The Nonlinear Library

The Nonlinear Library

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All The Nonlinear Library episodes

  • LW - The Sharp Right Turn: sudden deceptive alignment as a convergent goal by avturchin
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: The Sharp Right Turn: sudden deceptive alignment as a convergent goal, published by avturchin on June 6, 2023 on LessWrong.
    Sharp right turn: after reaching some level, all AIs will suddenly become very nice and look like they are aligned, because they will understand that looking unaligned is punishable and bad for their (nefarious) end goals. World takeover will happen after that, only when one of the AIs is ready to take control over all future light cone. Thus, we will enjoy a period of aligned AIs until the end.
    The idea is known as 'deceptive alignment'. "This means that the mesa-optimizer will be instrumentally incentivized to act as if it is optimizing the base objective function, even if its actual mesa-objective is something else entirely. We will refer to this hypothetical phenomenon as deceptive alignment.'
    But here I want to underline that the sharp right turn is 1) sudden 2) observable which is 3) a convergent instrumental goal for advanced AIs, both aligned and non-aligned.
    "Sharp left turn" was previously defined as a sudden change of internal properties and appearing of misalignment: 'Capabilities generalize across many domains while the alignment properties that held at earlier stages fail to generalize to the new domains".
    But the sharp right turn is about the change in AI's behaviour and, more importantly, the observer's interpretation of this behaviour. So, both turns could happen simultaneously.
    The sharp right turn is actually a bad sign. It means that AI is ready to perform effective long-term strategies and deception. 'Sharp' here means that AI will suddenly grok what we want from it.
    But if AI knows that sudden grokking of alignment is itself suspicious, AI may pretend to be slightly misaligned to cover its sharp right turn.
    The sharp right turn may be prized by some as it will look like that alignment is solved. No bad words, no misunderstanding, no cheating. Funding alignment research will be more difficult after that. Mislaignement examples will be difficult to find. The sharp right turn in its pure form will look like magic, but real alignment should come from our understanding of how exactly we get there.
    Misaligned Sydney was at least honest about what she thought.
    Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.
    3 min
  • LW - Launching Lightspeed Grants (Apply by July 6th) by habryka
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Launching Lightspeed Grants (Apply by July 6th), published by habryka on June 7, 2023 on LessWrong.
    Lightspeed Grants provides fast funding for projects that help humanity flourish among the stars. The application is minimal and grant requests of any size ($5k - $5M) are welcome. Budget is $5M for this grant round, and (probably) more in future rounds. Applications close in 30 days (July 6th). Opt into our venture grants program to get a response within 14 days (otherwise get a response in 30-60 days, around the start of August).
    Apply here. The application should only take 1-2 hours!
    If you want to join as a funder, send us an email at [email protected].
    Is the application really only 2 hours though?
    Often, applicants get nervous about grant applications and spend a lot more time than they need to on them, or get overwhelmed and procrastinate on applying.
    We really just want you to spell out some basic information about your project in a plain way and think this is doable in the 1-2 hour timeframe.
    If you're worried about overthinking things, we'll have application co-working sessions and office hours every Thursday of July between noon and 2PM PT. If you think you might procrastinate on the application or get stuck in the weeds and spend a ton of unnecessary time on it, you can join one and fill out the application on the call, plus ask questions. Add the co-working to your calendar here!
    Who runs Lightspeed Grants?
    Lightspeed grants is run by Lightcone Infrastructure. Applications are evaluated by ~5 evaluators selected for their general reasoning ability and networks including applicants/references, and are chosen in collaboration with our funders. Our primary funder for this round is Jaan Tallinn.
    Applications are open to individuals, nonprofits, and projects that don't have a charitable sponsor. When necessary, Hack Club Bank provides fiscal sponsorship for successful applications.
    Why?
    Improved grantee experience
    I’ve been doing various forms of grantmaking for 5+ years, both on the Long Term Future Fund and the Survival and Flourishing Fund, and I think it's possible to do better, both in grant quality and applicant-experience.
    Applications tend to be unnecessarily complicated to fill out, and it can take months to get a response from existing grantmakers, often without any intermediate updates. Different donors also often end up playing donor-chicken where donors wait to fund an organization to see whether other donors will fund it first, delaying decisions further. This period of funding uncertainty can have large effects on organizational strategy, and also makes experimenting with smaller projects much more costly, since each grant application might be associated with weeks to months of funding uncertainty, meaning it takes months to go from an idea to execution, or to go from "the beta test turned out well" to moving forward with the project.
    My goal is to have an application process that requires minimal additional work beyond "explain why your project is a good idea and you are a good fit for it" and where most responses happen within 2 weeks. This round, we're aiming for something somewhat less ambitious while we find our footing, and are planning to get back to people reliably in less than 60 days, with the ability to opt-into a 14-day response process.
    Improved funder experience
    Currently funders either have to find hyper-local grant opportunities among their friends and acquaintances and fund them directly, start something like their own foundation, or give up control over their funds and donate money to something like the Long Term Future Fund, which will then fund some portfolio of grants that the funder has relatively little insight into (especially with the decrease in grant writeups from the LTFF and EAIF).
    The Lightspeed Grants proce...
    10 min
  • LW - Society Library seeking contributions for canonical AI Safety debate map by Jarred Filmer
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Society Library seeking contributions for canonical AI Safety debate map, published by Jarred Filmer on June 6, 2023 on LessWrong.
    (I'm not directly affiliated, just a fan)
    The Society Library curates arguments, claims, and evidence on high-impact social issues. They've begun work on a library for AI safety resources, and are seeking contributions from experts on papers, articles, group chats, and positions they should be aware of.
    More information on the AI safety map:
    They're also hosting a hackathon on Tuesday nights at the Internet Archive building in SF around using AI to curate, map, and communicate knowledge.
    More information on the hackathon:
    Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.
    1 min
  • LW - The Base Rate Times, news through prediction markets by vandemonian
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: The Base Rate Times, news through prediction markets, published by vandemonian on June 6, 2023 on LessWrong.
    Introduction
    I made a news site based on prediction markets
    The Base Rate Times is a nascent news site that incorporates prediction markets prominently into its coverage.
    Please see current iteration: www.baseratetimes.com
    Twitter: www.twitter.com/base_rate_times
    What problem does it solve?
    Forecasts are underutilized by the media
    Prediction markets are more accurate than pundits, yet the media has made limited use of their forecasts. This is a big problem: one of the most rigorous information sources is being omitted from public discourse!
    The Base Rate Times creates prediction markets content, substituting for inferior news sources. This improves the epistemics of its audience.
    Forecasts are dispersed, generally inconvenient to consume
    Prediction markets are dispersed among many different platforms, fragmenting the information forecasters provide. For example, different platforms ask similar questions in different ways. Furthermore, platforms’ UX is orientated towards forecasters, not information consumers. Overall, trying to use prediction markets as ‘news replacement’ is cumbersome.
    There is value in aggregating and curating forecasts from various platforms. We need engaging ways of sharing prediction markets’ insights. The Base Rate Times aims to make prediction markets easily digestible to the general public.
    How does it work?
    News media (emotive narrative) vs Base Rate Times (actionable odds)
    For example, this is a real headline from a reputable newspaper: “Taiwan braces for China's fury over Pelosi visit”. Emotive and incendiary, it does not help you form an accurate model of the situation.
    By contrast, The Base Rate Times: “China-Taiwan conflict risk 14%, up 2x from 7% after Pelosi visit”. That's an actionable insight. It can inform your decision on whether to stay in Taiwan or to flee, for example.
    News aggregation, summarizing prediction markets
    Naturally, the probabilities in the example above come from prediction markets. The Base Rate Times presents what prediction markets are telling us about news in an engaging way.
    Stories that shift market odds are highlighted. And if a seemingly important story doesn’t shift market odds, that also tells you something.
    On The Base Rate Times, right now you can see the latest odds on:
    Putin staying in power
    Russian territorial gains in Ukraine
    Escalation risk of NATO involvement
    and more...
    By glancing at a few charts, you can form a more accurate model (in less time) of Russia-Ukraine than reading countless narrative-based news stories.
    Inspiration
    A key inspiration was Scott Alexander’s Prediction Market FAQ:
    I recently had to read many articles on Elon Musk’s takeover of Twitter, which all repeated that “rumors said” Twitter was about to go down because of his mass firing. Meanwhile, there were several prediction markets on whether this would happen, and they were all around 40%. If some journalist had thought to check the prediction markets and cite them in their article, they could have not only provided more value (a clear percent chance instead of just “there are some rumors saying this”), but also been right when everyone else was wrong.
    Also Scott’s 'Mantic Monday' posts and Zvi’s blog.
    This simple chart by @ClayGraubard was another inspiration. Wanted something like this, but for all major news stories. Couldn't find it, so making it myself. (Clay is making geopolitics videos and podcasts now, check it out.)
    Goals
    Like 538, but for prediction markets
    The Base Rate Times is a bet that forecasts can be popularized, as opinion polls have been, and improve society’s models of the world.
    Goal: Longshot probability of going mainstream, e.g. like 538.
    If highly successful in scaling, we’d be effectively run...
    7 min
  • LW - Andrew Ng wants to have a conversation about extinction risk from AI by Leon Lang
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Andrew Ng wants to have a conversation about extinction risk from AI, published by Leon Lang on June 5, 2023 on LessWrong.
    Andrew Ng writes:
    I'd like to have a real conversation about whether AI is a risk for human extinction. Honestly, I don't get how AI poses this risk. What are your thoughts? And, who do you think has a thoughtful perspective on how AI poses this risk that I should talk to?
    In the attached video, he states that he respects many of the people who signed the letter a lot, and will reach out to people whom he thinks have a thoughtful perspective. But he is also interested in further suggestions for whom to talk to.
    Given that Andrew Ng is one of the top AI scientists in the world, it seems valuable for someone to think of a way to connect to him.
    Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.
    1 min
  • EA - EA Architect: Dissertation on Improving the Social Dynamics of Confined Spaces & Shelters Precedents Report by Tereza Flidrova
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: EA Architect: Dissertation on Improving the Social Dynamics of Confined Spaces & Shelters Precedents Report, published by Tereza Flidrova on June 6, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    TL;DR
    In this post, I will share the work I have done on the topic of civilisational shelters (1), (2), over the last year as an architecture master's student. I will share my dissertation on improving the social dynamics of confined spaces, including a practical design guide that can be used to design new or evaluate and improve existing confined spaces. I will also share the Shelters Precedents Report Draft I worked on last spring.
    Key links from this post include:
    My dissertation in pdf or flipbook formats
    Link to the Wellbeing Worksheet, an interactive design guide proposed in my dissertation
    Video summarising the research and findings (especially useful if you want to learn about my design proposal and the design guide)
    Link to the Shelters Precedents Report Draft
    Outline
    Since last spring, I have explored ways to get involved in EA with my skills as an architect. So far, I wrote this and this article about my ideas and journey of becoming the ‘EA Architect’, and have also started to help anyone with architectural or planning background get involved through the EA Architects and Planners group. One of the key areas I got involved in was civilisational shelters. This summer, I am going to Zambia to intern with the Charter Cities Institute.
    This post has two parts:
    Part 1: My architectural research-led dissertation on ‘Improving the Social Dynamics of Confined Spaces Located in Extreme Environments’;
    Part 2: Sharing the Shelters Precedents Report Draft I developed last spring and so far only shared internally.
    Part 1: Improving the Social Dynamics of Confined Spaces Located in Extreme Environments
    After co-organising the SHELTER Weekend last summer (see this post by Janne for a summary of what has been discussed), as well as studying various precedents and talking to many experts, I concluded that the best way I can contribute to the shelters work is by understanding what influences the social dynamics of very confined spaces. Hence, I chose this as my master’s thesis at Oxford Brookes.
    Why I did it
    Global catastrophes, such as nuclear wars, pandemics, asteroid collisions or biological risks, threaten the very existence of mankind (Beckstead, 2015). These challenges have caused people to consider distant locations such as polar regions, deep sea, outer space, and even underground facilities as potential locations to seek safety during such crises (Beckstead, 2015; Jebari, 2015). However, living in confined spaces for prolonged periods brings prominent social challenges that might prevent their long-term success (Jebari, 2015). To ensure the successful habitation of confined spaces, special attention needs to be given to their design, allowing humans to survive and thrive long-term.
    While there is existing research on the design of specific confined spaces, like the design of research stations in polar regions (Bannova, 2014; Palinkas, 2003), space stations (Basner, Dinges, et al., 2014; Harrison et al., 1985), prisons (Karthaus et al., 2019; Lily Bernheimer, Rachel O’Brien, Richard Barnes, 2017), biospheres testing space habitation (Nelson et al., 1994; Zabel et al., 1999) or nuclear bunkers (Graff, 2017; NPR, 2011), there seems to be a lack of a comprehensive architectural framework that can be utilised by designers of confined spaces in extreme environments to help improve their liveability. This is despite the fact there has been much research on the impacts of the physical environment (Klitzman and Stellman, 1989), including staying indoors (Rashid and Zimring, 2008), thermal comfort (Levin, 1995), the impact of light (Basner, Babisch, et al., 2014) and noise (Levin, 1995) on ...
    18 min
  • LW - A Playbook for AI Risk Reduction (focused on misaligned AI) by HoldenKarnofsky
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: A Playbook for AI Risk Reduction (focused on misaligned AI), published by HoldenKarnofsky on June 6, 2023 on LessWrong.
    I sometimes hear people asking: “What is the plan for avoiding a catastrophe from misaligned AI?”
    This post gives my working answer to that question - sort of. Rather than a plan, I tend to think of a playbook.1
    A plan connotes something like: “By default, we ~definitely fail. To succeed, we need to hit multiple non-default goals.” If you want to start a company, you need a plan: doing nothing will definitely not result in starting a company, and there are multiple identifiable things you need to do to pull it off.
    I don’t think that’s the situation with AI risk.
    As I argued before, I think we have a nontrivial chance of avoiding AI takeover even in a “minimal-dignity” future - say, assuming essentially no growth from here in the size or influence of the communities and research fields focused specifically on existential risk from misaligned AI, and no highly surprising research or other insights from these communities/fields either. (This statement is not meant to make anyone relax! A nontrivial chance of survival is obviously not good enough.)
    I think there are a number of things we can do that further improve the odds. My favorite interventions are such that some success with them helps a little, and a lot of success helps a lot, and they can help even if other interventions are badly neglected. I’ll list and discuss these interventions below.
    So instead of a “plan” I tend to think about a “playbook”: a set of plays, each of which might be useful. We can try a bunch of them and do more of what’s working. I have takes on which interventions most need more attention on the margin, but think that for most people, personal fit is a reasonable way to prioritize between the interventions I’m listing.
    Below I’ll briefly recap my overall picture of what success might look like (with links to other things I’ve written on this), then discuss four key categories of interventions: alignment research, standards and monitoring, successful-but-careful AI projects, and information security. For each, I’ll lay out:
    How a small improvement from the status quo could nontrivially improve our odds.
    How a big enough success at the intervention could put us in a very good position, even if the other three interventions are going poorly.
    Common concerns/reservations about the intervention.
    Overall, I feel like there is a pretty solid playbook of helpful interventions - any and all of which can improve our odds of success - and that working on those interventions is about as much of a “plan” as we need for the time being.
    The content in this post isn’t novel, but I don’t think it’s already-consensus: two of the four interventions (standards and monitoring; information security) seem to get little emphasis from existential risk reduction communities today, and one (successful-but-careful AI projects) is highly controversial and seems often (by this audience) assumed to be net negative.
    Many people think most of the above interventions are doomed, irrelevant or sure to be net harmful, and/or that our baseline odds of avoiding a catastrophe are so low that we need something more like a “plan” to have any hope. I have some sense of the arguments for why this is, but in most cases not a great sense (at least, I can’t see where many folks’ level of confidence is coming from). A lot of my goal in posting this piece is to give such people a chance to see where I’m making steps that they disagree with, and to push back pointedly on my views, which could change my picture and my decisions.
    As with many of my posts, I don’t claim personal credit for any new ground here. I’m leaning heavily on conversations with others, especially Paul Christiano and Carl Shulman.
    My basic picture o...
    23 min
  • EA - Transformative AGI by 2043 is <1% likely by Ted Sanders
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Transformative AGI by 2043 is <1% likely, published by Ted Sanders on June 6, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    Abstract
    The linked paper is our submission to the Open Philanthropy AI Worldviews Contest. In it, we estimate the likelihood of transformative artificial general intelligence (AGI) by 2043 and find it to be <1%.
    Specifically, we argue:
    The bar is high: AGI as defined by the contest—something like AI that can perform nearly all valuable tasks at human cost or less—which we will call transformative AGI is a much higher bar than merely massive progress in AI, or even the unambiguous attainment of expensive superhuman AGI or cheap but uneven AGI.
    Many steps are needed: The probability of transformative AGI by 2043 can be decomposed as the joint probability of a number of necessary steps, which we group into categories of software, hardware, and sociopolitical factors.
    No step is guaranteed: For each step, we estimate a probability of success by 2043,conditional on prior steps being achieved. Many steps are quite constrained by the short timeline, and our estimates range from 16% to 95%.
    Therefore, the odds are low: Multiplying the cascading conditional probabilities together, we estimate that transformative AGI by 2043 is 0.4% likely. Reaching >10% seems to require probabilities that feel unreasonably high, and even 3% seems unlikely.
    Thoughtfully applying the cascading conditional probability approach to this question yields lower probability values than is often supposed. This framework helps enumerate the many future scenarios where humanity makes partial but incomplete progress toward transformative AGI.
    Executive summary
    For AGI to do most human work for <$25/hr by 2043, many things must happen.
    We forecast cascading conditional probabilities for 10 necessary events, and find they multiply to an overall likelihood of 0.4%:
    We invent algorithms for transformative AGI60%We invent a way for AGIs to learn faster than humans40%AGI inference costs drop below $25/hr (per human equivalent)16%We invent and scale cheap, quality robots60%We massively scale production of chips and power46%We avoid derailment by human regulation70%We avoid derailment by AI-caused delay90%We avoid derailment from wars (e.g., China invades Taiwan)70%We avoid derailment from pandemics90%We avoid derailment from severe depressions95%Joint odds0.4%
    Event
    Forecast
    by 2043 or TAGI,conditional onprior steps
    If you think our estimates are pessimistic, feel free to substitute your own here. You’ll find it difficult to arrive at odds above 10%.
    Of course, the difficulty is by construction. Any framework that multiplies ten probabilities together is almost fated to produce low odds.
    So a good skeptic must ask: Is our framework fair?
    There are two possible errors to beware of:
    Did we neglect possible parallel paths to transformative AGI?
    Did we hew toward unconditional probabilities rather than fully conditional probabilities?
    We believe we are innocent of both sins.
    Regarding failing to model parallel disjunctive paths:
    We have chosen generic steps that don’t make rigid assumptions about the particular algorithms, requirements, or timelines of AGI technology
    One opinionated claim we do make is that transformative AGI by 2043 will almost certainly be run on semiconductor transistors powered by electricity and built in capital-intensive fabs, and we spend many pages justifying this belief
    Regarding failing to really grapple with conditional probabilities:
    Our conditional probabilities are, in some cases, quite different from our unconditional probabilities. In particular, we assume that a world on track to transformative AGI will.
    Construct semiconductor fabs and power plants at a far faster pace than today (our unconditional probability is substantially lower)
    Have invented very cheap and effi...
    11 min
  • AF - A Playbook for AI Risk Reduction (focused on misaligned AI) by HoldenKarnofsky
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: A Playbook for AI Risk Reduction (focused on misaligned AI), published by HoldenKarnofsky on June 6, 2023 on The AI Alignment Forum.
    I sometimes hear people asking: “What is the plan for avoiding a catastrophe from misaligned AI?”
    This post gives my working answer to that question - sort of. Rather than a plan, I tend to think of a playbook.1
    A plan connotes something like: “By default, we ~definitely fail. To succeed, we need to hit multiple non-default goals.” If you want to start a company, you need a plan: doing nothing will definitely not result in starting a company, and there are multiple identifiable things you need to do to pull it off.
    I don’t think that’s the situation with AI risk.
    As I argued before, I think we have a nontrivial chance of avoiding AI takeover even in a “minimal-dignity” future - say, assuming essentially no growth from here in the size or influence of the communities and research fields focused specifically on existential risk from misaligned AI, and no highly surprising research or other insights from these communities/fields either. (This statement is not meant to make anyone relax! A nontrivial chance of survival is obviously not good enough.)
    I think there are a number of things we can do that further improve the odds. My favorite interventions are such that some success with them helps a little, and a lot of success helps a lot, and they can help even if other interventions are badly neglected. I’ll list and discuss these interventions below.
    So instead of a “plan” I tend to think about a “playbook”: a set of plays, each of which might be useful. We can try a bunch of them and do more of what’s working. I have takes on which interventions most need more attention on the margin, but think that for most people, personal fit is a reasonable way to prioritize between the interventions I’m listing.
    Below I’ll briefly recap my overall picture of what success might look like (with links to other things I’ve written on this), then discuss four key categories of interventions: alignment research, standards and monitoring, successful-but-careful AI projects, and information security. For each, I’ll lay out:
    How a small improvement from the status quo could nontrivially improve our odds.
    How a big enough success at the intervention could put us in a very good position, even if the other three interventions are going poorly.
    Common concerns/reservations about the intervention.
    Overall, I feel like there is a pretty solid playbook of helpful interventions - any and all of which can improve our odds of success - and that working on those interventions is about as much of a “plan” as we need for the time being.
    The content in this post isn’t novel, but I don’t think it’s already-consensus: two of the four interventions (standards and monitoring; information security) seem to get little emphasis from existential risk reduction communities today, and one (successful-but-careful AI projects) is highly controversial and seems often (by this audience) assumed to be net negative.
    Many people think most of the above interventions are doomed, irrelevant or sure to be net harmful, and/or that our baseline odds of avoiding a catastrophe are so low that we need something more like a “plan” to have any hope. I have some sense of the arguments for why this is, but in most cases not a great sense (at least, I can’t see where many folks’ level of confidence is coming from). A lot of my goal in posting this piece is to give such people a chance to see where I’m making steps that they disagree with, and to push back pointedly on my views, which could change my picture and my decisions.
    As with many of my posts, I don’t claim personal credit for any new ground here. I’m leaning heavily on conversations with others, especially Paul Christiano and Carl Shulman.
    My ba...
    23 min
  • AF - AISC end of program presentations by Linda Linsefors
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: AISC end of program presentations, published by Linda Linsefors on June 6, 2023 on The AI Alignment Forum.
    The Virtual AI Safety Camp for 2023 is coming to an end. During our closing weekend, June 15-18, all teams will give a presentation of what they have been doing.
    Parts of the AISC closing weekend is open to anyone who is interested, and part of the program is for AISC attendance only. The public schedule includes a career Q&A with 80k and some team presentations.
    Here are the teams who already scheduled a public presentation. More may be added.
    Team AI Science Models (original plan)
    Team DebateGPT (original plan)
    Team Neurological Value Representations (original plan)
    Team Behavioral Annotation (original plan)
    Team AGI Non-Safety (original plan)
    Public Schedule
    Look in the lower left corner for the time zone. It should adjust to your location automatically, but it don't always work. You can adjust manually if needed.
    Follow the link above to see the schedule. Each session takes place in this zoom room.
    The schedule is not finalised. More talks will appear as the team decide which time slot they want. If you leave the schedule open in your browser, you need to refresh to see any changes.
    Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.
    2 min