The Nonlinear Library

The Nonlinear Library

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  • AF - Humans aren't fitness maximizers by Nate Soares
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Humans aren't fitness maximizers, published by Nate Soares on October 4, 2022 on The AI Alignment Forum.
    Recently I've gotten a bunch of pushback when I claim that humans are not maximizers of inclusive genetic fitness (IGF).
    I think that part of what's going on here is a conflation of a few claims.
    One claim that is hopefully uncontroversial (but that I'll expand upon below anyway) is:
    Humans are not literally optimizing for IGF, and regularly trade other values off against IGF.
    Separately, we have a stronger and more controversial claim:
    If an AI's objectives included goodness in the same way that our values include IGF, then the future would not be particularly good.
    I think there's more room for argument here, and will provide some arguments.
    A semi-related third claim that seems to come up when I have discussed this in person is:
    Niceness is not particularly canonical; AIs will not by default give humanity any significant fraction of the universe in the spirit of cooperation.
    I endorse that point as well. It takes us somewhat further afield, and I don't plan to argue it here, but I might argue it later.
    On the subject of whether humans are literally IGF optimizers, I observe the following:
    We profess to enjoy many other things, such as art and fine foods.
    Suppose someone came to you and said: "I see that you've got a whole complex sensorium centered around visual stimuli. That sure is an inefficient way to optimize for fitness! Please sit still while I remove your enjoyment of beautiful scenery and moving art pieces, and replace it with a module that does all the same work your enjoyment was originally intended to do (such as causing you to settle down in safe locations with abundant food), but using mechanical reasoning that can see farther than your evolved heuristics." Would you sit still? I sure wouldn't.
    And if you're like "maybe mates would be less likely to sleep with me if I didn't enjoy fine art", suppose that we tune your desirability-to-mates upwards exactly as much as needed to cancel out this second-order effect. Would you give up your enjoyment of visual stimuli then, like an actual IGF optimizer would?
    And when you search in yourself for protests, are you actually weighing the proposal based on how many more offspring and kin's-offspring you'll have in the next generation? Or do you have some other sort of attachment to your enjoyment of visual stimuli, some unease about giving it up, that you're trying to defend?
    Now, there's a reasonable counterargument to this point, which is that there's no psychologically-small tweak to human psychology that dramatically increases that human's IGF. (We'd expect evolution to have gathered that low-hanging fruit.) But there's still a very basic and naive sense in which living as a human is not what it feels like to live as a genetic fitness optimizer.
    Like: it's pretty likely that you care about having kids! And that you care about your kids very much! But, do you really fundamentally care that your kids have genomes? If they were going to transition to silicon, would you protest that that destroys almost all the value at stake?
    Or, an even sharper proposal: how would you like to be killed right now, and in exchange you'll be replaced by an entity that uses the same atoms to optimize as hard as those atoms can optimize, for the inclusive genetic fitness of your particular genes. Does this sound like practically the best offer that anyone could ever make you? Or does it sound abhorrent?
    For the record, I personally would be leaping all over the opportunity to be killed and replaced by something that uses my atoms to optimize my CEV as best as those atoms can be arranged to do so, not least because I'd expect to be reconstituted before too long. But there's not a lot of things you can put in the "what my atoms ar...
    8 min
  • EA - Why don't people post on the Forum? Some anecdotes by Vaidehi Agarwalla
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Why don't people post on the Forum? Some anecdotes, published by Vaidehi Agarwalla on October 3, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    I know lots of people who want to write for the Forum, but who struggle to actually get their posts written. I think this is bad - it means that we miss out on useful knowledge and insight, and that Forum posts are skewed towards users who:
    are more self-confident
    have less impostor syndrome
    have more spare time
    feel more comfortable with writing
    Below, I share some anecdotes I’ve heard from acquaintances and people on EA Twitter about why they don’t post on the Forum. Then, I make some brief suggestions for things you can do if this post resonates.
    So why don’t people post?
    All of the stories below are real examples, but with the names and some other details changed for anonymity. Some of these stories come from private conversations; others from Twitter. I also know other specific examples I haven’t described in this post.
    I want to zoom out and see the big picture, before diving into examples. Aaron Bergman was kind enough to make this plot of unique authors over time (the big jump is likely due to all the competitions recently). Ideally, I would have liked to talk about Forum stats like the proportion of lurkers to commentors and posters, since the increase in authorship is correlated with a jump in overall activity, but that data was not available.
    I think the positive trend could be exciting, but there has also been some discussion about quality of Forum posts dropping recently. Many of the people I write about had ideas that I think would add meaningful ideas to the current discourse, and don't seem to have changed their minds on this in the last few months.
    They don’t have time
    Many people want to post, but struggle to find the time to write their ideas. Often, these are busy domain experts with valuable ideas and knowledge to share. For example, an acquaintance in the alt-protein industry told me that lots of useful information is not public, because the work on it is happening in the private sector. However, they didn’t have time to write about this themself.
    Even if someone does (eventually) post their ideas, delays can be costly. A grantmaker I know wanted to write about the risks of megaprojects. They worried that megaprojects could turn out to be an EA talent sink, drawing people away from more resource-effective (if smaller) projects; but they didn’t have time to write about this. If people are convinced, they might fund or take on fewer megaprojects and avoid the possible harms.
    I think that it’s especially important to make it easier for time-poor people to post on the Forum. I’ve had many incredibly informative conversations with experts like this; it’s a shame that their knowledge is not more widely available.
    They don’t think they can meet the Forum’s high standards
    Some people worry that because standards on the Forum are so high (rightly), they don’t have much to contribute. A Twitter user writes: ‘given the opportunity cost of time and the frequency of high-quality posts on the forum, it seems possibly net negative to post anything that dilutes the quality’. Others say similar things: one felt that ‘the bar is so high for quality and finality’; another believes they’d have to ‘clear a very high bar’.
    They feel initimidated, nervous or scared about how their posts will be received (if at all)
    Lots of people feel intimidated about posting on the Forum. An acquaintance in the finance industry wanted to make the case for exploring the potential to nudge ESG criteria to be more EA-aligned, since it influences trillions of dollars of investments. Conversations with friends discouraged them; they felt like they ‘had to write a whole scientific thesis just to not be torn apart.’ (This person was also time poor). Others ...
    10 min
  • LW - Ivermectin: Much Less Than You Needed To Know by George3d6
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Ivermectin: Much Less Than You Needed To Know, published by George3d6 on October 3, 2022 on LessWrong.
    I've recently gotten in touch with Alexandros Marinos, which has been writing lengthy critiques of Scott's most famous post, his review of Ivermectin.
    After hearing his point of view, I must admit I've been swayed to the thinking that:
    There are some obvious statistical errors in Scott's post and his interpretation of Bitterman's epidemiological data
    The evidence for ivermectin, while poor, is about as reasonable as that for any repurposed covid drug (e.g. fluvoxamine), and even purpose-made ones (plaxovid)
    While I fancy myself an off-label statistician I'm prone to error and maybe my interpretation is wrong. Given that Alexandros has recently finished this post which condenses his core criticisms, I was curious to see what people on LW thought about it.
    Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.
    2 min
  • AF - my current outlook on AI risk mitigation by Tamsin Leake
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: my current outlook on AI risk mitigation, published by Tamsin Leake on October 3, 2022 on The AI Alignment Forum.
    (thanks to Linda Linsefors, Artaxerxes, and jono for their feedback on drafts of this post)
    as part of the refine programme, i'm trying to figure out what's actually important to work on, with regards to AI risk. in the course of that, and motivated by some other factors such as increasingly wanting to write on my skepticism regarding ML-related approaches, i'm making this post which explains my current outlook on what the problem is, what the solutionspace we have so far looks like, and what i think should be focused on.
    in this post, i won't argue for the significance of AI risks; i'll merely explain my current view of those risks, and my arguing will be regarding how i currently think those risks are to be addressed.
    note that i'll be describing my own outlook, which is not the consensus even within the alignment community — arguaby, there is in fact no such consensus regarding many of the points i discuss here.
    what is the problem?
    i believe, akin to the yudkowsky-moore law of mad science, that the amount of resources it takes for the world to be destroyed — whether on purpose or by accident — keeps decreasing.
    my most likely scenario for how this could happen is as follows: pretty soon (probly this decade or the next), an artificial intelligence capable of undergoing recursive self-improvement (RSI) until it becomes a singleton, and at that point the fate of at least the entire future lightcone will be determined by the goals of that AI.
    the values we want are a very narrow target and we currently have no solid idea how to do alignment, so when AI does take over everything we're probly going to die. or worse, if for example we botch alignment.
    (there are some other scenarios where a dumber AI helps cause the destruction of the world first — for example, someone decides to just let an AI try to print whatever molecules it wants in the hope of getting something interesting, and the AI makes grey goo or a superplague. or we get something like the flash war, akin to the flash crash. but i have reasons to think the RSI scenario is the most likely (see also intelligence explosion microeconomics). i also believe that multipolar scenarios are pretty unlikely: the increased capability along the way just get a lot more chances for RSI to happen along the way.)
    i call the task of addressing this "AI risk mitigation"; calling it "solving alignment" rules out non-alignment solutions, and "AI risk" is broad enough to encompass not just existential risk but also suffering risks, which is in my opinion an even greater cause for concern.
    there may be other ways for us to be doomed, but AI seems like the largest risk factor; on top of that, if we do eventually figure out full alignment (a term i'll explain later), then we'll have a fully aligned AI which will give us utopia and take care of all other risks for us. so while full alignment might not be the only solution to this problem, if we do get it then we'll have solved pretty much all other problems.
    AI risk mitigation solutions
    there are roughly three ways people have thought of doing AI risk mitigation:
    fully aligned singleton (FAS)
    one approach is to create an AI which is powerful enough to become a singleton (an AI with enough power to make sure its goals are pursued, without anyone being able to do anything about it) but which is also fully aligned (ideally, continuously aligned) which takes care of all other problems in one fell swoop. the difficulty of this issue is that we have to build a FAS faster than others are building existentially-or-worse risky AI, even though the task of building a FAS is expected to be harder.
    by "fully aligned" i mean "so robustly aligned that with sufficient power such an AI wo...
    17 min
  • EA - Samotsvety Nuclear Risk update October 2022 by NunoSempere
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Samotsvety Nuclear Risk update October 2022, published by NunoSempere on October 3, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    After recent events in Ukraine, Samotsvety convened to update our probabilities of nuclear war. In March 2022, at the beginning of the Ukraine war, we were at ~0.01% that London would be hit with a nuclear weapon in the next month. Now, we are at ~0.05%/month. At the end of the post, we reflect on the size of our update, and what this means about our accuracy.
    Expected values are more finicky and more person-dependent than probabilities, and readers are encouraged to enter their own estimates, for which we provide a template. We’d guess that readers would lose 4 to 400 hours by staying in London in the next 1–3 months, but this estimate is at the end of a garden of forking paths, and more pessimistic or optimistic readers might make different methodological choices. We would recommend leaving if Russia uses a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine.
    Since March, we have also added our track record to samotsvety.org/track-record, which might be of use to readers when considering how much weight to give to our predictions.
    Question decomposition
    We have updated our decomposition to the following:
    What is the probability that Russia will use a nuclear weapon in Ukraine in the next MONTH?
    Conditional on Russia using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine what is the probability that nuclear conflict will scale beyond Ukraine in the next MONTH after the initial nuclear weapon use?
    Conditional on the nuclear conflict expanding to NATO, what is the chance that London would get hit, one MONTH after the first non-Ukraine nuclear bomb is used?
    For each of those questions, we also asked forecasters for their yearly probabilities. Following up on previous feedback, we also asked forecasters for their core reasons behind their forecasts, and we’ll present those alongside their probabilities.
    We also asked a range of questions about counterfactuals:
    Conditional on Russia NOT using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine, what is the probability of a nuclear conflict outside Ukraine in the next MONTH?
    Conditional on Russia NOT using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine what is the probability that nuclear conflict will scale beyond Ukraine in the next YEAR?
    Conditional on Russia NOT dropping a nuclear weapon in Ukraine in October, what is the probability that London will be hit with a nuclear weapon in October?
    As well as a sanity check:
    What is the unconditional probability of London being hit with a nuclear weapon in October?
    Summaries
    Summary tables
    For ≤ 1 month staggering times between each step
    Event Conditional on previous stepUnconditional probabilityRussia uses a nuclear weapon in Ukraine in the next month—Nuclear conflict scales beyond Ukraine in the next month after the initial nuclear weapon useLondon gets hit, one month after the first non-Ukraine nuclear bomb is used?
    8.6%
    4.5%
    0.36%
    14%
    0.055%
    For ≤ 1 year staggering times between each step
    Event Conditional on previous stepUnconditional probabilityRussia uses a nuclear weapon in Ukraine in the next year— Nuclear conflict scales beyond Ukraine in the next year after the initial nuclear weapon useLondon gets hit, one year after the first non-Ukraine nuclear bomb is used?
    23%
    14%
    3.2%
    23%
    0.75%
    Visualizations
    This time, we are also experimenting with providing a few visualizations. Their advantage is that they may be more intuitive; the disadvantage is that they may gloss over the shape of our uncertainty, and thus mislead. Reader beware.
    For the forecast with one month between each escalation step, we have:
    For our forecast with a maximum of one year between each escalation step, we have:
    A forecaster’s perspective
    In order to understand at what level we are forecasting here, we are providing forecasters’ comments. One forecaster prov...
    30 min
  • EA - Briefly, the life of Tetsu Nakamura (1946-2019) by Emrik
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Briefly, the life of Tetsu Nakamura (1946-2019), published by Emrik on October 3, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    I first heard about Tetsu Nakamura from a friend in 2018. He was a Japanese physician who moved to Pakistan (and later Afghanistan) in 1984 to help people during the Soviet-Afghan War. After several years of treating people mainly for leprosy and tuberculosis, he had expanded his activities to treat more illnesses, enlisted the help of foreign charities and funders, and opened three new clinics in Nangahar Province in the eastern parts of Afghanistan.
    Not content with the rate at which he was helping people, he began thinking creatively about how he could do more good with his time by addressing underlying problems. He'd noticed that most of his cases came from the same regions, and he attributed many of the illnesses he was treating to the severe malnutrition and poverty of the area. So naturally he switched paths and started prioritising agriculture.
    Soon after, a severe drought hit the region at the turn of the millennium, so he promptly set to work digging irrigation canals from the Kunar River so people had fertile land to grow crops on. Modern equipment was nowhere to be found, so he and his team researched 200-year old irrigation techniques to get the job done. He explained his reasoning:
    "One irrigation canal will do more good than 100 doctors. A hospital treats patients one by one, but this helps an entire village. I love seeing a village that's been brought back to life."
    This was extremely perilous work, to be clear. Local Talibani groups weren't too happy with him, maybe because they didn't like competition for power or because he was Christian--although he was no missionary, and he's pretty clear about just trying to help people. Either way, Nakamura had received several threats and warnings over the years, and one of his close colleagues was abducted and killed in 2008. At one point he narrowly escaped machinegun-fire from a U.S. helicopter.
    I think it took a lot of courage to do what he did, but ultimately there is always a sacrifice. On December 4th, 2019, he, his driver, and four of his government-assigned bodyguards were shot and killed by unidentified gunmen. Taliban denies involvement, but whatever--he's dead all the same. Wikipedia lists him as having built eight canals that now sustain the livelihood of 600,000 people, plausibly averting a famine. He had a theory of change and acted on it.
    "Weapons and tanks don't solve problems. The revival of farming is the cornerstone of Afghanistan's recovery."
    There's a beautifwl documentary on him made before he was shot, but resources in English are hard to find. Apparently there are books about or written by him, but they're all in Japanese. If you know the language, let me know if you can find any translations! Or if you end up reading them, I'd love to hear more about it. This was hastily written, and I kinda hope someone with access to these resources will do a proper write-up sometime.
    Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.
    4 min
  • EA - Announcing Amplify creative grants by finm
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Announcing Amplify creative grants, published by finm on October 3, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    We're announcing a small grants program for creative media, supported by Hear This Idea and the FTX Future Fund regranting program.
    Over the next few months, we’re aiming to make grants to podcasts and other creative media projects that spread ideas to help humanity navigate this century.
    We’re interested in applications that look to cover topics related to (i) reducing existential risk, (ii) helping fix pressing global problems, and (iii) putting humanity on a positive long-term trajectory. More details on all three below.
    We want to amplify ideas associated with effective altruism and longtermism, but you don’t need to be actively engaged with effective altruism to apply.
    We’re excited to support projects (new and existing) in English and other languages — sharing important ideas with new, global, audiences.
    If you are unsure whether your idea fits among the areas we outline below, please lean toward applying— we want to hear your ideas! The form is a single page of questions, and should easily take less than an hour. The first batch of grants will be approved around three weeks after this announcement. After that, we’ll approve grants on a rolling basis. Let us know if you have a deadline you need to hear back by, and we’ll do our best to accommodate and get back very quickly if necessary. If you have any questions which aren’t answered below, please contact us on [email protected].
    You can apply now by following this link.
    We want to support podcasts and other media with a plan for impact
    We are interested in supporting podcasts and other creative media projects, new and existing, which care about:
    Reducing (existential) risks this century: We’d love to see podcasts sharing knowledge relevant for reducing risks from AI, biosecurity, and other global catastrophes. We can also imagine projects that focus on methods and infrastructure for mitigating global risks, like forecasting or evidence-informed policymaking.
    Helping fix global problems: We want to see more media exploring how to make progress on the world’s most pressing problems, and reduce suffering in the world today. Topics might include: reducing factory farming, neglected issues in global health and wellbeing, or wild animal suffering.
    Putting humanity on a positive long-term trajectory: We are excited by projects that look to help inform the following questions: How could we positively influence humanity’s future if we make it through this century? How can we think about sharing a world with AI systems smarter than humans? What values should guide our future? What political institutions could help us collectively think over long time horizons?
    We want to support projects about —or relevant to— important problems. But we’re especially excited about applicants who have thought carefully about how their project could actually help make progress on these problems.
    Here are some ways that an impactful podcast or creative media project might do that:
    Field building: Several emerging research fields are oriented around the principles of effective altruism (like global priorities research, AI alignment and strategy, or welfare biology). A communication project focused on one of these (sub-)fields could help distill existing work, and inspire more of it.
    Advocacy: Advocacy makes most sense when you have an audience in mind. A project that has access to a small but select audience (for example policymakers, entrepreneurs, or academics in an impactful field) can have impact through changing minds on important topics.
    Information: Even once someone is convinced of the importance of a pressing problem, they still need to be well informed about it in order to make well-motivated decisions. But it’s often di...
    10 min
  • EA - EA Serbia is now launching! by Dušan D. Nešić (Dushan)
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: EA Serbia is now launching!, published by Dušan D. Nešić (Dushan) on October 2, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    Hello everyone, short and sweet news from the Balkans!
    My partner (Tatiana K. Nesic Skuratova) and I are starting an EA chapter in Serbia, and we kick it off with a casual meeting (upcoming weekend, October 9th) as well as a "What We Owe the Future" book discussion later this month. This post serves as a contact point for anyone in or near Serbia or Belgrade who wants to join or connect, as well as anyone who has tips on starting a new club :)
    We are happy to say that the support from Catherine Low and Amarins Veringa was on-point; while many other community builders have helped with advice and resources along the way! We are looking forward to seeing those of you that make their way to Belgrade, Serbia, or to cooperate virtually wherever you are!
    Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.
    2 min
  • EA - Why does AGI occur almost nowhere, not even just as a remark for economic/political models? by Franziska Fischer
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Why does AGI occur almost nowhere, not even just as a remark for economic/political models?, published by Franziska Fischer on October 2, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    Depending of different attitudes towards questions like take-off speed, people argue that with the development of AGI we will face situations of world GDP doubling days/weeks/a few years (with the number of years shriking with each further doubling). Many peoples's timelines here seem to be quite broad, including quite commonly expectations like "AGI within the next 2-3 decades very likely".
    How the global world order politically as well as economically will change over the next decades is a quite extensively discussed topic in public as well as academia, with many goals and forecasts made until years like 2050 or 2070 ("climate neutral 2050", "china's economy in 30 years"). Barely is AGI mentioned in economics classes, political research papers and the like, despite its apparent impact of making any politics redundant and throwing over any economic forecasts. If AGI was even significantly less mighty than we think and there was even just a 20% chance of it occuring in the next 3 decades, that should be the number one single factor debated in every single argument on any economic/political topic with medium-length scope. Why, do you think, is it the case, that AGI is comparatively so rarely a topic there?
    My motivated reasoning would immediately come up with explanations along the lines of
    people in these disciplines are just not so much aware of AI developments
    any forecasts/plans made assuming short timelines and fast takeoff speeds are useless anyways, so it makes sense to just assume longer timelines
    Maybe I am just not noticing the omnipresence of AGI debate in economic/political long-term discourse
    @1 seems unreasonable, because as soon as the first AI-economics people would come up with these arguments, if they were reasonable, they would become mainstream
    @2 if that assumption was consciously made, I'd expect to hear this more often as side note
    @3 hard to argue against, given it assumes I don't see the discourse. But I regularity engage with media/content from the UN on their SDGs, have taken some Economics/IR/Politics electives, try to be a somewhat informed citicien and have friends studying these things, and I barely see AI suddenly speeding up things in any forecasts or discussions
    Why might this be the case?To me it seems like either mainstream academia, global institutions and public discourse heavily miss something or we tech/ea/ai people are overly biased in the actual relevance of our own field (I'm CS student)?
    Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.
    3 min
  • LW - Are c-sections underrated? by braces
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Are c-sections underrated?, published by braces on October 1, 2022 on LessWrong.
    Summary
    I think so. Correlations tend to show worse outcomes for c-sections, but the guidelines take this evidence too literally. Careful causal evidence finds that it’s more of a mixed bag. Moderate negative effects on subsequent births seem more robust. An elective c-section might be the defensible choice for someone’s final pregnancy.
    Disclaimer: Not a doctor.
    The official guidelines
    C-sections cost about twice as much as vaginal delivery and are associated with worse health outcomes for infants and moms. These facts are concerning enough to the US Medicaid system that one of their “Improvement Initiatives” is reducing low-risk cesarean delivery. They write: “Cesarean delivery poses a greater risk of maternal morbidity and mortality for low-risk pregnancies when compared to vaginal births, a risk that ideally should be avoided.”
    They lead seminars with slides like this, highlighting that everything bad is correlated with c-sections:
    Hospitals have been falling in line. UCSF boasts: “Our view of labor and childbirth as a natural process has helped keep our overall Cesarean rate at 20 percent, among the lowest rates in California.Our threshold for making the decision to recommend a C-section is a lot higher than in other places.”
    The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) has similar advice, and to their credit they spell out the evidence and their reasoning. The main paper they cite is this Canadian study of 2.3m vaginal and 46k c-section deliveries. “A large population-based study from Canada found that the risk of severe maternal morbidities.was increased threefold for cesarean delivery as compared with vaginal delivery.”
    But what really should we make of the association between c-sections and bad outcomes? The observed correlation is ripe for reverse causality, for the same reason that going to the hospital is correlated with dying: c-sections are often performed because of some dangerous condition (e.g., preeclampsia). In the Canadian study, the treatment group was mothers who had scheduled a c-section due to breech position, and breech is correlated with other negative outcomes. In other studies, the c-sections could happen for reasons that are never recorded in hospital data, so even lots of control variables should make you worried about selection effects.
    The causal effect of a c-section
    A new paper by Card, Fenizia, and Silver, using data from California births, takes the question of causality seriously. It appears to be the only careful attempt at separating correlation and causation.
    C-sections are not randomly assigned. How can we use observational data to arrive at a causal estimate? Their approach combines the facts that hospitals exhibit stable differences in their (risk-adjusted) c-section rates and that moms often give birth at the hospital closest to them.
    Together, these mean that some moms will have c-sections by virtue of living close to a hospital that performs more of them. In essence, a causal estimate can be derived by comparing the outcomes of mothers who live near vs. far from high c-section hospitals.
    You might be concerned that certain kinds of moms live next to certain kinds of hospitals. But in detailed tests, the authors find no signs of problematic selection along this distance-to-hospital dimension (although with these kinds of designs it’s reasonable to worry that something not measured could still bias the estimates).
    And they show that the distance measure does have a large effect on c-sections for the group they study: low-risk first births. (Why restrict to this sample? High-risk births are often defaulted to c-sections, and a c-section in a first birth means you should probably only get c-sections in subsequent births—so this ...
    12 min