The Nonlinear Library

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Who should we interview for The 80,000 Hours Podcast?, published by Luisa Rodriguez on September 13, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum.

We'd love ideas for 1) who to interview and 2) what topics to cover (even if you don't have a particular expert in mind for that topic) on The 80,000 Hours Podcast.

Some prompts that might help generate guest ideas:

What 'big ideas' books have you read in the last 5 years that were truly good? (e.g. the Secret of Our Success)

Who gave that EAG(x) talk that blew your mind? (you can find recorded EAG(x) talks here)

What's an important EA Forum post that you've read that could be more accessible, or more widely known?

Who's an expert in your field who would do a great job communicating about their work?

What's an excellent in-the-weeds nonfiction book you've read in the last few years that might be relevant to a pressing world problem? (e.g. Chip War)

Who's appeared on our show in the past that you'd like to hear more from? (complete list of episodes here)

Who's spearheading an entrepreneurial project you want to learn more about?

Who has a phenomenal blog on ideas that might be relevant to pressing problem areas?

Who's a journalist that consistently covers topics relevant to EA, and nails it?

Who are the thought leaders or contributors in online forums or platforms (like LessWrong, EA Forum, or others) whose posts consistently spark insightful discussions?

We might be interested in covering the following topics on the show: suffering-risks, how AI might help solve other pressing problems, how industries like aviation manage risk, whether we should prioritize well-being over health interventions, what might bottleneck AI progress. Who's an expert you know of who can speak compellingly on one of those topics?

Some prompts that might help generate topic ideas:

What's a problem area that you've always wanted to know more about?

What's a great video essay you've seen in the last few months? What was it on?

What's a policy idea that you think more policymakers should hear?

What's a problem area that seems seriously underrated in EA?

What's a philosophy concept that's important to your worldview that people aren't talking enough about?

What's a major doubt you have about whether a particular problem (e.g. AI / biosecurity) is actually especially pressing, or a particular solution is especially promising?

What's an issue in the EA community that you'd like to hear someone address? (e.g. FTX, burnout, deference)

We'd love to get lots and lots of ideas - so please have a low bar for suggesting! That said, we get many more suggestions than we can plausibly make episodes, so in practice we follow through on <5% of proposals people put to us.

Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Difficult to get a job in EA not living in the West? Animal advocacy careers can impact millions of animals anywhere in the world, published by Animal Advocacy Careers on September 13, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum.

Some effective altruists focus on their donations, or just follow EA as a matter of intellectual pursuit. But for those who want to do direct work in an organisation, finding a job is not usually easy. This is also a big reason why a lot of people simply do not even consider looking for a job in an EA organisation in the first place.

We think that a considerable number of effective altruists who couldn't or didn't even try to get a job in EA organisations (due to high competition, lack of expertise, or distant location) may be overlooking extremely impactful career opportunities in animal advocacy. In this post, we'll show how these career opportunities might be a good fit for many effective altruists that experience similar difficulties and bottlenecks in their career.

We are not claiming that effective altruists should necessarily pursue a job in EA organisations, or stop looking for jobs in other EA cause areas, or prioritise animal advocacy over other causes or vice versa. Nor do we suggest that animal advocacy is inherently easier or that people should invariably pick more convenient options. Our goal is to simply point out additional possibilities for those who may be a good (or even better) fit for them.

Challenges in securing EA jobs

It is not easy to get a job in the EA space, especially if you don't have the right qualifications or live in high income countries.

While 80,000 Hours constantly updates EAs with hundreds of new roles in its job board, there are hundreds of thousands of people who apply for these roles too. As a result of this high demand, most hiring rounds are extremely competitive, which lowers the probability of getting hired.

In addition, regardless of the competitive nature of these jobs, required or desired qualifications are sometimes quite high and specific. For example, many AI safety positions typically require qualifications related to computer science and programming, while pandemic preparedness positions may require qualifications related to medicine or governance, and so forth.

While this doesn't imply that these fields exclude job opportunities for other skill sets, the available positions are limited and extremely competitive due to the sheer number of applicants.

On top of these challenges, geographical constraints can complicate matters. While some job opportunities are remote, most are not. Unless you are willing to relocate and have working permits, these job postings do not really count as opportunities.

This can be especially true for people who do not live in high income countries.

For those in countries like Australia or Germany, obtaining work permits for the US or the UK may be relatively easier. However, it's not as simple for individuals residing in places like Peru, Thailand or Türkiye (previously Turkey). Moreover, demonstrating your credentials can be comparatively tougher if you were born and raised in developing countries, as educational institutions or domestic firms may lack international recognition.

This is not to say that it is impossible to get a job in EA organisations, or that you should simply give up. Regardless of the challenges, you may very well overcome them and it may be worth it, especially considering the potential for meaningful impact. We are just describing how difficult it can be. And our guess is that this is how at least some people in the community experience their pursuit of jobs in the EA space (or the lack of it due to these high challenges).

There are high impact opportunities available in the animal advocacy space

In the animal advocacy field, there are numerous hi...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: UDT shows that decision theory is more puzzling than ever, published by Wei Dai on September 13, 2023 on LessWrong.

I feel like MIRI perhaps mispositioned FDT (their variant of UDT) as a clear advancement in decision theory, whereas maybe they could have attracted more attention/interest from academic philosophy if the framing was instead that the UDT line of thinking shows that decision theory is just more deeply puzzling than anyone had previously realized. Instead of one major open problem (Newcomb's, or EDT vs CDT) now we have a whole bunch more. I'm really not sure at this point whether UDT is even on the right track, but it does seem clear that there are some thorny issues in decision theory that not many people were previously thinking about:

Indexical values are not reflectively consistent. UDT "solves" this problem by implicitly assuming (via the type signature of its utility function) that the agent doesn't have indexical values. But humans seemingly do have indexical values, so what to do about that?

The commitment races problem extends into logical time, and it's not clear how to make the most obvious idea of logical updatelessness work.

UDT says that what we normally think of different approaches to anthropic reasoning are really different preferences, which seems to sidestep the problem. But is that actually right, and if so where are these preferences supposed to come from?

2TDT-1CDT - If there's a population of mostly TDT/UDT agents and few CDT agents (and nobody knows who the CDT agents are) and they're randomly paired up to play one-shot PD, then the CDT agents do better. What does this imply?

Game theory under the UDT line of thinking is generally more confusing than anything CDT agents have to deal with.

UDT assumes that the agent has access to its own source code and inputs as symbol strings, so it can potentially reason about logical correlations between its own decisions and other agents' as well defined mathematical problems. But humans don't have this, so how are humans supposed to reason about such correlations?

Logical conditionals vs counterfactuals, how should these be defined and do the definitions actually lead to reasonable decisions when plugged into logical decision theory?

These are just the major problems that I was trying to solve (or hoping for others to solve) before I mostly stopped working on decision theory and switched my attention to metaphilosophy. (It's been a while so I'm not certain the list is complete.) As far as I know nobody has found definitive solutions to any of these problems yet, and most are wide open.

Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: There is little (good) evidence that aid systematically harms political institutions, published by ryancbriggs on September 13, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum.

Sometimes in discussions of foreign aid or charity I see people raise the point that aid might do good directly, such as by providing a health service, but that it might cause harm indirectly, for example by allowing an incompetent or corrupt state to continue existing without being forced to become better by harsh economic realities. These arguments come up in conversation, and also in books by the likes of Angus Deaton or Larry Temkin. Recently, Martha Nussbaum brought up these concerns. They're worth taking seriously. Thankfully, political scientists and economists have in fact looked at them (somewhat) seriously.

In this post I'm going to tell you a tiny bit about me, explain the institutional criticism of aid in a bit more detail, and then explain the results of two papers testing this relationship. I'll also explain a tiny bit about the limitations of this kind of work. The upshot of all this is that we have very little strong evidence that aid systematically harms political institutions. My best personal guess is that while aid can sometimes have medium-sized positive or negative effects on politics in recipient countries in specific cases, on average right now and in the recent past it has very small effects in either direction.

All About Me

I'm a political scientist by training and most of my teaching is in a development studies department. When I was considering grad school, I was really interested in political accountability and the ways that "easy money" like oil can distort political relationships. My reading of recent history suggested to me that getting oil before having representative institutions meant locking in autocratic rule. I thought about studying oil states but then somewhat unrelatedly I tried living in Cairo for about half a year and found it quite challenging culturally - so I figured studying oil states was probably not going to work for me. My next idea was thinking about aid. In a lot of ways it seemed similar to oil: it was "easy money" for governments that let them provide goods or services to their citizens without taxing them. In many very poor countries it was also a large flow in terms of government expenditure or GDP. I wrote my big undergrad paper on this.

While doing so I read the work of Deborah Brautigam on this topic and then I went to do my PhD with her.

Aid and institutions in theory

The "aid harms institutions" story isn't dumb. It makes internal sense, and the early (cross-sectional) evidence that we had on it sometimes suggested harm. There are so many ways that aid could harm institutions or governance in recipient countries. It could do so by acting like oil. This primarily means allowing governments to exist absent taxation. If citizens aren't taxed, so the theory goes, then maybe they won't demand representation or results from government in the same way. And if governments don't have to collect tax, then maybe they won't do state building things like building up good ways of gathering information on everybody. If we look at European states, you can easily tell a story where states felt the acute need for more money (often for fighting wars) and this set off a chain of events that built strong states and created demands for state accountability to at least some segment of the population.

Aid could also harm institutions in more mundane ways. For example, donors might want to hire local staff and might pay well by local standards. This seems like a clear positive, but if enough donors do this they might poach all of the best people from government bureaucracies. Donors might also want lots of reporting to make sure money is well spent. Again this seems g...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Apply to lead a project during the next virtual AI Safety Camp, published by Linda Linsefors on September 13, 2023 on The AI Alignment Forum.

Do you have AI Safety research ideas that you would like others to work on? Is there a project you want to do and you want help finding a team to work with you? AI Safety Camp could be the solution for you!

Summary

AI Safety Camp Virtual is a 3-month long online research program from January to April 2024, where participants form teams to work on pre-selected projects. We want you to suggest the projects!

If you have an AI Safety project idea and some research experience, apply to be a Research Lead.

If accepted, we offer some assistance to develop your idea into a plan suitable for AI Safety Camp. When project plans are ready, we open up team member applications. You get to review applications for your team, and select who joins as a team member. From there, it's your job to guide work on your project.

Your project is totally in your hands. We, Linda and Remmelt, are just there at the start.

Who is qualified?We require that you have some previous research experience. If you are at least 1 year into a PhD or if you have completed an AI Safety research program (such as a previous AI Safety Camp, Refine or SERI MATS), or done a research internship with an AI Safety org, then you are qualified already. Other research experience can count too.

More senior researchers are of course also welcome, as long as you think our format of leading an online team inquiring into your research questions suits you and your research.

Apply here

If you are unsure, or have any questions you are welcome to:

Book a call with Linda

Message Linda Linsefors on the Alignment Slack

Send an email

Choosing project idea(s)

AI Safety Camp is about ensuring future AI are safe. This round, we split work into two areas:

To not build uncontrollable AIFocussed work toward restricting corporate-AI scaling. Given reasons why 'AGI' cannot be controlled sufficiently (in time) to stay safe.

Everything elseOpen to any other ideas, including any work toward controlling/value-aligning AGI.

We welcome diverse projects! Last round, we accepted 14 projects - including in Theoretical research, Machine learning experiments, Deliberative design, Governance, and Communication.

If you already have an idea for what project you would like to lead, that's great. Apply with that one!

You don't need to come up with an original idea though. What matters is you understanding the idea you want to work on, and why. If you base your proposal on someone else's idea, make sure to cite them.

Primary reviewers:

Remmelt reviews uncontrollability-focussed projects.

Linda reviews everything else.

We will also ask for assistance from previous Research Leads, and up to a handful of other trusted people, to review and suggest improvement for your project proposals.

You can submit as many project proposals as you want. However, we will not let you lead more than two projects, and we don't recommend leading more than one.

Use this template to describe each of your project proposals. We want one document per proposal.

Team structure

Every team will have:

one Research Lead

one Team Coordinator

other team members

To make progress on your project, every team member is expected to work at least 5 hours per week (however the RL can choose to favour people who can put in more time, when selecting their team). This includes time joining weekly team meetings, and communicating regularly (between meetings) with other team members about their work.

Research Lead (RL)

The RL suggests one or several research topics. If a group forms around one of their topics, the RL will guide the project, and keep track of relevant milestones. When things inevitably don't go as planned (this is research after all) the RL is in ch...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: UDT shows that decision theory is more puzzling than ever, published by Wei Dai on September 13, 2023 on The AI Alignment Forum.

I feel like MIRI perhaps mispositioned FDT (their variant of UDT) as a clear advancement in decision theory, whereas maybe they could have attracted more attention/interest from academic philosophy if the framing was instead that the UDT line of thinking shows that decision theory is just more deeply puzzling than anyone had previously realized. Instead of one major open problem (Newcomb's, or EDT vs CDT) now we have a whole bunch more. I'm really not sure at this point whether UDT is even on the right track, but it does seem clear that there are some thorny issues in decision theory that not many people were previously thinking about:

Indexical values are not reflectively consistent. UDT "solves" this problem by implicitly assuming (via the type signature of its utility function) that the agent doesn't have indexical values. But humans seemingly do have indexical values, so what to do about that?

The commitment races problem extends into logical time, and it's not clear how to make the most obvious idea of logical updatelessness work.

UDT says that what we normally think of as different approaches to anthropic reasoning are really different preferences, which seems to sidestep the problem. But is that actually right, and if so where are these preferences supposed to come from?

2TDT-1CDT - If there's a population of mostly TDT/UDT agents and few CDT agents (and nobody knows who the CDT agents are) and they're randomly paired up to play one-shot PD, then the CDT agents do better. What does this imply?

Game theory under the UDT line of thinking is generally more confusing than anything CDT agents have to deal with.

UDT assumes that the agent has access to its own source code and inputs as symbol strings, so it can potentially reason about logical correlations between its own decisions and other agents' as well defined mathematical problems. But humans don't have this, so how are humans supposed to reason about such correlations?

Logical conditionals vs counterfactuals, how should these be defined and do the definitions actually lead to reasonable decisions when plugged into logical decision theory?

These are just the major problems that I was trying to solve (or hoping for others to solve) before I mostly stopped working on decision theory and switched my attention to metaphilosophy. (It's been a while so I'm not certain the list is complete.) As far as I know nobody has found definitive solutions to any of these problems yet, and most are wide open.

Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Hiring retrospective: Research Communicator for Giving What We Can, published by Michael Townsend on September 13, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum.

Inspired by Aaron Gertler's notes on hiring a copyeditor for CEA and more recently ERA's hiring retrospective, I am writing a retrospective on Giving What We Can's hiring for the Research Communicator role. This is written in my capacity as a Researcher for Giving What We Can. I helped drive the hiring process along with several other team members. The main motivation of the post is to:

Provide more information for applicants on what the hiring process looked like internally.

Share our lessons learned so that other organisations can improve their hiring processes by avoiding our mistakes and copying what we think we did well.

Summary

We received ~145 applications from a diverse pool of candidates, and made one hire.

We had four stages:

An initial series of short answer questions - 24/145 moved to the next stage.

A ~2-hour work test - 5/24 moved to the next stage.

A work trial (11-hours total) - 2/5 moved to the next stage.

A final interview and reference checks - we made one offer.

There are parts of the hiring process that we think went well:

We had a large and highly diverse pool of candidates.

We provided at least some feedback for every stage of the application process, giving more detail for later stages.

We think there were advantages to our heavy reliance on work tests and trials, and the ways we graded them (e.g. anonymously, and by response rather than by candidate).

There are ways we could have done better:

Our work trial was overly intense and stressful, and unrepresentative of working at GWWC.

We could have provided better guidance and/or tools for how long to take on the initial application tasks.

We could have had better communication at various stages, e.g. on the meaning of some of the scores shared as feedback on that application.

What we did

In this section, I'll outline the stages of our hiring process and share some reflections specific to each. The next section will provide some more general reflections.

Advertising the role

We made a reasonable effort into ensuring we had as large and diverse a pool of candidates for the role as we could. Some of the things we did include:

Before the role opened, our Director of Research Sjir Hoeijmakers attended EAGxIndia and EAGxLatAm, in part motivated to meet potential candidates (we thought it was likely we would hire another person to our research team later in the year).

Once the role opened:

Many of our team reached out to our own personal networks to advertise the role, especially to those from less represented backgrounds.

We advertised the role on our newsletter, 80,000 Hours' job board, and used High Impact Professionals' directory to reach out to candidates outside our networks.

We think this contributed to a diverse applicant pool, including many candidates with backgrounds, experience, and perspectives that we felt were underrepresented by the existing team:

The majority of applicants at the work test and work trial stage were women (we mostly graded applicants blindly - more details below).

When we asked the 145 applications for their country of residence, roughly half were non-English speaking countries, and the majority of those were outside of Europe.

The initial application

We asked applicants to fill in an Airtable form which asked for:

General information and permissions (e.g., whether they wanted to opt-in to receiving feedback or to us proactively referring them to other related roles in the future).

Their LinkedIn profile and/or resume.

Answers to short-answer questions, about:

Their background with effective altruism or effective giving and interest in the role.

Specific questions that functioned more as a very quick test (providing an ...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Summary: High risk, low reward: A challenge to the astronomical value of existential risk mitigation, published by Global Priorities Institute on September 13, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum.

This is a summary of the GPI Working Paper "High risk, low reward: A challenge to the astronomical value of existential risk mitigation" by David Thorstad. The paper is now forthcoming in the journal Philosophy and Public Affairs. The summary was written by Riley Harris.

The value of the future may be vast. Human extinction, which would destroy that potential, would be extremely bad. Some argue that making such a catastrophe just a little less likely would be by far the best use of our limited resources--much more important than, for example, tackling poverty, inequality, global health or racial injustice. In "High risk, low reward: A challenge to the astronomical value of existential risk mitigation", David Thorstad argues against this conclusion. Suppose the risks really are severe: existential risk reduction is important, but not overwhelmingly important. In fact, Thorstad finds that the case for reducing existential risk is stronger when the risk is lower.

The simple model

The paper begins by describing a model of the expected value of existential risk reduction, originally developed by Ord (2020;ms) and Adamczewski (ms). This model discounts the value of each century by the chance that an extinction event would have already occurred, and gives a value to actions that can reduce the risk of extinction in that century. According to this model, reducing the risk of extinction this century is not overwhelmingly important-in fact, completely eliminating the risk we face this century could at most be as valuable as we expect this century to be.

This result-that reducing existential risk is not overwhelmingly valuable--can be explained in an intuitive way. If the risk is high, the future of humanity is likely to be short, so the increases in overall value from halving the risk this century are not enormous. If the risk is low, halving the risk would result in a relatively small absolute reduction of risk, which is also not overwhelmingly valuable. Either way, saving the world will not be our only priority.

Modifying the simple model

This model is overly simplified. Thorstad modifies the simple model in three different ways to see how robust this result is: by assuming we have enduring effects on the risk, by assuming the risk of extinction is high, and by assuming that each century is more valuable than the previous. None of these modifications are strong enough to uphold the idea that existential risk reduction is by far the best use of our resources. A much more powerful assumption is needed (one that combines all of these weaker assumptions). Thorstad argues that there is limited evidence for this stronger assumption.

Enduring effects

If we could permanently eliminate all threats to humanity, the model says this would be more valuable than anything else we could do--no matter how small the risk or how dismal each century is (as long as each is still of positive value). However, it seems very unlikely that any action we could take today could reduce the risk to an extremely low level for millions of years--let alone permanently eliminate all risk.

Higher risk

On the simple model, halving the risk from 20% to 10% is exactly as valuable as halving it from 2% to 1%. Existential risk mitigation is no more valuable when the risks are higher.

Indeed, the fact that higher existential risk implies a higher discounting of the future indicates a surprising result: the case for existential risk mitigation is strongest when the risk is low. Suppose that each century is more valuable than the last and therefore that most of the value of the world is in the future. Then high existential...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: About my job: GiveWell Philanthropy Advisor, published by maggie.lloydhauser on September 13, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum.

Overview

I've been a Philanthropy Advisor at GiveWell for two years. This role is a better job for me than I thought I could find, and GiveWell is a better workplace than I knew existed.

I'm often asked what a typical day in my role is like. Because my day to day is (delightfully) varied, I'll instead share what a typical month looks like as a Philanthropy Advisor. I'll also share some thoughts on my pathway to this role and its impact on GiveWell's work.

A GiveWell Philanthropy Advisor is best compared to a Major Gifts Officer at other institutions, though there are some key differences. Big-picture, my role is to fundraise for our top charities as well as for non-top charity grants (such as those funded from our All Grants Fund) that may align with a specific donor's priorities. I primarily do this by maintaining relationships with a portfolio of donors.

Unlike my preconceived notion of what fundraising entailed, my job does not require cold outreach or making awkward asks of existing donors. Instead, I try to get to know my donors, learning about what motivates them in their giving, helping them stay up to date with our research, sharing organizational updates, and occasionally presenting them with giving opportunities that seem strongly aligned with their philanthropic goals and interests. When I accepted this role, I worried that it would require me to be interpersonally disingenuous or that I'd have to make funding opportunities seem like surer bets than they really are; I've been delighted to find that our donors are genuinely easy to connect with and that GiveWell's values of transparency and truth-seeking translate to extreme honesty with donors about the risks and uncertainties of different grants.

The job

In a typical month, my responsibilities break down as follows:

Communication with donors: In a typical month, I'm likely to send an update to each of the donors I know. This is often part of a natural ongoing conversation, but if I'm not specifically in touch with a donor already, I might reach out with an interesting article, share an impact report for their most recent gift, or get their feedback on some of our work. I also answer inbound donor questions from people seeking GiveWell's expertise and have a lot of calls with donors (over 100 per year). The volume of donor calls I have in a typical month varies greatly, clustering at the end of the year when many donors have questions about our work as they make annual giving decisions. These calls range from in-depth research conversations to logistical conversations about estate planning or giving mechanics to intense conversations about long-term philanthropic and financial goals and challenges. As relationships grow, we might also have more personal calls to catch up.

Following GiveWell's research: In order to keep donors informed about our work, I have to stay up to date with it myself! I spend a lot of time listening in on research meetings, reading research documents for various grants, and asking our researchers questions about the specifics of different programs. A donor call can go in any direction - it's not uncommon for a donor to ask about a research decision we made years before my tenure at GiveWell began or about our position on a research area we have yet to publish public materials on - so keeping abreast of our research is a core component of the job. Depending on my workload, I might also lead the process of drafting a grant proposal.

This requires a deep dive into the supporting documents for a specific grant and then condensing a lot of technical materials into a donor-facing format that highlights the intervention, considers the benefits, risks, and unce...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Link: EU considers dropping stricter animal welfare measures (Financial Times), published by Matt Goodman on September 12, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum.

The Financial Times writes that the EU is considering dropping animal welfare regulations from the upcoming Green Deal. The main reasons presented are concerns over the the effects the regulations will have on food prices, which have increased since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It also mentions political pressure from center-right parties.

The FT claims EU's own draft impact assessment on the legislation would add up to 60 cents to the price of a dozen eggs, and expanding the space where broiler chickens are housed would add 12 cents.

It's a disappointing read. Pushing for higher animal welfare regulations is something the EA movement has success in, and the EU has historically led the world when it comes to animal welfare regulations.

Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org