This episode is about two key communications from Warren E. Buffett during 1970 and early 1971: a detailed annual report for Berkshire Hathaway Inc. and a separate instructive letter to his limited partners. The Berkshire Hathaway report highlights the company’s mixed 1970 performance, noting that excellent investment returns from Insurance Operations and record profits from Banking Operations offset the struggles and near break-even results of the core Textile Operations. This corporate overview also addresses new federal legislation affecting its status as a "one-bank holding company," which would require eventual divestiture of either the bank or non-banking assets. In contrast, the separate letter to the partners of Buffett Partnership, Ltd. functions as an extensive tutorial on the complexities of investing in tax-free municipal bonds. Buffett uses the letter to explain the mechanics of purchasing bearer bonds, analyze the impact of various tax laws, and strongly recommend specific long-term, non-callable bond categories, while warning against issues with poor marketability or unfair call provisions.

This episode is about four letters from Warren E. Buffett to his Buffett Partnership, Ltd. (BPL) partners in 1969, detailing his decision and plan for the liquidation and dissolution of the partnership by year-end. Buffett explains that the changing investing environment—characterized by a scarcity of undervalued opportunities and an increasingly short-term, speculative market—no longer suits his methods, and that he wishes to retire from the competitive pressure of constantly outperforming investment benchmarks. The correspondence outlines the complex distribution of assets, which includes a cash payout, and the proportional sharing of interests in the controlled companies Berkshire Hathaway Inc. and Diversified Retailing Company Inc. He also strongly recommends Bill Ruane as an alternative money manager for partners who require ongoing investment guidance and offers his candid analysis on the modest expected returns for professional equity management versus passive bond investments over the coming decade.

These sources are excerpts from two letters written by Warren E. Buffett to the limited partners of Buffett Partnership, Ltd. (BPL), summarizing the partnership’s investment performance during 1968. The July 11, 1968 letter reports an "unusually good" 16.0% gain for the first half of the year, significantly outperforming the Dow-Jones Industrial Average's 0.9% gain, though Buffett cautions against unwarranted excitement due to concentrated investments. The second letter, dated January 22, 1969, details the full year's spectacular success, achieving an overall gain of 58.8% against the Dow's 7.7%, attributing the extraordinary result to one "simple but sound idea" within the Generals–Private Owner category. Both communications include extensive tables comparing BPL’s historical results and annual compounded rates of return against the Dow and various major investment funds, highlighting BPL's consistent superiority. Buffett also expresses growing concern about the "chain-letter type stock-promotion vogue" prevalent in the market, noting that this mania creates both opportunities and challenges for finding fundamentally attractive investments.

This episode is about Buffett Partnership, Ltd. (BPL) correspondence document the firm's performance and strategic changes throughout 1967. The first letter, from July, reports a strong first-half performance for BPL, significantly outpacing the Dow Jones Industrial Average, although it notes challenges within controlled companies like Berkshire Hathaway's textile business. The October letter, which Warren Buffett considered essential for partners to review before committing to 1968, announces a fundamental shift: a reduction in future investment goals from ten percentage points over the Dow to the lesser of 9% or a five-percentage-point advantage over the Dow. Buffett attributes this change to a difficult market environment, the rise of speculation, the increased size of BPL's capital, and his own desire for a less compulsive approach to superior returns. Finally, the January 1968 letter confirms BPL’s overall superior performance in 1967, achieving 35.9% compared to the Dow's 19.0%, but notes that this success was primarily driven by the "Generals - Relatively Undervalued" category, as both "Workout" and controlled companies underperformed, reinforcing the need for the newly moderated objectives.

This episode is about letters from Warren Buffett of Buffett Partnership, Ltd. (BPL) to his partners, detailing the partnership’s investment performance and philosophy during 1966 and the first decade of operation. The July 1966 letter provides an interim performance report, noting the Dow's decline in the first half of the year while the partnership achieved an "abnormal" gain of 8.2%, and discusses the acquisition of Hochschild, Kohn & Co., a privately owned department store. The January 1967 letter reviews the full 1966 performance and the first decade of BPL, highlighting that BPL vastly outperformed the Dow and major investment funds, while also explaining the decreasing availability of attractive investment opportunities and reaffirming his commitment to a disciplined, long-term valuation-based approach rather than market forecasting. Both letters include detailed tables comparing BPL’s results against the Dow-Jones Industrial Average and various investment companies.

This episode is about letters by Warren E. Buffett to his partners at Buffett Partnership, Ltd. (BPL) detail the firm's financial performance and operational philosophy during 1965. The letters demonstrate BPL’s significant outperformance against the Dow Jones Industrial Average and major investment companies, with the Partnership Results showing a cumulative compounded annual rate of 29.8% compared to the Dow's 11.4% through 1965. Buffett discusses the strategic acquisition of a controlling interest in Berkshire Hathaway Inc. and explains the firm's unconventional but successful approach to low diversification, stating a willingness to invest up to 40% of capital in a single security. He also addresses administrative matters, such as the policies for advance payments and withdrawals and the decision to limit the admission of new partners due to concerns that increased size could harm future results. Finally, the letters emphasize the importance of using the Dow as a long-term yardstick for measuring investment management effectiveness.

These excerpts from letters to partners of Buffett Partnership, Ltd. (BPL) summarize the firm's financial performance and investment philosophy during 1964. The mid-year report notes performance generally aligned with the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (DOW) during an advancing market, while the year-end report confirms BPL significantly outperformed the DOW and several large investment companies, although the margin of superiority was the smallest since 1959. Warren Buffett consistently emphasizes the importance of objective performance measurement against the DOW and criticizes the poor results of highly-paid professional management in the broader investment company industry. The year-end letter also introduces a revised four-category framework for BPL's investment operations and discusses the firm's approach to taxes and conservatism, stressing that minimizing taxes is secondary to maximizing after-tax compound rate.

These source excerpts, taken from Buffett Partnership, Ltd. letters spanning 1963 and early 1964, detail the partnership's strong investment performance, particularly in 1963 when it significantly outperformed the Dow Jones Industrial Average and major investment companies. The communications emphasize the partnership's investment philosophy, which categorizes holdings into Generals, Workouts, and Controls, and stresses that short-term results are secondary to achieving superior long-term compounding rates with less risk compared to conventional investment media. A major success story highlighted is the turnaround and eventual sale of Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company, facilitated by manager Harry Bottle, which illustrates the effectiveness of their Control category investing. The letters also include administrative details for partners regarding taxes, withdrawals, and future commitments, while cautioning that their exceptional margin of outperformance in recent years is not sustainable indefinitely.

These sources are excerpts from partnership letters by Warren E. Buffett for Buffett Partnership, Ltd., dated between July 1962 and January 1963, detailing the firm's investment philosophy and performance. The letters emphasize that the partnership's success is measured by its advantage over the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (Dow), particularly in declining or static markets, and not by absolute yearly gains. Buffett outlines his investment categories—"generals" (undervalued securities), "work-outs" (event-driven situations), and "control" situations—explaining that work-outs, such as the successful turnaround of Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company in 1962, provided a significant performance edge when the Dow declined. Furthermore, the letters reiterate core ground rules for partners, stressing that no rate of return is guaranteed, and that performance should be judged over a minimum of three to five years, rather than short-term fluctuations.

These sources consist of two letters from Warren E. Buffett to his partners in Buffett Partnership, Ltd., detailing the fund's operations and financial performance in the early 1960s. The first letter, dated July 1961, announces the shift to a semi-annual correspondence and outlines extensive proposed changes to merge all existing partnerships into a single entity with a revised profit-sharing structure. The second letter, written in January 1962, reviews the partnership's impressive 1961 performance, showcasing substantial gains well above the Dow-Jones Industrial Average. This later communication also thoroughly explains the partnership's investment strategy—categorized as "generals," "work-outs," and "control" situations—and justifies using the Dow as a benchmark for performance while discussing the impact of increasing fund size.