One popular response to the "chinese room" thought experiment is to offer a broader notion of computation, one that doesn't depend on rules manipulating syntax. What alternative is there, and what is the argument for it? I examine:

O’Brien (2011). Defending the semantic conception of computation in cognitive science. Journal of Cognitive Science, 12, 381–399.

to find out.

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This episode ties in with first year philosophy of mind content on the diversity of computational approaches to the mind

In introductions to philosophy you may come across the claim that computers can't genuinely understand things. What's the basis for this claim? I consider:

Searle (1980) Minds, Brains, and Programs. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 417–457.

to find out

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This episode ties in with first year philosophy content on challenges to the computational theory of mind

Is the mind a computer? I look at:

Newell & Simon (1976). Computer science as empirical enquiry: Symbols and Search. Communications of the ACM, 19(3).

to begin to answer this.

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This episode ties in with first year philosophy content on the computational theory of mind

This week I look at arguments from:

Ullman (1980). Against Direct Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 373–415.

against the idea of direct perception and their use in arguing the mind involves representation.

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This episode ties in with first year philosophy content on the representational theory of mind 

In this episode I consider the use of:

Nagel (1974). What is it Like to be a Bat? Philosophical Review, 83, 435–450 

in arguments for property dualism, the claim that the mind is non-physical properties of the body.

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This episode ties into first year philosophy content on property dualism 

Descartes “Second Meditation: The nature of the human mind, and how it is better known than the body.” Translated by John Cottingham (1996) in Meditations of First Philosophy with selections from the objections and replies. Published by Cambridge University Press.

The second meditation provides an argument for substance dualism. What is it? How does it work?

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This episode ties into first year philosophy content on substance dualism

Should we believe textbooks when they make claims like ” where people have a strong national identity, they may be more likely to have negative attitudes toward groups they perceive as different to themselves.”

Falomir-Pichastor, & Frederic (2013). The dark side of heterogeneous ingroup identities: National identification, perceived threat, and prejudice against immigrants. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49(1), 72–79.

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This episode ties into first year psychology content on cross cultural psychology

Textbooks say things like: “the majority of participants sacrificed more money to reduce the stranger’s pain than their own pain.” Are they right?

Crockett, Kurth-Nelson, Siegel, Dayan, & Dolan (2014). Harm to others outweighs harm to self in moral decision making. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111(48), 17320–17325.

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This episode ties into first year psychology content on moral cognition 

This week I look at evidence for the effect of class on cognitive dissonance from 

Clémence (1990). Effect of social-class belonging on the cognitive dissonance resulting from threat severity. European Journal of Social Psychology, 20(6), 525–529.

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This episode ties into first year psychology content on attitude change

Textbooks make claims like: “Males and females may respond in about the same way to tricyclic antidepressants,” should we believe this? 

Wohlfarth, Storosum, Elferink, van Zwieten,, Fouwels, & van den Brink, W. (2004). Response to Tricyclic Antidepressants: Independent of Gender? American Journal of Psychiatry, 161(2), 370–372.

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This episode ties into first year psychollogy content on the treatment of psychopathologies