The end!
Who would be the politikos who could make another person politikos?  If reasoning has led to the fourth option proposed by Socrates, is it not episteme, and if so, why should it be reexamined? Socrates leaves Meno with an outline of the dialectic method.

Socrates provides Meno with a new answer to the question asked by Meno at the beginning of the dialogue. Virtue comes to people through divine lot.

What is the significance of good politicians being called divine? Why does it matter that not only women but also Spartan men think this way? We find out that all through Socrates' unflattering portrayal of good politicians as people lacking sense, Anytus has been listening, and appears to be, according to Meno, upset. Is this at all important for our understanding of the philosophical import of the dialogue, or is it merely a nod to the historical fact that Anytus was one of the prosecutors of Socrates?

Socrates continues his attempts to make Meno think even while leading up to his grand conclusion. Politicians don't understand what they are talking about. This is a given. However, Socrates is supposed to be demonstrating that they have true opinion as a guide to beneficial acts. This he emphatically does not do.

Socrates begins his last attempt to shock Meno into reacting to the ramifications of his own opinions and assumptions. If Meno is now happy that virtue not a knowledge (episteme) since there are no teachers of it (this itself is a false premise), then those good politicians (politicians with arete) guide cities without episteme. Socrates likens the senseless politicans to prophets and seers, to ease the transition from politicans being guided by correct opinion, through an ihtermediate stage of appearing to be guided well simply because of the good opinion of others, all the way to politicians being guided by gods, just as prophets and seers are.

Socrates concludes the confused summary of the arguments since the hypothesis that virtue is something teachable by setting up episteme and orthe doxa as the two things which lead well and beneficially,  only. to eliminate episteme on the specious claim that no one teaches it, leaving orthe doxa, correct opinion.  However, Socrates does not go to orthe doxa. He claims that politicians rely on eudoxia,  which is not "good opinion" but "good reputation" (despite the special pleading of LSJ).

Nearing the very end of the conversation, Socrates tries one last time to cause Meno to recollect, by seriously conflating and confusing 1. a summary of the hypothesis that virtue is teachable and 2. the discussion about understanding and true opinion. Socrates fails, since Meno agrees to everything Socrates says, as if each false remark exactly reflects what was said earlier.

Socrates continues to dwell on the similarities between episteme and orthe doxa - they are both good, and therefore beneficial, as are the men who have either of them. Socrates proceeds to recap the discussion from the time Meno gave up answering the question what arete is by returning to ask which of the four options is held by Socrates, concerning the type of thing arete is - teachable, exercisable, something coming to people by nature, or coming in some other way. Socrates' reconstruction of the discussion is perverse, the only plausible explanation being that he is testing Meno's ability to recollect.

I discuss the difference between correct opinion (orthē doxa) and understanding/knowledge (epistēmē), explaining why only understanding/knowledge is useful. Socrates, for his part, asserts his true belief that correct opinion is no worse than understanding/knowledge, and Meno confirms Socrates' belief, saying that Socrates is speaking correctly.

Socrates uses the statues of Daedalus as a way to explain to Meno how opinions (doxai) differ from pieces of knowledge (epistemai). One episteme, according to this account, is one doxa bound by "a reasoning of cause" (aitias logismos). Socrates suggests that they had agreed to this during the discussion of recollection (anamnesis), which is patently false. Meno once again fails Socrates' attempt to make him remember things already said in the dialogue.