The UAE didn’t stabilise Yemen — it entrenched fragmentation and turned a war into a permanent Red Sea problem. Right, so there is supposedly a ceasefire in place between Israel and Gaza, though Israel has breached it repeatedly, which already tells you how stable that claim is. Nevertheless, the Houthis have paused attacks on Israel and shipping, not because they can’t act, but because that ceasefire, however narrowly you define it, now governs the moment. The part people are missing is what is happening around that pause. Yemen is no longer being treated as a country that sets terms at the Bab el-Mandeb bottleneck to the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia has decided to exit, the south is being allowed to fragment as a result, the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council is moving in, and external powers are managing the coast instead of rebuilding the state beside it. And once you look at the structure that creates, Israel doesn’t need to direct any of this to benefit from it. A Red Sea without a unified Yemeni gatekeeper is a Red Sea where Israeli access and leverage improve by default. Add Israel’s recognition of Somaliland on the opposite shore, and you no longer have instability at a chokepoint — you have a Red Sea being reorganised around access without a unified state on either side to block it. Right, so I’m going to start where most coverage doesn’t, because starting in Yemen now misses the point. The strategic story here begins at the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the narrow maritime bottleneck linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, a piece of water that carries a significant share of global shipping and energy transit and has always mattered precisely because whoever controls access there doesn’t need to control much else. For decades, Yemen mattered in that equation because it existed as a sovereign state with territorial authority on one side of the strait, a state capable, at least in theory, of saying yes or no to who moved through its waters and ports.