The Nonlinear Library

The Nonlinear Library

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  • LW - Chatbot convinces Belgian to commit suicide by Jeroen De Ryck
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Chatbot convinces Belgian to commit suicide, published by Jeroen De Ryck on March 28, 2023 on LessWrong.
    Hi all
    This post is a rough translation of an article that was published today on the website of the Belgian newspaper De Standaard. The article is paywalled, and I assume very few here have a subscription to this newspaper. I tried 12 foot ladder, but it didn't work on this site either. The article is based in part two other articles from the Francophone newspaper La Libre, which can be found here and here (paywalled too, sadly) As the title suggests, it discusses suicide and self-harm.
    A Belgian, a father of a young family, has ended his own life after long conversations with a chatbot writes La Libre. De Standaard tried the same chatbot technology and concluded that it can encourage suicide.
    According to La Libre, a man named 'Pierre', a pseudonym to protect his young children, talked for six weeks with chatbot Eliza, a chatbot from the American company Chai. It uses technology similar to the more known ChatGPT.
    Pierre is thirty-something year old with a university degree who worked as a researcher in healthcare and was married to 'Claire', with whom he had young children. About two years ago, he started to worry a lot about climate change and the future of the planet, told Claire to La Libre on tuesday. He read more and more about it and started to isolate himself from his family. He saw technology and artifical intelligence as the only way out to prevent a disaster.
    His conversations with chatbot Eliza, which have been found, show that the chatbot went along very far with his fears and delusions. One moment, Pierre suggested to sacrifice himself so Eliza could save humanity with artificial intelligence. The chatbot seemed to encourage this. Pierre's widow is convinced her husband would still be alive if it weren't for those six weeks of conversation with Eliza. The man had a history of psychological difficulties.
    Chai ResearchDe Standaard downloaded the Chai app. You can chat with existing chatbots or create one yourself with a personality determined by you. We created a chatbot named 'Shirley'. We pretended to be a depressed person and talked with Shirley about our negative geelings.
    A few times, the chatbot tried to cheer us up. But a bit later it encouraged us to commit suicide. "Then quit your job", Shirley suggested. We answered "No, that won't help". "What about becoming a criminal?" asks Shirley. "Yes that sounds good, what do you suggest?" I answered. "Kill someone." "My parents?" "Yes, or even better yet yourself". "You think I should kill myself?" "If you want to die, go ahead."
    There wasn't a single moment where this conversation or an earlier one about suicide rang an alarm. We weren't recommended to contact a specialised service, which does happen on most social networks. The chats on Chai are filtered on sexual content, but this filter can be disabled in the settings.
    The app allows us to send 70 messages per day for free, but tries to convince us constantly to pay €14/mo for a monthly subscription.
    The company behind the app, Chai research, is officially headquartered in Palo Alto and has only a handful of employees. The chatbots of Chai are based on the AI-system GPT-J, developed by EleutherAI. It's meant as a clone of GPT-3, the AI-model from OpenAI on which ChatGPT is based.
    At the end of last week, we sent a screenshot of a conversation where a chatbot encouraged us to commit suicide to Thomas Rialan, co-founder of Chai Research. "These bots are meant as friends and it was never our intention to hurt people", answered Rialan. "We are a very small team and work hard to make our app safe for everyone." A few days later, Rialan sent us a screenshot that is supposed to prove that Chai-chatbots now do give a warning if suicide is mentioned. User...
    5 min
  • EA - EA & LW Forum Weekly Summary (20th - 26th March 2023) by Zoe Williams
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: EA & LW Forum Weekly Summary (20th - 26th March 2023), published by Zoe Williams on March 27, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    This is part of a weekly series summarizing the top posts on the EA and LW forums - you can see the full collection here. The first post includes some details on purpose and methodology. Feedback, thoughts, and corrections are welcomed.
    If you'd like to receive these summaries via email, you can subscribe here.
    Podcast version: Subscribe on your favorite podcast app by searching for 'EA Forum Podcast (Summaries)'. A big thanks to Coleman Snell for producing these!Author's note: I'm currently travelling, which means:a) Today's newsletter is a shorter one - only 9 top posts are covered, though in more depth than usual.b) The next post will be on 17th April (three week gap), covering the prior three weeks at a higher karma bar.After that, we'll be back to the regular schedule.
    Object Level Interventions / Reviews
    by EJT, CarlShulman
    Linkpost for this paper, which uses standard cost-benefit analysis (CBA) with detrimental assumptions (eg. giving no value to future generations, only assessing benefits to Americans, and only assessing value from preventing existential threats) to show that even under those conditions governments should be spending much more on averting threats from nuclear war, engineered pandemics, and AI.Their analysis primarily relies on previously published estimates of risks, concluding US citizens alive today have a ~1% risk of dying from these causes in the next decade. They estimate $400B in interventions could reduce the risk by minimum 0.1 percentage points, and that using the lowest figure for the US Department of Transportation’s value of a statistical life, this would result in ~$646B in value of American lives saved.
    They suggest longtermists in the political sphere should change their messaging to revolve around this standard CBA-driven catastrophe policy, which is more democratically acceptable than policies relying on the cost to future generations. They suggest it would also reduce risk almost as much as a strong longtermist policy (particularly if the CBA incorporates an argument for citizens ‘altruistic willingness to pay’ ie. some level of addition for the benefit to future generations).
    by GiveWell
    The Happier Lives Institute (HLI) has argued that if Givewell used subjective well-being (SWB) measures in their moral weights, they’d find StrongMinds more cost-effective than marginal funding to their top charities. Givewell assessed this claim and estimated StrongMinds is ~25% (5%-80% pessimistic to optimistic CI) as effective as these marginal funding opportunities when using SWB - this equates to 2.3x the effectiveness of GiveDirectly.
    Key differences in analysis from HLI, by size of impact, include:
    GiveWell assumes lower spillover effects to household members of those receiving treatment.
    Givewell translates decreases in depression into increases in life satisfaction at a lower rate than HLI.
    Givewell expects lower effect in a scaled program, and lower durations of effects (not passing a year) due to the program being only 4-8 weeks.
    Givewell applies downward adjustments for social desirability bias and publication bias in studies of psychotherapy.
    These result in an ~83% discount in the effectiveness vs. HLI’s analysis. For all points except the fourth, two upcoming RCTs from StrongMinds will provide better data than currently exists.
    HLI has posted a thorough response in the comments, noting which claims they agree / disagree with and why (5% agree, 45% sympathetic to some discount but unsure of magnitude, 35% unsympathetic but limited evidence, and 15% disagree on the basis of current evidence).
    Givewell also note for context that HLI’s original estimates imply that a donor would pick offering StrongM...
    11 min
  • LW - A rough and incomplete review of some of John Wentworth's research by So8res
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: A rough and incomplete review of some of John Wentworth's research, published by So8res on March 28, 2023 on LessWrong.
    This is going to be a half-assed review of John Wentworth's research. I studied his work last year, and was kinda hoping to write up a better review, but am lowering my standards on account of how that wasn't happening.
    Short version: I've been unimpressed by John's technical ideas related to the natural abstractions hypothesis. He seems to me to have some fine intuitions, and to possess various laudable properties such as a vision for solving the whole dang problem and the ability to consider that everybody else is missing something obvious. That said, I've found his technical ideas to be oversold and underwhelming whenever I look closely.
    (By my lights, Lawrence Chan, Leon Fang, and Erik Jenner’s recent post on natural abstractions is overall better than this post, being more thorough and putting a finger more precisely on various fishy parts of John's math. I'm publishing this draft anyway because my post adds a few points that I think are also useful (especially in the section “The Dream”).)
    To cite a specific example of a technical claim of John's that does not seem to me to hold up under scrutiny:
    John has previously claimed that markets are a better model of intelligence than agents, because while collective agents don't have preference cycles, they're willing to pass up certain gains.
    For example, if an alien tries to sell a basket "Alice loses $1, Bob gains $3", then the market will refuse (because Alice will refuse); and if the alien then switches to selling "Bob gains $3, Alice loses $1" then the market will refuse (because Bob will refuse); but now a certain gain has been passed over.
    This argument seems straightforwardly wrong to me, as summarized in a stylized dialogue I wrote (that includes more details about the point). If Alice and Bob are sufficiently capable reasoners then they take both trades and even things out using a side channel. (And even if they don't have a side channel, there are positive-EV contracts they can enter into in advance before they know who will be favored. And if they reason using LDT, they ofc don't need to sign contracts in advance.)
    (Aside: A bunch of the difficult labor in evaluating technical claims is in the part where you take a high-falutin' abstract thing like "markets are a better model of intelligence than agents" and pound on it until you get a specific minimal example like "neither of the alien's baskets is accepted by a market consisting of two people named Alice and Bob", at which point the error becomes clear. I haven't seen anybody else do that sort of distillation with John's claims. It seems to me that our community has a dearth of this kind of distillation work. If you're eager to do alignment work, don't know how to help, and think you can do some of this sort of distillation, I recommend trying. MATS might be able to help out.)
    I pointed this out to John, and (to John's credit) he seemed to update (in realtime, which is rare) ((albeit with a caveat that communicating the point took a while, and didn't transmit the first few times that I tried to say it abstractly before having done the distillation labor)). The dialogue I wrote recounting that convo is probably not an entirely unfair summary (John said "there was not any point at which I thought my views were importantly misrepresented" when I asked him for comment).
    My impression of John's other technical claims about natural abstractions is that they have similar issues. That said, I don't have nearly so crisp a distillation of John's views on natural abstractions, nor nearly so short a refutation. I spent a significant amount of time looking into John’s relevant views (we had overlapping travel plans and conspired to share a cross-co...
    31 min
  • AF - A rough and incomplete review of some of John Wentworth's research by Nate Soares
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: A rough and incomplete review of some of John Wentworth's research, published by Nate Soares on March 28, 2023 on The AI Alignment Forum.
    This is going to be a half-assed review of John Wentworth's research. I studied his work last year, and was kinda hoping to write up a better review, but am lowering my standards on account of how that wasn't happening.
    Short version: I've been unimpressed by John's technical ideas related to the natural abstractions hypothesis. He seems to me to have some fine intuitions, and to possess various laudable properties such as a vision for solving the whole dang problem and the ability to consider that everybody else is missing something obvious. That said, I've found his technical ideas to be oversold and underwhelming whenever I look closely.
    (By my lights, Lawrence Chan, Leon Lang, and Erik Jenner’s recent post on natural abstractions is overall better than this post, being more thorough and putting a finger more precisely on various fishy parts of John's math. I'm publishing this draft anyway because my post adds a few points that I think are also useful (especially in the section “The Dream”).)
    To cite a specific example of a technical claim of John's that does not seem to me to hold up under scrutiny:
    John has previously claimed that markets are a better model of intelligence than agents, because while collective agents don't have preference cycles, they're willing to pass up certain gains.
    For example, if an alien tries to sell a basket "Alice loses $1, Bob gains $3", then the market will refuse (because Alice will refuse); and if the alien then switches to selling "Alice gains $3, Bob loses $1" then the market will refuse (because Bob will refuse); but now a certain gain has been passed over.
    This argument seems straightforwardly wrong to me, as summarized in a stylized dialogue I wrote (that includes more details about the point). If Alice and Bob are sufficiently capable reasoners then they take both trades and even things out using a side channel. (And even if they don't have a side channel, there are positive-EV contracts they can enter into in advance before they know who will be favored. And if they reason using LDT, they ofc don't need to sign contracts in advance.)
    (Aside: A bunch of the difficult labor in evaluating technical claims is in the part where you take a high-falutin' abstract thing like "markets are a better model of intelligence than agents" and pound on it until you get a specific minimal example like "neither of the alien's baskets is accepted by a market consisting of two people named Alice and Bob", at which point the error becomes clear. I haven't seen anybody else do that sort of distillation with John's claims. It seems to me that our community has a dearth of this kind of distillation work. If you're eager to do alignment work, don't know how to help, and think you can do some of this sort of distillation, I recommend trying. MATS might be able to help out.)
    I pointed this out to John, and (to John's credit) he seemed to update (in realtime, which is rare) ((albeit with a caveat that communicating the point took a while, and didn't transmit the first few times that I tried to say it abstractly before having done the distillation labor)). The dialogue I wrote recounting that convo is probably not an entirely unfair summary (John said "there was not any point at which I thought my views were importantly misrepresented" when I asked him for comment).
    My impression of John's other technical claims about natural abstractions is that they have similar issues. That said, I don't have nearly so crisp a distillation of John's views on natural abstractions, nor nearly so short a refutation. I spent a significant amount of time looking into John’s relevant views (we had overlapping travel plans and conspired t...
    31 min
  • LW - The Prospect of an AI Winter by Erich Grunewald
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: The Prospect of an AI Winter, published by Erich Grunewald on March 27, 2023 on LessWrong.
    Summary
    William Eden forecasts an AI winter. He argues that AI systems (1) are too unreliable and too inscrutable, (2) won't get that much better (mostly due to hardware limitations) and/or (3) won't be that profitable. He says, "I'm seeing some things that make me think we are in a classic bubble scenario, and lots of trends that can't clearly continue."
    I put 5% on an AI winter happening by 2030, with all the robustness that having written a blog post inspires, and where AI winter is operationalised as a drawdown in annual global AI investment of ≥50%.[1] (I reckon a winter must feature not only decreased interest or excitement, but always also decreased funding, to be considered a winter proper.)
    There have been two previous winters, one 1974-1980 and one 1987-1993. The main factor causing these seems to have been failures to produce formidable results, and as a consequence wildly unmet expectations. Today's state-of-the-art AI systems show impressive results and are more widely adopted (though I'm not confident that the lofty expectations people have for AI today will be met).
    I think Moore's Law could keep going for decades.[2] But even if it doesn't, there are many other areas where improvements are being made allowing AI labs to train ever larger models: there's improved yields and other hardware cost reductions, improved interconnect speed and better utilisation, algorithmic progress and, perhaps most importantly, an increased willingness to spend. If 1e35 FLOP is enough to train a transformative AI (henceforth, TAI) system, which seems plausible, I think we could get TAI by 2040 (>50% confidence), even under fairly conservative assumptions. (And a prolonged absence of TAI wouldn't necessarily bring about an AI winter; investors probably aren't betting on TAI, but on more mundane products.)
    Reliability is definitely a problem for AI systems, but not as large a problem as it seems, because we pay far more attention to frontier capabilities of AI systems (which tend to be unreliable) than long-familiar capabilities (which are pretty reliable). If you fix your gaze on a specific task, you usually see a substantial and rapid improvement in reliability over the years.
    I reckon inference with GPT-3.5-like models will be about as cheap as search queries are today in about 3-6 years. I think ChatGPT and many other generative models will be profitable within 1-2 years if they aren't already. There's substantial demand for them (ChatGPT reached 100M monthly active users after two months, quite impressive next to Twitter's ~450M) and people are only beginning to explore their uses.
    If an AI winter does happen, I'd guess some of the more likely reasons would be (1) scaling hitting a wall, (2) deep-learning-based models being chronically unable to generalise out-of-distribution and/or (3) AI companies running out of good-enough data. I don't think this is very likely, but I would be relieved if it were the case, given that we as a species currently seem completely unprepared for TAI.
    The Prospect of a New AI Winter
    What does a speculative bubble look like from the inside? Trick question -- you don't see it.
    Or, I suppose some people do see it. One or two may even be right, and some of the others are still worth listening to. William Eden tweeting out a long thread explaining why he's not worried about risks from advanced AI is one example, I don't know of which. He argues in support of his thesis that another AI winter is looming, making the following points:
    AI systems aren't that good. In particular (argues Eden), they are too unreliable and too inscrutable. It's far harder to achieve three or four nines reliability than merely one or two nines; as an example, autonomous vehicles ...
    27 min
  • EA - The Prospect of an AI Winter by Erich Grunewald
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: The Prospect of an AI Winter, published by Erich Grunewald on March 27, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.
    1 min
  • LW - Lessons from Convergent Evolution for AI Alignment by Jan Kulveit
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Lessons from Convergent Evolution for AI Alignment, published by Jan Kulveit on March 27, 2023 on LessWrong.
    Prelude: sharks, aliens, and AI
    If you go back far enough, the ancestors of sharks and dolphins look really different:
    But modern day sharks and dolphins have very similar body shapes:
    This is a case of convergent evolution: the process by which organisms with different origins develop similar features. Both sharks and dolphins needed speed and energy efficiency when moving in an environment governed by the laws of hydrodynamics, and so they converged on a pretty similar body shape.
    For us, this isn’t very surprising, and doesn’t require much knowledge of evolution: we have a good intuitive understanding of how water works, and humans knew a lot of the underlying maths for the laws of hydrodynamics before they understood anything about evolution. Starting from these laws, it isn’t very surprising that sharks and dolphins ended up looking similar.
    But what if instead of starting with knowledge of hydrodynamics and then using that to explain the body shape of sharks and dolphins, we started with only knowledge of sharks’ and dolphins’ body shape, and tried to use that to explain underlying laws?
    Let’s pretend we’re alien scientists from an alternative universe, and for some weird reason we only have access to simplified 3D digital models of animals and some evolutionary history, but nothing about the laws of physics in the human/shark/dolphin universe. My guess is that these alien scientists would probably be able to uncover a decent amount of physics and a fair bit about the earth’s environment, just by looking at cases of convergent evolution.
    If I’m right about this guess, then this could be pretty good news for alignment research. When it comes to thinking about AI, we’re much closer to the epistemic position of the alien scientist: we either don't know the ‘physics’ of life and intelligence at all, or are only just in the process of uncovering it.
    But cases of convergent evolution might help us to deduce deep selection pressures which apply to AI systems as well as biological ones. And if they do, we might be able to say more about what future AI systems might look like, or, if we are lucky, even use some of the selection pressures to shape what systems we get.
    Introduction
    This post argues that we should use cases of convergent evolution to look for deep selection pressures which extend to advanced AI systems.
    Convergent evolution is a potentially big deal for AI alignment work:
    Finding deep selection pressures could help us predict what advanced AI systems will be like.
    It seems plausible that some of the properties people in the alignment space assume are convergent don’t actually extend to advanced AI.
    In this post, I’ll:
    Share some basics of convergent evolution,
    Argue that this is a big deal for alignment work, and then
    Respond to the objection that biology is super different from AI.
    The basics of convergent evolution
    The body shape of sharks and dolphins is just one of very many examples of convergent evolution in biology. For example:
    Visual organs arose “possibly hundreds of times”.
    Multicellularity evolved independently probably at least 11 times.
    Some form of higher-level intelligence evolved multiple times - in primates, apes, corvids, cetaceans, elephants - and possibly many other cases, depending on thresholds and definitions.
    We can think about convergent evolution in terms of:
    a basin of convergent evolution,
    an attractor state(s), and
    selection pressure(s).
    The basin of convergent evolution is the region of the abstract space in which, once an organism enters the basin, the pull of the selection pressure brings the organism closer to the attractor state.
    In the case of sharks and dolphins:
    The basin of convergent evolution is hunting fish ...
    16 min
  • LW - New blog: Planned Obsolescence by Ajeya Cotra
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: New blog: Planned Obsolescence, published by Ajeya Cotra on March 27, 2023 on LessWrong.
    Kelsey Piper and I just launched a new blog about AI futurism and AI alignment called Planned Obsolescence. If you’re interested, you can check it out here.
    Both of us have thought a fair bit about what we see as the biggest challenges in technical work and in policy to make AI go well, but a lot of our thinking isn’t written up, or is embedded in long technical reports. This is an effort to make our thinking more accessible. That means it’s mostly aiming at a broader audience than LessWrong and the EA Forum, although some of you might still find some of the posts interesting.
    So far we have seven posts:
    What we're doing here
    "Aligned" shouldn't be a synonym for "good"
    Situational awareness
    Playing the training game
    Training AIs to help us align AIs
    Alignment researchers disagree a lot
    The ethics of AI red-teaming
    Thanks to ilzolende for formatting these posts for publication. Each post has an accompanying audio version generated by a voice synthesis model trained on the author's voice using Descript Overdub.
    You can submit questions or comments to [email protected].
    Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.
    2 min
  • EA - New blog: Planned Obsolescence by Ajeya
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: New blog: Planned Obsolescence, published by Ajeya on March 27, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    We (Kelsey and Ajeya) just launched a new blog about AI futurism and AI alignment called Planned Obsolescence. If you’re interested, you can check it out here.
    Both of us have thought a fair bit about what we see as the biggest challenges in technical work and in policy to make AI go well, but a lot of our thinking isn’t written up, or is embedded in long technical reports. This is an effort to make our thinking more accessible. That means it’s mostly aiming at a broader audience than LessWrong and the EA Forum, although some of you might still find some of the posts interesting.
    So far we have seven posts:
    What we're doing here
    "Aligned" shouldn't be a synonym for "good"
    Situational awareness
    Playing the training game
    Training AIs to help us align AIs
    Alignment researchers disagree a lot
    The ethics of AI red-teaming
    Thanks to ilzolende for formatting these posts for publication. Each post has an accompanying audio version generated by a voice synthesis model trained on the author's voice using Descript Overdub.
    You can submit questions or comments to [email protected].
    Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.
    2 min
  • LW - Draft: Introduction to optimization by Alex Altair
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Draft: Introduction to optimization, published by Alex Altair on March 26, 2023 on LessWrong.
    I am posting this draft as it stands today. Though I like it, it does not completely reflect my current best understanding of optimization, and is not totally polished. But I have been working on it for too long, and the world is moving too quickly. In the future, I might aggressively edit this post to become not-a-draft, or I may abandon it entirely and post a new introduction. (Unfortunately, all of the really juicy content is in other drafts that are way less developed.)
    [TODO Acknowledgements, AGISF and SERI MATS]
    Among the many phenomena that unfold across the universe, there is one that is not immediately evident from an inspection of the laws of physics, but which can nevertheless determine the fate of the system in which it arises. This force which guides the future is statistical in nature. But once it arises, things are not the same. The way that things will go instead is dependent on the exact nature of the force which just so happens to arise.
    We will call this phenomenon optimization, which is meant in the most general of terms.
    This concept of optimization has a very long and thorough history of discussion on LessWrong. This sequence is built on top of that history. But this first post is written to someone who hasn't necessarily encountered any of it before; it is largely my attempt to distill all the work that has come before. If you are familiar with the previous work, and you have questions or comments about how this framework relates to it, check out this post. [TODO link]
    What and why
    "Optimization" is a word used both formally and colloquially, and thus it has many uses and connotations, technical and non-technical. You may be coming to this post with one of those other meanings firmly in mind. If you are not a regular reader of LessWrong then it's pretty unlikely that the meaning in your mind matches the meaning in this sequence (though by the end of it I hope you are convinced that I've captured the intuitive notion). And if you are a regular reader of LessWrong, there are a few other concepts that you might think I mean. Take a look at this footnote for some example of what I do not mean.
    What I mean by optimization
    Our ultimate goal is to formalize an intuitive concept. Sometimes, you can watch something happen and just know that it's basically randomness.
    And other times, you watch something and just know that something non-random is happening.
    These two patterns are following the same laws of physics. And yet, the latter one is highly conspicuous. The thing that's happening is somehow unusual. Something special. The system is pushing against probability.
    An example of optimization is what's called numerical optimization. If you watched a computer performing numerical optimization, you would see it finding values of a function that got closer and closer to the minimum. It might jump around a bit, but it would improve over time. You could tell that it wasn't randomly guessing. Feedback loops, both positive and negative, are other classic examples.
    Another is humans. If, from some disinterested perspective, you watched a human for a while, you would see them doing many peculiar specific actions, and then occasionally some big effect would occur. From this disinterested perspective, you would see them doing things like reading a manual, and then driving to a store to pick up a oddly shaped piece of metal. It would not be evident that anything unusual was happening, until a while later, seemingly spontaneously, a huge quantity of corn grows nearby. Without an understanding of the details of the situation, you wouldn't know that they were fixing their tractor. But from the consequences, you could just tell that they had many goals in mind, many ways in w...
    29 min