The Problem With Preemtive War - Perspectives in Military History

January 18, 2017 - Dr. Richard Harrison

In the spring of 1941, the Red Army high command sat poised to strike the German occupied Polish hinterland in a daring push to alter the course of the Second World War. Meanwhile, the German General Staff was likewise preparing for a blitzkrieg against the Russian western territories with the final prize of Moscow itself. The Russian commanders never carried out their plan to strike the Germans, however, and the German’s treacherous onslaught sprang forth first, resulting in the devastation of much of western Russia and contributing to the final defeat of the Nazi regime. The plan to invade Poland, though never carried out, offers fascinating insight into Soviet military thinking at the highest levels in response to a rapidly changing political-military situation.  This lecture examines the forces allotted for the preemptive attack, the route of their projected advance, and the interplay of personalities among the plan's authors and Stalin. Dr. Harrison concludes with a discussion of the strategy's utility and the lingering consequences of some of its component parts during the first weeks of the war.

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