Supreme Court of Canada Hearings (Floor Audio)

Before the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench, the appellant, Ryan David Clark, was convicted by a jury of second degree murder. The main issue at trial was the identity of the person who had beaten the deceased to death.

On appeal, Mr. Clark argued that the trial judge erred by failing to address the frailties of eyewitness evidence in his instructions to the jury, particularly with regard to in-court identification by two witnesses. He also argued that the trial judge erred by allowing other witnesses to provide bad character and post-offence conduct evidence and by failing to adequately caution the jury in relation to that testimony and that the verdict was unreasonable. A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The jury instructions properly equipped the jury to understand its task in evaluating all of the eyewitness identification evidence, including the in-court identification. It was adequately prepared to examine the frailties of the evidence of the two particular witnesses and to determine if it would accept their testimony as credible and reliable in accordance with the law. The trial judge also did not err in regard to post-offence conduct and bad character evidence and the verdict was not unreasonable.

In dissent, Leurer J.A. would have allowed Mr. Clark’s appeal and ordered a new trial. In his view, the jury charge did not adequately equip the jurors to deal with the frailties of the in-court eyewitness identification evidence in this case.

Argued Date

2022-11-30

Keywords

Criminal law - Charge to jury - Criminal law — Charge to jury — Eyewitness evidence — Identification — In-court identification — Caution — Whether the trial judge erred in not providing an adequate jury instruction or caution alerting jurors that a witness’s testimony had limited value for the purposes of identifying the assailant who killed the victim, and that this witness’s in court identification of the appellant had no evidentiary value — Whether the trial judge erred in not providing an adequate jury instruction or caution on the problematic nature of another witness’s in-court identification of the appellant, and that it would be dangerous to attribute to this identification any degree of certainty greater than what she had communicated to police prior — Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal erred in law by concluding the instructions on eyewitness identification evidence did not give rise to reversible legal error.

Notes

(Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Section 34(1)(e) of Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (“IRPA”) provides that permanent residents or foreign nationals are “inadmissible on security grounds” for “engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada”. The Minister alleged that both appellants were foreign nationals who were inadmissible under s. 34(1)(e) of the IRPA.

The issue before the Immigration Board and the Immigration Appeal Division was whether s. 34(1)(e) applied only where there is a connection to national security. Both agreed with the Minister that it did not. In their view, s. 34(1)(e) operates whether or not there is a connection to national security.

On judicial review, the Federal Court quashed the decisions in the two cases.

Both cases were heard together at the Federal Court of Appeal. It allowed the appeals, set aside the judgments of the Federal Court and dismissed the applications for judicial review. It found the administrative interpretation of s. 34(1)(e) was reasonable and answered the following certified question:

Q.: Is it reasonable to interpret para. 34(1)(e) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act in a manner that does not require proof of conduct that has a nexus with “national security” or the “security of Canada”?

A. Yes.

Argued Date

2022-11-29

Keywords

Immigration - Judicial review - Immigration — Inadmissibility on security grounds for “engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada” — Judicial review — Interpretation of s. 34(1)(e) of Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA) — Whether reasonable interpretation of s. 34(1)(e) of IRPA requires national security nexus — Whether s. 34(1)(e) of IRPA can apply to conduct that does not require a nexus to “national security” or “security of Canada” — How should reviewing courts determine whether a legislative provision can bear only one reasonable interpretation and what constraints will bear on this assessment — Whether Federal Court of Appeal erred in overturning Federal Court’s findings that tribunal decisions were unreasonable.

Notes

(Federal) (Civil) (By Leave)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration that exceeded eighty milligrams of alcohol in one hundred milliliters of blood. The appellant was released from custody on an undertaking, a condition of which was that she would not operate a motor vehicle. The appellant spent the 21 months that elapsed between her initial appearance and sentencing under a driving prohibition as a condition of her release. The Provincial Court sentencing judge imposed a $1,000 fine and decided a fit punishment in the circumstances was the one-year minimum driving prohibition. He then addressed whether he could take into account her 21-month presentence driving prohibition. Deciding he could, the appellant was not subjected to any further driving prohibition. The Crown’s appeal of that decision was dismissed by the summary conviction appeal judge. A majority of the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, varied the Provincial Court decision to include a one-year driving prohibition, and stayed the execution of prohibition order. The dissenting justice would have dismissed the appeal.

Argued Date

2022-11-08

Keywords

Criminal law - Sentencing - Criminal law – Sentencing – Mandatory minimum sentences – Did the sentencing judge commit an error of law by granting time served on a mandatory driving prohibition order – Is time served on a driving prohibition pursuant to an accused’s interim release deductible from a mandatory minimum driving prohibition on sentence that would leave the remaining time to be served on sentence below the mandatory minimum – Does this Court’s direction on the issue in Lacasse that dealt with a discretionary order on sentence which said pre-trial driving suspension must be deducted from the time on sentence apply to mandatory minimum prohibition orders?

Notes

(New Brunswick) (Criminal) (By Leave)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellants, Yves Des Groseillers and BMTC Group Inc., appealed assessments made by the respondent, the Agence du revenu du Québec (“ARQ”). In the course of tax audits, the ARQ added amounts to Mr. Des Groseillers’s taxable income as additional employment income. Those amounts represented the total value of the stock options donated by Mr. Des Groseillers to registered charities, for which he had claimed tax credits. The ARQ therefore added the amounts to BMTC’s payroll as well.

The Court of Québec allowed Mr. Des Groseillers’s application and vacated the notices of assessment. It allowed BMTC’s application in part and referred the notices of assessment to the Minister for reconsideration and reassessment. In the court’s view, although the transactions were subject to the special rules on the issuance of securities to employees, it would find that Mr. Des Groseillers had not received any benefit, because the evidence showed that he had not received any consideration for the donation and that he had not paid anything to acquire the options. The ARQ could not rely on the presumption set out in another division of the statute to the effect that the disposition of property is deemed to be made at its fair market value, because the special rules form a complete code. The Court of Appeal allowed the ARQ’s appeal, set aside the Court of Québec’s judgment and rendered the decision that ought to have been rendered, that is, it dismissed the appeals brought by Mr. Des Groseillers and BMTC from the notices of assessment. It held that the special rules do not exclude the application of the presumption.

Argued Date

2022-11-03

Keywords

Taxation - Income tax, Assessment - Taxation — Income tax — Assessment — Stock options — Charitable donation — Whether donation of stock options by individual to registered charity gives rise to taxable employment benefit where donor receives no actual consideration — Taxation Act, CQLR, c. I-3, ss. 48, 50, 54, 422.

Notes

(Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave)

Language

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Prior to the transactions at issue, the appellant, Deans Knight Income Corporation, was a Canadian public corporation that had approximately $90 million of unused non-capital losses and other deductions. It sought to realize the value of these tax attributes and entered into an agreement with a corporation that had expertise in arranging such transactions. From 2009 to 2012, the appellant deducted a majority of its tax attributes to reduce its tax liability. Following the issuance of reassessments to deny the deductions, the appellant successfully appealed to the Tax Court, but the decision was overturned by the Federal Court of Appeal.

Argued Date

2022-11-02

Keywords

Taxation - Taxation — Corporate restart transaction — Deductible losses — Non-capital losses — General anti-avoidance rule — Whether the Federal Court of Appeal erred in relying on the GAAR to conclude that “actual control” was Parliament’s intended test under ss. 37(6.1), 111(5) and 127(9.1) of the ITA — Whether the Federal Court of Appeal erred in concluding, contrary to the trial judge’s findings, that the avoidance transactions resulted in an abuse of ss. 37(6.1), 111(5) and 127(9.1) of the ITA — Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), ss. 37(6.1), 111(5) and 127(9.1).

Notes

(Federal) (Civil) (By Leave)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent was driving a vehicle, had exited the public highway, and was on private property when the police officer approached him. The officer testified that they did not see any signs of impairment prior to stopping the respondent and there was nothing unusual about his driving. The officer explained that they were exercising their authority to conduct random sobriety checks pursuant to s. 48(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8. At the stop, the officer spoke to the respondent, observed obvious signs of impairment, and arrested him. The respondent was convicted of impaired operation of a motor vehicle, and operating a motor vehicle while “over 80”. The respondent’s summary conviction appeal was allowed; the conviction was set aside and an acquittal was entered. A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant’s appeal.

Argued Date

2022-11-01

Keywords

Criminal law - Arbitrary detention (s. 9) - Charter of Rights — Arbitrary detention — Exclusion of evidence —Was the police stop authorized by s. 48(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 — If there was a breach of s. 9 of the Charter, should the evidence have been excluded under s. 24(2) — ss. 9, 24(2) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Notes

(Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave)

Language

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).