Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Ukraine Post #5: Bits of Information, published by Zvi on March 21, 2022 on LessWrong.
Rather than attempt a synthesis this time around, I’m going to experiment with the opposite. Over the course of the last three weeks, I kept adding to a long list of sources and interesting things the same way I do for Covid-19 posts, but without an overall update type of post there was nowhere for them to go.
Thus, while this in no way pretends to be complete or to provide a proper synthesis, this is the article form of that giant link bank and associated thoughts, organized in logical fashion.
When going through the list, many of the links from February were no longer relevant, as they concerned things like whether we would give aid, or whether we would impose sanctions and how many and how Russia would react, or whether firms would divest, and other things like that. Then there was a phase shift when it became clear we would sanction and provide aid and the military situation got bogged down, after which new info mostly stayed more relevant.
If I had to summarize the overall picture, I’d say something like this, note that even the summary contains a ton of stuff because there’s a ton of stuff to cover.
Russia’s military campaign has culminated.
It is going to be very difficult or impossible for Russia to progress further.
Russia has huge, potentially fatal, logistical problems.
Russia is out of deployable resources, seems unable to meaningfully further mobilize.
Sanctions are hurting but a quick total collapse will not happen.
Ukraine will still find it difficult for now to make progress rolling back Russia’s gains, but that slowly should change as Russia’s army degrades further.
Russia is a deeply dysfunctional mafioso state.
Russians are largely buying into not only the invasion but future ones too.
Russia does a good job preventing rebellion, but at cost of everything else.
Western approach to solving the problems of Russian Oil and Gas are non-zero but mostly not serious or of sufficient magnitude or physical-world-orientation.
The coming food crisis is mostly not being addressed at all.
If we did want to solve such issues, expensive but realistic solutions exist.
A lot of very large ‘pure wins’ also exist that we are not using either.
Western coalition’s core has become much stronger and more united.
Our game theory seems aggressive and less than ideal, but much better than that which the public would favor, which would be kind of totally nuts.
Escalation risks definitely exist on both sides, remains unclear what Putin will do if he realizes how badly he is losing and we’ve given NATO countries a green light to send troops into Ukraine (but won’t do it ourselves.)
No one takes nuclear safety or issues seriously, so they take nothing seriously.
West is creating a very big ‘penalty for being late’ problem, where any deviation from our agenda, or in some cases even from a very left-wing agenda, results in massive punishments.
This causes those who cannot accept the totality of the system out of the system, weakening its position and strengthening the opposition.
China is trying to be in opposition without provoking the response, so far this is working, but internal propaganda there seems very pro-Putin and anti-USA.
Those in opposition then tend to both cooperate with each other and to converge on a set of models, beliefs and rhetoric that includes many quite false and/or awful things, an anti-pattern demonstrating opposition.
Peace talks may or may not be ‘fake’ on either side especially the Russian one.
If they are real there are three issues: Territory, demilitarization and ‘denazification.’
Any peace soon likely involves some territorial concessions, unclear if a possible deal exists here yet.
Demilitarization will potentially be a Sweden/Austria model. Includes a no-NATO ...