Published on September 14, 2021 8:43 PM GMT
Epistemic status: Half-baked at best
I have often been skeptical of the value of a) critiques against effective altruism and b) fully general arguments that seem like they can apply to almost anything. However, as I am also a staunch defender of hypocrisy, I will now hypocritically attempt to make the case for applying a fully general critique to effective altruism.
In this post, I will claim that:
Motivated reasoning inhibits our ability to acquire knowledge and form reasoned opinions.
Effective altruism should not be assumed to be above these biases. Moreover, there are strong reasons to believe that incentive structures and institutions in effective altruism exacerbate rather than alleviate these biases.
Observed data and experiences in effective altruism support this theory; they are consistent with an environment where motivated reasoning and selection biases are rampant.
To the extent that these biases (related to motivated reasoning) are real, we should expect the harm done to our ability to form reasoned opinions to also seriously harm the project of doing good.
I will use the example of cost-effectiveness analyses as a jumping board for this argument. (I understand that effective altruism, especially outside of global health and development, has largely moved away from explicit expected value calculations and cost-effectiveness analyses. However, I do not believe this change invalidates my argument (see Appendix B)).
I also list a number of tentative ways to counteract motivated reasoning and selection bias in effective altruism:
Encourage and train scientific/general skepticism in EA newcomers.
Try marginally harder to accept newcomers, particularly altruistically motivated ones with extremely high epistemic standards
As a community, fund and socially support external (critical) cost-effectiveness analyses and impact assessments of EA orgs
Within EA orgs, encourage and reward dissent of various forms
Commit to individual rationality and attempts to reduce motivated reasoning
Maybe encourage a greater number of people to apply and seriously consider jobs outside of EA or EA-adjacent orgs
Maintain or improve the current culture of relatively open, frequent, and vigorous debate
Foster a bias towards having open, public discussions of important concepts, strategies, and intellectual advances
Motivated reasoning: What it is, why it’s common, why it matters
By motivated reasoning, I roughly mean what Julia Galef calls “soldier mindset” (H/T Rob Bensinger):
In directionally motivated reasoning, often shortened to "motivated reasoning", we disproportionately put our effort into finding evidence/reasons that support what we wish were true.
Or, from Wikipedia:
emotionally biased reasoning to produce justifications or make decisions that are most desired rather than those that accurately reflect the evidence
I think motivated reasoning is really common in our world. As I said in a recent comment:
My impression is that my interactions with approximately every entity that perceives themself as directly doing good outside of EA is that they are not seeking truth, and this systematically corrupts them in important ways. Non-random examples that come to mind include public health (on covid, vaping, nutrition), bioethics, social psychology, developmental econ, climate change, vegan advocacy, religion, US Democratic party, and diversity/inclusion. Moreover, these problems aren't limited to particular institutions: these problems are instantiated in academia, activist groups, media, regulatory groups and "mission-oriented" companies.
What does motivated reasoning look like in practice? In the field of cost-effectiveness analyses, it might look like this comment on a blog post about scientific conflicts of interest:
Back in the 90’s I did some consulting work for a startup that was developing a new medical device. They were honest people–they never pressured me. My contract stipulated that ...