Explore zombieland with Philip Goff and I as we discuss type-b physicalism, the link between conceivability and possibility, Goff’s differences with David Chalmers, and much else related to the conceivability argument against materialism.

First Zombie Argument Video

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Ralph Stefan Weir joins me to discuss his book, The Mind-Body Problem and Metaphysics: An Argument from Consciousness to Mental Substance. We talk about the myth of the interaction problem, the connection between theism and the soul, the implausibility of property dualism, substance dualism in Eastern thought, the causal closure argument and energy conservation, a posteriori necessities, modal rationalism, panpsychism and idealism, personal identity, transhumanism, mind-uploading, split brain cases, whether souls are eternal, and much else. 

Dustin Crummett's interview with Dr. Weir

. . .

For reference, here are the two arguments from the book we spent the most time on:

(i) The phenomenal facts do not a priori entail the existence of anything physical.

(ii) If the phenomenal facts do not a priori entail the existence of anything physical, then they do not necessitate the existence of anything physical.

(iii) Therefore, the phenomenal facts do not necessitate the existence of anything physical.

(i) If you accept the conceivability argument, you must accept the phenomenal disembodiment argument.

(ii) If you accept the phenomenal disembodiment argument, then you must accept the existence of nonphysical substances.

(iii) Therefore, if you accept the conceivability argument, then you must accept the existence of nonphysical substances.

. . .

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I am once again begging apologists to stop treating atheism and materialism as interchangeable concepts. It's intellectual laziness at best and dishonesty at worst.

This was originally a short video posted on my youtube channel.

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Today, we explore the privacy of consciousness, a feature of the mind rejected by qualia antirealists. 

(summary of the arguments begins at 43:45) 

A few of the papers and books referenced:

Is Mental Privacy Defensible? Jaffer Ahmed

Explaining Mental Privacy - Colin McGinn

Other minds are neither seen nor inferred - Mason Westfall 

Understanding Knowledge - Michael Huemer

Illusionism As A Theory of Consciousness 

Galileo's Error - Philip Goff

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Today we discuss three skeptical arguments from Wang Chong, a first-century Chinese philosopher who railed against the belief in ghosts. Although the skeptics who initially presented these arguments to me seemed to think they were decisive, I was unimpressed and wanted to explain why I think they miss the center of the spectral target. 

As summarized on Wang’s IEP entry: 

(1) Argument from physical shape:  The death of a person is the result of the body losing the animating qi (vital essence), and once the qi is separated from the body, the body decays.  All will admit to this.  If this is so, however, and the person’s qi is still existent, how can this qi itself manifest in the form of a physical shape?  It is not a body, it is qi.  But when one sees a ghost, one sees a body.  But if the person has died, they no longer have a body, so where could they get another one?  They cannot take over another living body, which will already possess its own qi.  Thus, the view that people when they die become ghosts is nonsensical. 

(2) Argument from population:  If people become ghosts when they die, there should be more ghost sightings than living people, as the number of people who have lived in the past and died is far greater than the number of people now living.  This is not true — ghost “sightings” are rare.  Thus it cannot be that people when they die become ghosts.

(3) Argument from ghostly efficacy:  If a living person is harmed, this person will immediately go to a magistrate and bring a case against the party who harmed them.  If it were the case that people become ghosts when they die and can interact with living humans, every ghostly murder victim would be seen going to a magistrate, telling him the name of the killer and the means of murder, leading him to the body, and so forth.  This is never witnessed (ever). 

Wang Chong - IEP 

Philosophy on the Fringes - Ghosts and Hauntings 

Dale Allison Interview - Encountering Mystery 

Greenbrier Ghost - Jimmy Akin’s Mysterious World 

Twitter thread where I first encountered Wang Chong

Music for this episode was performed by yours truly (except the drums).

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Today we discuss Mary the color scientist, her cousin Fred, and a colorblind Norwegian neuroscientist. Specifically, we talk about why Philip Goff thinks "phenomenal curiosity" threatens the ability hypothesis and the phenomenal concept strategy, ruling out moderate forms of physicalism. 

Curiosity and the Knowledge Argument - Philip Goff

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We discuss Philip Goff’s conversion, the online reaction to it, and what his “heretical Christianity” involves. Is he a real Christian? What does he think about the resurrection, the ascension, the miracles of Christ, the virgin birth, the trinity, inerrantism, the atonement, and God’s nature? 

Amos Wollen - Conversion Review: Christianity gains a new smart person 

Randal Rauser on Goff’s Conversion 

Nathan Ormond (DigitalGnosis)- Philosopher CONVERTS to Christianity 

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I give three reasons why panpsychism typically strikes us as counterintuitive, and why we shouldn't credit our innate bias against it. 

David Papineau: Physicalists who find panpsychism counterintuitive haven’t truly freed themselves from dualist thinking 

Jonathan Birch on overconfidence about sentience

This episode was available early to supporters at patreon.com/waldenpod

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Today we continue our exploration of the conceivability argument, covering the best response in the physicalist arsenal, and why it doesn't help physicalists escape the hoard of zombies in the end.

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Today we discuss David Chalmers' conceivability argument against physicalism: the zombie argument.

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