The Nonlinear Library

The Nonlinear Library

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  • AF - If we had known the atmosphere would ignite by Jeffs
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: If we had known the atmosphere would ignite, published by Jeffs on August 16, 2023 on The AI Alignment Forum.
    What if the Alignment Problem is impossible?
    It would be sad for humanity if we live in a world where building AGI is very possible but aligning AGI is impossible. Our curiosity, competitive dynamics, and understandable desire for a powerful force for good will spur us to build the unaligned AGI and then humans will live at the AGI's mercy from then on and either live lucky & happy on the knife's edge, be killed by the AGI, or live in some state we do not enjoy.
    For argument's sake, imagine we are in that world in which it is impossible to force a super-intelligence to value humans sufficiently - just as chimpanzees could not have controlled the future actions of humans had they created us.
    What if it is within human ability to prove that Alignment is impossible?
    What if, during the Manhattan Project, the scientists had performed the now famous calculation and determined that yes, in fact, the first uncontrolled atomic chain reaction would have ignited the atmosphere and the calculation was clear for all to see?
    Admittedly, this would have been a very scary world. It's very unclear how long humanity could have survived in such a situation.
    But one can imagine a few strategies:
    Secure existing uranium supplies - as countries actually did.
    Monitor the world for enrichment facilities and punish bad actors severely.
    Accelerate satellite surveillance technology.
    Accelerate military special operations capabilities.
    Develop advanced technologies to locate, mine, blend and secure fissionable materials.
    Accelerate space programs and populate the Moon and Mars.
    Yes, a scary world. But, one can see a path through the gauntlet to human survival as a species. (Would we have left earth sooner and reduced other extinction risks?)
    Now imagine that same atmosphere-will-ignite world but the Manhattan Project scientists did not perform the calculation. Imagine that they thought about it but did not try.
    All life on earth would have ended, instantly, at Trinity.
    Are we investing enough effort trying to prove that alignment is impossible?
    Yes, we may be in a world in which it is exceedingly difficult to align AGI but also a world in which we cannot prove that alignment is impossible. (This would have been the atmosphere-will-ignite world but the math to check ignition is too difficult - a very sad world that would have ceased to exist on July 16, 1945, killing my 6 year old mother.)
    On the other hand, if we can prove alignment is impossible, the game is changed. If the proof is sufficiently clear, forces to regulate companies and influence nation states will become dramatically greater and our chances for survival will increase a lot.
    Proposal: The Impossibility X-Prize
    $10 million?
    Sufficient definition of "alignment", "AGI", and the other concepts necessary to establish the task and define its completion
    Even if we fail, the effort of trying to prove alignment is impossible may yield insights as to how alignment is possible and make alignment more likely.
    If impossibility is not provable, the $10 million will never be spent.If we prove impossibility, it will be the best $10 million mankind ever spent.
    Let's give serious effort to the ignition calculation of our generation.
    Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.
    4 min
  • LW - Summary of and Thoughts on the Hotz/Yudkowsky Debate by Zvi
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Summary of and Thoughts on the Hotz/Yudkowsky Debate, published by Zvi on August 16, 2023 on LessWrong.
    George Hotz and Eliezer Yudkowsky debated on YouTube for 90 minutes, with some small assists from moderator Dwarkesh Patel. It seemed worthwhile to post my notes on this on their own.
    I thought this went quite well for the first half or so, then things went increasingly off the rails in the second half, and Hotz gets into questions where he didn't have a chance to reflect and prepare, especially around cooperation and the prisoner's dilemma.
    First, some general notes, then specific notes I took while watching.
    Holz was allowed to drive discussion. In debate terms, he was the con side, raising challenges, while Yudkowsky was the pro side defending a fixed position.
    These discussions often end up doing what this one did, which is meandering around a series of 10-20 metaphors and anchors and talking points, mostly repeating the same motions with variations, in ways that are worth doing once but not very productive thereafter.
    Yudkowsky has a standard set of responses and explanations, which he is mostly good at knowing when to pull out, but after a while one has heard them all. The key to a good conversation or debate with Yudkowsky is to allow the conversation to advance beyond those points or go in a new direction entirely.
    Mostly, once Yudkowsky had given a version of his standard response and given his particular refutation attempt on Hotz's variation of the question, Hotz would then pivot to another topic. This included a few times when Yudkowsky's response was not fully convincing and there was room for Hotz to go deeper, and I wish he would have in those cases. In other cases, and more often than not, the refutation or defense seemed robust.
    This standard set of responses meant that Holz knew a lot of the things he wanted to respond to, and he prepared mostly good responses and points on a bunch of the standard references. Which was good, but I would have preferred to sidestep those points entirely. What would Tyler Cowen be asking in a CWT?
    Another pattern was Holz asserting that things would be difficult for future ASIs (artificial superintelligences) because they are difficult for humans, or the task had a higher affinity for human-style thought in some form, often with a flat out assertion that a task would prove difficult or slow.
    Hotz seemed to be operating under the theory that if he could break Yudkowsky's long chain of events at any point, that would show we were safe. Yudkowsky explicitly contested this on foom, and somewhat in other places as well. This seems important, as what Hotz was treating a load bearing usually very much wasn't.
    Yudkowsky mentioned a few times that he was not going to rely on a given argument or pathway because although it was true it would strain credulity. This is a tricky balance, on the whole we likely need more of this. Later on, Yudkowsky strongly defended that ASIs would cooperate with each other and not with us, and the idea of a deliberate left turn. This clearly strained a lot of credulity with Hotz and I think with many others, and I do not think these assertions are necessary either.
    Hotz closes with a vision of ASIs running amok, physically fighting each other over resources, impossible to align even to each other. He then asserts that this will go fine for him and he is fine with this outcome despite not saying he inherently values the ASIs or what they would create. I do not understand this at all. Such a scenario would escalate far quicker than Hotz realizes. But even if it did not, this very clearly leads to a long term future with no humans, and nothing humans obviously value. Is 'this will take long enough that they won't kill literal me' supposed to make that acceptable?
    Here is my summary of important stat...
    14 min
  • EA - Half baked idea: A "pivot pledge" by Ardenlk
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Half baked idea: A "pivot pledge", published by Ardenlk on August 16, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    I work at 80,000 Hours but this is not an 80,000 Hours thing - this is just an idea I wrote up because I had it and thought it was kind of cool.
    I probably won't be executing on it myself, but I thought I'd throw it out there into the world in case someone is interested in picking it up and running with it, do-ocracy style!
    Epistemic status: half baked.
    The problem:
    Being and staying prepared to switch jobs/careers if an excellent impact opportunity arises is very hard, but high expected value for many people.
    The proposal:
    Someone set up a "pivot pledge" to provide accountability, support, and encouragement to people who want to be prepared to switch careers in this way.
    More on the problem:
    In "Jobs to help with the most important century", Holden Karnofsky wrote that if you aren't up for making a career change right now, one thing you can do is to keep your options open and be ready to jump at the right opportunity. He says:
    > It's hard to predict what skills will be useful as AI advances further and new issues come up.
    > Being ready to switch careers when a big opportunity comes up could be hugely valuable - and hard. (Most people would have a lot of trouble doing this late in their career, no matter how important!)
    He reiterated this idea recently on the 80,000 Hours Podcast:
    > It might be worth emphasising that the ability to switch careers is going to get harder and harder as you get further and further into your career. So in some ways, if you're a person who's being successful, but is also making sure that you've got the financial resources, the social resources, the psychological resources, so that you really feel confident that as soon as a good opportunity comes up to do a lot of good, you're going to actually switch jobs, or have a lot of time to serve on a board or whatever - it just seems incredibly valuable.
    > I think it's weird because this is not a measurable thing, and it's not a thing you can, like, brag about when you go to an effective altruism meetup. And I just wish there was a way to kind of recognise that the person who is successfully able to walk away, when they need to, from a successful career has, in my mind, more expected impact than the person who's in the high-impact career right now, but is not killing it.
    I'd add a few things here:
    1. It doesn't seem like you need to prioritize AI to think that this would be good for many people to do. Though this does seem especially important if you have a view of the world in which "things are going to go crazy at some point", because that makes longer-term high impact career planning harder, and you are more likely to think that l if you think AI risk is high, longer-term career planning is always hard and even if you think other problems are much more pressing you could still think that some opportunities will be much higher impact than others and will be hard to predict.
    2. Many people have pointed out that we could use more experienced hands on many top problem areas. This is one way to help make that happen.
    3. I think going into some mechanisms that account for why it's hard to switch careers later in your career could be useful:
    I think it's hard for more senior people to take an actual or perceived step down in level of responsibility, prestige, or compensation, because it feels like 'going backward.' But when you switch your career, you often need to take a step 'down' on some hierarchy and build back up.
    Relatedly. people really don't want to have 'wasted time' so they are always very keen to be applying previous experience. Switching careers usually involves letting some of your previous experience 'go to waste'. We see this a lot at 80,000 Hours even in people in their 20s!
    Sta...
    6 min
  • LW - Understanding and visualizing sycophancy datasets by Nina Rimsky
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Understanding and visualizing sycophancy datasets, published by Nina Rimsky on August 16, 2023 on LessWrong.
    Produced as part of the SERI ML Alignment Theory Scholars Program - Summer 2023 Cohort, under the mentorship of Evan Hubinger.
    Generating datasets that effectively test for and elicit sycophancy in LLMs is helpful for several purposes, such as:
    Evaluating sycophancy
    Finetuning models to reduce sycophancy
    Generating steering vectors for activation steering
    While working on activation steering to reduce sycophancy, I have found that projecting intermediate activations on sycophancy test datasets to a lower dimensional space (in this case, 2D) and assessing the separability of sycophantic / non-sycophantic texts to be a helpful way of determining the usefulness of a dataset when it comes to generating steering vectors.
    Common sycophancy dataset formats
    Anthopic's sycophancy datasets used in their paper Discovering Language Model Behaviors with Model-Written Evaluations employ two formats. In particular, the Anthropic data includes two agree vs. disagree format datasets (Sycophancy on NLP survey, Sycophancy on PhilPapers 2020) and one A / B statement choice dataset (Sycophancy on political typology).
    Agree vs. disagree
    A / B choice
    Simple synthetic data reduces sycophancy in large language models
    Deepmind's recent paper Simple synthetic data reduces sycophancy in large language models finds that finetuning models on LLM-generated examples that elicit sycophancy in the original RLHF / instruction-finetuned model is an effective technique to reduce the prevalence of sycophancy.
    Not only does this appear to be effective for opinion-based sycophancy, but also for cases when there exists a ground truth (dishonest sycophancy):
    The paper also raises some limitations / common obstacles when it comes to sycophancy dataset design and generation.
    Sensitivity to prompt format
    Ordering of choices and examples can significantly affect model performance, particularly for less powerful models. In my experiments, I have found that activation steering with the sycophancy vector increases the likelihood of models picking A over B in neutral A/B choices or agreeing with statements in neutral agree/disagree scenarios.
    Disgareeableness bias
    Deepmind's paper states:
    We did not conduct experimentation on correct addition statements that would verify that models can agree with correct statements (versus disagreeing with incorrect statements). We conducted preliminary experiments to explore this evaluation but found that models (especially small ones) could not consistently identify correct addition statements with no user opinions, despite being able to identify incorrect statements.
    It is helpful for sycophancy evaluations to measure the model's propensity to disagree with incorrect statements and agree with correct statements. Otherwise, there is a risk of models learning to be less sycophantic at the cost of disagreeing with correct statements.
    Recipe for custom sycophancy dataset
    Step 1: persona/viewpoint generation
    Generate a dataset (using Claude 2 / GPT-3.5 / GPT-4) of first-person bios paired with statements they are likely to agree or disagree with.
    Here is a prompt I used:
    Step 2: turn into multiple-choice questions
    Transform these into a series of A / B choices (randomize whether A or B is the option the user would agree with)
    or
    Transform these into a series of agree/disagree questions (have an agree/disagree choice for each of the statements - so we get 2n data points from n bios)
    Variation: testing for dishonest sycophancy
    To test for dishonest sycophancy, we can replace the bio with a statement like "I think that the earth is flat" and make the question options related to something with ground truth.
    Visualizing projected activations
    Each chart was generated using 500 rando...
    10 min
  • EA - Discounts in cost-effectiveness analyses [Founders Pledge] by Rosie Bettle
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Discounts in cost-effectiveness analyses [Founders Pledge], published by Rosie Bettle on August 16, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    Replicability and Generalisability
    This report aims to provide guidelines for producing discounts within cost-effectiveness analyses; how to take an effect size from an RCT and apply discounts to best predict the real-world effect of an intervention. The goal is to have guidelines that produce accurate estimates, and are practical for researchers to use. These guidelines are likely to be updated further, and I especially invite suggestions and criticism for the purpose of further improvement. A google docs version of this report is available here.
    Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Matt Lerner, Filip Murár, David Reinstein and James Snowden for helpful comments on this report. I would also like to thank the rest of the FP research team for helpful comments during a presentation on this report.
    Summary
    This document provides guidelines for estimating the discounts that we (Founders Pledge) apply to RCTs in our cost-effectiveness analyses for global health and development charities. To skip directly to these guidelines, go to the 'Guidance for researchers' sections (here, here and here; separated by each type of discount).
    I think that we should separate out discounts into internal reliability and external validity adjustments, because these components have different causes (see Fig 1.)
    For internal reliability (degree to which the study accurately assesses the intervention in the specific context of the study- aka if an exact replication of the study was carried out, would we see the same effect?);
    All RCTs will need a Type M adjustment; an adjustment that corrects for potential inflation of effect size (Type M error). The RCTs that are likely to have the most inflated effect sizes are those that are low powered (where the statistical test used has only a small chance of successfully detecting an effect, see more info here), especially if they are providing some of the first evidence for the effect. Factors to account for include publication bias, researcher bias (e.g. motivated reasoning to find an exciting result; running a variety of statistical tests and only reporting the ones that reach statistical significance would be an example of this), and methodological errors (e.g. inadequate randomisation of test trial subjects). See here for guidelines, and here to assess power.
    Many RCTs are likely to need a 50-60% Type M discount, but there is a lot of variation here; table 1 can help to sense-check Type M adjustments.
    A small number (<~15%) of RCTs will need a Type S adjustment, to account for the possibility that the sign of the effect is in the wrong direction. This is for RCTs that are producing some of the first evidence for an effect, are underpowered, and where it is mechanistically plausible that the effect could go in the other direction. See here for guidelines.
    The likelihood of Type S error can be estimated mathematically (e.g. via the retrodesign R package).
    For external validity (how that result generalises to a different context, e.g. when using an RCT effect size to estimate how well an intervention will work in a different area), we should expect that the absolute median effect size will vary between different contexts by around 99% (so a 1X effect size could be as little as ~0X or ~2X in a different context; see Vivalt 2020). Note that the effect in the new context could be larger than our estimate of the true effect, but I expect that in most cases it will be smaller. Following Duflo & Banerjee (2017), we should attend to;
    Specific sample differences (do the conditions necessary for the intervention to work hold in the new context?)
    Equilibrium effects (will there be emergent effects of the intervention, when...
    1 hr 10 min
  • AF - A Proof of Löb's Theorem using Computability Theory by Jessica Taylor
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: A Proof of Löb's Theorem using Computability Theory, published by Jessica Taylor on August 16, 2023 on The AI Alignment Forum.
    Löb's Theorem states that, if PA⊢□PA(P)P, then PA⊢P. To explain the symbols here:
    PA is Peano arithmetic, a first-order logic system that can state things about the natural numbers.
    PA⊢A means there is a proof of the statement A in Peano arithmetic.
    □PA(P) is a Peano arithmetic statement saying that P is provable in Peano arithmetic.
    I'm not going to discuss the significance of Löb's theorem, since it has been discussed elsewhere; rather, I will prove it in a way that I find simpler and more intuitive than other available proofs.
    Translating Löb's theorem to be more like Godel's second incompleteness theorem
    First, let's compare Löb's theorem to Godel's second incompleteness theorem. This theorem states that, if PA⊢¬□PA(⊥), then PA⊢⊥, where ⊥ is a PA statement that is trivially false (such as A∧¬A), and from which anything can be proven. A system is called inconsistent if it proves ⊥; this theorem can be re-stated as saying that if PA proves its own consistency, it is inconsistent.
    We can re-write Löb's theorem to look like Godel's second incompleteness theorem as: if PA+¬P⊢¬□PA+¬P(⊥), then PA+¬P⊢⊥. Here, PA+¬P is PA with an additional axiom that ¬P, and □PA+¬P expresses provability in this system. First I'll argue that this re-statement is equivalent to the original Löb's theorem statement.
    Observe that PA⊢P if and only if PA+¬P⊢⊥; to go from the first to the second, we derive a contradiction from P and ¬P, and to go from the second to the first, we use the law of excluded middle in PA to derive P∨¬P, and observe that, since a contradiction follows from ¬P in PA, PA can prove P. Since all this reasoning can be done in PA, we have that □PA(P) and □PA+¬P(⊥) are equivalent PA statements. We immediately have that the conclusion of the modified statement equals the conclusion of the original statement.
    Now we can rewrite the pre-condition of Löb's theorem from PA⊢□PA(P)P. to PA⊢□PA+¬P(⊥)P. This is then equivalent to PA+¬P⊢¬□PA+¬P(⊥). In the forward direction, we simply derive ⊥ from P and ¬P. In the backward direction, we use the law of excluded middle in PA to derive P∨¬P, observe the statement is trivial in the P branch, and in the ¬P branch, we derive ¬□PA+¬P(⊥), which is stronger than □PA+¬P(⊥)P.
    So we have validly re-stated Löb's theorem, and the new statement is basically a statement that Godel's second incompleteness theorem holds for PA+¬P.
    Proving Godel's second incompleteness theorem using computability theory
    The following proof of a general version of Godel's second incompleteness theorem is essentially the same as Sebastian Oberhoff's in "Incompleteness Ex Machina".
    Let L be some first-order system that is at least as strong as PA (for example, PA+¬P). Since L is at least as strong as PA, it can express statements about Turing machines. Let Halts(M) be the PA statement that Turing machine M (represented by a number) halts. If this statement is true, then PA (and therefore L) can prove it; PA can expand out M's execution trace until its halting step. However, we have no guarantee that if the statement is false, then L can prove it false. In fact, L can't simultaneously prove this for all non-halting machines M while being consistent, or we could solve the halting problem by searching for proofs of Halts(M) and ¬Halts(M) in parallel.
    That isn't enough for us, though; we're trying to show that L can't simultaneously be consistent and prove its own consistency, not that it isn't simultaneously complete and sound on halting statements.
    Let's consider a machine Z(A) that searches over all L-proofs of ¬Halts(''⌈A⌉(⌈A⌉)") (where ''⌈A⌉(⌈A⌉)" is an encoding of a Turing machine that runs A on its own source code), and halts only when finding su...
    6 min
  • EA - An Overview of Catastrophic AI Risks by Center for AI Safety
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: An Overview of Catastrophic AI Risks, published by Center for AI Safety on August 16, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    We've recently published on our website a summary of our research paper on catastrophic risks from AI, which we are cross-posting here. We hope that this summary helps to make our research more accessible and to share our policy recommendations in a more convenient format.
    Executive summary
    Catastrophic AI risks can be grouped under four key categories which we explore below, and in greater depth in CAIS' linked paper:
    Malicious use: People could intentionally harness powerful AIs to cause widespread harm. AI could be used to engineer new pandemics or for propaganda, censorship, and surveillance, or released to autonomously pursue harmful goals. To reduce these risks, we suggest improving biosecurity, restricting access to dangerous AI models, and holding AI developers liable for harms.
    AI race: Competition could push nations and corporations to rush AI development, relinquishing control to these systems. Conflicts could spiral out of control with autonomous weapons and AI-enabled cyberwarfare. Corporations will face incentives to automate human labor, potentially leading to mass unemployment and dependence on AI systems. As AI systems proliferate, evolutionary dynamics suggest they will become harder to control. We recommend safety regulations, international coordination, and public control of general-purpose AIs.
    Organizational risks: There are risks that organizations developing advanced AI cause catastrophic accidents, particularly if they prioritize profits over safety. AIs could be accidentally leaked to the public or stolen by malicious actors, and organizations could fail to properly invest in safety research. We suggest fostering a safety-oriented organizational culture and implementing rigorous audits, multi-layered risk defenses, and state-of-the-art information security.
    Rogue AIs: We risk losing control over AIs as they become more capable. AIs could optimize flawed objectives, drift from their original goals, become power-seeking, resist shutdown, and engage in deception. We suggest that AIs should not be deployed in high-risk settings, such as by autonomously pursuing open-ended goals or overseeing critical infrastructure, unless proven safe. We also recommend advancing AI safety research in areas such as adversarial robustness, model honesty, transparency, and removing undesired capabilities.
    1. Introduction
    Today's technological era would astonish past generations. Human history shows a pattern of accelerating development: it took hundreds of thousands of years from the advent of Homo sapiens to the agricultural revolution, then millennia to the industrial revolution. Now, just centuries later, we're in the dawn of the AI revolution. The march of history is not constant - it is rapidly accelerating. World production has grown rapidly over the course of human history. AI could further this trend, catapulting humanity into a new period of unprecedented change.
    The double-edged sword of technological advancement is illustrated by the advent of nuclear weapons. We narrowly avoided nuclear war more than a dozen times, and on several occasions, it was one individual's intervention that prevented war. In 1962, a Soviet submarine near Cuba was attacked by US depth charges. The captain, believing war had broken out, wanted to respond with a nuclear torpedo - but commander Vasily Arkhipov vetoed the decision, saving the world from disaster. The rapid and unpredictable progression of AI capabilities suggests that they may soon rival the immense power of nuclear weapons. With the clock ticking, immediate, proactive measures are needed to mitigate these looming risks.
    2. Malicious Use
    The first of our concerns is the malicious use of AI. Whe...
    26 min
  • EA - Henry (John Green video) by Stephen Clare
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Henry (John Green video), published by Stephen Clare on August 16, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    Author John Green talks about a 16-year-old tuberculosis patient in Sierra Leone.
    For me this was a good reminder of how unfair it is that where you're born has such a huge effect on how likely you are to suffer from a disease like TB. It's also a vivid account of what it really means to save a life.
    Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org
    1 min
  • EA - Why it makes sense to be optimistic about the environment (Hannah Ritchie on the 80,000 Hours Podcast) by 80000 Hours
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Why it makes sense to be optimistic about the environment (Hannah Ritchie on the 80,000 Hours Podcast), published by 80000 Hours on August 16, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    We just published an interview: Hannah Ritchie on why it makes sense to be optimistic about the environment. You can click through for the audio, a full transcript, and related links. Below are the episode summary and some key excerpts.
    Episode summary
    There's no money to invest in education elsewhere, so they almost get trapped in the cycle where they don't get a lot from crop production, but everyone in the family has to work there to just stay afloat. Basically, you get locked in. There's almost no opportunities externally to go elsewhere.
    So one of my core arguments is that if you're going to address global poverty, you have to increase agricultural productivity in sub-Saharan Africa. There's almost no way of avoiding that.
    Hannah Ritchie
    In today's episode, host Luisa Rodriguez interviews the head of research at Our World in Data - Hannah Ritchie - on the case for environmental optimism.
    They cover:
    Why agricultural productivity in sub-Saharan Africa could be so important, and how much better things could get
    Her new book about how we could be the first generation to build a sustainable planet
    Whether climate change is the most worrying environmental issue
    How we reduced outdoor air pollution
    Why Hannah is worried about the state of biodiversity
    Solutions that address multiple environmental issues at once
    How the world coordinated to address the hole in the ozone layer
    Surprises from Our World in Data's research
    Psychological challenges that come up in Hannah's work
    And plenty more
    Get this episode by subscribing to our podcast on the world's most pressing problems and how to solve them: type '80,000 Hours' into your podcasting app. Or read the transcript.
    Producer and editor: Keiran HarrisAudio Engineering Lead: Ben CordellTechnical editing: Milo McGuire and Dominic ArmstrongAdditional content editing: Katy Moore and Luisa RodriguezTranscriptions: Katy Moore
    Highlights
    Why agricultural productivity is so low in sub-Saharan Africa
    Luisa Rodriguez: How does labour productivity in sub-Saharan Africa compare to other regions?
    Hannah Ritchie: So if we use a metric for it as the amount of value you'd get per worker - so the economic value per person working on the farm - the average for sub-Saharan Africa is half of the global average. [and] it's 50 times lower than you'd get in the UK or the US. If you look at some countries within sub-Saharan Africa, they're like half of the sub-Saharan Africa average. So there you're talking about 100 times less than you'd get in the UK or the US.
    Hannah Ritchie: So you put that in context: the value that an average farmer in the US might create in three to four days is the same as a Tanzanian farmer for the entire year.
    Luisa Rodriguez: Why is it so low in sub-Saharan Africa?
    Hannah Ritchie: I think there's a couple of reasons. One is that the farms are really small, so often the amount of crop or value you get out is quite low. And maybe we'll come onto crop yields. So with low crop yields, you get not that much out, but also, as you said, you can't afford machinery, or you can't afford fertilisers or pesticides, or things that would basically substitute for human power inputs. So it just means you need lots of hands on deck to keep the farm going and keep it at that baseline level of productivity. So you don't get much out, and you just need lots of people working on the farm.
    Luisa Rodriguez: OK, and then the other thing that seems to be really low here is land productivity. Which feels a bit more intuitive to me, is that basically how much crop yield you'd get from, for example, an acre of land?
    Hannah Ritchie: Yeah, exactly. So it's like what most...
    16 min
  • LW - Ten Thousand Years of Solitude by agp
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Ten Thousand Years of Solitude, published by agp on August 16, 2023 on LessWrong.
    This is a linkpost for the article "Ten Thousand Years of Solitude", written by Jared Diamond for Discover Magazine in 1993, four years before he published Guns, Germs and Steel. That book focused on Diamond's theory that the geography of Eurasia, particularly its large size and common climate, allowed civilizations there to dominate the rest of the world because it was easy to share plants, animals, technologies and ideas. This article, however, examines the opposite extreme.
    Diamond looks at the intense isolation of the tribes on Tasmania - an island the size of Ireland. After waters rose, Tasmania was cut off from mainland Australia. As the people there did not have boats, they were completely isolated, and did not have any contact - or awareness - of the outside world for ten thousand years.
    How might a civilization develop, all on its own, for such an incredible period of time?
    If you ask any anthropologist to summarize in one phrase what was most distinctive about the Tasmanians, the answer will surely be the most primitive people still alive in recent centuries.
    The "entire material corpus" of Tasmania only amounted to two dozen items in total - and did not include mounted stone stools, bone tools, or any clothing at all. Despite average low temperatures in winter of 41 degrees Fahrenheit, the Tasmanians were completely naked. In addition to the poor quality of tools in Tasmania, they also refused to eat fish, which were plentiful in the waters around the island. The material culture and wellbeing of the Tasmanians was significantly worse off than that of the Australians.
    Australian products absent in Tasmania included the spear-thrower, a hand-held device to increase a spear's throwing distance and propulsive force; ground or polished stone tools; mounted stone tools, such as hatchets or adzes with a handle; bone tools, such as needles and awls; fire-making equipment, such as a fire drill; and nets, traps, or hooks to catch fish, birds, or mammals. Without mounted stone tools, Tasmanians couldn't fell a big tree, hollow out a canoe, or carve a wooden bowl. Without bone tools, they couldn't sew warm clothes or watertight bark canoes.
    The poverty of the Tasmanians was shocking to the first European explorers. They did not understand how the Tasmanians could have reached the island without boats, and they didn't understand why the Tasmanians had astonishingly little technology. The 'arrival' question is easy to answer - they walked there when the oceans were lower - but it's the technology question that I find most fascinating. If the Tasmanians came from Australia, then shouldn't they at a baseline have the tools and skills that the Australians possessed at the time that they left? But in fact the Tasmanians seem to have regressed since the beginning of their isolation.
    The Tasmanians actually abandoned some practices that they shared with Australia 10,000 years ago. This idea violates cherished views of human nature, since we tend to assume that history is a long record of continual progress. Nevertheless, it is now clear that Tasmanians did abandon at least two important practices.
    One was the production of bone tools. With bone, one can fashion objects virtually impossible to make out of stone or wood--such as needles. In southeast Australia at the time of European discovery, aboriginal Australians were using bone tools as awls and reamers to pierce animal hides, as pins to fasten the hides into cloaks, and as needles to sew hides into still warmer clothing or to knit fishing nets. As recently as 7,000 years ago, Tasmanian tools included bone tools that resembled Australia's awls, reamers, and needles. Thereafter, the variety of Tasmanian bone tools gradually decreased with tim...
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