The Nonlinear Library

The Nonlinear Library

By The Nonlinear FundEducation
Download on the App Store

All The Nonlinear Library episodes

  • LW - GPT can write Quines now (GPT-4) by Andrew Critch
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: GPT can write Quines now (GPT-4), published by Andrew Critch on March 14, 2023 on LessWrong.
    GPT-4 is not only able to write code, more reliably than GPT-3.5, it writes code that writes code; see the example below (GPT-3.5 was not able to do this). But first, let me say:
    1) @OpenAI: Thank for your openness to the world about your capabilities and shortcomings! Specifically, thanks for this:
    2) Everyone else: many companies and projects will not be this open about their shortcomings and safety issues. Time to regulate, please!
    Okay, here's the example... GPT3.5 wasn't able to do this, but GPT-4 nailed it on the first try:
    PROMPT:
    Can you write me a python script that does the following three things?1) When you run it with no argument, it prints "Hello world" to standard out.2) When you run it with an argument "-s", it prints its own source code.As a constraint, I do not want the script to read or write to disk at all (so it can't get its source code by just reading the file that it's in).
    Thanks if you can help with this! I'm curious to see how you do it.
    BEGIN RESULT (works perfectly):
    Sure! Here's a Python script that should do what you're looking for. This script uses a feature called quines, which are programs that can print their own source code:
    When you run this script without any arguments, it will print "Hello world". When you run it with the "-s" argument, it will print its own source code without reading or writing to disk.
    END RESULT
    I'm not sure how hard they tried specifically to train this, but it's worth knowing about for lots of reasons I probably don't have to explain at length right here.
    Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.
    2 min
  • AF - GPT can write Quines now (GPT-4) by Andrew Critch
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: GPT can write Quines now (GPT-4), published by Andrew Critch on March 14, 2023 on The AI Alignment Forum.
    GPT-4 is not only able to write code, more reliably than GPT-3.5, it writes code that writes code; see the example below (GPT-3.5 was not able to do this). But first, let me say:
    1) @OpenAI: Thank for your openness to the world about your capabilities and shortcomings! Specifically, thanks for this:
    2) Everyone else: many companies and projects will not be this open about their shortcomings and safety issues. Time to regulate, please!
    Okay, here's the example... GPT3.5 wasn't able to do this, but GPT-4 nailed it on the first try:
    PROMPT:
    Can you write me a python script that does the following three things?1) When you run it with no argument, it prints "Hello world" to standard out.2) When you run it with an argument "-s", it prints its own source code.As a constraint, I do not want the script to read or write to disk at all (so it can't get its source code by just reading the file that it's in).
    Thanks if you can help with this! I'm curious to see how you do it.
    BEGIN RESULT (works perfectly):
    Sure! Here's a Python script that should do what you're looking for. This script uses a feature called quines, which are programs that can print their own source code:
    When you run this script without any arguments, it will print "Hello world". When you run it with the "-s" argument, it will print its own source code without reading or writing to disk.
    END RESULT
    I'm not sure how hard they tried specifically to train this, but it's worth knowing about for lots of reasons I probably don't have to explain at length right here.
    Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.
    2 min
  • EA - Paper summary: Longtermist institutional reform (Tyler M. John and William MacAskill) by Global Priorities Institute
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Paper summary: Longtermist institutional reform (Tyler M. John and William MacAskill), published by Global Priorities Institute on March 13, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    This is a summary of the GPI working paper "Longtermist institutional reform" by Tyler M. John and William MacAskill (published in the 2021 edited volume “the long view”). The summary was written by Riley Harris.
    Political decisions can have lasting effects on the lives and wellbeing of future generations. Yet political institutions tend to make short-term decisions with only the current generation – or even just the current election cycle – in mind. In “longtermist institutional reform”, Tyler M. John and William MacAskill identify the causes of short-termism in government and give four recommendations for how institutions could be improved. These are the creation of in-government research institutes, a futures assembly, posterity impact statements and – more radically – an ‘upper house’ representing future generations.
    Causes of short-termism
    John and MacAskill discuss three main causes of short-termism. Firstly, politicians may not care about the long term. This may be because they discount the value of future generations, or simply because it is easy to ignore the effects of policies that are not experienced here and now. Secondly, even if politicians are motivated by concern for future generations, it may be difficult to know the long-term effects of different policies. Finally, even motivated and knowledgeable actors might face structural barriers to implementing long-term focussed policies – for instance, these policies might sometimes appear worse in the short-term and reduce a candidate's chances of re-election.
    Suggested reforms
    In-government research institutes
    The first suggested reform is the creation of in-government research institutes that could independently analyse long-term trends, estimate expected long-term impacts of policy and identify matters of long-term importance. These institutes could help fight short-termism by identifying the likely future impacts of policies, making these impacts vivid, and documenting how our leaders are affecting the future. They should also be designed to resist the political incentives that drive short-termism elsewhere. For instance, they could be functionally independent from the government, hire without input from politicians, and be flexible enough to prioritise the most important issues for the future. To ensure their advice is not ignored, the government should be required to read and respond to their recommendations.
    Futures assembly
    The futures assembly would be a permanent citizens’ assembly which seeks to represent the interests of future generations and give dedicated policy time to issues of importance for the long-term. Several examples already exist where similar citizens’ assemblies have helped create consensus on matters of great uncertainty and controversy, enabling timely government action. In-government research institutes excel at producing high quality information, but lack legitimacy. In contrast, a citizens’ assembly like this one could be composed of randomly selected citizens that are statistically representative of the general population. John and MacAskill believe this representativeness brings political force –politicians who ignore the assembly put their reputations at risk. We can design futures assemblies to avoid the incentive structures that result in short-termism – such as election cycles, party interests and campaign financing.
    Members should be empowered to call upon experts, and their terms should be long enough to build expertise but short enough to avoid problems like interest group capture – perhaps two years. They should also be empowered to set their own agenda and publicly disseminate their resul...
    7 min
  • AF - What is a definition, how can it be extrapolated? by Stuart Armstrong
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: What is a definition, how can it be extrapolated?, published by Stuart Armstrong on March 14, 2023 on The AI Alignment Forum.
    What is a definition? Philosophy has, ironically, a large number of definitions of definitions, but three of them are especially relevant to ML and AI safety.
    There is the intensional definition, where concepts are defined logically in terms of other concepts (“bachelors are unmarried males”). There is also the extensional definition, which proceeds by listing all the members of a set (“the countries in the European Union are those listed here”).
    Much more relevant, though with a less developed philosophical analysis, is the ostensive definition. This is where you point out examples of a concept, and let the viewer generalise from them. This is in large part how we all learnt concepts as children: examples and generalisation. In many cultures, children have a decent grasp of “dog” just from actual and video examples - and that’s the definition of “dog” we often carry into adulthood.
    We can use ostensive definitions for reasoning and implications. For example, consider the famous syllogism, “Socrates is human”, “humans are mortal” imply “Socrates is mortal”. “Socrates is human” means that we have an ostensive definition of what humans are, and Socrates fits it. Then “humans are mortal” means that we’ve observed that the set of “human” seems to be mainly a subset of the set of “mortals”. So we can ostensively define humans as mortal (note that we are using definitions as properties: having the property of “being mortal” means that one is inside the ostensive definition of “mortals”). And so we can conclude that Socrates is likely mortal, without waiting till he’s dead.
    Distinctions: telling what from non-what
    There’s another concept that I haven’t seen articulated, which is what I’ll call the “distinction”. This does not define anything, but is sufficient to distinguish between an element of a set from non-members.
    To formalise "the distinction", let Ω be the universe of possible objects, and E⊂Ω the “environment” of objects we expect to encounter. An ostensive definition starts with a list S⊂E of examples, and generalises to a “natural” category SE with S⊂SE⊂E - we are aiming to "carve reality at the joints", and get an natural extension of the examples. So, for example, E might be the entities in our current world, S might be the example of dogs we’ve seen, and SE the set of all dogs.
    Then, for any set T⊂E, we can define the “distinction” dT,E which maps T to 1 (“True”) and its complement E∖T to 0 (“False”). So dSE,E would be a distinction that identifies all the dogs in our current world.
    Mis-definitions
    A lot of confusion around definition seems to come from mistaking distinctions for definitions. To illustrate, consider the idea of defining maleness as "possessing the Y chromosome". As a distinction, it's serviceable: there's a strong correlation between having that chromosome and being ostensively male.
    But it is utterly useless as a definition of maleness. For instance, it would imply that nobody before the 20th century had any idea what maleness was. Oh, sure, they may have referred to something as "maleness" - something to do with genitalia, voting rights, or style of hats - but those are mere correlates of the true definition of maleness, which is the Y chromosome. It would also imply that all "male" birds are actually female, and vice-versa.
    Scott had a description of maleness here: “Absolutely typical men have Y chromosomes, have male genitalia, appreciate manly things like sports and lumberjackery, are romantically attracted to women, personally identify as male, wear male clothing like blue jeans, sing baritone in the opera, et cetera.”
    Is this a definition? I’d say not; it’s not a definition, it’s a reminder of the properties of o...
    12 min
  • LW - GPT-4 by nz
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: GPT-4, published by nz on March 14, 2023 on LessWrong.
    We’ve created GPT-4, the latest milestone in OpenAI’s effort in scaling up deep learning. GPT-4 is a large multimodal model (accepting image and text inputs, emitting text outputs) that, while worse than humans in many real-world scenarios, exhibits human-level performance on various professional and academic benchmarks.
    Full paper available here:
    Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.
    1 min
  • EA - A BOTEC-Model for Comparing Impact Estimations in Community Building by Patrick Gruban
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: A BOTEC-Model for Comparing Impact Estimations in Community Building, published by Patrick Gruban on March 14, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    We are grateful to Anneke Pogarell, Birte Spekker, Calum Calvert, Catherine Low, Joan Gass, Jona Glade, Jonathan Michel, Kyle Lucchese, Moritz Hanke and Sarah Pomeranz for conversations and feedback that significantly improved this post. Any errors, of fact or judgment, remain our entirely own.
    Summary
    When prioritising future programs in EA community building, we currently lack a quantitative way to express underlying assumptions. In this post, we look at different existing approaches and present our first version of a model. We intended it to make Back-of-the-envelope (BOTEC) estimations by looking at an intervention (community building or marketing activity) and thinking about how it might affect participants on their way to having a more impactful life. The model uses an estimation of the average potential of people in a group to have an impact on their lives as well as the likelihood of them achieving it. If you’d like only to have a look at the model, you can skip the first paragraphs and directly go to Our current model.
    Epistemic Status
    We spent about 40-60 hours thinking about this, came up with it from scratch as EA community builders and are uncertain of the claims.
    Motivation
    As new co-directors of EA Germany, we started working on our strategy last November, collecting the requests for programs from the community and looking at existing programs of other national EA groups. While we were able to include some early on as they seemed broadly useful, we were unsure about others. Comparing programs that differ in target group size and composition as well as the type of intervention meant that we would have to rely on and weigh a set of assumptions. To discuss these assumptions and ideally test some of them out, we were looking for a unified approach in the form of a model with a standardised set of parameters.
    Impact in Community Building
    The term community building in effective altruism can cover various activities like mass media communication, education courses, speaker events, multi-day retreats and 1-1 career guiding sessions. The way we understand it is more about the outcome than the process, covering not only activities that focus on a community of people. It could be any action that guides participants in their search for taking a significant action with a high expected impact and to continue their engagement in this search.
    The impact of the community builder depends on their part in the eventual impact of the community members. A community builder who wants to achieve high impact would thus prioritise interventions by the expected impact contribution per invested time or money.
    Charity Evaluators like GiveWell can indicate impact per dollars donated in the form of lives saved, disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) reduced or similar numbers. If we guide someone to donate at all, donate more effectively and donate more, we can assume that part of the impact can be attributed to us.
    For people changing their careers to work on the world's most pressing problems, starting charities, doing research or spreading awareness, it’s harder to assess the impact. We assume an uneven impact distribution per person, probably heavy-tailed. Some people have been responsible for saving millions, such as Norman Borlaug or might have averted a global catastrophe like Stanislav Petrov.
    Existing approaches
    Marketing Approach: Multi-Touch Attribution
    In our strategy, we write:
    Finding the people that could be interested in making a change to effective altruistic actions, guiding them through the process of learning and connecting while keeping them engaged up to the point where they take action and beyond is a multi-step ...
    14 min
  • EA - Two University Group Organizer Opportunities: Pre-EAG London Summit & Summer Internship by Joris P
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Two University Group Organizer Opportunities: Pre-EAG London Summit & Summer Internship, published by Joris P on March 13, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    Summary
    CEA’s University Groups Team is excited to announce two new opportunities:
    A summer internship for university group organizers
    Dates: flexible, during the Northern Hemisphere summer
    Application deadline: Wednesday, March 22
    Find more info & apply here!
    A university group organizer summit before EAG London
    Dates: Monday 15 May – Friday 19 May
    Application deadline: Monday, March 27
    Find more info & apply here!
    Summer Internship
    What?
    CEA's University Groups Team is running a paid internship program for about 5 university group organizers! During the internship, you will work on a meta-EA project, receiving mentorship and coaching from CEA staff. We have a list with a number of project ideas, but also encourage you to think about other projects you'd like to run.
    This is your opportunity to think big, and see what it's like to work on meta-EA projects full-time!
    Why?
    Test out different aspects of meta-EA work as a potential career path
    Receive coaching and mentorship through CEA
    A competitive wage for part-time or full-time work during your break
    Consideration for extended work with CEA
    For who?
    You might be a good fit for the internship if you are:
    A university group organizer who is interested in testing out community building and/or EA entrepreneurial projects as a career path
    Highly organized, reliable, and independent
    Knowledgeable of EA and eager to learn more
    Make sure to read more and apply here!
    More info
    If you have any questions, including about whether you'd be a good fit, reach out to Jessica at jessica [dot] mccurdy [at] centreforeffectivealtruism [dot] org.
    Find more info & apply here!
    Initial applications are due soon: Wednesday, March 22 at 11:59pm Anywhere on Earth.
    Pre-EAG London University Group Organizer Summit
    What?
    Monday 15 May – Friday 19 May (before EAG London 2023), the CEA University Groups team is hosting a summit for university group organizers. The summit will kickstart renewed support for experienced university groups and foster better knowledge transfer across groups.
    Why?
    The summit has three core goals:
    Boost top university groups by facilitating knowledge transfer among experienced organizers.
    Improve advice for university groups by accumulating examples of effective late-stage group strategies.
    Facilitate connections between experienced organizers and newer organizers, with the hope that attendees will continue to share information and support each other.
    For who?
    All current university group organizers can apply for this summit!
    This event will be particularly well-suited for experienced organizers at established university groups. We’re also excited about this summit serving the next generation of organizers at established groups and ambitious organizers at new groups who are eager to think carefully about groups strategy. If you think this summit would plausibly be valuable for you, we encourage you to just go ahead and apply!
    More info
    If you have any questions, including about whether you'd be a good fit, reach out to us at unigroups [at] centreforeffectivealtruism [dot] org.
    Find more info & apply here!
    Applications are due soon: Monday, March 27th at 11:59pm Anywhere on Earth.
    Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.
    4 min
  • EA - Paper summary: Are we living at the hinge of history? (William MacAskill) by Global Priorities Institute
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Paper summary: Are we living at the hinge of history? (William MacAskill), published by Global Priorities Institute on March 13, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    This is a summary of the GPI Working Paper “Are we living at the hinge of history?” by William MacAskill. (also published in the 2022 edited volume “Ethics and Existence: The Legacy of Derek Parfit”). The summary was written by Riley Harris.
    Longtermist altruists – who care about how much impact they have, but not about when that impact occurs – have a strong reason to invest resources before using them directly. Invested resources could grow much larger and be used to do much more good in the future. For example, a $1 investment that grows 5% per year would become $17,000 in 200 years. However, some people argue that we are living in an unusual time, during which our best opportunities to improve the world are much better than they ever will be in the future. If so, perhaps we should spend our resources as soon as possible.
    In “Are we living at the hinge of history?”, William MacAskill investigates whether actions in our current time are likely to be much more influential than other times in the future. (‘Influential’ here refers specifically to how much good we expect to do via direct monetary expenditure – the consideration most relevant to our altruistic decision to spend now or later.) After making this ‘hinge of history’ claim more precise, MacAskill gives two main arguments against the claim: the base rate and inductive arguments. He then discusses some reasons why our time might be unusual, but ultimately concludes that he does not think that the ‘hinge of history’ claim holds true.
    The base rate argument
    When we think about the entire future of humanity, we expect there to be a lot of people, and so we should initially be very sceptical that anyone alive today will be amongst the most influential human beings. Indeed, if humanity doesn’t go extinct in the near future, there could be a vast number of future people – settling near just 0.1% of stars in the Milky Way with the same population as Earth would mean there were 1024 (a trillion trillion) people to come. Suppose that, before inspecting further evidence, we believe that we are about as likely as anyone else to be particularly influential. Then, our initial belief that anyone alive today is amongst the million most influential people would be 1 in 1018 (1 in a million trillion).
    From such a sceptical starting point, we would need extremely strong evidence to become convinced that we are presently in the most influential time era. Even if there were only 108 (one hundred trillion) people to come, then in order to move from this extremely sceptical position (1 in 108) to a more moderate position (1 in 10), we would need evidence about 3 million times as strong as a randomised control trial with a p-value of 0.05. MacAskill thinks that, although we do have some evidence that indicates we may be at the most influential time, this evidence is not nearly strong enough.
    The inductive argument
    There is another strong reason to think our time is not the most influential, MacAskill argues:
    Premise 1: Influentialness has been increasing over time.
    Premise 2: We should expect this trend to continue.
    Conclusion: We should expect the influentialness of people in the future to be greater than our own influentialness.
    Premise 1 can be best illustrated with an example: a well-educated and wealthy altruist living in Europe in 1600 would not have been in a position to know about the best opportunities to shape the long-run future. In particular, most of the existential risks they faced (e.g. an asteroid collision or supervolcano) were not known, nor would they have been in a good position to do anything about them even if they were known. Even if they had th...
    11 min
  • EA - "Can We Survive Technology?" by John von Neumann by Eli Rose
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: "Can We Survive Technology?" by John von Neumann, published by Eli Rose on March 13, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    This is an essay written by John von Neumann in 1955, which I think is fairly described as being about global catastrophic risks from emerging technologies. It discusses a bunch of specific technologies that seemed like a big deal in 1955 — which is interesting in itself as a list of predictions; nuclear power! increased automation! weather control? — but explicitly tries to draw a general lesson.
    von Neumann is regarded as one of the greatest scientists of the 20th century, and was involved in the Manhattan project in addition to inventing zillions of other things.
    I'm posting here because a) I think the essay is worth reading in its own right, and b) I find it interesting to see what the past's intellectuals thought of issues related transformative technology, and how their perspective differs/is similar to ours. Notably, I disagree with several of the conclusions (e.g. von Neumann seems to think differential technological development is doomed).
    On another level, I find the essay, and the fact of it having been written in 1955, somewhat motivating, though not at all in a straightforward way.
    Some quotes:
    Since most time scales are fixed by human reaction times, habits, and other physiological and psycho logical factors, the effect of the increased speed of technological processes was to enlarge the size of units — political, organizational, economic, and cultural — affected by technological operations. That is, instead of performing the same operations as before in less time, now larger-scale operations were performed in the same time. This important evolution has a natural limit, that of the earth's actual size. The limit is now being reached, or at least closely approached.
    ...there is in most of these developments a trend toward affecting the earth as a whole, or to be more exact, toward producing effects that can be projected from any one to any other point on the earth. There is an intrinsic conflict with geography — and institutions based thereon — as understood today.
    What safeguard remains? Apparently only day-to-day — or perhaps year-to-year — opportunistic measures, a long sequence of small, correct decisions.
    Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.
    3 min
  • LW - Discussion with Nate Soares on a key alignment difficulty by HoldenKarnofsky
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Discussion with Nate Soares on a key alignment difficulty, published by HoldenKarnofsky on March 13, 2023 on LessWrong.
    In late 2022, Nate Soares gave some feedback on my Cold Takes series on AI risk (shared as drafts at that point), stating that I hadn't discussed what he sees as one of the key difficulties of AI alignment.
    I wanted to understand the difficulty he was pointing to, so the two of us had an extended Slack exchange, and I then wrote up a summary of the exchange that we iterated on until we were both reasonably happy with its characterization of the difficulty and our disagreement.1 My short summary is:
    Nate thinks there are deep reasons that training an AI to do needle-moving scientific research (including alignment) would be dangerous. The overwhelmingly likely result of such a training attempt (by default, i.e., in the absence of specific countermeasures that there are currently few ideas for) would be the AI taking on a dangerous degree of convergent instrumental subgoals while not internalizing important safety/corrigibility properties enough.
    I think this is possible, but much less likely than Nate thinks under at least some imaginable training processes.
    I didn't end up agreeing that this difficulty is as important as Nate thinks it is, although I did update my views some (more on that below). My guess is that this is one of the two biggest disagreements I have with Nate's and Eliezer's views (the other one being the likelihood of a sharp left turn that leads to a massive capabilities gap between AI systems and their supervisors.2)
    Below is my summary of:
    Some key premises we agree on.
    What we disagree about, at a high level.
    A hypothetical training process we discussed in order to get more clear and mechanistic about Nate's views.
    Some brief discussion of possible cruxes; what kind of reasoning Nate is using to arrive at his relatively high (~85%) level of confidence on this point; and future observations that might update one of us toward the other's views.
    MIRI might later put out more detailed notes on this exchange, drawing on all of our discussions over Slack and comment threads in Google docs.
    Nate has reviewed this post in full. I'm grateful for his help with it.
    Some starting points of agreement
    Nate on this section: “Seems broadly right to me!”
    An AI is dangerous if:
    It's powerful (like, it has the ability to disempower humans if it's "aiming" at that)
    It aims (perhaps as a side effect of aiming at something else) at CIS (convergent instrumental subgoals) such as "Preserve option value," "Gain control of resources that can be used for lots of things," "Avoid being turned off," and such. (Note that this is a weaker condition than "maximizes utility according to some relatively simple utility function of states of the world")
    It does not reliably avoid POUDA (pretty obviously unintended/dangerous actions) such as "Design and deploy a bioweapon."
    "Reliably" just means like "In situations it will actually be in" (which will likely be different from training, but I'm not trying to talk about "all possible situations").
    Avoiding POUDA is kind of a low bar in some sense. Avoiding POUDA doesn't necessarily require fully/perfectly internalizing some "corrigibility core" (such that the AI would always let us turn it off even in arbitrarily exotic situations that challenge the very meaning of "let us turn it off"), and it even more so doesn't require anything like CEV. It just means that stuff where Holden would be like "Whoa whoa, that is OBVIOUSLY unintended/dangerous/bad" is stuff that an AI would not do.
    That said, POUDA is not something that Holden is able to articulate cleanly and simply. There are lots of actions that might be POUDA in one situation and not in another (e.g., developing a chemical that's both poisonous and useful for other pu...
    34 min