australasian posthumanities

In this podcast, Magdalena talks about how material objects in cultural memory studies question the philosophic assumptions about inanimate things and ‘lower level’ organic objects in the Aristotelian hierarchy of beings. She analyzes the nexus of materiality, plasticity and memory in the work of French philosopher and art historian Georges Didi-Huberman, with the aim of, first, contributing to explorations of the mnemonic effects and affordances of material things, and, also, of approaching collective memory from the perspective of a deconstructive engagement with some of the foundational binaries of Western philosophy: surface/depth, exterior/interior, visible/invisible and malleable/rigid. 

More information about the Australasian Post-Humanities at aposthumanities.org.

What is the "posthumanities?" Taking a pragmatic approach to the posthumanities, Stephen's seminar engages with the work of Rosi Braidotti, Isabelle Stengers, Bruno Latour and Lesley Green in order to glean some methodological principles in this wide-ranging field. Stephen asks what the posthumanities makes it possible to do that we couldn’t do so well before, and what kinds of practical problems the field can address.

More information about the Australasian Post-Humanities at aposthumanities.org.

Andrew shows that algorithmic modes of thought have long and problematic histories of collusion in processes of governmentality, dating at least back to the Atlantic slave trade and including the othering of neurodiverse, black and indigenous, and queer cultures. Beyond their instrumentation within systems of power, he proposes that at the foundation level of algorithmic design there are a series of assumptions about what constitutes legitimate thought processes. These assumptions are based on neurotypical modes of thought and often ignore the possibilities of more neurodiverse thinking, which is regularly devalued in our society. This naturalised “whiteness” that lies at the centre of and colonises algorithmic programming needs to be interrogated and rethought, he argues, in order to break the relationships between algorithms and oppressive power systems.  The talk also includes brief discussion of the artwork Collective Fabulations: Propositions for Social Dreaming, the author’s collaborative project with Canadian artist-philosopher Erin Manning, exploring the concept of an analgorithmic mode of thought proposed in the paper.

More information about the Australasian Post-Humanities at aposthumanities.org.

Tracy asks, 'Do one's abdominal organs "belong" to oneself?' In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari refer to the Body Without Organs - a mysterious and confounding concept. Interestingly, they're careful to explain they have nothing against organs; it's the assemblage that is the problem, because assemblages tend to concentrate or enact power. In my novel, working title The Pouch of Douglas*, the affected organs in a cancerous human body tell us about their own lives and trials. It is a cancer memoir with a difference: the "romantically suffering" human subject is radically decentered; she is glimpsed only ​indirectly, as a character offstage in this drama, or perhaps as venue for the drama.

More information about the Australasian Post-Humanities at aposthumanities.org.

As Dinesh argues, existentialism is no Humanism; that is, no forms of Humanism can be properly existentialist. Sartre’s idea of free will cannot be denied to non-human animals (henceforth simply labelled animals), because like humans, animals undertake projects and make choices throughout their lives. And it cannot be logically or empirically argued, without uncertainty, that animals are only mechanical automata; if humans can be argued, with certainty, to be free via the experienced structures of our consciousness. Consciousness is common to all living beings that undertake projects throughout their lives. Therefore, the freedom of consciousness must also be common to all living beings: not just humans, but all animals including insects. 

More information about the Australasian Post-Humanities at aposthumanities.org.

As Maddy explores, shame is the psychological desire to be socially connected and understood, and its fulfillment is essential to our wellbeing and flourishing, while its neglect leads to psychological and moral damage. Invoking the eudaemonistic framework of (neo-Aristotelian) virtue ethics, she argues that the practice of shaming cannot therefore ever be ethically justified. From this it follows that the most ethically desirable reaction one can have to shame is one which best allows them to resist or overcome the emotion. To this end, Maddy analyses two common responses to shame, compliance and anger, proposing an alternative: the practice of emotional vulnerability.

More information about the Australasian Post-Humanities at aposthumanities.org.

Tracy asks, 'Do one's abdominal organs "belong" to oneself?' In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari refer to the Body Without Organs - a mysterious and confounding concept. Interestingly, they're careful to explain they have nothing against organs; it's the assemblage that is the problem, because assemblages tend to concentrate or enact power. In my novel, working title The Pouch of Douglas*, the affected organs in a cancerous human body tell us about their own lives and trials. It is a cancer memoir with a difference: the "romantically suffering" human subject is radically decentered; she is glimpsed only ​indirectly, as a character offstage in this drama, or perhaps as venue for the drama.

As Dinesh argues, existentialism is no Humanism; that is, no forms of Humanism can be properly existentialist. Sartre’s idea of free will cannot be denied to non-human animals (henceforth simply labelled animals), because like humans, animals undertake projects and make choices throughout their lives. And it cannot be logically or empirically argued, without uncertainty, that animals are only mechanical automata; if humans can be argued, with certainty, to be free via the experienced structures of our consciousness. Consciousness is common to all living beings that undertake projects throughout their lives. Therefore, the freedom of consciousness must also be common to all living beings: not just humans, but all animals including insects. 

This episode offers a brief summary of the Australasian Post-Humanities seminar series, and details how you can get involved. For more information, see: https://linktr.ee/aphseminars