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Recyclops spent 13 years earning a client worth 92% of its business. Then the client walked away, with no explanation.
Ryan Smith is founder and CEO of Recyclops, which brings curbside recycling to rural and underserved communities that the big waste companies skip. Door to door worked, but a 13 to 15 month payback was too slow. So Recyclops started selling to local governments instead: 1 decision, 1 address list, a whole town at once.
Ryan is open about the contract that nearly broke the company: what he'd price differently, the data hire he made months too late, and how he decided what to tell his team. He also explains how new extended producer responsibility (EPR) laws in Colorado changed the pitch from "please sign up" to "good news, your residents already have free recycling."
We discuss:
- What Ryan would do differently with a contract worth 92% of revenue
- Why city councils always choose opt-in, and why Recyclops stopped offering it
- How opt-out took participation from 1 to 5% to 60 to 80%
- How 2 salespeople brought on 30,000 households in 4 days under Colorado's EPR law
- Why impact investors didn't fund a recycling company, and capitalists did
Ryan's take is direct: "If you know that they're always gonna go for the cheapest package, don't mention the cheapest package."
If you're a climate founder selling to governments or carrying a single client that's most of your revenue, this conversation is full of specific, hard-won lessons on pricing big contracts, designing the offer, and using new regulation to sell.
Gamaya's customers would pay 2 to 3 times more for an SAP rollout than for a change that could improve their harvest. One is the industry standard. The other feels too scary.
Yury Vasilkov is CEO of Gamaya, which began as a hyperspectral imaging company and now runs 1 platform across sugarcane harvest forecasting, reforestation tracking and carbon compliance. Its customers are sugar mills and agribusinesses, not farmers, so every deal is an enterprise sale.
The pivotal beat: Gamaya's forecasts were accurate, and customers mostly used them as a second opinion. Without process change the value stayed marginal, sales took longer and pricing never matched the value. So Yury stopped selling software alone and found a channel partner who could handle the implementation.
We discuss:
- Why accurate forecasts still ended up as a "second opinion" nobody acted on
- Why buyers pay 2 to 3 times more for SAP than for a new solution that could do more
- Why "4 weeks earlier" gets approved and "move it to September" gets shelved
- Why partnerships with big software players stalled, and what finally worked
- Whether agtech can ever prove ROI, and why speed is the better proof
Yury's take is direct: if your solution "required too much change compared to what they did," it "might be just stopped, never be implemented because it's too scary."
If you're an AgTech or climate data founder whose customers love the pilot but won't change how they work, this conversation is full of specific, hard-won lessons on enterprise sales, change management and finding a partner who needs you as much as you need them.
Most direct air capture companies sell carbon credits. Soletair Power sells building owners a lower energy bill.
Petri Laakso is CEO of Soletair Power, a Finnish company that builds CO2 capture into building ventilation. Buildings already move huge volumes of air to deal with the CO2 people breathe out. Soletair captures it there, and in hot, humid cities like Singapore the system saves more ventilation energy than it uses.
It took 3 pivots to get there. The first outdoor unit, sold in 2016, showed capture costs would be too high. A mentor later told Petri to stop talking about how CO2 affects people's thinking, because it was hard to monetise. Energy savings were not. Now the pitch is about how capture raises a building's value.
We discuss:
- Why Soletair stopped pitching cognitive performance and started pitching savings
- How capture in buildings gets to minus $400 per ton
- Why selling the same tech means a different pitch in Sweden and Singapore
- What happened when a Series A investor backed out because it couldn't raise its own fund
- Why Petri thinks his business model was too complicated for investors
Petri's take is direct: "You don't need to speak about whether the capture cost is $100 per ton or $150 per ton because we are at minus $400 per ton."
If you're a climate hardware founder with a working pilot, a commercial model still taking shape, and investors who like the science but aren't writing cheques, this conversation is full of specific, hard-won lessons on pivoting your pitch, selling on savings, and raising money without overpromising.
In 2022, Meadow had data showing consumers would pay a premium for sustainable packaging. They would. Just not for sustainability.
Victor is a co-founder of Meadow, which turns the aluminium beverage can into a refill cartridge for reusable dispensers. It works with shampoo, sprays, pours and products nobody expected. Aluminium is one of the few packaging materials that truly circulates: a can is often back on shelf within 60 days.
The wedge decision was not to build a factory. Packaging is a 4.5 trillion unit a year industry, so Meadow licenses its technology to can makers instead, including a strategic partnership with Ball Corporation, the world's largest can maker. Victor calls licensing terrifying. It's also the only way Meadow sees to hit its 2030 targets.
We discuss:
- Why the ESG premium everyone predicted in 2022 never turned up, and what buyers pay for instead
- Why Meadow licenses its tech instead of building its own factories
- Why Meadow took industry investors who open doors, and no venture capital
- The schoolyard rule for getting a new product on shelf
- The aluminium myth that still costs Meadow partnerships "every day"
Victor's take is direct: sustainability "is the core of why we exist, but it doesn't need to be what we always talk about."
If you're a climate or circular economy founder with strong technology, real business outcomes and brands that love you but haven't launched, this conversation is full of specific, hard-won lessons on licensing models, selling to global CPGs, and leading with value instead of the sustainability story.
Most energy companies buy their customers with ad spend. Public Grid fixed a task everyone hates instead: setting up your electricity account.
Joe Robbins is co-founder and COO of Public Grid. When residents move in, Public Grid sets up their electricity account in about 3 minutes, then moves them onto programs that lower their bill and their emissions. The utilities keep the grid running. Public Grid handles the customer experience they don't.
The wedge was distribution. Public Grid tried B2C, then doubled down on B2B2C: it sits on the move-in checklist at large multifamily buildings, and that channel now brings in 99.99% of its customers. Getting there meant almost no marketing, a board of advisors paid in small amounts of equity for warm introductions, and 2 years of slow enterprise deals.
We discuss:
- Why most energy companies throw ad dollars at acquisition, and what Public Grid did instead
- Why Public Grid gave away equity for introductions (and why it still took 2 years)
- Why a clear no from a big prospect is worth as much as a yes
- The 3 levers that get a landlord to say yes, including reporting that's "window dressing they have to do"
- Why checking your marketing monthly is far too slow
Joe's take: "Let's just solve a real life problem they have. Often the monetary value isn't as high as some people like to think it is."
If you're an energy, prop tech or climate founder trying to reach end customers through a slow, legacy industry, this conversation is full of specific, hard-won lessons on partner-led distribution, selling to enterprise buyers, and giving every stakeholder their own reason to say yes.
Michael Newton spent 15 years at Nike watching startups pitch new materials and fail. Now he's the one pitching.
Michael is CEO of Qorium, which grows real leather from cow cells in weeks instead of the 2 years it takes to raise a cow. Qorium doesn't call it a leather alternative. It's leather, made in precise uniform sheets that cut waste, and priced to compete in the top third of a 100 billion euro market.
The interesting part is how Qorium sells it. Michael helped build Nike's innovation department, so he knows what the buying side sees. Qorium shortlisted almost 100 luxury brands against clear criteria, built warm introductions, and treats fewer than 10 committed partners as a huge win. Its first public product with a major brand lands in 2027.
We discuss:
- Why there's no green premium, and what Qorium sells on instead
- Why an intro from the CEO usually goes nowhere (Michael watched it happen at Nike)
- The 3 groups you have to win inside a big brand, and why selling to 1 champion sinks materials startups
- How to tell a real "come back later" from a polite no
- What a commercial CEO sees that a scientist founder can't
Michael's take is direct: "There's no green premium out there. You have to make an incredibly beautiful, high performing product."
If you're a climate or materials founder with a better product, a long sales cycle, and big-brand partners who love you but haven't signed, this conversation is full of specific, hard-won lessons on selling into large companies, positioning past the sustainability story, and building a commercial engine around the science.
Most founders scale by hiring layers of management. Stenver Jerkku is trying to build a billion dollar company without ever building any.
Stenver is the founder of Soldera, infrastructure for global energy compliance, helping corporates and utilities navigate one of the most fragmented, old-school markets in the world. He's a serial entrepreneur who founded Soldera the same month GPT-3.5 launched, and went all in on AI from day one. Instead of hiring layers of managers as the company grows, he's staying under 30 people and giving each "star" hire a full suite of AI agents instead of a team to manage.
We discuss:
Why he's betting a $1 billion outcome on staying under 30 people, and giving every top hire an AI agent team instead of a management chain
Why AI skill is nearly worthless without taste, and how bad taste just produces "slop at scale"
Why he let go of 40% of his hires last year, and why he says he's never once regretted firing someone, only firing too slow
Why AI can do every part of enterprise sales except the actual moment of human contact, and how buyers instantly pattern-match "AI slop"
Why he validated Soldera's market with a bottle of wine before writing a line of code, and why he now refuses to trust "public domain" or investor narratives
Stenver's take is fairly straightforward: if you can't sell it yourself, why should anybody else be able to sell it?
If you're a technical founder who's brilliant at the product but avoids the sales calls, or you're weighing whether AI agents can genuinely replace headcount, this conversation is full of specific, hard-won lessons on hiring, firing, and why growth still has to start with you.
Nobody designs a product for a material made out of potato peels.
Sophie Tuviahu is CEO of Bioplasmar, which makes biodegradable materials from green waste. Before this, she worked in commercial roles at UBQ Materials. When she joined Bioplasmar, the company was selling biodegradable plant pots direct to the horticultural market, a low-end, price-sensitive category where a product costing 2 to 4 times more than standard plastic never wins on a straight comparison. Her fix wasn't a better pot. It was a different business: stop selling a product that degrades and start selling a material that does, supplied to manufacturers as an injection molding or extrusion grade compound.
We discuss:
Why the plant pot business was a trap even though the material was genuinely better
The real reason bioplastics get priced out, and it isn't the cost of the raw material
Why she thinks a good salesperson beats a conference booth almost every time
Who actually moves first on sustainable materials, and why it's rarely the brand you'd expect
How Europe's PPWR packaging regulation is about to force new demand for compostable materials, and where the opportunity sits in the supply chain
Sophie's take is direct: it is not a planting pot that degrades, it is a material that degrades, and once you find the right application, the cost difference takes care of itself.
If you're a materials or climate-tech founder pricing against an incumbent commodity, this conversation is full of specific, hard-won lessons on repositioning around your actual value, reading regulation as a demand signal, and choosing your battles in go-to-market.
Most founders protect what's working. Tom Wilford burned his own company down while it was still growing.
Tom is the founder and CEO of Ella, an AI agent for sustainability data, carbon reporting and B Corp certification. For 4 years he ran Future Proof, a working ESG software platform, before deciding at a team retreat in Prague to tear it down and rebuild it from nothing as an AI-native agent. No customer was asking for it. He made the call on instinct a year before the market caught up, and spent 2025 quietly moving every existing customer onto the new platform.
We discuss:
Tom's take? "just focus on stuff that is must-haves for businesses and not nice-to-haves."
If you're a bootstrapped climate founder trying to work out whether your product is a want or a need, this conversation is full of specific, hard-won lessons on pivoting, positioning and selling sustainability as a commercial decision, not a mission statement.
Great science doesn't guarantee a market. Nick Sandland spent years finding that out for other people, before he bet his own career on it.
In this episode of The Plucky Bamboo Podcast, Nick Sandland, the commercial lead at Algenesis Labs, talks about what it actually takes to turn deep material science into a business. Algenesis was founded by three UC San Diego professors with a genuinely novel biodegradable polyurethane and no industry experience. Nick joined to build the commercial side from nothing, including the sales pipeline, the manufacturing logistics, and the go-to-market strategy.
Nick explains why footwear became Algenesis's wedge market instead of chasing every industry that could technically use the material, and how a research paper on microplastics, published within weeks of a major New England Journal of Medicine article, unexpectedly turned an abstract sustainability pitch into something people could feel personally.
We discuss:
Why scientific credibility and commercial viability are two separate problems
Why off-take agreements aren't the safety net most founders assume
How the funding bar for materials companies has quietly risen, and what VCs actually mean when they say no
Why relying on a single manufacturing plant is a bigger risk than founders realise
Why giving away product converts faster than any pitch deck
Nick's take is straightforward: in industrial materials, there's no way to skip the adoption curve. You win the innovators and early adopters first, and everything else follows from there.
If you're commercialising deep science in a risk-averse, long-cycle industry, this conversation is full of specific, hard-won lessons on positioning, partnerships, and what actually earns trust.
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