Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Reverse-engineering using interpretability, published by Beth Barnes on December 29, 2021 on The AI Alignment Forum.

Building a model for which you're confident your interpretability is correct, by reverse-engineering each part of the model to work how your interpretability says it should work. (Based on discussion in alignment reading group, ideas from William, Adam, dmz, Evan, Leo, maybe others)

The basic idea

Train an untrusted network

Do interpretability on it, getting some human-understandable schema that is intended to capture what (some of) the model is doing

Identify anything that should be changed about what the model is (supposedly) doing, and make a new human-understandable schema of the desired behavior

Train a model to do what this new representation says it should be doing, by having a human implement each part of the schema then doing imitation + distillation

I think this can be thought of in a few different ways:

One way you might implement Microscope AI in practice

A way to do imitative amplification where the decomposition is generated by gradient descent instead of by humans, combined with some aspects of imitative generalization

The main advantages here are:

Compared to just using interpretability to audit your trained model, this is safer, because you can be more confident your interpretation matches what the final model is doing (because you trained the final model to conform to your interpretation). If you have mistakes in your interpretability, you should get performance issues rather than safety issues.

Compared to normal IDA or ‘trying to build a schema from scratch’, this is easier because you use the power of the initial model to decide how to decompose tasks, or how to solve individual tasks, and you can use patterns the model learnt from large volumes of data without needing to have been able to generate that knowledge yourself

The main disadvantages are:

To be competitive this requires really good interpretability - basically understanding everything about what the model is doing. This scheme might actually require more out of your interpretability techniques than just auditing your model would.

The ‘ontology mismatch’ issue for ELK is still a problem.

A naive implementation of this training procedure is really expensive (in terms of both compute and human labels)

The scheme in more detail:

First, train some big, untrusted model on untrusted, unsupervised data

Next, use some (automated) interpretability tools to get natural-language (or otherwise) descriptions of functions of components of the model (e.g. neurons, circuits, attention heads, etc)

E.g.:

Now we’re going to build a new model that is constructed based on the description of this model. Each component in the new model is going to be a small model trained to imitate a human computing the function that the description of the component specifies.

For the low-level components, we train a small model to e.g. recognise edges, based on human labels of whether a region contains edges.

For the components above this, we train a small model to go from the human-understandable descriptions of the features that go into it, to the human-understandable description of behavior. For example, we train a model to go from the description of the locations of windows, wheels and car body in the image to a description of the location of likely cars in the image.

Now we have a model that is definitely well-described by the interpretability we did, because we constructed each component to have the function we understood it to. (There’s another assumption needed here - that we can ‘trust’ IID supervised learning. That is, if we have a dataset X, and we can get human labels h(x) for any particular example x \in X, we can train a model to perfectly imitate h on X.)

The hope is that we can now do things l...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Should I blog on LessWrong?, published by maria a on December 28, 2021 on LessWrong.

This is my first post here. I would like feedback on my decision of signing up to LessWrong with the idea of writing here occasionally. I explain my reasoning below, but first, for context, here is a brief intro about me:

I am not sure if I consider myself a rationalist or part of the rationality community, but I enjoy scrolling through LW and reading some posts. I do consider myself part of the Effective Altruism community and have been involved in it for over two years. I'm a graduate student in one of the 80,000 Hours priority cause areas and my aim is to be a researcher, perhaps also involved with policy, in such area.

I have a website where I used to blog about anything I found interesting. Since I applied to graduate school, it has become a professional/academic website (I removed most of my existing posts) and I intend to keep it that way (with occasional academic posts). I enjoy writing and I recognize it's a very useful skill to develop. However, I'm concerned that having several posts on my professional website about EA or Rationality would cause a negative impression on academics or future employers who visit my website.

I have not included my surname on my LW username for the same reasons (my LW user does not show up on a google search of my full name). I do not want complete anonymity: I expect that most of the people who know me will identify me as the person behind this LW profile and that those reading this LW profile may find my website. I'm okay with both. Does my reasoning seem reasonable? A few final thoughts:

I expect I would cross-post some posts from here on my blog, and vice-versa.

I have also created a profile on the EA Forum with the same username () to use in a similar fashion (but I expect to post on LW more frequently due to its broader content scope).

I can always link to my LW account on the first page of my website should I want to (effectively becoming fully public), and even re-posting there (some of) my LW posts.

Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: COVID Skepticism Isn't About Science, published by jaspax on December 29, 2021 on LessWrong.

You live in a roughly Dunbar-sized group. This does not mean that you live in a small village, but it does mean that your actual personal contacts, the number of people that you have direct social contact with, is about one hundred. One day, a respiratory illness starts to circulate among your social group. At first it seems just like a bad cold; later it becomes clear that it's a really bad cold.

You catch it, and you spend four days in bed with fever, muscle aches, chills, and nausea. Your sense of taste and smell go away. Once the fever breaks and you get out of bed, you deal with another week of sinus headaches and persistent dry cough. This is way longer than a typical cold, but it does eventually abate, and you get back to your normal life. [1]

In the aftermath, you take stock with your friends and acquaintances. It seems that about half of everyone you knew got the supercold; the rest avoided it by good luck or had such mild cases that they didn't notice. One person had a fever for ten days and almost had to go to the hospital, but they did eventually recover.

Nobody that you know died, though you did hear about a friend's elderly great-uncle who caught the cold and died of complications.

One day shortly after this, a mysterious man in a gray suit approaches you.

"I see that you and your friends have survived the passing of the great and terrible novel respiratory virus," he says.

"Uh, yes," you said, wondering why he refers to it in such an obtuse manner. "Who are you?"

"I am a concerned bureaucrat," the man says. "It also so happens that I am in possession of a time-travel device."

"Whoah, what? How does that work?"

"Never mind that. The point is: I can make it so that your friends do not suffer from the supercold."

"Okay. What's the catch?" You are genre-savvy and know that there is always a catch.

"Well, you'll have to close down many of your businesses for several months."

"Okay... so how will my friends who are waiters or small business owners avoid bankruptcy??"

The man shrugs. "We'll send them a check for a few thousand dollars."

"That's not nearly---"

The man cuts you off. "Also you'll have to give up in-person socializing for the same period. Especially you have to stop big social events like church and synagogue meetings, holiday parties, and weddings."

"But my sister is getting married---"

"And you will be required to wear uncomfortable masks whenever you leave the house for the same time period."

You are starting to have doubts. "But if we do this you promise it'll stop the disease?"

The man shrugs. "Well... maybe. For a little while."

"That's not very comforting. I'm really not sure that this is a good deal. Listen, the disease was about a week of discomfort for most people, nobody died, and if you hadn't showed up to make this pitch to me, I would have been well on my way to forgetting the whole thing. Is this really worth it?"

The bureaucrat begins to get upset. "How can you say nobody died?"

"I don't know a single one. My case was among the worst ones out of my friends, and it was unpleasant but not life-altering."

"What about your friend's great-uncle?"

"He was already quite old. And while his family surely grieves, it's still a fact of life that old people die a lot."

"And so you're going to throw him to the wolves in order to save your friends livelihoods!"

"Honestly... maybe. Really, though, shouldn't we be able to do something to protect the elderly or other vulnerable people without causing everyone else six months of financial hardship and lost relationships?"

"Six months..." the man squirms. "I might need you to do this for a year or two."

"And you said that I still might eventually catch the cold anyway."

"Aren't you listening to me? People di...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: EA/Rationalist Safety Nets: Promising, but Arduous, published by Ozzie Gooen on December 29, 2021 on The Effective Altruism Forum.

Rigor: Quickly written (~6 hours). Originally made as a Facebook post that emphasized the “Potential Challenges” section. There’s some discussion there.

Epistemic Status: This mostly comes from personal experiences and discussions with community members in the last few years.

Many thanks to Aaron Gertler, Stefan Schubert, Julia Wise, and Evan Gaensbauer for feedback directly on this post. Also, thanks for everyone involved in the Facebook discussion.

Introduction

I’ve been around EA/rationality for several years now (starting in 2008, during college). I’ve seen several instances where promising people (myself included) could have really used some help.

Potential help includes:

Money

Good mental health support

Friends or helpers, for when things are tough

Insurance (broader than health insurance)

I’m based in the United States. Government benefits here are substantially worse than in some European countries, so it’s possible these concerns don’t apply elsewhere.

I think interventions in these areas could be valuable. However, I believe they’re unusually challenging to implement. I encourage future groups tackling this space to plan accordingly. I also hope that people upset with a lack of existing infrastructure can sympathize with the challenges around it.

Also, see this post for related discussion: An Emergency Fund for Effective Altruists.[1]

Evidence of the Problem

Some evidence of what I’m referring to includes:

Howie Lempel’s podcast with 80,000 Hours went into detail about hard times he’s had and help he received. I’m thankful that this information was made public. It’s probably the best case study we have now within our community. I think it’s pretty clear that Howie Lempel is doing great work, and his situation might have turned grimmer if things had gone a bit differently, including if he had less support. While I’m happy he had this support, this support seemed exceptional compared to other things I’ve seen and would expect.

I have had a few scares. Earlier on in my career, I was very low on money and had health problems that I was worried might put me on disability or worse.

I’ve known several effective altruists and rationalists who have been very low on funding for some possibly-crucial parts of their lives. Some have gone on later to do very well, but it’s easy to imagine it going differently. Unlike with Howie Lempel’s case, they had rough spots before they did valuable work.

In general, the situation for many people in the United States (including and outside of our communities) seems pretty bad, so the prior is poor. Many people have feeble social support structures. (There’s quite a bit of literature on this topic.)

Related Infrastructure

Our communities already have a few valuable initiatives. Some of these include (just off the top of my head):

The CEA community health team

Lightcone Infrastructure

The Centre for EA Learning and Research

REACH

Perhaps we can learn from religious communities. A while ago, I chatted to a Mormon effective altruist who explained how their system works. Mormons regularly tithe 10% of their income to the Mormon church, but in return, the church seems to take care of them when they're down. I’ve recently been watching videos from Peter Santenello about the Hasidic Jewish and the Amish communities, and they seem to have similar systems.

Potential Challenges

At this point, there are some wealthy people in and around effective altruism. So if there are straightforward spending opportunities that would be competitive through an EA lens, there could be funding for them.

Unfortunately, I think setting up a safety net would result in several nasty complications. These might be particularly grueling ...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Technocracy vs populism (including thoughts on the democratising risk paper and its responses), published by freedomandutility on December 29, 2021 on The Effective Altruism Forum.

TL;DR:

I think EAs are advocating for more technocratic decision-making without having formally thought about this.

This makes it an urgent priority for EAs to answer the following questions:

What balance should policymakers strike between technocracy and populism generally?

How, if at all, should this balance change when there is a large difference between public and expert opinion?

How, if at all, should this balance change when moral and/or empirical uncertainty is extremely high or extremely low?

How, if at all, should this balance change when the differences in expected value between plausible policy options is extremely high or extremely low?

Definitions:

In this post, by 'populism' I mean 'policymakers making decisions based on public opinion' and don't intend to attach negative connotations to 'populism'.

(I'd like to find a better word for this because 'populism' is a loosely defined word and has negative connotations. I considered using the word 'democracy' here, but I think the positive connotations for 'democracy' are too large and thought that 'populism' is relatively more neutral (i.e, it seems more socially acceptable to argue for more populism than for less democracy). I also think 'democracy' doesn't convey the extreme end of decisions being made on public opinion. If you can think of a better word, please suggest it).

By technocracy, I mean 'policymakers making decisions based on expert opinion'.

Post:

We can think of decisions by policymakers as existing on a spectrum from extremely technocratic to extremely populist.

My view of EA has long been that it clearly advocates for more technocratic decision-making.

The clearest example of this is an investigation into reducing populism and promoting evidence-based policy.

Apart from this, here are some subjective impressions which contribute to my view:

many EAs think governments should use more expert surveys in decision-making

many EAs actively seek to use their expertise to lobby policymakers, but few are pursuing 'grassroots' approaches to policy change (Note: While aiming to be the person available when policymakers want expert opinion does not favour more technocratic decision-making, actively seeking to influence policymakers does favour more technocratic decision-making)

Off the top of my head, these are the 2 main, broad, downsides to more technocratic decision-making:

More populist decision-making reduces the risks involved in acting under moral and empirical uncertainty, by incorporating a wider range of moral theories and opinions into decision making. So, more technocratic decision-making increases the risks.

More populist decision-making reduces the risks from experts intentionally or unintentionally advocating for unethical policies (under a wide range of moral theories) out of self-interest. So, more technocratic decision-making increases this risk. (This risk is a greater risk than the risk of >50% of the public advocating for unethical policies out of self-interest, because in expectation, unethical policies in the self-interest of ">50% of the public" would be good for more people than unethical policies in the self-interest of experts).

Some people (including a past version of me) consider 'more democratic' decision-making to be inherently good, regardless of outcomes, because they see everyone having more equal political power as an end in itself. So more technocratic decision-making goes against this.

And this is the main, broad downside to more populist decision-making:

Public opinion on moral theories and empirical evidence are less likely to be correct and rational than expert opinion, so decisions mad...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: What would you like from Microcovid.org? How valuable would it be to you?, published by Elizabeth on December 29, 2021 on LessWrong.

Microcovid.org was a vital tool to many of us during the pandemic- I made a whole speech about it back at summer solstice. The back and forth over how finished covid is, plus a dependence entirely on volunteers, has pushed microcovid into something of a limbo. It's not clear what the best next step for it is. One option would be to update microcovid for new problems, but that’s a lot of work and I have a lot of uncertainty about how valuable any given improvement is. So I’d to collect some data.

How are you using microcovid now?

What is the minimum viable change that would create value for you, and what would that value be? The more explicit the better here- comments like “feature X would be worth $n to me” or “it enabled me to find a collaborated then enabled a project” are more useful than “I like it a lot”

What’s your dream microcovid, and what value would that create for you?

Anything else you’d like to share on this topic?

I’ve asked LW to enable the experimental agree/disagree feature for this post. The benefit of this is that you can boost particular data points without writing anything. The risk is that an individual's preferences get counted repeatedly: 5 people with the same opinion who write five posts and agree with all of the others’ identical points should be counted as 5 people, not 25. So I ask that you:

Not agree with comments substantially overlapping with a comment you write

If multiple comments make the same point, only click agree for one of them

This isn’t an exact science because comments will sometimes contain more than one point or make very similar but not totally identical points, but please do your best.

Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: A non-magical explanation of Jeffrey Epstein, published by lc on December 28, 2021 on LessWrong.

On some level, in order to understand the society they live in, most people have to be conspiracy theorists. Forming correct conspiracy theories is a critical and essential part of understanding politics, international relations, and the justice system. Genuine conspiracies between people are a fact of living in an industrialized, highly populated globe. There are actual intelligence organizations, law enforcement agencies, insurrectionist militias, and organized criminal enterprises which by their nature create secrets, and clandestinely plan murders and arrests. We don't generally regard them as spectacular, because you can read about most of the important (and publicly disclosed) ones on Wikipedia.

Politicians and journalists have to be conspiracy theorists in order to pursue their ambitions and model their political opponents. People who work for large businesses tend to have to do it to prevent themselves from being taken advantage of by their coworkers and management. Even kids in grade school, in all but the most idyllic settings, are forced to quickly learn to understand the underlying motivations of other friend groups and fight for status amongst their in-groups. The stakes may be low or high, but people come inborn with a powerful ability to lie and understand the plausibility of the small schemes others might pull.

Clearly, then, there are key differences between the regular conspiracy theorist, which almost all of us are, and the cultural conception of a "conspiracy theorist". One common difference is an implausible level of sophistication and ability assigned to the schemers. When working in their near lives, people have an intuition about how many people can be told about something salacious without it becoming public knowledge. Even in circumstances where everyone is properly motivated and there are low rewards for becoming an informant, like a middle school classroom, we understand intuitively how hard it is to keep everyone from leaking information to the teacher. The airquoted "conspiracy theorist" first and foremost rejects their internal social navigation sensors. Instead, in order to make their ideas plausible, they tend to see intelligence officers who are really just bigger LARPers than the "conspiracy theorist" as supernaturally competent and cooperative within their in-group.

A second thing the "conspiracy theorist" will do is assign demonic or otherworldly values to large groups of people, lacking any backstory for why they seem to have these strange motivations. Now, in real life, people can have very strange reasons for their actions. I find it hard to imagine that it'd be possible to successfully gather nineteen people for the 9/11 terror attacks, and end up without a single person who'd object and alert the FBI. But that's just a failure of my own imagination. There is a huge amount of indoctrination, socialization, and child rearing before someone is entrusted with a task like driving a plane into the pentagon - and on top of it the 9/11 hijackers were born into almost as different a culture from mine as you could find. Sacrificing yourself and thousands of others in the name of God is not an implausible story, given the enormous amount of brainwashing that goes into preparing someone for the role.

It's just hard for me to empathize as some atheist American.

On the other hand, the "conspiracy theorist" will just call all government and business leaders pedophiles. They will usually not go far enough to suppose an actual source for these wildly dissimilar and almost universally abhorred preferences. They don't claim (usually) that elites grew up in a different culture where pedophilia is promoted and instilled as a norm in youth. They'll jus...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Running an EA outreach project involving high school students? Let us know!, published by Julia Wise on December 28, 2021 on The Effective Altruism Forum.

TL;DR: Please let CEA's community health team know if you are running, or planning to run, an education program involving high school students in the spaces of EA, longtermism, or rationality.

We think outreach to school students might be very promising, and there seems to be an increased interest in it recently. However, working with high school students has risks that don’t occur (or occur less) with university students and adults. We think it’s worth tracking and mitigating these risks, but that it is not normally worth significantly changing, delaying, or scaling down projects because of these risks.

CEA’s community health team works to (among other things) increase the chances that people have positive experiences in the community, and that we successfully communicate EA-related ideas. So we’re hoping to learn about all of the school outreach and education projects that are running or planned. We’ll try to advise on things like

good practices around child protection

reducing reputational risks among teachers and parents

helping with any problems that occur.

There are other organizers doing outreach to this age group who coordinate and share ideas and advice. We’ll put you in touch with them if you’re not already connected. So please let us know if you are running, or planning to run, an EA education program targeting high school students. You can fill in this very brief (~1 minute) form, or email Catherine Low on [email protected]. Thank you!

If you know of other people who are running EA outreach projects, you can email Catherine, fill out the form, or comment below.

Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Omicron Post #10, published by Zvi on December 28, 2021 on LessWrong.

Reporting in the wake of Christmas remains spotty, but this fog of war was anticipated, and we must do what we can with what we do know. Mostly, what we’ve learned reinforces the picture outlined in Post #9, with reduced severity. Also with reduced generation time which we confirmed a bit via a study from South Korea.

I’ve also written up Omicron: My Current Model which gives the ‘here’s where we are at’ takeaways and news you can most practically use.

Denmark

Denmark’s reporting is usually excellent, but they’ve taken a few days off for Christmas and I don’t see new data even now, so nothing new to report on that front.

Hospitalizations continue to come in lower than expected (WaPo).

More important, hospitalizations have come in — so far — on the very low end of what was projected. A week ago, Denmark’s government science institute said daily new coronavirus hospital admissions could range between 120 and 250 patients by Christmas Eve. In recent days, daily admissions have hung around 125.

That’s not a big range, only varying by a factor of two. It reflects a kind of overconfidence – we have large uncertainty over true case counts and over severity on multiple fronts. We have known cases increasing by a factor of three or four depending on how you count lag, real cases doubtless up far more than that, yet hospitalizations only up about 50%, and still solidly below the United States.

The UK’s hospitalization numbers here are less promising, because given the delays in reporting plus lag in events, we still don’t have much information.

By Thursday data should have caught up, and we’ll have a strong data point on the severity level of Omicron. We won’t know if cases peaked or not, because of the holidays, unless the numbers kept going up in spite of the holidays.

United Kingdom

Looks like cases continue to rise, but holidays again make it very difficult to be certain.

Omicron has fully taken over.

The temporary drop in testing followed by a return to trendline indicates to me that it was a temporary blip. It may have been reluctance to test, or reduced testing capacity, before the holidays. It may have been behavior change in advance of the holidays. Either way, records are once again being set.

Another data source and perspective.

There’s no way we had this kind of decline that quickly given subsequent data. The only plausible interpretation here is that people stopped reporting.

Another estimate has 9.5% of Londoners Covid-19 positive on Christmas Eve, which seems plausible to me.

Thread on UK hospital situation. Important questions here so quoting in full for those interested.

I find #12 especially interesting here: We don’t know which patients are in the hospital because of Covid, and that’s what matters, so ideally we’d compare total admissions now and then, the same way we might measure net excess deaths. As long as there’s plenty of capacity, that seems right, but the obvious problem is that as hospitals fill up admission criteria changes, and once they’re full admission numbers are effectively a constant, so this metric breaks down rapidly under strain. But if overall numbers haven’t changed at all, and there was capacity before, that seems like a big game. Then again, #15 notes that NHS was already under tremendous pressure. If anyone reading this works at a UK hospital, especially in London, I’d ask, if you know: Are the thresholds for admission starting to rise? Or are you using the same heuristics you were last month? And are the staff shortages pushing down ability to admit patients and reducing admissions that way?

So we can’t draw firm conclusions, as Hopson notes, but it’s still promising news. It certainly seems at this point to rule out relatively horrible outcomes on severity. By t...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Solstice Quaker Darkness Circling, published by Raemon on December 28, 2021 on LessWrong.

This year I did a small "Darkness Solstice" in the woods (i.e. basically got up to the moment of darkness, and then instead of having an uplifting third act we just sorta sat in the darkness for awhile).

"Darkness Solstice" probably doesn't make sense for most people. But a thing that was interesting and perhaps surprisingly relevant was "Solstice Quaker Circling".

After the moment of darkness we just sat around a campfire in silence. Anyone could speak up and share something if they felt like it. I modeled this after the structure of a Quaker meeting, with a vague dose of Circling culture thrown in.

When you felt like you'd had "enough", you lit a candle indicate you were ready to move on from the segment (which in this case meant wrapping up the solstice with one final song)

I think it was about 40 minutes before a critical mass of people had lit their "I'm done" candles. I was happy with how the "I'm done" mechanic played out – if I had had to guess how long to have the period have lasted, I might have went with something much shorter.

We ended up sharing a lot of personal stuff that felt valuable to me. There were some impromptu solstice speeches came up that were interesting. Some minor personal interactions.

A question came up: "Am I allowed to respond to what other people have said?" and my answer was "Yes, but only in slow motion. To preserve the overall vibe and prevent it from turning into "just a conversation", the guideline was to always wait a minute or so before saying the next thing. So, you could respond to something someone else said but not transition into rapid back-and-forth that'd have killed the mood.

It as definitely a great experience for me as a small solstice. There were six of us there, and five of us shared things during the period.

I think this might surprisingly just.... work, even at larger scales? Its modeled after a Quaker meeting. I've seen Quaker meetings work well with ~30-40 people, and the largest ones are apparently ~70 (but maybe have a different vibe than the smaller ones).

In open-invite large scale Solstice, I think there are additional complications – I think it's bad to create an illusion of a safer space than you can guarantee. There's also a risk of someone bringing up a social conflict in the middle of the space, or a political rant, in a way that's hard to deal with. (It seems to me the Quakers would also run into this problem at least sometimes. I'm curious how they deal)

I tried this out specifically hoping it could be a thing that worked well at small solstices, and gave people more of a reason to hold private events after they go to Big Regional Solstice. I think it worked really well for that.

Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.