Supreme Court of Canada Hearings (Floor Audio)

11368 NL Inc. was the owner of commercial real estate known as Kenmount Terrace. Patrick Street Holdings Limited is part of a group of related companies that, through loans secured by mortgages, financed development projects undertaken by a group of related companies including 11368 NL Inc. In early 2016, two mortgages known as Mortgage 608132 and Mortgage 708519 went into default and notices of power of sale were issued under the Conveyancing Act, RSNL 1990, c. C-34. These power of sale proceedings halted when 11368 NL Inc., as the mortgagee, gave a third mortgage known as Mortgage 759678. Mortgage 759678 is a collateral mortgage registered against Kenmount Terrace to a limit of $4,000,000 in support of 11368 NL Inc.’s guarantee of Mortgage 608132. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. reactivated power of sale proceedings under Mortgage 708519 and obtained Kenmount Terrace at public auction. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. provided an accounting of the proceeds of the power of sale to all encumbrancers of Kenmount Terrace stating that specific charges including Mortgage 759678 took priority and exhausted the power of sale proceeds such that not all encumbrancers could be paid. Two unpaid encumbrancers commenced an application challenging the accounting. 11368 NL Inc. filed an interlocutory application claiming entitlement to any surplus funds from the power of sale plus interest, but also advancing a claim of priority for another encumbrancer, Ms. Cheeke. On October 3, 2017, Handrigan J. determined the two encumbrancers’ application but not 11368’s interlocutory application. Handrigan J. held there was a surplus on the power of sale of approximately $4.2 million. He accepted most of Patrick Street Holdings Ltd.’s accounting but did not include its claim to $4,000,000 under Mortgage 759678 in his accounting. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. appealed, The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. paid the two applicant encumbrancers’ claims and withheld the balance of the surplus of the power of sale proceeds. On July 16, 2022, Handrigan J. determined the interlocutory application filed by 11368 NL Inc. Handrigan J. held Ms. Cheeke’s encumbrance took priority and was due from the remaining surplus. He held that his conclusion on October 3, 2017, that Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. had not established what was owing under Mortgage 759678 had been accepted on appeal and nothing had been shown to cause him to change his mind on this issue. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. was ordered to pay the surplus remaining after payment to Ms. Cheeke to 11368 NL Inc. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. appealed. A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

Argued Date

2025-10-15

Keywords

Civil procedure — Res judicata — Estoppel — Abuse of process by re-litigation — Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred in law in finding res judicata may be raised for first time on appeal — If so, whether requirements of res judicata satisfied — Whether doctrine of abuse of process by re-litigation applied beyond permissible limits — Whether abuse of process for purchaser to rely on collateral mortgage — Amount due and payable under a mortgage at the time of power of sale proceedings.

Notes

(Newfoundland & Labrador) (Civil) (By Leave)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2015, a finding of misconduct was made against an Edmonton Police Service (EPS) detective, and was recorded in a document entitled “Decision of Hearing”. The EPS provided the respondent, His Majesty the King in Right of Canada (hereafter, the “Crown”), with a copy of the Decision of Hearing in July 2015 in relation to a prosecution. The finding of misconduct to which the Decision of Hearing relates was later removed from the detective’s record of discipline by operation of s. 22 of the Police Service Regulation.By June of 2022, respondent John McKee had been charged with drug and weapons offences, following an investigation in which the detective had been involved. In July 2023, the Crown advised Mr. McKee’s counsel that records relating to the detective’s past misconduct may be relevant and subject to disclosure, as the details of the misconduct were serious and had a realistic bearing on the detective’s credibility. The Crown further advised that the EPS opposed disclosure of the records but the Crown would consent to an application for disclosure if Mr. McKee should choose to bring one.Mr. McKee brought an application for disclosure in the Court of King’s Bench of Alberta. The application judge held that the information of misconduct in the Decision of Hearing was relevant and disclosable by the Crown as first-party information. The application was granted.

Argued Date

2025-10-08

Keywords

Criminal law — Evidence — Disclosure — Police disciplinary records — Information relating to past finding of misconduct of police detective removed from detective’s record of discipline pursuant to Police Service Regulation — Detective involved in investigation leading to charges against accused — Crown determining information concerning detective’s past misconduct possibly relevant and material to accused’s prosecution — Detective and chief of police opposing disclosure — Application judge determining information of misconduct must be disclosed — Whether the scope of “the possession of the prosecuting Crown” includes information provided to the Crown’s office outside of the particular prosecution at issue — Scope of disclosure of police disciplinary records required by R. v. McNeil, 2009 SCC 3 — Whether statutorily expunged findings of police officer misconduct disclosable to the accused in unrelated criminal proceedings — Whether factors not listed in R. v. Sullivan, 2022 SCC 19 constitute permissible exemptions to horizontal stare decisis — Police Service Regulation, Alta. Reg. 356/1990, s. 22.

Notes

(Alberta) (Criminal) (By Leave)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2015, a finding of misconduct was made against an Edmonton Police Service (EPS) detective, and was recorded in a document entitled “Decision of Hearing”. The EPS provided the respondent, His Majesty the King in Right of Canada (hereafter, the “Crown”), with a copy of the Decision of Hearing in July 2015 in relation to a prosecution. The finding of misconduct to which the Decision of Hearing relates was later removed from the detective’s record of discipline by operation of s. 22 of the Police Service Regulation.By June of 2022, respondent John McKee had been charged with drug and weapons offences, following an investigation in which the detective had been involved. In July 2023, the Crown advised Mr. McKee’s counsel that records relating to the detective’s past misconduct may be relevant and subject to disclosure, as the details of the misconduct were serious and had a realistic bearing on the detective’s credibility. The Crown further advised that the EPS opposed disclosure of the records but the Crown would consent to an application for disclosure if Mr. McKee should choose to bring one.Mr. McKee brought an application for disclosure in the Court of King’s Bench of Alberta. The application judge held that the information of misconduct in the Decision of Hearing was relevant and disclosable by the Crown as first-party information. The application was granted.

Argued Date

2025-10-07

Keywords

Criminal law — Evidence — Disclosure — Police disciplinary records — Information relating to past finding of misconduct of police detective removed from detective’s record of discipline pursuant to Police Service Regulation — Detective involved in investigation leading to charges against accused — Crown determining information concerning detective’s past misconduct possibly relevant and material to accused’s prosecution — Detective and chief of police opposing disclosure — Application judge determining information of misconduct must be disclosed — Whether the scope of “the possession of the prosecuting Crown” includes information provided to the Crown’s office outside of the particular prosecution at issue — Scope of disclosure of police disciplinary records required by R. v. McNeil, 2009 SCC 3 — Whether statutorily expunged findings of police officer misconduct disclosable to the accused in unrelated criminal proceedings — Whether factors not listed in R. v. Sullivan, 2022 SCC 19 constitute permissible exemptions to horizontal stare decisis — Police Service Regulation, Alta. Reg. 356/1990, s. 22.

Notes

(Alberta) (Criminal) (By Leave)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

B.F., a surgical nurse, has a child, E. B.F. and E.’s father are separated and, in 2019, were engaged in litigation about parenting rights. An interim ruling in that case in early June 2019 granted E.’s father supervised access, which B.F. resisted. At this time, B.F. was residing with her mother, I.F.On June 12, 2019, after the interim ruling, a neighbour found B.F., I.F., and E., then 19 months old, in B.F.’s home. All three were unconscious in B.F.’s bedroom; E. was in her crib. First responders found five empty insulin pens at the scene, each of which originally contained many times the normal adult dose. There were nine visible injection marks on E.’s body and evidence that E. had resisted the injections; no injection marks were visible on B.F. or I.F. The first responders also located a handwritten letter at the scene that they characterized as a suicide note. Due to the quantity of insulin injected into her system, E. suffered serious and permanent brain damage, as well as permanent damage to other organs. She was diagnosed with cerebral palsy and spasticity, and suffers from seizures. She requires constant medical care. B.F. and I.F. have since fully recovered. B.F. was arrested and charged with two counts of attempted murder by administering a noxious substance (a potentially lethal amount of insulin by injection), and two counts of aggravated assault.The jury convicted B.F. of the attempted murder of E. and I.F., and of the aggravated assault of E. The jury acquitted B.F. of the aggravated assault of I.F.B.F. appealed her conviction and sentence. The conviction appeal in relation to the attempted murder of E. was dismissed. The conviction appeal in relation to the attempted murder of I.F. was allowed and a new trial ordered.

Argued Date

2025-05-22

Keywords

Criminal law — Offences — Elements of offence — Charge to jury — Party liability — Attempted murder and aiding suicide — Suicide pact defence — Whether victim of a crime may also be a principal of an offence — Whether accused may be liable as a party to an offence without a principal offender being found guilty — Whether trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on the scenario presented by counsel for B.F. — Whether jury instructions were misleading to the point of error — Whether jury instructions raise a reasonable apprehension of biais — Whether suicide pact defence available — Whether Court of Appeal erred in approach to causation — Whether Court of Appeal incorrectly required additional elements that must be satisfied for an act that may assist suicide to also constitute murder

Notes

(Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent was arrested without warrant by the police 11 days after the date of an alleged crime. At his trial, he brought a motion in which he claimed that his arrest and his detention following his arrest were unlawful pursuant to s. 495(2)(b), (d) and (e) of the Criminal Code and s. 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. He argued that the power to arrest and detain without warrant for a hybrid offence is lawful only if the peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that an indictable offence was actually committed or is about to be committed and that such measures are necessary in the public interest.The trial judge summarily dismissed the motion on the ground that it had no chance of success. The police officers could, pursuant to s. 495(3) of the Criminal Code, proceed solely on reasonable grounds to believe that an indictable offence was actually committed. There was nothing unlawful about his arrest. The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had erred in refusing to hold a voir dire on the motion, because the motion was not bound to fail. The right to challenge the lawfulness of the arrest without warrant is guaranteed by the terms of s. 495(3) in accordance with a viable interpretation of the limitations imposed on the power of arrest without warrant set out in s. 495(2). The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

Argued Date

2025-05-21

Keywords

Criminal law — Arrest — Police — Powers — Arrest without warrant — Whether s. 495(2) of Criminal Code modifies peace officer’s power to arrest person without warrant — Whether s. 495(3) of Criminal Code excuses non compliance with s. 495(2) — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that trial judge had erred in summarily dismissing motion in which unlawfulness of arrest by reason of non compliance with s. 495(2) was alleged — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C 46, s. 495.

Notes

(Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

On December 6, 2021, S.A. was charged with assault and sexual assault. He elected to be tried by judge and jury. A trial date of April 17, 2023 was set but, on April 17, 2023, the trial could not commence because no judge was available. A trial date was set for February 12, 2024. Forestell J. held that delay of 6 to 10 months was unreasonable and breached s. 11(b) of the Charter. Notwithstanding that net delay was below the presumptive ceiling of 30 months set in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, she stayed the proceedings. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal and set aside the stay of proceedings.

Argued Date

2025-05-16

Keywords

Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Right to tried in reasonable time — How should delay caused by judicial vacancy be treated under s. 11(b) of the Charter?

Notes

(Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2019, Mr. Dorsey and Mr. Salah both applied for transfer to a minimum security institution. At the time, Mr. Dorsey, a dangerous offender, was incarcerated at a medium security facility; Mr. Salah was sentenced to concurrent life sentences and is incarcerated at a different medium security facility. Mr. Dorsey’s case management team, his Manager of Assessment and Intervention, and his Warden all agreed that he met the criteria for reclassification to minimum security but, because of his dangerous offender status, his transfer request had to be approved by the Regional Deputy Commissioner and then the Assistant Commissioner of Correctional Operations and Programs. In September 2019, the Regional Deputy Commissioner assessed Mr. Dorsey’s public safety rating as moderate. His request was denied.Mr. Salah’s case management team, his parole officer, and his Manager of Assessment and Intervention recommended reclassification and transfer to a minimum security facility, but, in October 2019, a new Manager of Assessment and Intervention and Intervention was assigned to his file. He assessed Mr. Salah as a moderate escape risk, so the Warden wrongly denied his transfer request.Mr. Dorsey and Mr. Salah each applied under the Habeas Corpus Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H-1, for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum with certiorari in aid. Although they did not apply under the Charter, they alleged that the denial of their transfer requests engaged ss. 7, 9, 10(c) and 12 of the Charter. On consent, the applications were joined for the purpose of determining a common threshold legal issue: whether Mr. Dorsey and Mr. Salah could resort to habeas corpus to challenge the denials of their applications for transfer to lower security prisons.The applications were dismissed on the grounds that habeas corpus was not available for denials of reclassification, which were not deprivations of residual liberty. After the application judge’s decision, Mr. Dorsey was reclassified and transferred to a minimum security institution, but he continued his appeal. The appeal was dismissed.

Argued Date

2025-05-13

Keywords

Prerogative writs — Habeas corpus — Prisons — Deprivation of residual liberty — Security classification — Transfer — Denial of reclassification — Denial of transfer to lower security institution — Whether denial of reclassification and transfer to lower security institution is deprivation of residual liberty reviewable by way of habeas corpus.

Notes

(Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent is a criminal defence lawyer whose client was the subject of a wiretap authorization under the Criminal Code. The authorization did not permit live monitoring of phone calls with a lawyer; such calls could be recorded, but a judge’s order was required to access them. During the surveillance operation, the respondent called her client, which was automatically recorded. A civilian employee also listened to a portion of the call before disconnecting.A reviewing judge concluded that an initial portion of the telephone call was not subject to solicitor-client privilege and it was released to the Crown. The recording revealed the respondent informed her client that a third party had been arrested and that the police would likely be obtaining search warrants for places where the third party had been. The respondent was charged with wilfully attempting to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice by interfering in an ongoing police investigation, contrary to s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code.In a voir dire, the trial judge concluded that the respondent’s rights under s. 8 of the Charter were not breached with respect to the civilian employee listening to her phone conversation. However, she also concluded that her rights under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter had been breached due to her inability to access the second, privileged portion of the recording. She ordered the entire recording excluded under s. 24(1) of the Charter. The Crown called no evidence and the respondent was acquitted.A majority of the Court of Appeal affirmed the acquittal and the trial judge’s decision with respect to the breaches of the respondent’s rights under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter. However, it also concluded that her rights under s. 8 had been breached, and it therefore would have excluded the evidence of the telephone call under s. 24(2) of the Charter rather than s. 24(1). The dissenting judge would have held that the respondent’s ss. 7 and 11(d) rights were not breached. He agreed with the majority that there was a breach of her s. 8 rights, but he would have held that the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2). He would have ordered a new trial.

Argued Date

2025-05-20

Keywords

Criminal Law — Charter of rights — Search and seizure (s. 8) — Full answer and defence (ss. 7 and 11(d) — Solicitor-client privilege — Wire-tap authorization — Interaction between solicitor-client privilege and an accused’s lawyer’s Charter rights — Wire-tap monitoring and recording of phone call between defence counsel and client — Whether the respondent’s right to make full answer and defence was breached by not having access to the full recording of a phone call protected by solicitor-client privilege — Whether evidence obtained by s. 8 breaches should have been excluded.

Notes

(Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda entered Quebec on or about October 9, 2018, via Roxham Road following a stay in the United States. Originally from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda made a claim for refugee protection under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, when she arrived. She has three children, who accompanied her and were very young at the time the application was filed. During the waiting period for the processing of her claim for refugee status, which was lengthy, she obtained a work permit allowing her to work in Quebec, and she approached three childcare facilities to find subsidized spaces for the children. However, she was denied access to subsidized childcare because such childcare is reserved for those whose refugee status is formally recognized by the federal authorities, which excludes those waiting for a decision in this regard. On May 31, 2019, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda filed an application for judicial review, which was amended on August 16, 2019. In the application, she challenged the legality, on the basis of an absence of valid statutory authorization, and the constitutional validity, on the basis of an infringement of certain rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter, of s. 3 of the Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1.

Argued Date

2025-05-15

Keywords

Charter of Rights — Right to equality — Discrimination based on sex — Disproportionate impact of exclusion from subsidized childcare on women claiming refugee protection who have obtained work permit ? Whether s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation infringes right to equality protected by s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter — If so, whether this infringement is justified under s. 1 of Canadian Charter — If this Court were to find that s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation unjustifiably infringes s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter, what should appropriate remedy be? — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 15(1) — Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1, s. 3.

Notes

(Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave)

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Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda entered Quebec on or about October 9, 2018, via Roxham Road following a stay in the United States. Originally from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda made a claim for refugee protection under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, when she arrived. She has three children, who accompanied her and were very young at the time the application was filed. During the waiting period for the processing of her claim for refugee status, which was lengthy, she obtained a work permit allowing her to work in Quebec, and she approached three childcare facilities to find subsidized spaces for the children. However, she was denied access to subsidized childcare because such childcare is reserved for those whose refugee status is formally recognized by the federal authorities, which excludes those waiting for a decision in this regard. On May 31, 2019, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda filed an application for judicial review, which was amended on August 16, 2019. In the application, she challenged the legality, on the basis of an absence of valid statutory authorization, and the constitutional validity, on the basis of an infringement of certain rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter, of s. 3 of the Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1.

Argued Date

2025-05-14

Keywords

Charter of Rights — Right to equality — Discrimination based on sex — Disproportionate impact of exclusion from subsidized childcare on women claiming refugee protection who have obtained work permit ? Whether s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation infringes right to equality protected by s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter — If so, whether this infringement is justified under s. 1 of Canadian Charter — If this Court were to find that s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation unjustifiably infringes s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter, what should appropriate remedy be? — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 15(1) — Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1, s. 3.

Notes

(Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave)

Language

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).