Not too tall, not too small. Among other things, it's about humility.

In deciding whether to break one's fast on Yom Kippur, as with other medical issues, the halakhah tells us to follow the counsel of experts. Except when it doesn't. In this episode we explore how the halakhah makes sure that we always err on the side of life. 

Source sheet available at www.freehofinstitute.org/learning, scroll down to The Twelve Minute Shiur.

In our last installment, we were left with the question: does Jewish law recognize that we bear a duty of patriotism? Does it oblige us to care for the country in which we live, to work for its welfare, to defend it against attack? In this shiur, we suggest a halakhic basis for patriotism, at least for citizens of democratic societies: the principle of dina d'malkhuta dina, "the law of the state is valid law," acknowledged as such by Jewish legal tradition. 

Download the source sheet at www.freehofinstitute.org/learning, scroll down to the Twelve Minute Shiur.

Is it appropriate for a synagogue to display the national flag on its bimah? Does this exalt the flag to the status of Jewish religious symbol? Does this differ from the prayers that Jews have for centuries recited for the welfare of the king/queen/government? And for that matter, does halakhah have anything to say about "patriotism," devotion to the wellbeing of one's country?

We definitely won't cover all of that in twelve minutes, but we'll make a start! Get the source sheet at www.freehofinstitute.org/learning, scroll down to The Twelve Minute Shiur.

Happy is an elephant housed at the Bronx Zoo. She was the subject of a recent court case that dealt with the question: what legal rights - if any - does an animal enjoy? And this got us thinking, naturally, about what Jewish law might have to say about the same question. Get the source sheet at www.freehofinstitute.org/learning, scroll down to The Twelve Minute Shiur. 

In our last few installments, we’ve been talking about the interplay of coercion and consent in the halakhah. In this shi`ur, we’ll take a look at the mitzvah of tz’dakah. It’s a mitzvah that, in theory, the community does not have the power to enforce. The Rabbis, however, were not satisfied with that state of affairs.

Download the source sheet at www.freehofinstitute.org/learning, scroll down to the Twelve Minute Shi`ur.

In our last two installments, we’ve seen how the concepts of “consent” and “coercion” intersect in the halakhah, particularly in the realm of business transactions. Here in shi`ur number 15 we take a look at how those concepts play out in the traditional halakhah of marriage and divorce. The ancient Rabbis were prepared to utilize coercion, both legal and physical, to rescue wives whose husbands abused the power granted them under Torah law. Would that today’s Orthodox rabbinate might find the creative thought and energy to do the same.

For the source sheet, visit www.freehofinstitute.org/learning, scroll down to the Twelve Minute Shi`ur.

"If they hang him from a tree until he agrees to sell - the sale is valid."

In our previous shiur, we saw that, according to the halakhah, a person may be coerced into giving their free-will consent (g’mirat da`at) to a binding agreement. Illogical? Unjust? Yes, but maybe realistic, too. In this episode we dig a bit deeper into the psychological, ethical, and even theological elements of this issue.

"If they hang him from a tree until he agrees to sell - the sale is valid."

That's absurd, right? Surely our freely-given consent is absolutely required before we take on a legal obligation! Well, that's what we'd like to think. But the halakhah declares that there are times when we are pressured – or coerced – into giving our “consent” to an agreement… and even so, the agreement is binding upon us. Where's the justice in that? This episode begins a series in which we consider that question, the not-always-clear line between coercion and consent.

In this episode, we read a responsum by Rabbi Yechiel Yaakov Weinberg, an eminent 20th-century Orthodox authority, on our question. Weinberg is candid enough to admit that the reformers who introduced vernacular prayer back in the 1800s had a powerful halakhic argument to support then. He indicates, as well, that the Hatam Sofer’s creative halakhic theory forbidding prayer in the vernacular (episode 3 in this series) does not really prove the reformers wrong. But he goes on to forbid the introduction of the vernacular into the synagogue service for other, non-halakhic reasons. It’s a good example of how supposedly “non-halakhic” considerations often influence the way that rabbis read the law. The question: which reading - the "reform" or the "orthodox" - is the better one?