The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution addresses criminal procedure and other aspects of the Constitution. It was ratified, along with nine other articles, in 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights. The Fifth Amendment applies to every level of the government, including the federal, state, and local levels, in regard to a US citizen or resident of the US. The Supreme Court furthered the protections of this amendment through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

One provision of the Fifth Amendment requires that felonies be tried only upon indictment by a grand jury. Another provision, the Double Jeopardy Clause, provides the right of defendants to be tried only once in federal court for the same offense. The self-incrimination clause provides various protections against self-incrimination, including the right of an individual to not serve as a witness in a criminal case in which they are the defendant. "Pleading the Fifth" is a colloquial term often used to invoke the self-incrimination clause when witnesses decline to answer questions where the answers might incriminate them. In the 1966 case of Miranda v Arizona, the Supreme Court held that the self-incrimination clause requires the police to issue a Miranda warning to criminal suspects interrogated while under police custody. The Fifth Amendment also contains the Takings Clause, which allows the federal government to take private property for public use if the government provides "just compensation."

Like the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment includes a due process clause stating that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The Fifth Amendment's due process clause applies to the federal government, while the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause applies to state governments. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause as providing two main protections: procedural due process, which requires government officials to follow fair procedures before depriving a person of life, liberty, or property, and substantive due process, which protects certain fundamental rights from government interference. The Supreme Court has also held that the Due Process Clause contains a prohibition against vague laws and an implied equal protection requirement similar to the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.

Text.

The amendment as proposed by Congress in 1789:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

Exclusionary rule.

One way courts enforce the Fourth Amendment is through the use of the exclusionary rule. The rule provides that evidence obtained through a violation of the Fourth Amendment is generally not admissible by the prosecution during the defendant's criminal trial. The Court stated in Elkins v United States (1960) that the rule's function "is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guarantee in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it."

The Court adopted the exclusionary rule in Weeks v United States (1914), prior to which all evidence, no matter how seized, could be admitted in court. In Silverthorne Lumber Company v United States (1920) and Nardone v United States (1939), the Court ruled that leads or other evidence resulting from illegally obtained evidence are also inadmissible in trials. Justice Felix Frankfurter described this secondary evidence in the Nardone decision as the "fruit of the poisonous tree". The Supreme Court rejected incorporating the exclusionary rule by way of the Fourteenth Amendment in Wolf v Colorado (1949), but Wolf was explicitly overruled in Mapp v Ohio (1961), making the Fourth Amendment (including the exclusionary rule) applicable in state proceedings.

The exclusionary rule and its effectiveness have often been controversial, particularly since its 1961 application to state proceedings. Critics charge that the rule hampers police investigation and can result in freeing guilty parties convicted on reliable evidence; other critics say the rule has not been successful in deterring illegal police searches. Proponents argue that the number of criminal convictions overturned under the rule has been minimal and that no other effective mechanism exists to enforce the Fourth Amendment. In 1982, California passed a "Victim's Bill of Rights" containing a provision to repeal the exclusionary rule; though the bill could not affect federally mandated rights under the Fourth Amendment, it blocked the state courts from expanding these protections further.

Limitations.

Since 1974, the Supreme Court has repeatedly limited the exclusionary rule. In United States v Calandra (1974), the Court ruled that grand juries may use illegally obtained evidence when questioning witnesses, because "the damage to that institution from the unprecedented extension of the exclusionary rule outweighs the benefit of any possible incremental deterrent effect." Explaining the purpose of the rule, the Court said the rule "is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."

Warrant

Under the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement must receive written permission from a court of law, or otherwise qualified magistrate, to lawfully search and seize evidence while investigating criminal activity. A court grants permission by issuing a writ known as a warrant. A search or seizure is generally unreasonable and unconstitutional if conducted without a valid warrant and the police must obtain a warrant whenever practicable. Searches and seizures without a warrant are not considered unreasonable if one of the specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement applies. These exceptions apply "nly in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable."

In these situations where the warrant requirement doesn't apply a search or seizure nonetheless must be justified by some individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. However, the U.S. Supreme Court carved out an exception to the requirement of individualized suspicion. It ruled that, "In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion" a search  would still be reasonable.

Probable cause

The standards of probable cause differ for an arrest and a search. The government has probable cause to make an arrest when "the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information" would lead a prudent person to believe the arrested person had committed or was committing a crime. Probable cause to arrest must exist before the arrest is made. Evidence obtained after the arrest may not apply retroactively to justify the arrest.

When police conduct a search, the amendment requires that the warrant establish probable cause to believe the search will uncover criminal activity or contraband. They must have legally sufficient reasons to believe a search is necessary. In Carroll v United States (1925), the Supreme Court stated that probable cause to search is a flexible, common-sense standard. To that end, the Court ruled in Dumbra v United States (1925) that the term probable cause means "less than evidence that would justify condemnation," reiterating Carroll's assertion that it merely requires that the facts available to the officer would "warrant a man of reasonable caution" in the belief that specific items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime. It does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false. A "practical, non-technical" probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required. In Illinois v Gates (1983), the Court ruled that the reliability of an informant is to be determined based on the "totality of the circumstances."

Applicability

The Fourth Amendment, and the personal rights which it secures, have a long history. The Bill of Rights originally restricted only the federal government, and went through a long initial phase of "judicial dormancy;" in the words of historian Gordon S Wood, "After ratification, most Americans promptly forgot about the first ten amendments to the Constitution." Federal jurisdiction regarding criminal law was narrow until the late 19th century when the Interstate Commerce Act and Sherman Antitrust Act were passed. As federal criminal jurisdiction expanded to include other areas such as narcotics, more questions about the Fourth Amendment came to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court responded to these questions by stating on the one hand that the government powers to search and seizure are limited by the Fourth Amendment so that arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals are prevented and by outlining on the other hand the fundamental purpose of the amendment as guaranteeing "the privacy, dignity and security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the Government, without regard to whether the government actor is investigating crime or performing another function". To protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State is the overriding function of the Fourth Amendment according to the Court in Schmerber v California (1966), because "he security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police" is "at the core of the Fourth Amendment" and "basic to a free society." Pointing to historic precedents like Entick v Carrington (1765) and Boyd v United States (1886), the Supreme Court held in Silverman v United States (1961) that the Fourth Amendments core is the right to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. With a view to Camara v Municipal Court (1967) the Supreme Court observed in Torres v Madrid (2021) that the focus of the Fourth Amendment is the privacy and security of individuals, not the particular manner of arbitrary invasion by governmental officials. In Mapp v Ohio (1961), the Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment applies to the states by way of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority, and to forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law. This protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all intrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws. The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts, which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution, and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.

--Justice William R Day in the Opinion of the Court in Weeks v United States (1914).

The Third Amendment to the United States Constitution places restrictions on the quartering of soldiers in private homes without the owner's consent, forbidding the practice in peacetime. The amendment is a response to the Quartering Acts passed by the British parliament during the buildup to the American Revolutionary War, which had allowed the British Army to lodge soldiers in private residences.

The Third Amendment was introduced in Congress in 1789 by James Madison as a part of the United States Bill of Rights, in response to Anti-Federalist objections to the new Constitution. Congress proposed the amendment to the states on September 28, 1789, and by December 15, 1791, the necessary three-quarters of the states had ratified it. Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson announced the adoption of the amendment on March 1, 1792.

The amendment is one of the least controversial of the Constitution and is rarely litigated, with criminal justice writer Radley Balko calling it the "runt piglet" of the U.S. Constitution. To date, it has never been the primary basis of a Supreme Court decision, though it was the basis of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit case Engblom v Carey in 1982.

Text.

The complete text of the amendment is:

No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law..

Background.

In 1765, the British parliament enacted the first of the Quartering Acts, requiring the American colonies to pay the costs of British soldiers serving in the colonies, and requiring that if the local barracks provided insufficient space, that the colonists lodge the troops in alehouses, inns, and livery stables. After the Boston Tea Party, the Quartering Act of 1774 was enacted. As one of the Intolerable Acts that pushed the colonies toward revolution, it authorized British troops to be housed wherever necessary, including in private homes. The quartering of troops was cited as one of the colonists' grievances in the United States Declaration of Independence.

The Third Amendment to the United States Constitution places restrictions on the quartering of soldiers in private homes without the owner's consent, forbidding the practice in peacetime. The amendment is a response to the Quartering Acts passed by the British parliament during the buildup to the American Revolutionary War, which had allowed the British Army to lodge soldiers in private residences.

The Third Amendment was introduced in Congress in 1789 by James Madison as a part of the United States Bill of Rights, in response to Anti-Federalist objections to the new Constitution. Congress proposed the amendment to the states on September 28, 1789, and by December 15, 1791, the necessary three-quarters of the states had ratified it. Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson announced the adoption of the amendment on March 1, 1792.

The amendment is one of the least controversial of the Constitution and is rarely litigated, with criminal justice writer Radley Balko calling it the "runt piglet" of the U.S. Constitution. To date, it has never been the primary basis of a Supreme Court decision, though it was the basis of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit case Engblom v Carey in 1982.

Text.

The complete text of the amendment is:

No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law..

Background.

In 1765, the British parliament enacted the first of the Quartering Acts, requiring the American colonies to pay the costs of British soldiers serving in the colonies, and requiring that if the local barracks provided insufficient space, that the colonists lodge the troops in alehouses, inns, and livery stables. After the Boston Tea Party, the Quartering Act of 1774 was enacted. As one of the Intolerable Acts that pushed the colonies toward revolution, it authorized British troops to be housed wherever necessary, including in private homes. The quartering of troops was cited as one of the colonists' grievances in the United States Declaration of Independence.

National Federation of Independent Business v. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, is a Supreme Court of the United States case before the Court on an application for a stay of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's COVID-19 vaccination or test mandate. On January 13, 2022, the Supreme Court ordered a stay of the mandate.

Background.

In September 2021, President of the United States Joe Biden announced his administration would be promulgating a vaccination or test mandate for all private companies with 100 or more employees. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration announced its Emergency Temporary Standard (ETS) on November 5, 2021. On November 6, 2021, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued a nationwide stay of the ETS's implementation; it issued an opinion explaining its reasoning on November 12, 2021.

Challenges to OSHA regulations are randomly assigned to one of the twelve United States courts of appeals with geographic jurisdiction. The challenges to the COVID-19 ETS were all transferred to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on November 16, 2021. The petitioners sought initial hearing en banc for consideration of the challenges. On December 15, 2021, the court denied the petition by an 8 to 8 vote, over the dissents of Chief Judge Jeffrey Sutton and Judge John K Bush, joined by six additional judges.

On December 17, 2021, a panel of the court dissolved the Fifth Circuit's stay of the ETS by a 2 to 1 vote. Judge Joan Larsen dissented.

Supreme Court.

Numerous challengers filed emergency applications at the Supreme Court of the United States in the days after the Fifth Circuit's stay was dissolved. The federal government responded to the applications on December 30, 2021. In an unusual proceeding for emergency applications, oral argument was held on January 7, 2022. The National Federation of Independent Business, representing many private companies, and Ohio, representing more than 20 states, argued for the petitioners. The Supreme Court granted a stay of the ETS in a per curiam order on January 13, 2022. The order stated that the OSHA mandate exceeded the authority that it was given by Congress; OSHA could only regulate occupational safety, and the vaccine mandate was seen as "broad public health measures." The order stated that "Permitting OSHA to regulate the hazards of daily life — simply because most Americans have jobs and face those same risks while on the clock — would significantly expand OSHA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization." In a concurring statement written by Justice Neil Gorsuch and joined by Justices Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas, Gorsuch wrote that it should be up to states and Congress to decide best how to respond to a pandemic like COVID.

A joint dissent to the order was written by Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. They stated that employees have "little control, and therefore little capacity to mitigate risk", and that the ruling "stymies the Federal Government’s ability to counter the unparalleled threat that COVID-19 poses to our Nation’s workers." The three countered Gorsuch's statement and stated that OSHA was the actor with the best understanding of the workplace in light of threats like COVID, and not the court system.

McDonald v City of Chicago.

On June 28, 2010, the Court in McDonald v City of Chicago, (2010), held that the Second Amendment was incorporated, saying that "t is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty." This means that the Court ruled that the Second Amendment limits state and local governments to the same extent that it limits the federal government. It also remanded a case regarding a Chicago handgun prohibition. Four of the five justices in the majority voted to do so by way of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, while the fifth justice, Clarence Thomas, voted to do so through the amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause.

Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, noted that the Privileges or Immunities Clause refers to "citizens" whereas the Due Process Clause refers more broadly to any "person", and therefore Thomas reserved the issue of non-citizens for later decision. After McDonald, many questions about the Second Amendment remain unsettled, such as whether non-citizens are protected through the Equal Protection Clause.

In People v Aguilar (2013), the Illinois Supreme Court summed up the central Second Amendment findings in McDonald:

Two years later, in McDonald v City of Chicago, (2010), the Supreme Court held that the second amendment right recognized in Heller is applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In so holding, the Court reiterated that "the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense"; that "individual self-defense is 'the central component' of the Second Amendment right" (emphasis in original)(quoting Heller); and that "self-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present day".

Caetano v Massachusetts.

On March 21, 2016, in a per curiam decision the Court vacated a Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision upholding the conviction of a woman who carried a stun gun for self-defense. The Court reiterated that the Heller and McDonald decisions saying that "the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding", that "the Second Amendment right is fully applicable to the States", and that the protection is not restricted to "only those weapons useful in warfare". The term "bearable arms" was defined in District of Columbia v Heller, (2008) and includes any "eapo of offense" or "thing that a man wears for his defense, or takes into his hands", that is "carrying. ... for the purpose of offensive or defensive action".

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v City of New York, New York.

 The Court heard New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v City of New York, New York on December 2, 2019, to decide whether a New York City ordinance that prevents the transport of guns, even if properly unloaded and locked in containers, from within city limits to outside of the city limits is unconstitutional. The New York Rifle & Pistol Association challenged the ordinance on the basis of the Second Amendment, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the right to travel. However, as the city had changed its rule to allow transport while the case was under consideration by the Court, the Court ruled the case moot in April 2020, though it remanded the case so the lower courts could review the new rules under the petitioner's new claims.

Supreme Court cases

In the century following the ratification of the Bill of Rights, the intended meaning and application of the Second Amendment drew less interest than it does in modern times. The vast majority of regulation was done by states, and the first case law on weapons regulation dealt with state interpretations of the Second Amendment. A notable exception to this general rule was Houston v Moore, (1820), where the U.S. Supreme Court mentioned the Second Amendment in an aside. In the Dred Scott decision (1857), the opinion of the court stated that if African Americans were considered U.S. citizens, "It would give to persons of the negro race, who were recognised as citizens in any one State of the Union, the right ... to keep and carry arms wherever they went."

State and federal courts historically have used two models to interpret the Second Amendment: the "individual rights" model, which holds that individuals hold the right to bear arms, and the "collective rights" model, which holds that the right is dependent on militia membership. The "collective rights" model has been rejected by the Supreme Court, in favor of the individual rights model, beginning with its District of Columbia v Heller (2008) decision.

The Supreme Court's primary Second Amendment cases include United States v Miller, (1939); District of Columbia v Heller (2008); and McDonald v Chicago (2010).

Heller and McDonald supported the individual rights model, under which the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms much as the First Amendment protects the right to free speech. Under this model, the militia is composed of members who supply their own arms and ammunition. This is generally recognized as the method by which militias have historically been armed, as the Supreme Court in Miller said:

The significance attributed to the term Militia appears from the debates in the Convention, the history and legislation of Colonies and States, and the writings of approved commentators. These show plainly enough that the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. 'A body of citizens enrolled for military discipline.' And further, that ordinarily when called for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time.

Of the collective rights model that holds that the right to arms is based on militia membership, the Supreme Court in Heller said:

A purposive qualifying phrase that contradicts the word or phrase it modifies is unknown this side of the looking glass (except, apparently, in some courses on Linguistics). If "bear arms" means, as we think, simply the carrying of arms, a modifier can limit the purpose of the carriage ("for the purpose of self-defense" or "to make war against the King"). But if "bear arms" means, as the petitioners and the dissent think, the carrying of arms only for military purposes, one simply cannot add "for the purpose of killing game". The right "to carry arms in the militia for the purpose of killing game" is worthy of the mad hatter.

Commentary since late 20th century.

Until the late 20th century, there was little scholarly commentary of the Second Amendment. In the latter half of the 20th century, there was considerable debate over whether the Second Amendment protected an individual right or a collective right. The debate centered on whether the prefatory clause ("A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State") declared the amendment's only purpose or merely announced a purpose to introduce the operative clause ("the right of the People to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed"). Scholars advanced three competing theoretical models for how the prefatory clause should be interpreted.

The first, known as the "states' rights" or "collective right" model, held that the Second Amendment does not apply to individuals; rather, it recognizes the right of each state to arm its militia. Under this approach, citizens "have no right to keep or bear arms, but the states have a collective right to have the National Guard". Advocates of collective rights models argued that the Second Amendment was written to prevent the federal government from disarming state militias, rather than to secure an individual right to possess firearms. Prior to 2001, every circuit court decision that interpreted the Second Amendment endorsed the "collective right" model. However, beginning with the Fifth Circuit's opinion United States v Emerson in 2001, some circuit courts recognized that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms.

The second, known as the "sophisticated collective right model", held that the Second Amendment recognizes some limited individual right. However, this individual right could be exercised only by actively participating members of a functioning, organized state militia. Some scholars have argued that the "sophisticated collective rights model" is, in fact, the functional equivalent of the "collective rights model". Other commentators have observed that prior to Emerson, five circuit courts specifically endorsed the "sophisticated collective right model".

The third, known as the "standard model", held that the Second Amendment recognized the personal right of individuals to keep and bear arms. Supporters of this model argued that "although the first clause may describe a general purpose for the amendment, the second clause is controlling and therefore the amendment confers an individual right 'of the people' to keep and bear arms". Additionally, scholars who favored this model argued the "absence of founding-era militias mentioned in the Amendment's preamble does not render it a 'dead letter' because the preamble is a 'philosophical declaration' safeguarding militias and is but one of multiple 'civic purposes' for which the Amendment was enacted".

Meaning of "well regulated militia"

An early use of the phrase "well-regulated militia" may be found in Andrew Fletcher's 1698 A Discourse of Government with Relation to Militias, as well as the phrase "ordinary and ill-regulated militia". Fletcher meant "regular" in the sense of regular military, and advocated the universal conscription and regular training of men of fighting age. Jefferson thought well of Fletcher, commenting that "the political principles of that patriot were worthy the purest periods of the British constitution. They are those which were in vigor."

The term "regulated" means "disciplined" or "trained". In Heller, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "the adjective 'well-regulated' implies nothing more than the imposition of proper discipline and training."