Clause 3: Salaries.

The compensation of judges may not be decreased, but may be increased, during their continuance in office.

Section 2: Judicial power, jurisdiction, and trial by jury.

Section 2 delineates federal judicial power, and brings that power into execution by conferring original jurisdiction and also appellate jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court. Additionally, this section requires trial by jury in all criminal cases, except impeachment cases.

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.

United States v Texas was United States Supreme Court case that involved the Texas Heartbeat Act (also known as Senate Bill 8 or SB8), a state law that bans abortion once a fetal heartbeat is detected, typically six weeks into pregnancy. A unique feature of the Act, and challenges to it, is the delegation of enforcement to any and all private individuals who are authorized by the Act to file civil actions against abortion providers who violate it, and aiders and abetters, while state and local officials are prohibited from doing so. The Act is stated by its opponents to go against the landmark 1973 Supreme Court decision Roe v Wade, which bans states from regulating abortions during the first trimester of pregnancy in favor of the woman's right to privacy guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

As one of several challenges to the law, the Supreme Court within United States v Texas will consider and decide whether the federal government has standing and the right to sue Texas for injunctive and declaratory relief to stop enforcement of the Act through private civil litigation in the Texas judicial system. The case was fast-tracked by the Court and heard on November 1, 2021, alongside Whole Woman's Health v Jackson, which was brought by abortion providers and allies as a pre-enforcement challenge to the constitutionality of the Texas Heartbeat Act under the U.S. constitution. The Supreme Court ruled in a per curiam decision in December 2021 that the writ of certiorari was improvidently granted and dismissed the case.

Background.

Texas passed the Texas Heartbeat Act in May 2021, with the bill to go into effect on September 1, 2021. One of several heartbeat bills in the country, Texas's bill banned abortion once "cardiac activity" in an embryo can be detected, typically after six weeks of pregnancy. Because of the potential conflict with the Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v Wade in that states could not regulate abortions during the first trimester (three months) of pregnancy in the interest of the right of privacy for women, the Texas Heartbeat Act does not allow the state to enforce the ban, but instead gives power to any interested party to sue anyone that performs an illegal abortion or supports that, and seek statutory damages of at least $10,000 in courts.

District Court.

On September 6, 2021, United States Attorney General Merrick Garland announced that the Justice Department (DOJ) will protect abortion seekers under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act. On September 8, 2021, The Wall Street Journal reported that the Biden administration plans to sue Texas on the basis that the Act "illegally interferes with federal interests".

Article Three of the United States Constitution establishes the judicial branch of the federal government. Under Article Three, the judicial branch consists of the Supreme Court of the United States, as well as lower courts created by Congress. Article Three empowers the courts to handle cases or controversies arising under federal law, as well as other enumerated areas. Article Three also defines treason.

Section 1 of Article Three vests the judicial power of the United States in the Supreme Court, as well as inferior courts established by Congress. Along with the Vesting Clauses of Article One and Article Two, Article Three's Vesting Clause establishes the separation of powers between the three branches of government. Section 1 authorizes the creation of inferior courts, but does not require it; the first inferior federal courts were established shortly after the ratification of the Constitution with the Judiciary Act of 1789. Section 1 also establishes that federal judges do not face term limits, and that an individual judge's salary may not be decreased. Article Three does not set the size of the Supreme Court or establish specific positions on the court, but Article One establishes the position of chief justice.

Section 2 of Article Three delineates federal judicial power. The Case or Controversy Clause restricts the judiciary's power to actual cases and controversies, meaning that federal judicial power does not extend to cases which are hypothetical, or which are proscribed due to standing, mootness, or ripeness issues. Section 2 states that federal judiciary's power extends to cases arising under the Constitution, federal laws, federal treaties, controversies involving multiple states or foreign powers, and other enumerated areas. Section 2 gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction when ambassadors, public officials, or the states are a party in the case, leaving the Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction in all other areas to which the federal judiciary's jurisdiction extends. Section 2 also gives Congress the power to strip the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction, and establishes that all federal crimes must be tried before a jury. Section 2 does not expressly grant the federal judiciary the power of judicial review, but the courts have exercised this power since the 1803 case of Marbury v Madison.

Section 3 of Article Three defines treason and empowers Congress to punish treason. Section 3 requires that at least two witnesses testify to the treasonous act, or that the individual accused of treason confess in open court. It also limits the ways in which Congress can punish those convicted of treason.

Section 1: Federal courts.

Section 1 is one of the three vesting clauses of the United States Constitution, which vests the judicial power of the United States in federal courts, requires a supreme court, allows inferior courts, requires good behavior tenure for judges, and prohibits decreasing the salaries of judges.

The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

Clause 3: Recess appointments.

The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.

During recesses of the Senate, the president may appoint officers, but their commissions expire at the conclusion of the Senate's next session.

Section 3: Presidential responsibilities.

He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.

Clause 1: State of the Union.

The president must give the Congress information on the "State of the Union" "from time to time." This is called the State of the Union Clause. Originally, presidents personally delivered annual addresses to Congress. Thomas Jefferson, who felt that the procedure resembled the speech from the throne delivered by British monarchs, chose instead to send written messages to Congress for reading by clerks. Jefferson's procedure was followed by future presidents until Woodrow Wilson reverted to the former procedure of personally addressing Congress, which has continued to this day.

Kesavan and Sidak explain the purpose of the State of the Union clause:

The State of the Union Clause imposes an executive duty on the president. That duty must be discharged periodically. The president's assessment of the State of the Union must be publicized to Congress, and thus to the nation. The publication of the president's assessment conveys information to Congress—information uniquely gleaned from the president's perspective in his various roles as commander-in-chief, chief law enforcer, negotiator with foreign powers, and the like—that shall aid the legislature in public deliberation on matters that may justify the enactment of legislation because of their national importance.

Mckesson v Doe, (2020), was a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court that temporarily halted a lawsuit by a police officer against an activist associated with the Black Lives Matter movement, and instructed the lower federal court (the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit) to seek clarification of state law from the Louisiana Supreme Court. At issue was whether the activist, DeRay Mckesson, could be liable under Louisiana tort law for injuries caused by other people at a protest. Mckesson had argued that the First Amendment's protection of freedom of assembly should block the lawsuit entirely. The Court's decision to instead redirect the tort law issue to the Louisiana Supreme Court means that the constitutional question was delayed or avoided.

Background.

In July 2016, the shooting of Alton Sterling by police led to intense protests in Baton Rouge. DeRay Mckesson, an early organizer of the Black Lives Matter movement, participated in these protests and was among over 100 people arrested by Baton Rouge police. The protests included some violent moments, the worst of which was the ambush shooting of six police officers by a man named Gavin Long on July 17. At one protest where Mckesson was present, which blocked a highway in front of the Baton Rouge Police Department headquarters, some protesters took to throwing objects at police, possibly including water bottles, rocks, or pieces of concrete. One of the thrown objects struck and injured an officer, identified in the lawsuit only as "John Doe." His injuries included brain injuries, jaw injuries, and missing teeth.

One of the officers shot by Gavin Long would sue Mckesson and other organizers of the Black Lives Matter movement, but that case, titled Smith v Mckesson, would be dismissed, and the dismissal upheld by the Fifth Circuit in an unpublished (for example, not precedential) opinion.

District Court.

Office "John Doe" sued Mckesson and Black Lives Matter in federal court, arguing that Mckesson was "in charge of the protests", and were therefore responsible for the actions of the protestors. Mckesson argued that the precedent set in NAACP v Claiborne Hardware (a 1982 case that limited the liability of protest organizers) meant the case should be dismissed. Judge Brian Jackson agreed with Mckesson:

. . .the Complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief against Mckesson and it names as a Defendant a social movement . . ."BlackLivesMatter" — a hashtag — lacks the capacity to be sued. . .

— Doe v Mckesson, (2017) (Judge Jackson, emphasis in original)

Clause 7: Salary / Clause 8: Oath or affirmation

The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.

The president's salary, currently $400,000 a year, must remain constant throughout the president's term. The president may not receive other compensation from either the federal or any state government.

Clause 8: Oath or affirmation.

Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:—"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."

According to the Joint Congressional Committee on Presidential Inaugurations, George Washington added the words "So help me God" during his first inaugural, though this has been disputed. There are no contemporaneous sources for this fact, and no eyewitness sources to Washington's first inaugural mention the phrase at all—including those that transcribed what he said for his oath.

Also, the president-elect's name is typically added after the "I", for example, "I, George Washington, do...." Normally, the chief justice of the United States administers the oath. It is sometimes asserted that the oath bestows upon the president the power to do whatever is necessary to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution." Andrew Jackson, while vetoing an Act for the renewal of the charter of the national bank, implied that the president could refuse to execute statutes that he felt were unconstitutional. In suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, President Abraham Lincoln claimed that he acted according to the oath. His action was challenged in court and overturned by the U.S. Circuit Court in Maryland (led by Chief Justice Roger B Taney) in Ex Parte Merryman, (1861). Lincoln ignored Taney's order. Finally, Andrew Johnson's counsel referred to the theory during his impeachment trial. Otherwise, few have seriously asserted that the oath augments the president's powers.

The vice president also has an oath of office, but it is not mandated by the Constitution and is prescribed by statute. Currently, the vice presidential oath is the same as that for members of Congress and members of the Cabinet.

I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God

Tanzin v Tanvir, (2020), was a United States Supreme Court case involving legal remedies that could be sought by litigants against federal officials for violations of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. In a unanimous decision issued December 10, 2020, the court ruled that the Act allowed for litigants to seek not only injunctive relief but also monetary damages.

Background.

At the center of the case were three men of the Muslim community with either U.S. citizenship or lawful permanent residency. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the men were approached by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents for questioning but not for any involvement of terrorist activity. Instead, the FBI wanted the men to serve "as government spies in their religious communities." The men refused, and the FBI pushed the matter by threatening to add their names to the Transportation Security Administration's No Fly List. The men continued to refuse to participate, and the FBI followed through with the threat around 2013.

The men tried repeatedly to have their names removed through the TSA but were directed to the FBI, which continued to state that if they co-operated by becoming informants in their Muslim communities, they would have their names removed. The men lost money on plane tickets that they could not use and also could not travel to see their families overseas or for other work-related functions.

Lower courts.

The three men sued the FBI in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Upon the commencement of legal action, the FBI took steps to remove their names from the No Fly List and stated that the case should be considered moot. The plaintiffs continued the case, seeking monetary compensation, and asserted that it was allowed for by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which allows for one to "obtain appropriate relief against a government" when one's religious rights are harmed by a federal officer of the government.

The District Court ruled to dismiss the case by asserting that the "appropriate relief" clause of the RFRA does not allow for monetary recovery from such damages and that with the removal from the No Fly List, there were no further remedies that the men could pursue.

The men appealed to the Second Circuit Appeals Court, which reversed the District Court's decision in May 2018, and allowed their case to go forward. The Second Circuit found the District Court erred in the reading of the RFRA since the suit was directed at the specific agents of the FBI whose actions had adversely affected the men's religious freedom, and monetary compensation was considered part of the appropriate relief that could be awarded. The Second Circuit declined to rehear the case en banc, with multiple judges dissenting.

Clause 3: Electoral College.

The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each, which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately choose by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner choose the President. But in choosing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State having one Vote; A quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall choose from them by Ballot the Vice President.

(Note: This procedure was changed by the 12th Amendment in 1804.)

Article Two of the United States Constitution establishes the executive branch of the federal government, which carries out and enforces federal laws. Article Two vests the power of the executive branch in the office of the president of the United States, lays out the procedures for electing and removing the president, and establishes the president's powers and responsibilities.

Section 1 of Article Two establishes the positions of the president and the vice president, and sets the term of both offices at four years. Section 1's Vesting Clause declares that the executive power of the federal government is vested in the president and, along with the Vesting Clauses of Article One and Article Three, establishes the separation of powers among the three branches of government. Section 1 also establishes the Electoral College, the body charged with electing the president and the vice president. Section 1 provides that each state chooses members of the Electoral College in a manner directed by each state's respective legislature, with the states granted electors equal to their combined representation in both houses of Congress. Section 1 lays out the procedures of the Electoral College and requires the House of Representatives to hold a contingent election to select the president if no individual wins a majority of the electoral vote. Section 1 also sets forth the eligibility requirements for the office of the president, provides procedures in case of a presidential vacancy, and requires the president to take an oath of office.

The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows:

Section 1 begins with a vesting clause that confers federal executive power upon the president. Similar clauses are found in Article 1 and Article 3; the former bestows federal legislative power exclusively to Congress, and the latter grants judicial power solely to the Supreme Court, and other federal courts established by law. These three articles together secure a separation of powers among the three branches of the federal government, and individually, each one entrenches checks and balances on the operation and power of the other two branches.

Article I grants certain powers to Congress, and the Vesting Clause does not reassign those powers to the President. In fact, because those actions require legislation passed by Congress which must be signed by the president to take effect, those powers are not strictly executive powers granted to or retained by Congress per se. Nor were they retained by the U.S. Congress as leftovers from the Articles of Confederation. The Articles of Confederation, Continental Congress and its powers were abolished at the time the new U.S. Congress was seated and the new federal government formally and officially replaced its interim predecessor. And although the president is implicitly denied the power to unilaterally declare war, a declaration of war is not in and of itself a vehicle of executive power since it is literally just a public declaration that the U.S. government considers itself "at war" with a foreign political entity.

United States v Briggs, was a United States Supreme Court case involving whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) erred in ruling that the Uniform Code of Military Justice allows prosecution of a rape committed between 1986 and 2006 only if it was discovered and charged within five years. The Court, with the exception of Justice Amy Coney Barrett who did not participate in the case, ruled unanimously that under the Uniform Code, such crimes that are "punishable by death" under the Code do not have a statute of limitations unlike similar civilian crimes.

This case was considered notable due to its implications on the issue of sexual assault in the United States military and the military's ability to address these types of cases. The case was consolidated with another, similar case called United States v Collins.

Background.12/01/2021

Legal environment.

Under United States federal law, there is a separation between military and civilian law. Congress enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to create a separate, parallel legal system for the military, which is enforced by its own judicial system. In general, under the UCMJ crimes prosecuted under military law must be charged within five years due to the statute of limitations, with the primary exception being the crime of desertion or being absent without leave during a time of war. In 1986, Congress passed a law to exempt certain capital offenses (those punishable by the death penalty) from the statute of limitations as well. At the time of the 1986 amendment, capital offenses included rape. However, in 1977, the Supreme Court ruled in Coker v Georgia that imposing the death penalty for rape violated the Eighth Amendment. Congress subsequently amended the UCMJ again to clarify that there was no statute of limitations for rape under the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2006. This created an ambiguity in the law as it relates to rape and sexual assault cases that took place between 1986 (when Congress initially removed the statute of limitations for all capital offenses) and 2006 (when Congress clarified that the statute of limitations did not apply to rape even though rape was no longer a capital offense). This was resolved by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces in their 2018 ruling United States v Mangahas. In Mangahas, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces ruled that, because rape was not a capital offense since 1977 due to Coker v Georgia and because Congress did not pass a law separately excluding rape from the general statute of limitations, the general 5-year statute of limitations would apply to all rape cases stemming from incidents that took place before 2006. As a result of this ruling, several pending rape investigations were suspended and cases that were on appeal were dismissed.