The Nonlinear Library

The Nonlinear Library

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All The Nonlinear Library episodes

  • LW - Am I secretly excited for AI getting weird? by porby
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Am I secretly excited for AI getting weird?, published by porby on October 29, 2022 on LessWrong.
    This post is arguably darker than my other one. I don't make any persuasive arguments about AI forecasting here; if you don't feel like looking at doominess, feel free to skip this.
    I've noticed a few instances of what look like people assuming that those who are visibly concerned about AI risk don't really buy into the full weight of what they're saying.
    Recently, I came across this (hi, niknoble!):
    As a specific example of what I suspect is a bit of cognitive dissonance, look at the recent post on AGI by porby, which predicts AGI by 2030. I loved reading that post because it promises that the future is going to be wild. If porby is right, we're all in for an adventure. Based on the breathless tone of the post, I would surmise that porby is as excited by his conclusion as I am. For example, we have this excerpt:
    This is crazy! I'm raising my eyebrows right now to emphasize it! Consider also doing so! This is weird enough to warrant it!
    Would you have predicted this in 2016? I don't think I would have!
    Does this strike you as someone who dreads the arrival of AGI? It seems to me like he is awaiting it with great anticipation.
    But then in the comments on the post, he says that he hopes he's wrong about AGI! If you're reading this porby, do you really want to be wrong?
    This is an excellent example of the kind of thing I'm talking about, so I'm going to use it.
    I think my writing and speaking style defaults to a kind of lightness that can be misleading. So let me try to write something a little darker.
    Well, do you?
    Because I don't think P(doom | AGI) is anywhere close to 0, especially for AGI developed on very short timescales:YES, I DO WANT TO BE WRONG.
    The kind of "excitement" I feel about near-term AGI is adjacent to hearing the tornado siren, looking at the radar, seeing the warned cell moving straight east, walking out on my porch to look at a black wall of rain a mile or two away, and seeing the power flashes straight west of me as the tornado rips lives apart. While grabbing a mattress to throw over a tub, I'm doing some quick mental calculations- the statistical rarity of EF-3 or stronger tornadoes, will it stay on the ground, how large is it (glance at the hook on the reflectivity map), how sturdy is this house (the feeling of the entire house shunting to one side during an earlier storm's 120 mph winds wasn't promising), how much damage would a near miss cause? All the while, telling my family to get their shoes, don't worry, we have time (do we have time? probably), just get into the bathroom.
    It didn't stay on the ground. Also, we have a storm shelter now. It only took about 6 close calls to bite that bullet!
    More than excitement
    You know that voyeuristic "excitement" of a really bad hurricane about to make landfall? Something wildly out of the ordinary, something that breaks the sense of normalcy and reminds you that human civilization is fragile? It's a weird, darkly attractive kind of novelty.
    Watching COVID-19 in January 2020 felt that way, for a while. It was distant and not here, so it felt like an almost fictional threat. Within a few weeks, it became something else. With a sense of vertigo, I settled into the realization that it was really happening. I told my parents to go buy anything they wouldn't want to run out of if there was a run on it at the stores, because things are going to get bad, and that a lot of people were going to die. I explained they had medical backgrounds that put them at much higher risk, and hospitals might get overwhelmed soon, so they shouldn't go inside places with other people if they could avoid it. And if they do, wear masks.
    The transition of the threat to inevitable reality made me feel bad about the feeling of excitemen...
    6 min
  • LW - The Social Recession: By the Numbers by antonomon
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: The Social Recession: By the Numbers, published by antonomon on October 29, 2022 on LessWrong.
    Fewer friends, relationships on the decline, delayed adulthood, trust at an all-time low, and many diseases of despair. The prognosis is not great.
    By Anton Stjepan Cebalo
    Intermission (also known as Intermedio) by Edward Hopper, 1963.
    One of the most discussed topics online recently has been friendships and loneliness. Ever since the infamous chart showing more people are not having sex than ever before first made the rounds, there’s been increased interest in the social state of things. Polling has demonstrated a marked decline in all spheres of social life, including close friends, intimate relationships, trust, labor participation, and community involvement. The trend looks to have worsened since the pandemic, although it will take some years before this is clearly established.
    The decline comes alongside a documented rise in mental illness, diseases of despair, and poor health more generally. In August 2022, the CDC announced that U.S. life expectancy has fallen further and is now where it was in 1996. Contrast this to Western Europe, where it has largely rebounded to pre-pandemic numbers. Still, even before the pandemic, the years 2015-2017 saw the longest sustained decline in U.S. life expectancy since 1915-18. While my intended angle here is not health-related, general sociability is closely linked to health. The ongoing shift has been called the “friendship recession” or the “social recession.”
    My intention here is not to present a list of miserable points, but to group them together in a meaningful context whose consequences are far-reaching. While most of what I will outline here focuses on the United States, many of these same trends are present elsewhere because its catalyst is primarily the internet itself. With no signs of abating, a new kind of sociability has only started to affect what people ask of the world through the prism of themselves.
    The topic has directly or indirectly produced a whole genre of commentary from many different perspectives. Many of them touch on the fact that the internet is not being built with pro-social ends in mind. Increasingly monopolized across a few key entities, online life and its data have become the most sought-after commodity. The everyday person’s attention has thus become the scarcest resource to be extracted. Other perspectives, often on the left, also stress economic precarity and the decline of public spaces as causes. Some of these same criticisms have been adopted by the New Right, who also indict the culture at large for undermining traditions of sociality, be it gender norms or the family. Believing it disproportionately affects men, this position has produced many lifestylist spinoffs: Men Going Their Own Way (MGTOW), trad-life nostalgia, inceldom, masculinist groups, and hustle culture with a focus on 'beating the rat race.’
    All of these subcultures are symptoms of the social recession in some way, for better or worse.
    Often standing outside this conversation altogether are the self-described ‘adults in the room’ — professional media pundits, politicians, bureaucrats, and the like, disconnected from the problem themselves, but fixated on its potential to incubate political extremism. Entire institutes have been set up to study, monitor, and surveil the internet’s radicalizing tendencies buoyed by anti-social loneliness. The new buzzword often used in this sphere is “stochastic terrorism” and the need to contain some unknown, dangerous online element taking hold of the dispirited. The goal here is not to solve a pernicious problem, but instead to pacify its most flagrant outbursts.
    We have no clear, comparative basis on which to judge what will emerge from the growing number of people who feel lost, lonely or ...
    14 min
  • EA - A Critique of Longtermism by Popular YouTube Science Channel, Sabine Hossenfelder: "Elon Musk & The Longtermists: What Is Their Plan?" by Ram Aditya
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: A Critique of Longtermism by Popular YouTube Science Channel, Sabine Hossenfelder: "Elon Musk & The Longtermists: What Is Their Plan?", published by Ram Aditya on October 29, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    A popular science channel host, Sabine Hossenfelder just posted this video on a critique of longtermism.
    I don't think it was a fair assessment and misunderstood key concepts of longtermism. It is sad to see it being misrepresented to thousands of general viewers who might turn away from even critically engaging with these ideas based on a biased general overview. It could be worth engaging with her and her viewers in the comment section, to both learn what longtermism might be getting wrong so as to update our own views, and to discuss some of the points she raises, more critically. I'm concerned that EA would become too strongly associated with longtermism which could make thousands of these viewers avoid EA.
    Some things I agree with:
    Her discomfort with the fact that many major ideas of EA and longtermism have all originated from a handful of philosophers all located at Oxford or related institutes.
    This quote from Singer that she cites: “..just how bad the extinction of intelligent life on our planet would be depends crucially on how we value lives that have not yet begun and perhaps never will begin”. I agree that this is an important crux that makes for a good argument against longtermism, or for a more cautious advancement on the longtermism front.
    Some of the points which I disagree with:
    “Unlike effective altruists, longtermists don’t really care about famines or floods because those won’t lead to extinction”. She mistakes prioritizing long term future over short term as an implication that they don’t “care” about the short term at all. But it is a matter of deciding which has more impact, among many extraordinary ways of doing good which includes caring about famines and floods.
    “So in a nutshell longtermists say that the current conditions of our living don’t play a big role and a few million deaths are acceptable, so long as we don’t go extinct”. Nope, I don’t think so. Longtermism merely states that causing the deaths of a few billion people might be worse. Both (a million deaths and a billion deaths) are absolutely unacceptable, but I think what she misses is the trade-offs involved in doing good and the limited amount of time and resources that we have. I am surprised she misses the point that when one actually wants to do the most good, then one has to go about it a rational way.
    “Have you ever put away a bag of chips because you want to increase your chances of having more children so we can populate the entire galaxy in a billion years? That makes you a longtermist.” Nope I don’t think longtermism advocates for people going out of their way to make more children.
    She quotes a few opinion pieces that criticize longtermism: “.. the fantasy that faith in the combined power of technology and the market could change the world without needing a role for the government”, “..longtermism seems tailor-made to allow tech, finance and philosophy elites to indulge their anti-humanistic tendencies..”. Ironically, I think longtermists are more humanistic given that one of their primary goals is to ensure the long-term sustenance of humanity. Also, as far as I know, longtermism only says that given that technology is going to be important, it is best that we develop it in safer ways. It does not necessarily promote ideas of pushing for technological progress just for the sake of it. It also does not impose a technocractic moral worldview when it advocates for extinction risk prevention or prioritizing the survival of humanity and life as a whole.
    With regards to Pascal Mugging that she brings up, I am uncertain how this can be resolved. I’ve read a few EA ...
    4 min
  • LW - Covid 10/27/22: Another Origin Story by Zvi
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Covid 10/27/22: Another Origin Story, published by Zvi on October 27, 2022 on LessWrong.
    The big story this week was a new preprint claiming to show that Covid-19 had an unnatural origin. For several days, this was a big story with lots of arguing about it, lots of long threads, lots of people accusing others of bad faith or being idiots or not understanding undergraduate microbiology, and for some reason someone impersonating a virologist to spy on Kelsey Piper.
    Then a few days later all discussion of it seemed to vanish. It wasn’t that everyone suddenly came to an agreement to move on. All sides simply decided that this was no longer the Current Thing. See the section for further discussion. In the end I did not update much, so I am mostly fine with this null result.
    There’s also more Gain of Function research looking to create a new pandemic. There was a lot of consensus among the comments and those I know that this work must stop, yet little in the way of good ways to stop it. Several people gave versions of ‘have you considered violence or otherwise going outside the law?’ and my answer is no. While the dangers here are real, they are not at anything like the levels that would potentially justify such actions.
    Note on Deleted Post from This Week
    Finally, I need to address the post that got taken down in a bit more detail. I want to thank Saloni in particular for quickly and efficiently making some of my mistakes clear to me both quickly and clearly, with links, so I could within about an hour realize I’d made a huge mistake and the whole post structure and conclusions no longer made sense, so I took the post down. Please disregard it. Everyone has been great about understanding that mistakes happen, and I want you to know I appreciate it, and hope it helps myself and others similarly address errors in the future.
    How did the mistakes happen? Ultimately, it is 100% my fault, on multiple counts, no excuses. What are some of the things I did wrong, so I can hopefully minimize chances they happen again?
    My logic was flawed. I wasn’t thinking about the power of the study properly. I let the truly awful takes and absence of good takes defending colonoscopies make me too confident in the lack of available good takes doing so, and let that bias my thinking. I got feedback before posting, but I did not get enough or get it from the right sources. I heard everyone talking about ‘first RCT’ in various forms and failed to notice it was only the first to look at all-cause mortality rather than the first RCT. The authors of this one made the mistake of trying to measure all-cause mortality as primary endpoint despite lacking the power to do so, in a way that my brain didn’t properly process, compounding the errors. I didn’t properly consider the possibility that the main result of a published paper was plausibly highly ‘unlucky’ in part due to training on decades of publication bias.
    I didn’t fully appreciate the magnitude of the healthy patient bias, which made certain extrapolations sound patently absurd – I’m still super skeptical of those claims but they’re not actually obviously crazy on reflection. And I messed up a few small technical details.
    In general, the whole thing is really complicated. There is no question that the study was a disappointing result for the effectiveness of colonoscopies, well below what the researchers expected to find. However, there is a lot of room for ‘disappointing but still worthwhile’ and a lot of additional past data to incorporate. I genuinely don’t know what I am going to think when I am finished thinking about it.
    Executive Summary
    New preprint on potential origins of Covid-19, not updating much.
    Gain of Function research continues.
    Please disregard this week’s earlier post until I can properly fix it.
    Let’s run the numbers.
    The Numbe...
    21 min
  • EA - AGI and Lock-In by Lukas Finnveden
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: AGI and Lock-In, published by Lukas Finnveden on October 29, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    The long-term future of intelligent life is currently unpredictable and undetermined. In the linked document, we argue that the invention of artificial general intelligence (AGI) could change this by making extreme types of lock-in technologically feasible. In particular, we argue that AGI would make it technologically feasible to (i) perfectly preserve nuanced specifications of a wide variety of values or goals far into the future, and (ii) develop AGI-based institutions that would (with high probability) competently pursue any such values for at least millions, and plausibly trillions, of years.
    The rest of this post contains the summary (6 pages), with links to relevant sections of the main document (40 pages) for readers who want more details.
    0.0 The claim
    Life on Earth could survive for millions of years. Life in space could plausibly survive for trillions of years. What will happen to intelligent life during this time? Some possible claims are:
    A. Humanity will almost certainly go extinct in the next million years.
    B. Under Darwinian pressures, intelligent life will spread throughout the stars and rapidly evolve toward maximal reproductive fitness.
    C. Through moral reflection, intelligent life will reliably be driven to pursue some specific “higher” (non-reproductive) goal, such as maximizing the happiness of all creatures.
    D. The choices of intelligent life are deeply, fundamentally uncertain. It will at no point be predictable what intelligent beings will choose to do in the following 1000 years.
    E. It is possible to stabilize many features of society for millions or trillions of years. But it is possible to stabilize them into many different shapes — so civilization’s long-term behavior is contingent on what happens early on.
    Claims A-C assert that the future is basically determined today. Claim D asserts that the future is, and will remain, undetermined. In this document, we argue for claim E: Some of the most important features of the future of intelligent life are currently undetermined but could become determined relatively soon (relative to the trillions of years life could last).
    In particular, our main claim is that artificial general intelligence (AGI) will make it technologically feasible to construct long-lived institutions pursuing a wide variety of possible goals. We can break this into three assertions, all conditional on the availability of AGI:
    It will be possible to preserve highly nuanced specifications of values and goals far into the future, without losing any information.
    With sufficient investments, it will be feasible to develop AGI-based institutions that (with high probability) competently and faithfully pursue any such values until an external source stops them, or until the values in question imply that they should stop.
    If a large majority of the world’s economic and military powers agreed to set-up such an institution, and bestowed it with the power to defend itself against external threats, that institution could pursue its agenda for at least millions of years (and perhaps for trillions).
    Note that we’re mostly making claims about feasibility as opposed to likelihood. We only briefly discuss whether people would want to do something like this in Section 2.2.
    (Relatedly, even though the possibility of stability implies E, in the top list, there could still be a strong tendency towards worlds described by one of the other options A-D. In practice, we think D seems unlikely, but that you could make reasonable arguments that any of the end-points described by A, B, or C are probable.)
    Why are we interested in this set of claims? There are a few different reasons:
    The possibility of stable institutions could pose an existential risk, i...
    18 min
  • EA - EA movement course corrections and where you might disagree by michel
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: EA movement course corrections and where you might disagree, published by michel on October 29, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    This is the final post in a series of two posts on EA movement strategy. The first post categorized ways in which EA could fail.
    Summary
    Following an influx of funding, media attention, and influence, the EA movement has been speeding along an exciting, yet perilous, trajectory recently.
    A lot of the EA community’s future impact rests on this uncertain growth going well (and thereby avoiding movement collapse scenarios).
    Yet, discussions or critiques of EA’s trajectory are often not action-guiding. Even when critiques propose course corrections that are tempting to agree with (e.g., EA should be bigger!) proposed course corrections to make EA more like X often don’t rigorously engage with the downsides of being more like X, or the opportunity cost of not being like Y. Proposals to make EA more like X also often leave me with only a vague understanding of what X looks like and how we get from here to X.
    I hope this post and the previous write-up on ways in which EA could fail can make discussions of the EA community’s trajectory more productive (and to clarify my own thinking on the matter).
    This post analyzes the different domains within which EA could change its trajectory, as well as key considerations that inform those trajectory changes where reasonable people might disagree.
    I also share next steps to build on this post.
    Preface
    I was going to write another critique of EA. How original. I was going to write about how there’s an increasingly visible EA “archetype” (rationalist, longtermist, interested in AI, etc.) that embodies an aesthetic few people feel warmly towards on first impression, and that this leads some newcomers who I think would be a great fit for EA to bounce off the community.
    But as I outlined my critique, I had a scary realization: If EA adopted my critique, I’m not confident the community would be more impactful. Maybe, to counter my proposed critique, AI alignment is just the problem of our century and we need to orient ourselves toward that unwelcome reality. Seems plausible. Or maybe EA is rife with echo chambers, EA exceptionalism, and an implicit bias to see ourselves as the protagonist of a story others are blind to. Also seems plausible.
    And then I thought about other EA strategy takes. Doesn't a proposal like “make EA enormous” also rest on lots of often implicit assumptions? Like how well current EA infrastructure and coordination systems can adapt to a large influx of people, the extent to which “Effective Altruism” as a brand can scale relative to more cause-area-specific brands, and the plausible costs of diluting EA’s uniquely truth-seeking norms. I’m not saying we shouldn’t make EA enormous, I’m saying it seems hard to know whether to make EA enormous– or for that matter to have any strong strategy opinion.
    Nevertheless, I’m glad people are thinking about course corrections to the EA movement trajectory. Why? Because I doubt the existing “business as usual” trajectory is the optimal trajectory.
    I don’t think anyone is deliberately steering the EA movement. The Centre for Effective Altruism (CEA) does at some level with EAG(x)’s, online discussion spaces, and goals for growth levels, but ask them and they will tell you CEA is not in charge of all of EA.
    EA thought leaders also don’t claim to own course-correcting all of EA. While they may nudge the movement in certain directions through grants and new projects, their full-time work typically has a narrower scope.
    I get the sense that the EA movement as we see it today is a conglomeration of past deliberate decisions (e.g., name, rough growth rate, how to brand discussion and gathering spaces) and just natural social dynamics (e.g., grouping by inter...
    40 min
  • LW - New book on s-risks by Tobias Baumann
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: New book on s-risks, published by Tobias Baumann on October 28, 2022 on LessWrong.
    Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.
    1 min
  • LW - Resources that (I think) new alignment researchers should know about by Akash
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Resources that (I think) new alignment researchers should know about, published by Akash on October 28, 2022 on LessWrong.
    Here are some resources that I think new alignment researchers should know about.
    Starting off
    AGI Safety Fundamentals is the most common starting point. There’s also the (new) Alignment 201 course, which is meant to be read after AGI safety fundamentals. Note that one disadvantage of reading a popular curriculum is that it might get you thinking in the same ways as everyone else (which might be especially concerning if people are currently coming up with the same ideas).
    Exposing yourself to different sources everyone else seems like a pretty good way to try to come up with different ideas than everyone else. As a result, I often recommend people spend a few weeks trying out alternative approaches.
    For example, you might start thinking about the problem for yourself, diving deeply into the agenda of a researcher you respect, writing down your naive hypotheses about AI alignment, diving into list of lethalities, writing about what you agree with and disagree with, and trying out alignment problems, or performing other exercises (see below).
    On the margin, I think more people should try out these “alternative” approaches. I’m especially excited when people are able to write, distill, and analyze works relatively early on in their upskilling journey.
    There are also some readings that are meant to help you think about how to think about alignment. These are mostly about how to think rather than what to think (or what to think about), which makes me more comfortable recommending them widely. (Note though that the point about diversifying and seeking out alternative perspectives still applies).
    Some examples of readings about how to think about alignment research:
    Most people start with the same few bad ideas (4 mins)
    7 traps that (we think) new alignment researchers often fall into (4 mins)
    More is different for AI (3 mins)
    Worst-case thinking in AI alignment (8 mins)
    Principles for alignment/agency projects (5 mins)
    Taboo “outside view” (10 mins)
    Nonetheless, I think AGI Safety Fundamentals is a decent place to start. I recommend completing it quickly (I expect you can do it in 1-4 weeks, as opposed to 8. Though note that it is useful to spend time thinking, reflecting, and writing).
    Diving Deeper
    OK, but what next? Broadly, you have three options: independent research, a program run by the AI safety community, or a program run by the rest of the world.
    Independent Research
    This is the easiest way to start, and it’s the most unstructured. You can follow your curiosities. You can go through an existing reading list. You can skill-up in machine learning. You can do whatever you want, basically.
    If you take this route, I recommend staying focused on trying to solve the problem (or specific subproblems). It’s easy to spend a lot of time “learning” without actually focusing on doing alignment research. With that in mind, if you don’t know any linear algebra, calculus, or ML, nearly everyone recommends getting (at least) a basic understanding of these. See also 7 traps that (we think) new alignment researchers often fall into.
    I usually recommend that people start off by spending at least 1-2 weeks doing research without much contact with others. I think it’s useful to be forced to come up with your own opinions before you get anchored by the ideas of others.
    After that, many people find it helpful to connect with alignment researchers, visit AI safety hubs, and find “sparring partners” to discuss ideas with. There are also some Slack channels and discords.
    Programs within the AI Safety Community
    SERI-Mats: Upskill in alignment research with a mentor
    Refine: Upskill in conceptual alignment research with an emphasis on thinking for yourself
    Remix: Contribu...
    7 min
  • LW - Prizes for ML Safety Benchmark Ideas by joshc
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Prizes for ML Safety Benchmark Ideas, published by joshc on October 28, 2022 on LessWrong.
    “If you cannot measure it, you cannot improve it.” – Lord Kelvin (paraphrased)
    Website: benchmarking.mlsafety.org – receiving submissions until August 2023.
    ML Safety lacks good benchmarks, so the Center for AI Safety is offering $50,000 - $100,000 prizes for benchmark ideas (or full research papers). We will award at least $100,000 total and up to $500,000 depending on the quality of submissions.
    What kinds of ideas are you looking for?
    Ultimately, we will are looking for benchmark ideas that motivate or advance research that reduces existential risks from AI. To provide more guidance, we’ve outlined four research categories along with example ideas.
    Alignment: building models that represent and safely optimize difficult-to-specify human values.
    Monitoring: discovering unintended model functionality.
    Robustness: designing systems to be reliable in the face of adversaries and highly unusual situations.
    Safety Applications: using ML to address broader risks related to how ML systems are handled (e.g. for cybersecurity or forecasting).
    See Open Problems in AI X-Risk [PAIS #5] for example research directions in these categories and their relation to existential risk.
    What are the requirements for submissions?
    Datasets or implementations are not necessary, though empirical testing can make it easier for the judges to evaluate your idea. All that is required is a brief write-up (guidelines here). How the write-up is formatted isn’t very important as long as it effectively pitches the benchmark and concretely explains how it would be implemented. If you don’t have prior experience designing benchmarks, we recommend reading this document for generic tips.
    Who are the judges?
    Dan Hendrycks, Paul Christiano, and Collin Burns.
    If you have questions, they might be answered on the website, or you can post them here. We would also greatly appreciate it if you helped to spread the word about this opportunity.
    Thanks to Sidney Hough and Kevin Liu for helping to make this happen and to Collin Burns and Akash Wasil for feedback on the website. This project is supported by the Future Fund regranting program.
    Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.
    3 min
  • LW - aisafety.community - A living document of AI safety communities by zeshen
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: aisafety.community - A living document of AI safety communities, published by zeshen on October 28, 2022 on LessWrong.
    The AI safety field has been rapidly growing over the last few years, and more and more communities have been sprouting up all over the world, both physically and online.
    The Alignment Ecosystem Development (AED) team identified having a living document listing them all as a low-hanging fruit, and volunteers are maintaining this live database of AI safety communities.
    Here’s what you can do now:
    Join communities you’re interested in and participate.
    Link this to your friends.
    Add communities to the document if they’re missing (account creation with coda.io is required)
    Improve the descriptions of any communities which you’re a part of. Many of the current descriptions are incomplete or outdated, jump right in and share your knowledge.
    Volunteer as a maintainer, or join the Alignment Ecosystem Development Discord server, where they host monthly calls to pitch or join shovel ready volunteering opportunities.
    Thanks to JJ Hepburn from AI Safety Support for providing the domain through ea.domains, another soon-to-be-launched AED project!
    Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.
    2 min