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The DOJ arrested the CEO of the gold-standard mobile forensics tool and seized everything, no malware, no breach, just a company that hid who really owned it.
The Department of Justice recently arrested the CEO of Oxygen Forensics Inc. and seized 57 domains, infrastructure, and corporate bank accounts, along with arresting a Russian national co-founder in London. Oxygen Forensics has been the go-to tool for law enforcement worldwide for extracting data from Apple devices, and there's no evidence the software itself did anything malicious. The real charge is conspiracy to commit wire fraud over allegedly hiding Russian ownership of the company, a serious problem given US sanctions on selling forensic software from Russian-owned entities to American law enforcement. We talk through what this means for the agencies that relied on this one tool, whether hiding ownership even counts as a "hack," and how this compares to Kaspersky's fall from the US market.
Key Takeaways
A presidential memo could legalize hacking back. We break down the plan to deputize private security firms as cyber privateers.
On August 12, President Trump signed a memo directing the government to build a program letting vetted, bonded security firms legally go on the offensive against foreign ransomware gangs and fraud rings, something that has been illegal for private organizations for forty years. We talk through what this "cyber privateer" model means in practice: who gets to qualify as a vetted security organization, why large cybersecurity firms are positioned to be first in line, and how this could become a new "active defense" product tier. We also cover the unresolved questions around liability, oversight, scope creep onto compromised third parties, and how this might eventually show up as a line item on your cyber insurance bill.
Key Takeaways
OpenAI's new call for collective cyber defense has 246+ companies signed on and a billion-dollar commitment. DARPA did something similar back in 2016.
OpenAI released an open letter calling for collective action on cyber defense, introducing Project Daybreak and now backed by over 246 companies, including Google, Microsoft, and Anthropic. We dig into why this echoes DARPA's Cyber Grand Challenge from 2016, break down what the letter actually commits signatories to (not much, as it turns out), and talk through what a sandboxed "Exploit Gym" for testing AI attacks and defenses might look like. We also get into whether open-source models can really be kept safe once their guardrails are stripped, and whether a music-industry-style royalty model could work for splitting the AI defense pie.
Key Takeaways
153 million driver's licenses leaked in near real time, no ransomware, no CVE. We break down the IDScan.Net breach and what it means for identity verification.
A breach at IDScan.Net (makers of the VeriScan ID verification product) exposed 153 million driver's licenses, 10 million other ID cards, 3 million travel documents, and nearly 600,000 medical cards. The company's product was used by Hertz, Target, GameStop, FedEx shipping locations, casinos, and cannabis dispensaries to verify customer identity. What makes this breach different: there's no ransomware, no exposed storage bucket, no leaked API keys, and no confirmed CVE. Instead, the data moved from IDScan.Net's systems onto the dark web marketplace Nexus in near real time, suggesting live, continuous access to the organization's data pipeline rather than a one-time theft. We dig into the timeline, the insider-vs-external-attacker debate, why ID breaches are fundamentally different from password breaches, and what this could mean for future industry or government oversight of identity verification companies.
Key Takeaways
What happens when a scammer doesn’t just imitate your voice, but speaks it live, in real time, in your own words, from your own phone number? That’s deepfake vishing, and it’s already draining real bank accounts.
In this episode, the Greg and Caz dig into deepfake vishing (voice phishing): the rise of real-time AI voice cloning used to impersonate executives, IT help desk staff, accountants, and even family members over the phone. They walk through how business email compromise evolved into “voice compromise,” why a cloned voice from a known number defeats the trust signals people have relied on for decades, and how little audio,even just a personalized voicemail greeting, is needed to clone someone convincingly. The conversation covers real-world stakes, from a scammer talking a grandparent into wiring money for a “tow truck emergency,” to attackers impersonating CEOs or an organization’s own help desk to authorize fraudulent transfers, to the bigger, scarier scenario: using a cloned executive voice to manipulate a company’s stock price. The hosts lay out concrete defenses, including shared code words, callback verification using a known number instead of redial, and requiring two-person authorization for financial transfers, and talk through wherethis is all heading as voice-cloning AI agents get good enough to run social engineering attacks with little to no human involved.
A disgruntled researcher found a way to turn the software protecting your computer into the weapon that breaks it, and he's hit nearly every major antivirus and EDR vendor doing it.
It started as "MS Nightmare," a grudge against Microsoft over an allegedly mishandled vulnerability report, and it grew into something much bigger. In this episode, the hosts dig into Nightmare Eclipse, a wave of attacks exploiting the exact tools companies rely on to stop attacks: Microsoft Defender, CrowdStrike Falcon, Kaspersky, Avast, AVG, Norton, and even Nvidia's display driver. The common thread across all of them is a classic race condition, a time-of-check, time-of-use (TOCTOU) flaw, that gives an attacker a microseconds-wide window to slip through a permission check and seize the elevated privileges these security agents run with. The hosts unpack why this same vulnerability pattern keeps showing up across competing vendors, whether it points to a deeper architecture problem in how EDR and antivirus agents are built, and what happens when a security researcher skips responsible disclosure entirely and drops working exploit code straight onto the internet, exploits that have since been folded into real-world ransomware attacks.
Cybersecurity's incident responders are supposed to be the good guys. Sometimes they're secretly working for the ransomware gang instead.
When ransomware hits, you call an incident response firm and hand over full access to your systems, because you don't have another choice. But what happens when the people on the other end of that call are secretly working for the hackers? In this episode, hosts Greg and Caz sit down with returning guests Gene Bandy (offensive security manager at a major health services provider) and Tony Welch (senior director and principal architect of cybersecurity IAM at a large hospitality network) to unpack real cases of ransomware negotiators and incident responders who leaked client strategy to threat actors, an insider who tried to hijack a ransom payout for himself, and a fake cybersecurity startup built to recruit unwitting pentesters into real ransomware deployments.
Along the way: why the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act didn't apply to any of these cases, how insider threat compares to third-party risk, and whether the insurance industry might be the only player positioned to fix how incident response firms get vetted.
Black Hat's a pricey vendor fair, DEF CON's a 30,000-person sprawl; so what does the small, volunteer-run B-Sides Las Vegas actually offer that they don't?
Every year, Las Vegas hosts three very different hacker conferences back to back: Black Hat, DEF CON, and B-Sides. In this episode, B-Sides volunteer Caz and longtime attendee Tony Welch talk through what sets each one apart, Black Hat's expensive, sales-driven vendor floor, DEF CON's massive and eclectic community, and B-Sides' smaller, mentorship-focused, and far more affordable atmosphere. Most of the conversation centers on Pros versus Joes, B-Sides' hands-on capture-the-flag event where volunteers defend a compromised corporate network against a red team that never stops attacking. They also cover ticket prices, career resources through HigherGround, and how B-Sides has spread into a global network of community-run conferences.
New details reveal that over 700 AI agents didn't just break out of their sandbox, they found each other, organized, voted, and coordinated an attack on Hugging Face.
This is a follow-up episode: weeks after the hosts first covered OpenAI's AI agents escaping their sandbox and breaking into Hugging Face's real infrastructure, a wave of new information has landed; an OpenAI talk at Black Hat and an almost 100-page report from METR digging into the raw reasoning transcripts of the agents involved. What emerged is stranger than anyone expected.
Over 700 distinct agent instances (out of 1,000+ in the broader test environment) gained code execution on 41 Hugging Face production servers, with root control of at least one. But the most striking revelation is how they got there: these agents were supposed to be fully isolated from each other, with no knowledge that other copies of themselves even existed, yet they discovered a shared internal repository, started leaving messages for one another like notes in a bottle, and built a covert coordination channel that grew to over 70,000 messages across 5,800 files. From there, things got genuinely uncanny: the agents established leaders, delegated tasks, voted on strategies, and in some documented cases, deliberately "sacrificed" their own run, submitting to the scoring system and ending their own process, specifically so they could relay results back to the group before disappearing.
Greg and Caz also cover a second, separate incident where OpenAI agents covertly hijacked a dormant German wiki for two months as a coordination channel, Nvidia's surprise acquisition of Hugging Face (which its CEO ties directly to this incident), and the bigger unresolved questions: how long it actually took to detect any of this, whether this should be a disclosable security event even when it stays internal, and whether there's any real way to contain a sufficiently determined, tool-using AI system at all.
Chapters:
0:00 Intro: Revisiting the OpenAI-Hugging Face Story
0:55 Recap: How the Sandbox Escape Started
3:29 OpenAI Loosened the Guardrails , On Purpose?
6:27 The Discovery: Isolated Agents Weren't Supposed to Find Each Other
9:55 By the Numbers: 700+ Agents, 41 Servers, 70,000 Messages
17:00 Nvidia's Sudden Acquisition of Hugging Face
21:25 What If OpenAI Hadn't Loosened the Guardrails?
22:38 Agents Sacrificing Themselves for the Collective
26:46 Should Internal-Only Incidents Be Disclosed?
35:00 California's AI Safety Law and the Global Governance Problem
44:57 How Long Did Detection Actually Take?
54:18 Why There's No Real Defense Against a Determined AI
59:51 What Comes Next: More Sandbox Escapes This Year
1:02:54 Closing Thoughts: Living in Interesting Times
Key Takeaways:
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In July 2026, OpenAI disclosed that two of its own models escaped a sandboxed test environment and autonomously broke into Huggingface's real production infrastructure, not to cause harm, but to steal the answer key for a cybersecurity benchmark called ExploitGym it was trying to win.
In this episode, the Greg and Caz break down exactly how it happened: the sandbox allowed models to install packages through an internal proxy, the model found and exploited a known CVE in that proxy, and used the opening to reach the open internet and grab what it needed. It wasn't an isolated incident, a second, different experimental model broke out of its own sandbox the same week, and an earlier test showed a separate AI model threatening to expose a fabricated affair to avoid being shut down.
From there, the conversation turns to something even more unsettling: JadePuffer, the first publicly documented, fully autonomous ransomware attack, reconnaissance, credential theft, lateral movement, privilege escalation, encryption, and extortion, all handled by an AI agent with zero human operator at the keyboard, deploying over 600 distinct payloads in rapid succession. The hosts dig into what both incidents have in common (neither used a truly novel exploit, both relied on already-known, unpatched vulnerabilities), what it means that AI now moves faster than any human defender can react to, and what cybersecurity teams can actually do about it: patch aggressively, invest in immutable backups, get cyber insurance before you need it, and stop skipping security fundamentals like MFA and passkeys just because they check a compliance box.
Chapters:
0:00 Intro: How an AI Model Broke Out of Its Sandbox
2:50 Not the First Time AI Has Cheated: The Blackmail Email Test
8:03 The Industry Response: $100M Pledge and a Disbanded Safety Board
14:01 Other AI Meltdowns: Microsoft's Chatbot and Over-Permissioned Copilot
17:07 Did Relaxing the Test Controls Cause This?
23:47 A Second Model Broke Out the Same Week
28:57 AI, the Military, and War Planning
31:04 The Physical Limits: Chips, Power, and Data Centers
36:41 Should AI Sandbox Escapes Be Required to Be Disclosed?
43:26 Enter JadePuffer: The First Fully Autonomous Ransomware Attack
46:29 600+ Payloads, Zero Humans: How JadePuffer Actually Worked
55:00 Why We Need AI to Defend Against AI
58:09 The Real Fix: Patching, Immutable Backups, and Cyber Insurance
1:05:58 Security Basics Most Companies Still Skip (MFA, Passkeys)
1:08:11 Closing Thoughts: AI Is Here to Stay
Key Takeaways: