advanced intoxication. The judge concluded that the Crown did not prove part of the actus reus (being a lack of subjective consent) beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant Crown appealed to the Court Martial Appeal Court. It submitted that the military judge erred in finding that the prosecution failed to prove a lack of consent or capacity to consent. Its submission rested on the proposition recognized in R. v. J.M.H., 2011 SCC 45, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 197, that the judge committed a legal error by failing to consider the entirety and cumulative effect of the evidence in reaching his conclusion on the issue. A majority of the appeal court (per Bell C.J. and Trotter J.A.) dismissed the appeal. It held the military judge did not err in law in his analysis leading to the respondent’s acquittal. Any findings the military judge made that the majority took issue with were held to have no bearing on the verdict reached. The majority further held that in the event it was incorrect on this point, it would rely upon s. 241 of the NDA, which states that “[n]otwithstanding anything in this Division, the Court Martial Appeal Court may disallow an appeal if, in the opinion of the Court, to be expressed in writing, there has been no substantial miscarriage of justice”. In dissent, McVeigh J.A. would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. In her view, the military judge erred in law by failing to consider all of the evidence cumulatively, which led him to speculate improperly about alternative theories. These errors might have reasonably had a material bearing on the verdict. Further, the military judge erred by relying on improper inferences which, in effect, amounted to an insistence that the complainant’s intoxication had to be corroborated beyond the available evidence in this case.

Argued Date

2024-01-16

Keywords

Criminal law — Armed forces — Military Offences —Sexual Assault — Evidence — Whether the military judge failed to consider all of the evidence cumulatively — Whether the military judge assessed the evidence based on the wrong legal principles.

Notes

(Federal) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

After a trial in the Court of Québec, the appellant, Yves Caleb Jr. Charles, was convicted of assault with a weapon, using an imitation firearm in the commission of assault, and uttering threats. During the trial, a prosecution witness refused to cooperate, and the trial judge allowed the prosecution to introduce an out of court statement made by the witness into evidence as hearsay. In the judge’s view, the statement had features of substantive reliability in light of the corroborative evidence and the circumstances in which the statement had been made. The Court of Appeal, for the reasons of Doyon and Cournoyer JJ.A., dismissed the accused’s appeal. Bachand J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, as he was of the view that the out of court statement in issue did not satisfy the threshold reliability requirement for being admitted into evidence. He found that the corroborative evidence was not relevant in analyzing the threshold reliability of the assertion made by the witness concerning the appellant’s conduct and words, and that the circumstances in which the statement had been made did not provide sufficient guarantees of substantive reliability.

Argued Date

2024-01-18

Keywords

Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Hearsay — Out-of-court statement — Corroborative evidence — Circumstances in which statement made — Whether results of search were considered as corroborative evidence, in accordance with principles enunciated in R. v. Bradshaw, 2017 SCC 35, for purpose of admitting K.A.’s statement into evidence — Whether circumstances of K.A.’s statement provided sufficient guarantees of substantive reliability.

Notes

(Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) (SEALING ORDER) (CERTAIN INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC)

On March 23, 2022, the Quebec Court of Appeal issued a redacted version of its reasons, which it had originally delivered on February 28, 2022, allowing the respondent Named Person’s conviction appeal and staying the criminal proceedings brought against Named Person, a police informer. The trial judgment under appeal had not been made public, and all the details of the proceedings, which were held in camera, were unknown to the public. The Court of Appeal ordered that the original version of its judgment and all information in its record be sealed.

After the Court of Appeal issued the redacted judgment, the media appellants filed a motion to have the confidentiality orders concerning the appeal record and the trial record lifted in whole or in part. The appellant the Attorney General of Quebec filed a motion to vary the sealing order applicable to the appeal record. The Court of Appeal dismissed the motions.

Argued Date

2023-12-12

Keywords

Criminal law - Canadian charter (Criminal), Procedure - Criminal law — Charter of Rights — Procedure — Informer privilege — Order that proceedings be held in camera and sealing order — Whether trial judge can proceed outside justice system, completely and totally in camera, without putting together record or revealing very existence of court proceedings, contrary to open court principle protected by s. 2(b) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Whether, even though police informer privilege is absolute, its unrestrained interpretation may displace constitutional principle of open court proceedings, as Court of Appeal suggested — In addition to identity and list of information that would automatically identify informer, for which there is absolute protection, what test and framework should apply to permit adversarial proceeding in order to decide what other information might identify police informer — When determining facts that may be published while still protecting police informer’s identity, whether judge who hears application should order that interested third parties be notified and have opportunity to be heard on these matters — Whether Court of Appeal erred in refusing to partially unseal its record on ground that this exercise seemed unworkable.

Notes

(Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Respondent Joseph Power was convicted of two criminal offences in the 1990s. He served a term of imprisonment.

In 2010 Mr. Power made inquiries about the process to obtain a pardon, but did not apply for one.

In 2011, Mr. Power’s employer learned of his criminal record. He was suspended from work.

Mr. Power applied for a pardon — now called a record suspension — in 2013 in order to continue working in his chosen field. However, two enactments since 2010 — the Limiting Pardons for Serious Crimes Act and the Safe Streets and Communities Act — had amended the Criminal Records Act. Transitional provisions in both of the amending acts gave them retrospective application to offences that had occurred before their coming into force. The combined effect of these enactments and their transitional provisions was to render Mr. Power permanently ineligible for a record suspension.

Mr. Power lost his job and became ineligible for membership with provincial bodies governing his field of employment.

The transitional provisions of both the Limiting Pardons for Serious Crimes Act and the Safe Streets and Communities Act, which gave them retrospective application to offences committed prior to their enactment, were later declared unconstitutional.

Mr. Power brought an action against the Crown, alleging that the adoption and application of the transitional provisions constituted conduct that was clearly wrong, undertaken in bad faith, and abusive of government power. He sought damages pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Prior to trial, the appellant Attorney General of Canada sought a determination of questions of law, concerning whether the Crown could ever be held liable in damages in respect of the enactment of legislation that is later declared unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal of New Brunswick upheld the application judge’s determination of those questions, and dismissed the Attorney General’s appeal.

Argued Date

2023-12-07

Keywords

Constitutional law - Charter of Rights, Remedy (s. 24), Damages - Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Remedy (s. 24) — Damages — Respondent convicted of criminal offences prior to certain amendments to regime for obtaining pardons, but transitional provisions applied the amendments retrospectively — Respondent seeking pardon after employer learned of criminal record, but amendments rendered respondent permanently ineligible for a pardon — Respondent losing his employment — Respondent seeking damages after transitional provisions declared unconstitutional — Whether the Crown may be held liable in damages for government officials and Ministers preparing and drafting legislation that is later declared unconstitutional — Whether the Crown may be held liable in damages for Parliament enacting legislation that is later declared unconstitutional — Limiting Pardons for Serious Crimes Act, S.C. 2010, c. 5 — Safe Streets and Communities Act, S.C. 2012, c. 1 — Criminal Records Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-47.

Notes

(New Brunswick) (Civil) (By Leave)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent, British Columbia Securities Commission found that the appellants, Thalbinder Singh Poonian and Shailu Poonian, breached the Securities Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 418, by engaging in conduct that resulted in the misleading appearance of trading activity in, or an artificial price for, a corporation’s shares. It then imposed both a disgorgement order and an administrative penalty against the Poonians.

The Commission applied to the BCSC for an order declaring that the amounts owed to it by the Poonians were debts that would not be released by an order of discharge under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. The BCSC granted the Commission’s application. It concluded that the debts fell within two exemptions to the discharge of debts outlined at s. 178(1) of the BIA: the debts were fines, penalties or restitution orders imposed by a court (s. 178(1)(a)) and they resulted from obtaining property or services by false pretences or fraudulent misrepresentation (s. 178(1)(e)). The Court of Appeal for British Columbia dismissed the appeal. While it disagreed that the sanctions had been imposed by a court, it concluded that the BCSC had not erred in finding that the sanctions in this case fell within the exemption defined in s. 178(1)(e) of the BIA. The fact that the misrepresentation was not made to the creditor, in this case, the Commission, did not preclude the Commission from relying on the exemption.

Argued Date

2023-12-06

Keywords

Bankruptcy and insolvency - Securities - Bankruptcy and Insolvency — Debts not released by discharge — Securities Commission finding appellants breached Securities Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 418, and imposing disgorgement order and administrative penalties — Courts below granting declaration that amounts appellants owe Securities Commission are not to be released by any order or discharge granted under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding Commission’s administrative monetary penalties and disgorgement orders survived Poonian’s discharge from bankruptcy — If so, whether Court of Appeal erred in finding creditors seeking to avail themselves of s. 178(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act did not have to prove they were same party debtor made direct representations to by fraud or fraudulent pretense — Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 178(1).

Notes

(British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, John Aquino, was the directing mind of Bondfield Construction Company Limited (“BCCL”) and its affiliate, 1033803 Ontario Inc., commonly known as Forma-Con (“debtor companies”). He and the other appellants carried out a false invoicing scheme over a number of years by which they siphoned off tens of millions of dollars from both debtor companies. The respondents challenged the false invoicing scheme and sought to recover some of the money under s. 96 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and s. 36.1 of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36. They asserted that the false invoicing scheme was implemented by means of transfers at undervalue by which Mr. Aquino and the debtor companies intended to defraud, defeat or delay a creditor. The appellants asserted that the principles of the common law doctrine of corporate attribution set out in Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 662, did not permit the imputation of Mr. Aquino’s intention to either debtor company. The application judge imputed the fraudulent intention of Mr. Aquino to the corporate debtors. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants’ appeals.

Argued Date

2023-12-05

Keywords

Bankruptcy and insolvency - Bankruptcy and Insolvency — Doctrine of corporate attribution — Interpretation of requirement that debtor have intent to defraud, defeat or delay creditor, set out in provision of Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act that permits courts to declare transfers at undervalue void — Courts below holding intent requirement met by attributing intent of companies’ directing mind to the corporate debtors — Whether the Court of Appeal was entitled to reframe the common law corporate attribution doctrine, as formulated in Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 662, and its progeny, within the bankruptcy context — Whether the Court of Appeal made an extricable error in law when it upheld the applications judge’s ruling to the effect that the true financial condition of the corporate debtors, at the time of the impugned transactions, was not “determinative” of whether its directing mind, as a matter of fact, had the requisite intent to defraud, defeat or delay the third-party creditors — Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 96.

Notes

(Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)

Mr. Tayo Tompouba was charged with sexual assault. On his first appearance, he was not advised of his right to apply for a trial in French, despite the court’s obligation to inform him of that right under s. 530(3) of the Criminal Code. He was convicted following a trial in English. The Court of Appeal acknowledged that not advising Mr. Tayo Tompouba of his right was an error, but it applied the curative proviso to dismiss his appeal. It held that the right provided for in s. 530(3) is a procedural right, not a substantive right.

Argued Date

2023-10-11

Keywords

Criminal law - Trial - Criminal law — Trial — Language of accused — French-speaking accused not advised of his right to be tried in official language of his choice — Whether curative proviso in s. 686 of Criminal Code can apply to violation of s. 530(3) of Criminal Code — Whether new trial must be ordered — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 530(3), 686(1)(b).

Notes

(British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case)

Language

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The private communications of two teachers, recorded on their personal, password-protected log were read and captured by screenshots taken by their school principal, and then used by the respondent school board (“Board”) to discipline them. The union filed a grievance against the written reprimand issued to the teachers (“Grievors”) claiming the Board violated the Grievors right to privacy by assessing private digital information without reasonable cause and using that information as the basis for an investigation that led to the discipline.

By the time the grievance was heard, the written reprimands had been removed from the Grievors’ records. But the parties agreed to move forward with the issue of the alleged breach of the right to privacy.

The arbitrator dismissed the grievance against the Board. The majority of the Divisional Court upheld the arbitrator’s decision and dismissed the appeal. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and quashed the award of the arbitrator.

Argued Date

2023-10-18

Keywords

Canadian charter (Non-criminal) - Charter of Rights — Unreasonable search and seizure — Reasonable expectation of privacy — Private communications of teachers captured by screenshots taken by school principal and used for discipline purposes — What standard of review applies to labour arbitrator’s decision adjudicating employee’s privacy claim — Whether Charter applies to school boards — Scope and content of employee’s privacy rights in workplace, either under s. 8 of Charter or common law.

Notes

(Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave)

Language

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Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).